Adversarial Collaboration Contest 2019

[self plagiarism notice: this is mostly copied from last year’s contest announcement]

1. Announcing the second annual Adversarial Collaboration Contest

An adversarial collaboration is an effort by two people with opposing opinions on a topic to collaborate on a summary of the evidence. Just as we hope that a trial with both prosecutor and defense will give the jury a balanced view of the evidence for and against a suspect, so we hope an adversarial collaboration will give readers a balanced view of evidence for and against some thesis. It’s typically done for scientific papers, but I’m excited about the possibility of people applying the concept to to less formal writeups as well.

For example, a pro-gun activist might collaborate with an anti-gun activist to write a joint article on the evidence for whether gun control saves lives. We trust each person to make sure the best evidence for their respective side is included. We also trust that they’ll fact-check each other and make sure there aren’t any errors or falsehoods in the final document. There might be a lot of debating, but it will happen on high-bandwidth informal channels behind the scenes and nobody will feel like they have tailor their debating to sounding good for an audience.

Last year, SSC held an adversarial collaboration contest. You can see the entries here:

1. Does The Education System Adequately Serve Advanced Students?

2. Should Transgender Children Transition?

3. Should Childhood Vaccination Be Mandatory?

4. Are Islam And Liberal Democracy Compatible?

I want to repeat the contest this year. Prize money depends how many people enter (see terms below) but will probably be around $2500 (thanks to people who support this blog on Patreon). All entries that meet a minimum level of quality will also be published on SSC.

2. How To Form A Team

Setting up teams was chaotic last year, so I’m going to try to be more organized about it. If you want to participate, please post a top-level comment on this post saying the topic you’re interested in, your position on it, any other relevant information, and an email that would-be-partners can contact you at. Make the comment in bold so that it stands out against the background of people idly discussing things. For example:

Hi, I want a partner for a collaboration on whether the moon is made of green cheese (I think yes). I am an astrogastronomy PhD student and would prefer to work with someone else who has at least degree-level knowledge in the field. Email me at fake[at]example[dot]com

If you’re interested in someone else’s topic, please send them an email. Don’t reply to their comment, since a) the person might not see it, b) it might discourage other people from replying, and the proposer might want to get contacted by more prospective partners so they can see who would be the best. Once two people have agreed to be a team, the person with the top-level comment can edit it to clarify they’re not interested in taking more offers.

Once two people have agreed to be a team, please email me, scott[at]slatestarcodex[dot]com, with your names and the topic you’re working on.

3. Terms And Conditions

1. You should write an essay summarizing your joint summary of the evidence regarding a controversial topic you disagree on. Strongly recommend that this be a single factual issue, like “Does gun control save lives on net?”, rather than a vaguer moral question like “Guns – good or bad?”, though it can still be a pretty broad topic – I would love to see people write about Caplan’s case against education, for example. Even though most of the examples here are political, this doesn’t have to be; it could involve controversial topics in medicine, history, religion, et cetera.

2. You will write the essay as a united front. Please don’t write “Alice says this study proves guns save lives, but Bob says it’s wrong and this other study proves guns are bad.” Instead you are going to have to come to an agreement on how to describe each study. For example “Here is a study purporting to show that guns save lives. It seems to accurately describe what is going on in rural areas, but it might be of limited applicability elsewhere.”

3. You will come to at least some sort of unified conclusion, even if that conclusion is “There’s not enough evidence in this field to be sure either way and we should default to our priors/biases”.

4. The essay should be similar in length, tone, and amount-of-research to one of my Much More Than You Wanted To Know essays, eg here and here.

5. By entering the contest, you are giving me permission to publish your essay on SSC (with full attribution to you, of course). You can also publish it wherever else you want. I will probably publish the winning essay, and I might or might not publish the others depending on how good they are.

6. Because of (5), please don’t research any topic that I would not be able to publish on SSC if you came to a taboo conclusion. If you want to do an adversarial collaboration on taboo topics, you can feel free to arrange it in the comments, but it won’t be considered an official entry, it won’t be eligible for prizes, and I probably won’t post it (I might link it if it’s posted somewhere else). If you’re wondering whether a specific topic is taboo, you can ask.

7. Due date is November 1.

8. I won’t hold the contest if fewer than five teams sign up. That’s “sign up”, not “complete their collaboration”; I realize many teams will drop out. I’ll let you know if I’m holding the contest or not within a week or two, before you waste too much time on it.

9. If I hold the contest at all, I’ll disburse $1000 in prize money. If there are at least four complete eligible entries, I’ll disburse $2500 in prize money. If there are at least ten, $5000. More then ten, I don’t know, but I’ll try to make it worth your time.

10. I’ll give the winning entry somewhere between 50-100% of the total prize money. If I don’t give it 100%, the rest will go to second place, third place, etc. I haven’t decided how/whether I will do this and it depends on how good the individual entries are.

11. If you win, I will pay through PayPal or online donations to the charity of your choice.

12. Winner will be determined by poll of SSC readers, plus my vote counting for 10 percentage points in the poll.

13. I reserve the right to change these conditions in minor ways that don’t significantly inconvenience contest participants.

14. I’ll give an update on the next visible Open Thread.

Book Review: The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test

Ken Kesey, graduating college in Oregon with several wrestling championships and a creative writing degree, made a classic mistake: he moved to the San Francisco Bay Area to find himself. He rented a house in Palo Alto (this was the 1950s, when normal people could have houses in Palo Alto) and settled down to write the Great American Novel.

To make ends meet, he got a job as an orderly at the local psych hospital. He also ran across some nice people called “MKULTRA” who offered him extra money to test chemicals for them. As time went by, he found himself more and more disillusioned with the hospital job, finding his employers clueless and abusive. But the MKULTRA job was going great! In particular, one of the chemicals, “LSD”, really helped get his creative juices flowing. He leveraged all of this into his Great American Novel, One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest, and became rich and famous overnight.

He got his hands on some extra LSD and started distributing it among his social scene – a mix of writers, Stanford graduate students, and aimless upper-class twenty-somethings. They all agreed: something interesting was going on here. Word spread. 1960 San Francisco was already heavily enriched for creative people who would go on to shape intellectual history; Kesey’s friend group attracted the creme of this creme. Allan Ginsberg, Hunter S. Thompson, and Wavy Gravy passed through; so did Neil Cassady (“Dean Moriarty”) Jack Keroauc’s muse from On The Road. Kesey hired a local kid and his garage band to play music at his acid parties; thus began the career of Jerry Garcia and the Grateful Dead.

Sometime in the early 1960s, too slow to notice right away, they transitioned from “social circle” to “cult”. Kesey bought a compound in the redwood forests of the Santa Cruz Mountains, an hour’s drive from SF. Beatniks, proto-hippies, and other seekers – especially really attractive women – found their way there and didn’t leave. Kesey and his band, now calling themselves “the Merry Pranksters”, accepted all comers. They passed the days making psychedelic art (realistically: spraypainting redwood trees Day-Glo yellow), and the nights taking LSD in massive group therapy sessions that melted away psychic trauma and the chains of society and revealed the true selves buried beneath (realistically: sitting around in a circle while people said how they felt about each other).

What were Kesey’s teachings? Wrong question – what are anyone’s teachings? What were Jesus’ teachings? If you really want, you can look in the Bible and find some of them, but they’re not important. Any religion’s teachings, enumerated bloodlessly, sound like a laundry list of how many gods there are and what prayers to say. The Merry Pranksters were about Kesey, just like the Apostles were about Jesus. Something about him attracted them, drew them in, passed into them like electricity. When he spoke, you might or might not remember his words, but you remembered that it was important, that Something had passed from him to you, that your life had meaning now. Would you expect a group of several dozen drug-addled intellectuals in a compound in a redwood forest to have some kind of divisions or uncertainty? They didn’t. Whenever something threatened to come up, Kesey would say —the exact right thing—-, and then everyone would realize they had been wrong to cause trouble.

But what were Kesey’s teachings? Oh, fine. He talked a lot about movies. Everyone had a movie. The cops had a cop movie, businessmen had a businessman movie, trauma victims had trauma victim movies. Everyone was just reading their script, doing what was expected of them. But with enough enlightenment (realistically: drugs), you could break out of other people’s movies – not just refusing to play the part they assigned you, but making them question the role they assigned themselves. You could rewrite your own movie, stop being an actor and take control of your own life. That woman in the picture, who put the flower in the barrel of the gun as the riot police stared her on: she was channeling Kesey. The riot police have their riot police movie, where you either back off or fight against them or do some other reasonable riot-police-related thing. If you can break out of that, just be yourself, your repetoire of possible actions expands to infinity.

There was some big New York celebration of Ken Kesey’s second novel. The Merry Pranksters decided to make a road trip out of it. They got a school bus, painted it in crazy psychedelic colors, set the destination plaque on the front to “Further”, and all crammed aboard. Neil Cassady took the wheel; everyone else got super high on drugs, dressed up in the craziest costumes they could think of, crowded around the windows and on the roof, and set out on a quest to deprogram everyone in middle America (realistically: shout at them and act crazy). For a five thousand mile round trip, they abused every drug known to man, had wild sex, played pranks (in Arizona, they pretended to be a campaign stunt for ultraconservative presidential candidate Barry Goldwater), and generally bonded. A couple of people predictably went psychotic and had to be let off at local mental hospitals, but as Kesey’s gnomic proverb went, “you’re either on the bus or off the bus”.

By the time they got back to their California compound, they had become legends. Various gurus and counterculture figures came to seek audiences with Kesey; they all left convinced that something had happened, even if they couldn’t put it into words. The Hell’s Angels, notorious for crashing hippie parties and then fucking everyone up, came to Kesey’s compound, and Kesey…somehow socially hacked them. They ended up behaving like perfect gentlemen the whole time, then left promising to play support for Kesey if he ever needed it. Kesey got invited to speak at a Unitarian meeting on the evolving counterculture. Somehow he…hacked…the Unitarians, so that all of the younger attendees (and some of the older ones) were following Keseyism and not Unitarianism by the end of the conference.

(you can make jokes about “what’s the difference?”, but I don’t know enough history to know if Unitarianism was its current ultraliberal hippieish self at the time, or how much of that is actually because of Kesey hacking their conference)

The Bay Area counterculture was going to unite for a giant anti-Vietnam rally. They were going to march on the military base! They were going to start a revolution! They invited Kesey as their speaker, and Kesey decided he would hack their movie. He repainted his bus in military camo, then covered it in swastikas. At the head of a literal battalion of military-uniformed, swastika-bearing Merry Pranksters, he marched onto stage and declared that protesting a war was much like fighting in a war, in the sense that either way you were playing the war movie. He was going to do something different. He was going to play “Home On The Range” on his harmonica on stage, for no reason, until the organizers forced him to stop. Which they couldn’t do, because he was surrounded by loyal cultists doing a pretty good army imitation. So in the midst of what was supposed to be the beginning of a violent revolution, a swastika-clad Kesey stood on stage and played “Home On The Range” on his harmonica, until everyone got confused and dispersed.

Energy started to build. Kesey couldn’t be stopped. His momentum was too strong. It was one thing after another. The Beatles started making clearly Kesey-inspired albums. All the hip people of San Francisco begged him to lead them, show them the way forward. Kesey obliged. He started holding a series of parties – first small, then gradually larger – called Acid Tests. Everyone would take LSD. But not just LSD. The LSD would be modulated, amplified a thousand times by every bit of technology and ingenuity the Merry Pranksters could dream up. Strobe lights, black lights, surround-sound, the true multimedia experience. Kesey had invented the rave. The Grateful Dead, now his official cult band, followed him everywhere. Owsley Stanley, a weird scientific prodigy who at one point was personally responsible for synthesizing the majority of the world’s LSD, became his audio guy, and invented large swathes of modern audio processing. They were doing things light-years beyond what anyone had done before, and they were doing it at scale: 6,000 people attended one 1966 Acid Test.

Finally, Caiaphas and the Pharisees decided they had seen enough. The police swooped down. LSD was legal at the time, but the Merry Pranksters were using so many other illegal drugs that it didn’t matter. Kesey was arrested on marijuana charges, potentially carrying a long prison sentence. He decided to do the same thing any reasonable person would: fake his suicide and flee to Mexico.

It went badly. The fake suicide was spotted almost immediately, because Kesey couldn’t resist writing an overly dramatic, slightly hilarious suicide note. Also, without Kesey’s stabilizing presence, the Merry Pranksters immediately fell to backstabbing and infighting. Kesey’s St. Peter figure, Ken Babbs, tried his hardest to hold everything together, but despite some victories (for example, inventing the concept of spiking Kool-Aid with LSD) it all collapsed. Everyone decided that life without Kesey wasn’t worth living, boarded their highly conspicuous psychedelic bus, and crossed the Mexican border to hunt him down. The police noticed this and sent their own agents to Mexico to hunt him down (what’s the Spanish for “did any of you see a bus painted bright rainbow colors full of screaming half-naked people pass through here recently?”). Also, somehow some hot hippie girls who were into Kesey managed to track him down, which did not bode well for his concealment from police. There followed a complicated Mexican manhunt which at one point involved Kesey jumping onto a moving train.

Finally Kesey realized: he’s in their movie. The cops-and-fugitive movie. He’s got to break out of that frame. So he dresses as a cowboy, gets on a horse, crosses the border back into America through some sort of cowboys-do-what-they-want exemption, and goes back to San Francisco. There he becomes the most public fugitive in the history of crime, speaking at various hippie events, attending various concerts, and giving interviews to the press – always disappearing just before the police arrived. His fame shoots past the stratosphere and into the Outer Empyrean.

Finally, inevitably, the police nab him. He’s still very rich from his Cuckoo’s Nest royalties, so he gets great lawyers who are able to bargain down to a minor marijuana charge. As icing on the cake, Kesey gives a speech. He says that, during his time in Mexico, he’s realized that it’s time to go “beyond LSD”. The judge is intrigued. During Kesey’s absence, hippiedom has grown from a small avante-garde to a giant movement, and become Public Enemy #1 in the eyes of the law. And here’s the Chief Hippie himself, saying what sort of sounds like “kids shouldn’t do drugs”. This is good enough for them! They let him out on bail for the one minor marijuana charge he still has going, on the condition that he preach his “beyond LSD” message to vulnerable youth.

(is it just me, or might the San Francisco legal system contain some of the stupidest people in the whole of human history?)

Kesey calls in all his favors. He rents one of the biggest concert halls in the Bay Area. He books the Grateful Dead. He calls forth the Hell’s Angels. He tells everyone – everyone to be there. He is going to tell them how to go beyond LSD and usher in the New Project. They are going to have the Acid Test Graduation, where the greatest Acid Test of all time transitions seamlessly into some grand post-LSD future that Kesey has planned.

Except – people like LSD. They like being hippies. They like taking drugs, then talking about how this is totally going to be the next stage of human evolution, man, if only the squares could see it. They like having sex with the torrent of hot women who are coming to the 1960s Bay Area to have sex with hippie guys. The famous hippie rock bands like being famous hippie rock bands. The wacky hippie philosophers like being wacky hippie philosophers. If Jesus Christ held a Second Coming in 1200 AD, and asked everyone to gather in Jerusalem for further instructions, would they go? Maybe the Pope likes being the Pope. Maybe bishops like being bishops. Maybe they don’t want to move to the next stage.

And so Kesey is betrayed. The Grateful Dead have another engagement. The concert hall is – oops – otherwise occupied. The financial backers are mysteriously low on cash. What should have been the crowning event of everything gets unceremoniously cancelled, “with no time left to start again”.

So Kesey says fuck it, he’ll do it all from an abandoned warehouse owned by the Pranksters. No music, no fancy lights, no crowds. Just whoever still holds the faith and wants to come and listen.

They come. Not everybody, but some people. The people who know. The hippest of the hip, the ones who haven’t abandoned the cause.

Kesey gets up on stage, faces all of them, and…

…just kind of rambles for an hour or two. Mumble mumble beyond LSD mumble. It doesn’t make a lot of sense.

Kenneth E. Kesey has lost the Mandate of Heaven. Maybe he left it in Mexico, during the chaos of flight. Maybe it got beaten out of him by the cops, or extracted from him in jail. Maybe it slunk away in shame when all his friends betrayed him. But it’s not there. It’s gone.

A few months later, he goes to trial on his minor marijuana charge. He gets six months in jail, about the usual punishment for a charge like that. He spends six months in jail. Then he moves back to Oregon. He lives there in relative obscurity for another thirty years, writing occasional short stories and giving occasional interviews to reporters and historians.

II.

There, I saved you from having to read Tom Wolfe’s The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test.

Tom Wolfe is as famous as they get. And the book jacket claims that EKAAT “defined a generation”. I couldn’t stand it. Wolfe is trying to do some kind of experimental fiction where he portrays the Merry Pranksters in the style of an LSD trip. But I don’t want my nonfiction novels to have the style of an LSD trip. I want them to just tell me the piece of history they’re supposed to be about. Wolfe is a great writer, journalist, and historian. When he wants to, he can draw out exactly what’s so fascinating and amazing about this incredible piece of history. But in order to get to those moments, I have to read through prose like:

EXCEPT FOR HAGEN’S GIRL, THE BEAUTY WITCH. IT SEEMS LIKE she never even gets off the bus to cop a urination. She’s sitting back in the back of the bus with nothing on, just a blanket over her lap and her legs wedged back into the corner, her and her little bare breasts, silent, looking exceedingly witch-like. Is she on the bus or off the bus? She has taken to wearing nothing but the blanket and she sheds that when she feels like it. Maybe that is her thing and she is doing her thing and wailing with it and the bus barrels on off, heading for Houston, Texas, and she becomes Stark Naked in the great movie, one moment all conked out, but with her eyes open, staring, the next laughing and coming on, a lively Stark Naked, and they are all trying to just snap their fingers to it but now she is getting looks that have nothing to do with the fact that she has not a thing on, hell, big deal, but she is now waxing extremely freaking ESP. She keeps coming up to somebody who isn’t saying a goddamn thing and looking into his eyes with the all-embracing look of total acid understanding, our brains are one brain, so let’s visit, you and I, and she says: ‘Ooooooooh, you really thinkthat, I know what you mean, but do you-u-u-u-u-u-u-u- ueeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee” — finishing off in a sailing trémulo laugh as if she has just read your brain and !t is the weirdest of the weird shit ever, your brain eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee —

STARK-NAKED
in a black blanket —
Reaching out for herself,
she woke up one morning to
find herself accosted on all
sides by

LARGE

MEN

surrounding her threatening her
with their voices, their presence, their always
desire reaching inside herself
and touching her obscenely upon her
desire and causing her to laugh
and
LAUGH
with the utter
ridiculousness
of it. . .

— but no one denied her a moment of it, neither the conked-out bug-eyed paranoia nor the manic keening coming on, nobody denied her, and she could wail, nobody tried to cool that inflamed brain that was now seeping out Stark Naked into the bouncing goddamn — stop it! — currents of the bus throgging and roaring 70 miles an hour into Texas, for it was like it had been ordained, by Kesey himself, back in San Juan Capistrano, like there was to be a reaction scale in here, from negative to positive, and no one was to rise up negative about anything, one was to go positive with everything — go with the flow — everyone’s cool was to be tested, and to shout No, no matter what happened, was to fail.

I am not against experimental fiction. But I wish people would restrict the experimental fiction to bad books, so that it isn’t in the way of me learning actually interesting stuff.

One thing I did appreciate about Wolfe was that he really knew his anthropology of religion. This thing, where one guy suddenly starts radiating this sense of knowing, and then a knot of disciples forms around him, and then predictable consequences ensue: this has happened again and again in human history. If I’d had to read this same story, written by someone who didn’t realize he was writing about a trope – didn’t realize that instead of an indiscriminate catalogue of events, he should focus on the way this illuminates the general principle, or differs from it – it would have been annoying. Instead, Wolfe gets it exactly right.

I’m less convinced Kesey understood what was going on. At one point (p. 193) he says:

We’re not on the Christ Trip. That’s been done, and it doesn’t work. You prove your point, and then you have 2,000 years of war. We know where that trip goes.

But it’s never clear exactly what he’s doing to avoid that trip. And although there are worse problems to have than “failed to sufficiently differentiate yourself from Jesus”, this is about the limit of Kesey’s self-awareness – at least as described in this book. It’s weird to think that a prophet’s biographer knows more about religion than the prophet themselves, but that’s the impression I walked away with. If Tom Wolfe had started a cult, it would have gone somewhere.

III.

A few years ago, I reviewed PIHKaL on Alexander Shulgin. Shulgin and Kesey are twin titans of modern drug culture: Shulgin invented the drugs, Kesey invented the culture.

Why care about Bay Area drug culture? One could give Captain Barbossa’s answer: “You better start caring about Bay Area drug culture, Miss Turner: you’re in it!” I don’t really use psychedelics myself, but I have a couple of patients – and a few acquaintances – who are on the Kesey trip. Some of them have taken the Kesey trip all the way to the psych hospital and the borders of schizophrenia. Others still think they’re making new discoveries, getting closer to the place Kesey called Edge City where you can gaze off the end of the world into the mysteries beyond. Even beyond my own social circle, it’s unclear how much the world in general owes Bay Area drug culture. A lot of important movements – environmentalism, meditation, wellness, vegetarianism, antipsychiatry – trace at least some of their origins to that strange froth. Over thirty million Americans have taken psychedelics – probably disproportionately intellectuals and creative people. If the drug actually changes people’s minds, in some important way, then that’s a big deal. If some alien supercomputer had been simulating world history from Mesopotamia onward, would its predictions start going haywire sometime in the 1960s? Would the alien programmers charged with debugging it eventually find that money, power, and the other usual suspects had sufficed before then – but that afterwards the simulation needed to include some very specific aspects of mushroom biochemistry?

Or one could give H.G. Wells’ answer: “New and stirring things are belittled because if they are not belittled the humiliating question arises ‘Why then are you not taking part in them?”. One of two things must be true. Either psychedelics are a unique gateway to insight and happiness, maybe the most powerful ever discovered. Or they have a unique ability to convince people that they are, faking insight as effectively as heroin fakes happiness. Either one would be fascinating: the first for obvious reasons, the second because it convinces some pretty smart people. If the insight of LSD were fake, its very convincingness could tell us a lot about the mind and about how rationality works.

The story of Ken Kesey doesn’t do much to clarify the situation. On the one hand, Kesey becomes a very successful cult leader, attracting some of the most creative people of his era. He is able to accomplish larger-than-life feats like taming the Hell’s Angels, escaping the FBI, and inventing modern party culture. Everyone who meets him ends up enchanged, terrified, or both. This sounds like the sort of thing we would expect of someone who’s successfully developed Secret Wisdom Into The True Nature Of Things.

On the other hand, Kesey’s followers are unable to replicate his success. Kesey tries to communicate what he has to his followers; first out of basic desire to help, and later because he knows he’s going to have to flee to Mexico and leave them on their own. He handpicks his successor, Ken Babbs, who is respected and liked by the rest of the Pranksters. But the moment he leaves, everything collapses. Tom Wolfe lampshades this quite cruelly. Every grudge, conflict, and personal failing comes out into the open, and the whole movement comes tumbling down. Then when Kesey’s back on bail, he picks up the pieces, says just the right words to everybody, and they all come together again as if nothing happened. Then he’s out again, and everything collapses a second time. The impression one gets is that Ken Kesey is a special person, with LSD playing a supporting role at best. Did LSD help give Ken Kesey his powers? Unclear. Did it give anything at all similar to the dozens of other bright people who took it under Kesey’s supervision? Clearly not. But then what made Kesey special? Did he have a unique Book Four style experience? When? How come I just read his entire biography and don’t see anything of the sort?

And what are we to make of Kesey’s own exhortation that seekers needed to move “beyond LSD”? What was his Acid Test Graduation? I don’t know if Wolfe’s impenetrable writing style failed me here, or if Kesey was inherently unclear on this. There were hints that maybe he thought some of the paraphernalia of drug culture – the strobe lights, the acid rock music, the multimedia experience – could produce the psychedelic state without needing drugs. Seems pretty false.

And what is the whole “mandate of heaven” thing? This is my term; Wolfe didn’t make such a big deal of it. But reading the book, it really does seem as if at some point after his bail, Kesey lost his effectiveness. He tried to draw people in and they didn’t come. He tried to change everything but it wouldn’t change. Then he gave up, moved to Oregon, and did approximately nothing for the next thirty years.

The best I can do in making sense of this story is to think of Kesey as having unique innate talents that made him a potential cult leader, combined with the sudden rise in status from being a famous author and the first person in his social scene with access to LSD. Despite the connotations of “cult leader”, Kesey was overall a good person, genuinely wanted to help people’s spiritual development, and genuinely thought LSD could do this. LSD formed the content of his cult, the same way Messianic Judaism formed the content of Jesus’ cult. It also made his life easier because of the drug’s natural tendency to make people think they are having important insights. When he, attempting to genuinely discover a spiritual path, decided to change the content and go beyond LSD, he lost that crutch, his people betrayed him, he became less confident in himself, and eventually he gave up.

But it’s interesting how often malevolent cult leaders have turned to drugs since then – so often that I see it listed in some lists of cult warning flags. It’s especially surprising since we usually think of LSD as helping people break out of systems of mental control – why would you give it to somebody you’re trying to brainwash? One hypothesis that I think Wolfe points at in Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test is that LSD keeps you constantly convinced you’re on the verge of some great revelation that will change everything. This both makes you more skeptical of everyday society – they don’t have the revelation! – and more vulnerable to spiritual predators, who can say that yes, they have the great revelation, and if only you follow them for a little longer you might get it too.

Kesey rode this wave innocently, carried on by the same hopes as his followers. Some benevolent god judged him mercifully and granted him a quiet retirement writing short stories in the woods of Oregon, which is a lot better than how these stories usually end. I’m more nervous about anyone who tries the same strategy today.

Know Your Gabapentinoids

The gabapentinoids are a class of drugs vaguely resembling the neurotransmitter GABA. Although they were developed to imitate GABA’s action, later research discovered they acted on a different target, the A2D subunit of calcium channels. Two gabapentinoids are approved by the FDA: gabapentin (Neurontin®) and pregabalin (Lyrica®).

Gabapentin has been generic since 2004. It’s commonly used for seizures, nerve pain, alcoholism, drug addiction, itching, restless legs, sleep disorders, and anxiety. It has an unusually wide dose range: guidelines suggest using anywhere between 100 mg and 3600 mg daily. Most doctors (including me) use it at the low end, where it’s pretty subtle (read: doesn’t usually work). At the high end, it can cause sedation, confusion, dependence, and addiction. I haven’t had much luck finding patients a dose that works well but doesn’t have these side effects, which is why I don’t use gabapentin much.

Pregabalin officially went generic last month, but isn’t available yet in generic form, so you’ll have to pay Pfizer $500 a month. On the face of things, pregabalin seems like another Big Pharma ploy to extend patents. The gabapentin patent was running out, so Pfizer synthesized a related molecule that did the same thing, hyped it up as the hot new thing, and charged 50x what gabapentin cost. This kind of thing is endemic in health care and should always be the default hypothesis. And a lot of scientists have analyzed pregabalin and said it’s definitely just doing the same thing gabapentin is.

But some of my anxiety patients swear by pregabalin. They call it a miracle drug. They can’t stop talking about how great it is. I can’t use it too often, because of the price, but I’m really excited about the upcoming generic version coming out so I can use it more often.

Still, I have to wonder – why am I sitting around waiting when I could just give people gabapentin? Confirmed pharmacodynamically-identical, generic, and cheap? The answer is, gabapentin doesn’t seem to work that well. I’ve never had patients with more than minimal anxiety happy on gabapentin alone. Am I imagining a difference betwee these two supposedly-similar medications? I don’t know. Although studies confirm pregabalin is great for anxiety, nobody has done the studies on gabapentin that would let me compare it. For now, the apparent difference between pregabalin and gabapentin is one of the great mysteries of life, one of the things that makes me doubt my own sanity.

One possibility is that we’re getting the doses wrong. UpToDate recommends treating anxiety disorders with gabapentin using a starting dose of 300 mg twice a day = 600 mg daily. But it recommends 100 mg three times a day = 300 mg of pregabalin. This dosing table suggests 1 mg pregabalin = 5 mg gabapentin, so 300 mg of pregabalin = 1500 mg gabapentin! So we’re starting gabapentin patients on less than half as much medicine as we start pregabalin patients on. If this forms a reference point in the doctor’s mind, then maybe what we think of as a “high dose” of gabapentin is the same as what we think of a “low dose” of pregabalin. Maybe all our gabapentin doses are just too low.

I usually avoid higher gabapentin doses because I feel like they have more side effects than low pregabalin doses. Is this just an illusion? Is it my bias? If a patient reports feeling dizzy on high-dose gabapentin, do I say “Yeah, you’re on a really high dose, I’m not surprised you feel that way, let’s back off?” And then if they feel the same thing on low-dose pregabalin, might I say “It’s a low dose, you’re just getting used to the medication, give it a few more weeks”? Might my biases even be affecting how patients report their own experiences?

Or might there be some obscure pharmacologic mechanism? This paper tries to compare the pharmacology of the two drugs. They say the body can easily absorb pregabalin, but has a limited ability to absorb gabapentin – the more gabapentin there is, the lower a percent gets absorbed:

With regard to the fraction of the dose absorbed, the lowest gabapentin dose studied (100 mg every 8 hours) is associated with absolute bioavailability of approximately 80%. This value was shown to decrease with increasing dose to an averageof 27% absolute bioavailability for a 1600 mg dose every 8 hours. In contrast, oral bioavailability of pregabalin averaged 90% across the full dose range of 75 to 900 mg/day studied

This doesn’t match the dosing table linked above, which suggests a 1:5 constant ratio between gabapentin and pregabalin dose. It also doesn’t really match the paper’s Figure 3, which shows a linear effect of gabapentin up to 1800 mg for nerve pain. It does match the paper’s figure 4, which shows little to no effect of gabapentin past 600 mg for seizures. I don’t really know what’s going on here. It would make some sense if the bottleneck were plasma -> CSF absorption, but that’s not what the paper’s saying. In any case, if the gabapentin/pregabalin relationship followed the same pattern for anxiety as for seizures, it would be impossible to ever get a dose of gabapentin as high as the starting dose for pregabalin, which would explain perceptions of pregabalin’s superiority. Try to increase gabapentin dose, and you just have extra gabapentin sitting around in the GI tract causing trouble. I don’t know if this is at all the right way to be thinking about this.

One more difference: gabapentin is not a controlled substance, but pregabalin is Schedule V, the designation the government uses for things that are technically addictive but that it’s not going to worry about too much. Why the difference? The government’s documentation of their decision doesn’t say. It could be total chance: both substances are right on the border, and a different bureaucrat got assigned to each case. But the decision doesn’t seem totally off-base to me. Although it’s theoretically possible to get addicted to gabapentin if you use a really high dose and try really hard, you’d have to be pretty desperate even by drug addict standards. I’ve seen a little more pregabalin addiction, though I agree with the FDA that it’s still pretty unusual (some people in the comments disagree). One likely culprit is the absorption rate: pregabalin gets absorbed in an hour or so, gabapentin takes three or four. Faster-acting substances are always more addictive; they peak higher and sooner, and it’s easier for the brain to associate stimulus (taking the drug) with response (feeling good). Could this also explain some of the efficacy difference? I don’t know.

Phenibut is not FDA-approved; it’s a common medication in Russia which gets sold as a supplement/nootropic/recreational drug in the US. The FDA occasionally asks people to stop selling it, but they’ve never gotten serious, and it’s still easily available on the open Internet.

Phenibut has the kind of approval ratings usually associated with North Korean dictators who kill anyone who disapproves of them – including the highest median rating on my nootropics survey. It’s phenomenal for social anxiety – not in the SSRI way of making you a little calmer, but more in the “getting just the right amount of drunk” way that turns you into a different, bolder, and more fun-loving person. Aside from this, it can give a hard-to-describe sense of tranquility and well-being.

(it also makes you feel like you’re wearing a hat even when you aren’t. I swear this is a real side effect.)

Needless to say, it’s potentially addictive and can seriously ruin your life. Conventional wisdom in the phenibut user community is that you can use 500 mg once every week (or maybe every two weeks) safely. Anything beyond that and you develop rapid tolerance. Increase the dose to fight the tolerance, and you start feeling worse on the days you don’t take it, using it more and more to compensate for the rebound, and eventually getting a withdrawal syndrome closely related to the delirium tremens that sometimes kills recovering alcoholics.

(does this mean that responsible phenibut use is a free way to have one great day per two weeks? depends how good your willpower is, I guess. see also this graph from this source)

The discovery of ketamine’s efficacy for depression was a mixed blessing. Ketamine such is a difficult medication to use – dangerous side effects, intolerable hallucinations, IV delivery – that it could never be a panacea, whatever its potential. But the discovery sparked a hunt for other ketamine-like chemicals that shared its efficacy but not its downsides. It also started a race to figure out how ketamine worked, with the hope that this would provide the key to what depression really was, deep down. Phenibut should inspire the same kind of interest. It’s too dangerous to use regularly, but it’s great enough that we should be looking into what the heck is going on.

Early research into phenibut focused on GABA, the main inhibitory neurotransmitter. The brain has two kinds of GABA receptors, GABA-A and GABA-B. Alcohol, Xanax, Valium, Ambien, barbituates, and the other classic sedatives all hit GABA-A. There aren’t that many chemicals that hit GABA-B, and the few that are out there tend to be kind of weird – one of them fell to Earth on a meteorite. But phenibut is a GABA-B agonist. This sounds like a neat solution to the mystery: a drug with unique anti-anxiety properties affects a unique inhibitory receptor. But another GABA-B agonist, baclofen, has minimal anti-anxiety effects. It is mostly just a boring muscle relaxant (there was some excitement over a possibility that it might cure alcoholism, but the latest studies say no). So probably GABA-B on its own doesn’t explain phenibut.

This led researchers to propose that phenibut might work as a gabapentinoid. It has the defining GABA backbone, and it has activity at the A2D calcium channel subunit. But its gabapentinoid activity is much weaker than gabapentin itself, so why should its effects be stronger?

Baclofen outdoes phenibut as a GABA-B agonist, and gabapentin outdoes phenibut as a gabapentinoid, but phenibut works better than either. This is the other big gabapentinoid mystery that keeps me awake at night.

Might it be a synergistic effect between the two different actions? If this were true, we would expect taking gabapentin and baclofen together to have phenibut-like effects. But these drugs are sometimes used for the same kinds of neuromuscular conditions and nobody has ever noticed anything out of the ordinary. I would love to see this studied but I don’t expect much.

Phenibut has two enantiomers, r-phenibut and s-phenibut. Both are decent gabapentinoids, but only r-phenibut has GABA-B activity. If both worked equally well, that would suggest phenibut worked on A2D; if r-phenibut worked better, that would implicate GABA. The best source I can find is this study, which says that only r-phenibut has effects on rats. Do the hokey tests they run rats through exactly correspond to treating anxiety in humans? Unclear, but this pushes me more in the direction of thinking GABA-B is an important part of phenibut’s effects. So does a passing resemblance between phenibut and GHB, an unusual drug that works on GABA-B among other things.

Overall I think phenibut is probably more GABA-B agonist than gabapentinoid, but I can’t explain why it’s so different from baclofen.

One fringe possibility: it isn’t. I’ve said that these two drugs are used for different indications, by different populations, and get different results. But the map isn’t the territory, and the way humans use and think about drugs doesn’t always reflect chemical reality. Everyone knew the second generation antipsychotics were totally different from the first generation ones, until we learned that they weren’t really, and the different effects we saw were a combination of using them differently plus having different expectations. And placebo alcohol can still get people pretty drunk. The only study I’ve found directly comparing phenibut to baclofen finds they work for similar indications, at least in rats (see bottom of page 476). And I can find a few comments on Reddit backing this up from experience.

My odds are against this theory – I think there’s probably some real difference between these drugs that we don’t understand. But constant vigilance never hurts.

[EDIT: commenter dtsund points out that baclofen has some issues with blood-brain barrier permeability; see here for more. Although some of it gets through, it could build up in the plasma much faster than in the brain, giving it disproportionately peripheral effects]

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 101 Comments

Caution On Bias Arguments

“You say it’s important to overcome biases. So isn’t it hypocritical that you’re not trying to overcome whichever bias prevents you from realizing you’re wrong and I’m right?”
— everybody

Correcting for bias is important. Learning about specific biases, like confirmation bias or hindsight bias, can be helpful. But bias arguments – “People probably only believe X because of their bias, so we should ignore people who say X” tend to be unproductive and even toxic. Why?

1. Everyone Is Biased All The Time

You could accuse me of having a conservative bias. After all, I’m a well-off straight white man, a demographic well-known to lean conservative. If a liberal wanted to discount everything I say, or assume any conservative arguments I make come from self-serving motives, they’ve got all the ammunition they need.

Or you could accuse me of having a liberal bias. After all, I’m a college-educated atheist Jewish psychiatrist in the San Francisco Bay Area. All of those demographics are well-known to lean liberal. If a conservative wanted to discount everything I say, or assume any liberal arguments I make come from self-serving motives, they’re not short on ammunition either.

This is a general phenomenon: for any issue, you can think of biases that could land people on one side or the other. People might be biased toward supporting moon colonization because of decades of sci-fi movies pushing space colonization as the wave of the future, or because Americans remember the moon landing as a great patriotic victory, or because big defense companies like Boeing will lobby for a project that would win them new contracts. Or people might be biased against moon colonization because of hidebound Luddite-ism, or an innate hominid preference for lush green forests and grasslands, or a pessimistic near-termism that rejects with payoffs more than a few years out. I personally might be biased towards moon colonization because I’ve been infected with the general Silicon Valley technophile mindset; or I personally might be biased against it because I’m a Democrat and Trump’s been the loudest modern proponent of more moon missions.

This is even easier if you’re allowed to invent biases on the spot. For example, I said people are against moon colonization because of “hidebound Luddite-ism” – is that actually a thing? If I say that regulatory action against tech companies is driven by anti-tech populism, have I identified a bias, made up a bias, or just tautologically rebranded people wanting regulation of tech companies as a force biasing people towards regulation of tech companies? Won’t people who support regulation, counter by saying that opponents are just knee-jerk technophiles in who have drunk some sort of Silicon Valley hype Kool-Aid?

2. Everyone Is Hypersensitive To Biases Against Their Side, And Thinks Biases In Favor Of Their Side Are Irrelevant

This is called the hostile media effect, though it’s broader than just the media. I’ve talked about it before in against bravery debates. My favorite example is conservatives complaining that the media condemns far-right terrorism but excuses Islamic terrorism (eg 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) alongside liberals complaining that the media condemns Islamic terrorism but excuses far-right terrorism (eg 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

Or if you prefer facts to anecdotes: according to a Gallup poll, conservatives are more likely to believe the news has a liberal bias; liberals are more likely to believe the news has a conservative bias. In a study where experimenters showed partisans a trying-to-be-neutral video on the Israel-Palestine conflict, the pro-Israel people said the video was biased toward Palestine, and the pro-Palestine people said the video was biased towards Israel.

This ties into the problem where you can just make up a bias, like “hidebound Luddite-ism”. Technophiles will see an anti-tech bias everywhere. And whenever they meet a specific anti-tech person, they can assume that their positions have been shaped not by reason, but by the anti-tech sentiments that are omnipresent in our society. Having explained away their opponents’ position as the product of bias, they’ll feel no need to debate it or question whether it might be true.

Anyone can come up with any bias for any position, but this meta-bias is going to affect people’s sense of which biases matter and which ones don’t. Pro-moon-colonizers are going to doubt that technophilia is really a problem motivating people’s reasoning, but think that hidebound Luddite-ism is a big problem motivating everyone on the other side.

3. It’s Hard To Even Figure Out What Bias Means Or When It Is Bad

Suppose A and B are debating some issue, and B is part of a group especially closely linked to the issue. For example:

1. A plumber and a teacher are debating a proposed pay cut for teachers.
2. A man and a woman are debating abortion.
3. An atheist and a Jew are debating the peace process in Israel.
4. A white person and a black person are debating slavery reparations.
5. A citizen and an undocumented immigrant are debating immigration policy.
6. King Edward and a Jew are debating whether to expel all the Jews from England.
7. You and a KKK Grand Wizard are debating whether the KKK should be banned as a hate group.
8. A scientist and a tobacco company executive are debating whether cigarettes are dangerous.

Who is more biased? A or B?

This is a tough question. If we’re just working off the dictionary definition of bias, it ought to be B. But in cases like 6, it would be pretty bad to adjust away from B’s opinion, or discount B as too biased to give a good argument.

We can’t dismiss this as “A is also affected by the issue”. It’s true that for example the plumber may lose a little money if he has to pay higher taxes to fund increased teacher salaries. But since there are fewer teachers than taxpayers, each taxpayer’s loss is much smaller than each teacher’s gain. It still seems like B should be more biased.

We could model this as two opposite considerations. A is less biased. But B may be better informed. Sometimes this is literal information: I’d expect an immigrant to know more about immigration policy than an average citizen. Other times it can be emotional “information” about how something feels; for example, a woman may have hard-to-communicate information about what makes abortion rights feel important to her.

Is it meaningful to say the Jew has hard-to-communicate information about how much he doesn’t want to be kicked out of England? Or should we just say that, as the person most affected by the policy, he’s more likely to be thinking about it clearly? But now we’ve come full circle to saying that motivated reasoning itself is good!

I have a hard time squaring this circle. The lesson I take is that it’s easy to switch between “we should trust the more affected party less” and “we should trust the more affected party more” without clear principles to guide us.

Probably most people will do this in a biased way. When their side is the more affected party, they’ll say that gives them special insight and so other people should back off. When they’re the less affected party, they’ll say that makes them unbiased and other people are just motivated reasoners. This is yet another reason to expect that bias arguments have so many degrees of freedom that everyone will figure their opponents are biased and they aren’t.

4. Bias Arguments Have Nowhere To Go

Most people are already aware of their potential biases. No straight man will be surprised to be told that they are a straight man, or that this might bias them. “You are a straight man, so consider that you might be biased” doesn’t give new information. It just deflects the conversation from potentially productive object-level discussion to a level which is likely to sound patronizing and overly personal, and which has less chance of being productive.

Someone asks me “Are you sure you don’t just hold that opinion because of the liberal Jewish milieu you grew up in?” I look deep into my brain, the opinion still sounds right, I don’t see a sticker on the opinion saying “Proud product of the liberal Jewish milieu you grew up in”, and…then what? Do I drop the opinion even though it still seems right? Do I keep holding the opinion, but feel guilty about it? Do I retort back “Aha, no, you only hold your opinion because of the conservative Gentile milieu you grew up in, so you should drop your opinion!”?

There’s a sense in which we should always be considering the Outside View (see part III here) for each of the opinions we hold. That is, on the Inside View, the opinion might still seem convincing, but on the Outside View, we might have enough circumstantial evidence that it was produced by some process uncorrelated with truth that we doubt it despite its convincingness. But just learning that there’s some possible bias should rarely have much of an effect on this process, especially since with any self-awareness we should probably have already priced all of our own biases in.

5. Where To Go From Here

I think low-effort (and even medium-effort) arguments from bias will usually be counterproductive. Second person bias arguments (“You are probably biased on this topic because X”) and third-person bias arguments (“Society is probably biased on this topic because X”) are at least as likely to perpetuate biases as to help overcome them, and less useful than just focusing on the object-level argument.

What’s left? Bias is an important obstacle to truth-seeking; do we just ignore it? I think bias arguments can be useful in a few cases.

First, it’s fair to point out a bias if this gives someone surprising new information. For example, if I say “The study proving Panexa works was done by the company producing Panexa”, that might surprise the other person in a way that “You are a straight man” wouldn’t. It carries factual information in a way that “You’re a product of a society laden with anti-tech populism” doesn’t.

Second, it’s fair to point out a bias if you can quantify it. For example, if 90% of social scientists are registered Democrats, that gets beyond the whole “I can name one bias predisposing scientists to be more liberal, you can name one bias predisposing scientists to be more conservative” arms race. Or if you did some kind of study, and X% of social scientists said something like “I feel uncomfortable expressing conservative views in my institution”, I think that’s fair to mention.

Third, it’s fair to point out a bias if there’s some unbiased alternative. If you argue I should stop trusting economists because “they’re naturally all biased towards capitalism”, I don’t know what to tell you, but if you argue I should stop trusting studies done by pharmaceutical companies, in favor of studies done by non-pharma-linked research labs, that’s a nice actionable suggestion. Sometimes this requires some kind of position on the A vs. B questions mentioned above: is a non-Jew a less biased source for Israel opinions than a Jew? Tough question.

Fourth, none of this should apply in private conversations between two people who trust each other. If well-intentioned smart friend who understands all the points above brings up a possible bias of mine in a spirit of mutual truth-seeking, I’ll take it seriously. I don’t think this contradicts the general argument, or is any different from other domains. I don’t want random members of the public shaming me for my degenerate lifestyle, but if a close friend thinks I’m harming myself then I want them to let me know. I’m realizing as I’m writing this that this paragraph deserves its own essay, and that it would probably be a better and more important essay than this one is.

Most important, I think first-person bias arguments are valuable. You should always be attentive to your own biases. First, because it’s easier for you; a rando on Twitter may not know how my whiteness or my Jewishness affects my thought processes, but I might have some idea. Second, because you’re more likely to be honest: you’re less likely to invent random biases to accuse yourself of, and more likely to focus on things that really worry you. Third, you have an option besides just shrugging or counterarguing. You can approach your potential biases in a spirit of curiosity and try to explore them. I think I’m probably biased against communism because many communists I met have been nasty people who tried to hurt me, so I try to solve that by reading more communist books and seeking out good communist arguments wherever I can find them. Second- and third-person bias arguments risk feeling some kind of awkward option to change your opinions to something you don’t really believe in order to deflect someone’s bias accusations. First-person bias arguments should lead to a gradual process of trying to look for more information to counter whatever motivated reasoning you might have.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 155 Comments

Against Lie Inflation

[Related to: The Whole City Is Center]

I.

I got into an argument recently with somebody who used the word “lie” to refer to a person honestly reporting their unconsciously biased beliefs – her example was a tech entrepreneur so caught up in an atmosphere of hype that he makes absurdly optimistic predictions. I promised a post explaining why I don’t like that use of “lie”. This is that post.

A few months ago, a friend confessed that she had abused her boyfriend. I was shocked, because this friend is one of the kindest and gentlest people I know. I probed for details. She told me that sometimes she needed her boyfriend to do some favor for her, and he wouldn’t, so she would cry – not as an attempt to manipulate him, just because she was sad. She counted this as abuse, because her definition of “abuse” is “something that makes your partner feel bad about setting boundaries”. And when she cried, that made her boyfriend feel guilty about his boundary that he wasn’t going to do the favor.

We argued for a while about whether this was a good definition of abuse (it isn’t). But I had a bigger objection: this definition was so broad that everyone has committed abuse at some point.

My friend could have countered that this was a feature, not a bug. Standards have been (and should be) getting stricter. A thousand years ago, beating your wife wasn’t considered abuse as long as you didn’t maim her or something. A hundred years ago, you could bully and belittle someone all you wanted, but as long as there was no physical violence it wasn’t abuse. As society gets better and better at dealing with these issues, the definition of abuse gets broader. Maybe we should end up with a definition where basically everyone is an abuser.

But a wise supervillain once said, “When everyone is super, nobody is”. In the same way, when everyone is an abuser, nobody’s an abuser.

Right now, if I hear that someone is an serial abuser, I would be less likely to date them, or I might warn my friends away from them, or I might try not to support them socially. The world is divided into distinct categories – abuser and non-abuser – and which category someone is in gives you useful information about that person’s character. I’m not saying that every abuser is an awful person who is 100% defined by their misdeeds and can never be redeemed. But I think the category contains useful information about a person’s character and likely future actions.

But if everyone used my friend’s definition, and we acknowledged that everybody is an abuser – the category stops being informative. “John is an abuser”. So what? Doesn’t mean you should worry about John, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t date John, doesn’t even mean you shouldn’t set your single friends up on blind dates with John. It just means John is a human. Maybe he cries sometimes. So what?

Broadening the definition of “abuser” this far doesn’t help fight abuse or make anybody nicer. It just removes a useful word from the English language. I can still eventually warn someone that John is cruel or violent toward people close to him. I just have to circumlocute around the word “abuser”, in order to find some other word or phrase that hasn’t been rendered meaningless.

(I’m cheating here by talking about “abusers” rather than “abuse”, since there is still a useful distinction between abuse and non-abuse actions. But although the abuse case is less clear, I think some of the same considerations apply – just because an action is abuse no longer means you can be sure it’s especially bad)

But it’s worse than this, because change to a definition doesn’t instantaneously propagate to all of its web of connotations in our minds. So probably some people will continue to use the new definition while still holding the connotations of the old definition. This means bad actors can stigmatize anyone they want:

1. We don’t tolerate abusers around here, right? Right!
2. John’s actions technically qualify as abuse by this incredibly broad standard that includes basically everyone.
3. Therefore we shouldn’t tolerate John.

I previously called this manuever The Worst Argument In The World. Maybe that’s a slight exaggeration, I’m just really tired of seeing it again and again.

II.

This is also my objection to broadening the meaning of “lie”.

The word “lie” is useful because some statements are lies and others aren’t. And although people may disagree on which statements are lies or not (Did OJ lie when he said he was innocent? opinions differ!) everyone agrees on a mapping between states-of-the-world and lie-vs-truth status. When I say “OJ lied”, everyone understands me as making a specific claim about the world, which they can either accept or reject. I don’t have a lot of leeway in how I use the word “lie”; if I’m calling you a liar, I’m making a specific claim about the world.

If “lie” expands to include biased or motivated reasoning, who’s going to throw the first stone? We’re probably all biased to some degree. Does that make us all liars? If everyone’s a liar, nobody is. I can accuse Donald Trump of lying constantly, and you can just nod your head and say “Oh, so you’re saying he’s not a perfect person free from all bias, whatever”. You’ll feel no need to decrease your opinion of him.

Maybe we should only apply the word “lie” to particularly egregious bias and motivated reasoning? But we’ve already abandoned the only defensible Schelling fence. So how will people decide where to draw the line? My guess is: in a place drawn by bias and motivated reasoning, same way they decide everything else. The outgroup will be lying liars, and the ingroup will be decent people with ordinary human failings.

This is my criticism of the original post that started this argument. It declared belief in a near-term singularity to be a “scam” and that believers were “being duped into believing a lie”. Its evidence was listing some reasons people might be biased to believe the singularity was near.

The obvious next step is that someone who believes the singularity is near writes a post listing some biases that singularity skeptics probably hold (for example, the absurdity fallacy). Having shown that skeptics are biased, they pronounce skeptics to be liars perpetrating a massive fraud on the scientific community.

There are a few ways this expanded-definition world becomes different from the world where people restricted “lie” to mean a knowingly false statement.

First, everyone is much angrier. In the restricted-definition world, a few people write posts suggesting that there may be biases affecting the situation. In the expanded-definition world, those same people write posts accusing the other side of being liars perpetrating a fraud. I am willing to listen to people suggesting I might be biased, but if someone calls me a liar I’m going to be pretty angry and go into defensive mode. I’ll be less likely to hear them out and adjust my beliefs, and more likely to try to attack them.

Second, bad actors can use The Worst Argument In The World to prove whatever they want. As long as you’re willing to equivocate and deceive people, you can prove anyone a liar, and then draw on now-obsolete connotations of “liar” to silence or ostracize them.

Third, the biggest beneficiaries are actual liars. Suppose some singularitarian claims that internal Google documents prove they have already created human-level AI. And suppose that’s totally false and no such documents exist. Usually I would accuse them of lying, and this accusation would be enough to alert people that, hey, something has gone terribly wrong here. But if both sides are constantly accusing each other of lying just for having normal human failings, then “you are a liar” no longer carries much weight. I have to come up with some complex circumlocution in order to let people know that someone told a mistruth.

And that complex circumlocution can only last until people realize it too is an exploitable signal. The whole reason that rebranding lesser sins as “lying” is tempting is because everyone knows “lying” refers to something very bad. But the whole reason everyone knows “lying” refers to something very bad is because nobody has yet succeeded in rebranding it to mean lesser sins. The rebranding of lying is basically a parasitic process, exploiting the trust we have in a functioning piece of language until it’s lost all meaning – after which the parasitism will have to move on to whatever other trusted functional piece of language has sprung up to replace it.

III.

I realize this is a kind of long post arguing against a weird thing that not many people are doing. But I think it’s an especially clear case of a broader thing that many people are doing. Words like “disabled”, “queer”, and “autistic” are also gradually shifting meanings, getting applied more and more loosely.

This isn’t always bad! Words are useful because as they separate the world into categories; this suggests a word should apply in more than 0% of cases but less than 100% of cases. Exactly where it should fall in between that range, I don’t know. The broader you make the definition, the better the word’s ability to name things that have even a small level of the relevant quality. But the broader you make the definition, the less power the word will have to separate strong examples of a quality from marginal examples.

I think of this as a sort of sensitivity-and-specificity statistics problem, setting a threshold to divide the population into two groups. If you have a very strict threshold for “abuser”, maybe only someone who inflicts serious physical injuries, then you can use it to separate the most abusive 1% of people from the other 99%. If you have a very weak threshold for “abuser”, so low that 99% of people qualify, then you can use it to separate the 1% least abusive people from the other 99%. If you set it in the middle, you can separate the more abusive half of the population from the less abusive half. If “abuser” picks out the most abusive 1% of people, it transmits a lot of information in a small number of cases. If it picks out the most abusive 99% of people, it transmits very little information in a large number of cases (and now “not an abuser” transmits a large amount of information in a small number of cases!). If the boundary is set at 50%, it transmits an equal moderate amount of information about everyone.

There’s no rule that 50-50 is always the best – for example, if the word “murderer” referred to anyone in the more murderous half of the population, that would be much worse than the system now, where it refers to a much smaller set of people, who you have much more reason to worry about as a discrete group. You’re going to have to find the right threshold for each individual concept.

But it’s never the right decision to draw the line outside the population, so that literally 100% of people fall in one category and 0% in the other.

A few months ago I told a fable about a city. The citizens worried that people living in the outskirts of the city felt unimportant and excluded. So they redefined “city center” to mean the entire city, including the outskirts. Nobody ended up feeling any more important because of this, because living in city center stops being prestigious when everywhere is city center. But it was now impossible to direct tourists to where they wanted to go, and people had to invent new phrases like “the part of the city where there are the most tall buildings” in order to discuss city center.

The moral of the story is: don’t set thresholds for category membership so far outside a distribution that they stop conveying useful information.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 322 Comments

OT132: Open Shed

This is the bi-weekly visible open thread (there are also hidden open threads twice a week you can reach through the Open Thread tab on the top of the page). Post about anything you want, but please try to avoid hot-button political and social topics. You can also talk at the SSC subreddit or the SSC Discord server – and also check out the SSC Podcast. Also:

1. Local lawyer Nate Gabriel is trying to mount a constitutional challenge to zoning laws saying that “no more than X unrelated people can live in a house here”. He needs some plaintiffs, and says the best-case scenario would be a group of at least four people in a polyamorous relationship, [since] for freedom of association it matters how intimate and family-like the relationship is”. They also couldn’t be in CA, NJ, or NY, which have already aboilished those laws. If you’re a polycule living together in a house outside those states, you could be well-placed to help start this important legal change; email Nate if you’re willing to help.

2. I process bans and unbans once every few weeks. If you were just banned and don’t know why, check the Register of Bans at the Comments tab on the top of the page; it was probably for something bad you did a few weeks ago that I’m only now getting around to dealing with. And if your ban has expired but I haven’t unbanned you yet, it’s probably because I haven’t gotten around to it; feel free to email me reminding me to do that.

3. New sidebar ad for Doof Media, a group making podcasts and other online content about their favorite (mostly SFF) movies, books, etc. Especially focused on Wildbow stories like Worm and Pact.

4. I’ll probably be launching another adversarial collaboration contest later this month. If you have suggestions on how to improve the process, now’s the time to let me know.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 830 Comments

Do People Like Their Mental Health Care?

Along with more specific questions, I asked people who took the SSC survey to rate their experience with the mental health system on a 1 – 10 scale.

About 5,000 people answered. On average, they rated their experience with psychotherapy a 5.7, and their experience with medication also 5.7.

This is more optimistic than a lot of the horror stories you hear would suggest. A lot of the horror stories involve inpatient commitment (which did get a dismal 4.4/10 approval rating) so I checked what percent of people engaging with the system ended up inpatient. Of people who had seen either a psychiatrist or therapist, only 7% had ever been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. Note that this data can’t tease out causation, so this doesn’t mean 7% of people who saw an outpatient professional were later committed – it might just mean that lots of people got committed to the hospital by police, then saw a professional later.

Going into more detail about what people did or didn’t like (note truncated y-axis):

I asked people what kind of therapy they did. People liked all schools of therapy about the same, except that they liked “eclectic” therapy that wasn’t part of any specific school less than any school. Every school including eclectic got higher than 5.7, because people who wouldn’t answer this question – who weren’t even sure what kind of therapy they were doing – rated it less than any school or than eclectic therapy.

People really liked doing therapy from a book. They liked doing therapy with an in-person therapist a little less, and they liked online therapy apps least of all. This doesn’t match published literature, and this would be a good time to remember that all of these results are horribly biased and none of them can prove causation. For example, the sort of motivated go-getter who would go out and get a therapy book and read it themselves might be systematically different from somebody who gets therapy through an app or in a clinic.

This graph shows how people liked medication (blue) and therapy (red) based on what their mental health issue was (note truncated y-axis). Some groups – people with eating disorders, people with borderline personalities – were just generally hard to please. Alcoholics were much happier with their therapy than with pharmaceutical treatment (though the sample size was only about 50 per group). People with bipolar and ADHD were happier with medication than therapy.

This is a little different. The last graph averaged everyone’s opinion of medication and everyone’s opinion of therapy. This one just includes the people who have tried both, who might have a better standard for comparison. The higher the bar above the red line, the more they preferred the medication; the lower the bar below the red line, the more they preferred the therapy.

Alcoholics and borderlines prefer the therapy. Autistic people strongly prefer the medication, which is weird because there’s no good medication for autism. This could be them hating the social interaction involved in therapy. Or it could be a condemnation of therapies like applied behavior analysis, which can become a sort of confrontational attempt to force them to conform, with potential punishment for failure. The ADHD preference for medication is less surprising; stimulants always get a high approval rating.

Remember, none of these numbers measure whether treatment works – just whether patients are happy. And they’re all vulnerable to selection effects and a host of other biases. Take them as exploratory only. I welcome people trying to replicate or expand on these results. All of the data used in this post are freely available and can be downloaded here.

Survey Results: Sexual Roles

I already started analyzing the SSC survey data on fetishes, but I wanted to move on to look at dominance, submission, sadism, and masochism.

Why might this be interesting? For one thing, some people have fetishes for things that seem, well…bad. Getting hurt. Letting other people control and abuse them. As if they have a drive toward weakness and unhappiness. This is kind of reminiscent of the self-sabotage and bad decisions some people make throughout their lives (for example, marrying a spouse who treats them the same way as an abusive parent). Sometimes I conceptualize this as them having a set point of low self-esteem and degradation that they try to enforce, regardless of its cost to their well-being. If this had the same roots as sexual masochism, that would be worth studying.

But I didn’t find anything interesting like that in the data.

BDSM preferences were heavily gendered. Of people who expressed a preference, 71% of cis men preferred the dominant role, compared to only 16% of cis women (18% of trans women; insufficient sample size of trans men). This was such a big difference that gender swamped every other effect, so I limited the analysis to cis men from this point on, since they made up most of the sample.

80% of straight men preferred the dominant role, compared to only 34% of gay men. This was such a big difference that orientation swamped every other effect, so I limited the analysis to straight cis men from this point on.

In order of importance, here are some factors that made the men in this sample more likely to be dominant, rather than submissive. All of these are self-rated:

– Good social skills
– High risk taking
– High ambition
– Conservative political values
– Low anxiety
– High status
– Belief that others are trustworthy

Forget the lurid stories about high-powered executives who secretly want to be abused and degraded. Most of these are pretty straightforward. The more successful and less neurotic a man’s personality, the more likely he is to be sexually dominant. But none of these are big effects. For example, conservatives are more dominant than liberals, but the exact numbers are 83% vs. 70%. Straight men are still mostly dominant, regardless of politics.

Submissive men reported lower sex drive, fewer dates (9 vs. 18), fewer sexual partners (5 vs. 11), and fewer long-term relationships (2.7 vs. 3.5) than dominant men. This probably has to do with the worse social skills and decreased risk taking.

This was so boring that I tried switching to sadism vs. masochism. Most self-reported sadists were also self-reported masochists, so I took only the subset of people who reported one but not the other. This showed similar patterns to dominance vs. submission, so much so that it’s not worth going over them separately.

Two mildly interesting findings. First, although psychiatric issues in general only affected these roles weakly and inconsistently, men with OCD were four times less likely to be sadists (and somewhat more likely to be masochists) than anyone else. This seems like an extreme form of the effect of high anxiety, plus maybe an obsessive fear of hurting someone else, or a response to feelings of guilt.

Second, although there was no effect of self-reported childhood trauma, men who grew up poor reported about twice the sexual sadism rates of people who grew up rich or middle-class; whether or not you were currently poor mattered a little less. Given how many comparisons I did, I’m not very confident in this result even though the effect size is pretty big.

The data didn’t support any kind of connection between dominance/submission/sadism/masochism and more prosaic forms of selfishness or self-sacrifice. Men were about equally likely to give money to charity, or identify as effective altruists, or hold various opinions in moral philosophy, regardless of their sexual roles.

Although I’ve made every other part of the survey publicly available, given the sensitivity of fetishes I’m keeping these particular answers private. If you are a professional researcher (or an amateur researcher with a good track record of professionalism and data integrity), and you want to test these results, please email me at scott[at]slatestarcodex[dot]com and we can discuss how to make that happen.

Gay Rites Are Civil Rites

I.

I went to Antigua Guatemala in April. Their claim to fame is the world’s biggest Easter celebration. I wasn’t even there for Easter. I was three weeks early. But already the roads were choked with pre-parties, practice parades, and centurion cosplayers.


I couldn’t go out and grab dinner at 9 PM because all the streets looked like this

Day. Night. The hours of the morning when tourists are trying to sleep and don’t want loud Spanish singing outside their hotel windows. It didn’t stop. Some people bore the floats on their backs (they weren’t motorized, they had to be carried like a sedan chair). Other people crowded into empty lots and backyards, putting finishing touches on art or costumes or paraphernalia. Children and teenagers ran around in Easter purple, jockeying for the best spots on the parade routes. Civic dignitaries stood around, practicing looking important for their turn in the celebrations.


I missed the scene in the Bible where a winged mechanical lion drags the body of Christ in an intricate silver juggernaut, but the Guatemalans definitely didn’t.

This was around the time I was reading about cultural evolution, so I couldn’t help rehearsing some familiar conservative arguments. A shared religion binds people together. For a day, everyone is on the same side. That builds social trust and helps turn a city into a community. It was hard to argue with that. I’m no expert in Guatemala. I don’t even speak Spanish. But for a little while, everybody, old and young, rich or poor, whatever one Guatemalan political party is and whatever the other Guatemalan political party is, were caught up in the same great wave, swept together by the glory of the Easter narrative.

It was the sort of thing, I thought sadly to myself, that would never happen back in America, where we didn’t have the same kind of shared religious purpose, where the liberal traditions like the separation of church and state prevented the same kind of all-consuming state-sponsored dedication to a single narrative. Right?

II.

After five minutes I realized of course this was false. I’ve been to Fourth of July parades. Not recently; I live in the Bay Area, where the Fourth of July parades are pretty disappointing. But I remember when I was very young, my parents took me to a town in the California mountains famous for its Independence Day celebrations, and there was a respectable level of parading. Maybe a little deficient in the winged mechanical lion department, but respectable. The Mayor and City Council came by in fancy old automobiles. Marching bands played patriotic music. All the cops drove by in their cop cars; all the firefighters drove by in their fire engines. The Boy Scouts marched by waving posters that said THE BOY SCOUTS. The local charitable organizations marched by waving posters that said LOCAL CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS. Adorable little children marched irregularly in a vaguely forward direction. Sometimes there were dogs wearing red-white-and-blue beads around their necks, and if you stood close enough to the fences blocking off the street, you could reach out and pet them.

It might not have been super-high-production-value. The point is, I got the same feeling I got in Guatemala. Every building, from government offices to stores to private houses, was decorated with red-white-and-blue flags and streamers. All the civic dignitaries stood around looking important. There was a sense that we’d captured the best of both worlds. We’d stuck to our liberal principles of not having a state religion. But we’d also come together as a community – not just some small group of people holding a parade for themselves, but the honest-to-goodness government declaring that we were all going to come together and do this. And we did, not because we were forced, but out of genuine affection for the cause being paraded for. It was the same sense of rich and poor and old and young joining together in a single narrative and ending up a stronger and tighter community.

Sociologists like to talk about the American civil religion, the sense in which patriotism serves the role in America that a state church used to hold in a lot of more traditional countries. Figures like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln (and now also MLK) take on a quasi-prophetic significance. Independence Day becomes the sort of festival that ancient Greece or Rome would have held in honor of the gods. The troops become martyrs, the Constitution becomes Scripture (with the Bill of Rights’ Ten Amendments replacing the Ten Commandments) and the Pledge of Allegiance becomes the Lord’s Prayer. King George III replaces Pharaoh as a watchword for tyranny, Benedict Arnold replaces Judas as a watchword for betrayal. Liberty and justice for all stand in for faith, hope, and charity.


We’re not a religion, we just decorated the ceiling of our most important building with a giant mural showing our founder ascending to Heaven surrounded by angels and goddesses, drawn by an artist who used to work for the Pope drawing near-identical pictures of the Assumption Of The Virgin Mary.

I’m a pretty big believer in the theory of an American civil religion. For me, the important part of religion isn’t the part with gods, prophets, or an afterlife – Buddhism lacks gods, traditional Judaism doesn’t have much of an afterlife, and both get along just fine. It’s about a symbiosis between a society and an ideology. On the most basic level, it’s the answer to a series of questions. What is our group? Why are we better than the outgroup? Why is our social system legitimate?

For most of history, all religion was civil religion – if not of a state, then of a nation. Shinto for the Japanese, Judaism for the Israelites, Olympianism for the Greeks, Hinduism for the Indians. This was almost tautological; religion (along with language and government) was what defined group boundaries, divided the gradients of geography and genetics into separate peoples. A shared understanding of the world and shared rituals kept societies together. Later religions transcended ethnicity to create entirely new supernational communities of believers. Sometimes these were a threat to their host nation, creating a new locus of cultural power. Other times the host nation converted and lived in comfortable symbiosis with them, and the king would get called His Most Catholic Majesty or something.


We’re not a religion, we just put a 30-foot tall stone idol in the center of our capital. And we make our king leave a sacrificial offering before it on the same day every year. Then we spend the next few days arguing about whether he truly meant it in his heart or was just going through the motions.

But this argument still follows the conservative playbook. Say it with me: patriotism is a great force uniting our country. Now liberals aren’t patriotic enough, so the country is falling apart. The old answers ring hollow. What is our group? America? Really? Why are we better than the outgroup? Because we have God and freedom and they are dirty commies? Say this and people will just start talking about how our freedom is a sham and Sweden is so much better. Why is our social system legitimate? Because the Constitution is amazing and George Washington was a hero? Everyone already knows the stock rebuttals to this. The problem isn’t just that the rebuttals are convincing. It’s that these answers have been dragged out of the cathedral of sacredness into the marketplace of open debate; questioning them isn’t taboo – and “taboo” is just the Tongan word for “sacred”. The Bay Area’s lack of civic rituals (so goes the argument) is both a cause and a symptom of a larger problem: the American civil religion has lost its sacredness. That means it can’t answer the questions of group identity, and that communities aren’t as unified as they should be.

III.

Last week I watched the San Francisco Gay Pride Parade.

Everyone should do this once, regardless of their politics. SF Pride should be counted among the great festivals of the world, up there with Mardi Gras in New Orleans and Easter in Guatemala.

It starts on the subway going from wherever you are to the parade route. All the subway stations are decorated with rainbow flags. Most of your subway-mates are obvious revelers. Most of them are teenagers. They’re dressed in rainbow facepaint, rainbow clothing, rainbow jewelery. Some of them have rainbow-dyed hair. Groups spontaneously break into song.

By the time you reach the parade, everything is in full carnival mode. The houses and stores on both sides of the road are hung with rainbow flags, rainbow streamers, and slogans about how LOVE WINS. The people are all either dressed in rainbow clothing, or dressed in weird punk or bondage-adjacent outfits related to the atmosphere in some way.


Thanks to these people for letting me take their picture


I even saw some naked people! I mean, there are parts of San Francisco where I often see naked people. But these were different parts of San Francisco, and there were naked people anyway!

The parade itself hit all the requisite notes. Marching bands. Celebrities. Floats. Adorable children. Charitable organizations. The Governor drove by in his shiny black car. The Mayor, surrounded by adoring supporters. Public streetcars and sightseeing buses, festooned for the occasion.



A typical float.


I think this was sponsored by a seafood restaurant, because it was surrounded by dancing women dressed as seafood dishes.


Somebody told me this was Ariana Huffington, but I have no idea if that’s true.


There were big black vans driving behind him that someone said were the California equivalent of the Secret Service


The banner says “it doesn’t get more SF” than this. I agree a streetcar festooned with gay pride decorations is pretty SF, but it got better. Some socialist activist group was marching ahead of it, and one of the marchers did some kind of dance routine, got distracted, and jumped right in front of the streetcar, which had to make a sudden screeching stop. It doesn’t get more SF than a streetcar festooned with gay pride decorations, with its progress halted by socialists.


Actually, I take it back, a sightseeing bus displaying people’s preferred pronouns might be the most SF thing.

Then came the march of the big corporations. Blue Shield, the health insurance company had a float; with impressive chutzpah, they had chosen the motto “Love Covers All”. Their employees rushed ahead, distributing Blue Shield paddle/fan/advertisements for everyone to wave. The crowd of teenage girls standing next to me accepted them with gusto, waving their Blue Shield fan-paddles and cheering as the Blue Shield delegation passed by.

Apple, Facebook, Google, and Uber were all there. But the show was stolen by Amazon (temporarily rebranded “Glamazon”), who were going for a Santa Claus type image as a source of limitless cornucopian gifts.


The Amazon float featured a rainbow of colorful packages


Get it? “Fulfillment?”


The Amazon Treasure Truck, ready to bring all your wildest dreams

I don’t know when I realized it was a sublimated Fourth of July Parade. But once I figured it out, it wasn’t subtle – and not just because it was being held the weekend before July 4th. The police cars with red-white-and-blue stripes had been replaced by police cars with rainbow stripes. The civic dignitaries waving American flags had been replaced by civic dignitaries waving gay flags. Even the Boy Scouts were still there, in the same place as always.


Police cars in full regalia


Apparently the sheriff’s department is different from the police department. You learn something new every day.


Some third group of basically cop-like people, not sure what’s going on here.


As a gaggle of teenage girls waved their Blue-Shield-advertisement-paddles to cheer on the police, I thought to myself “Yes, this exactly captures the spirit of the original Stonewall rioters”.


The Bud Light float should be your cue that this is less about gayness and more about generic summer holiday Americana


You can tell something’s still hip and countercultural and definitely hasn’t sold out when the Boy Scouts get involved


No, stop with the obvious symbolism! I’m trying to pretend that I’m very insightful for noticing this! Stop it right now!

Am I saying that gay pride has replaced the American civil religion?

Maybe not just because it had a cool parade. But put it in the context of everything else going on, and it seems plausible. “Social justice is a religion” is hardly a novel take. A thousand tradcon articles make the same case. But a lot of them use an impoverished definition of religion, something like “false belief that stupid people hold on faith, turning them into hateful fanatics” – which is a weird mistake for tradcons to make.

There’s another aspect of religion. The one that inspired the Guatemala Easter parade. The group-building aspect. The one that answers the questions inherent in any group more tightly bound than atomic individuals acting in their self-interest:

What is our group? We’re the people who believe in pride and equality and diversity and love always winning.

Why is our group better than other groups? Because those other groups are bigots who are motivated by hate.

What gives our social system legitimacy? Because all those beautiful people in fancy cars, Governor Gavin Newsom and Mayor London Breed and all the rest, are fighting for equality and trying to dismantle racism.


Pictured: a religious festival successfully granting legitimacy to the secular power


More support for the secular power, in this case California senator Kamala Harris.


Still more support for the secular power.


The secular power is starting to get kind of creeped out, and wants to clarify that it only likes you as a friend.

IV.

“Civil religion” is a surprising place for social justice to end up. Gay pride started at Stonewall as a giant fuck-you to civil society. Homeless people, addicts, and sex workers told the police where they could shove their respectable values.

But there was another major world religion that started with beggars, lepers, and prostitutes, wasn’t there? One that told the Pharisees where to shove their respectable values. One whose founder got in trouble with the cops of his time. One that told its followers to leave their families, quit their jobs, give away all their possessions, and welcome execution at the hands of the secular authorities.


We’re not a religion, we just parade images of martyrs up and down the streets.

The new faith burst into a world dominated by the religio Romana, the civil religion par excellence. Emperor Augustus had just finished moral reforms promoting all the best values: chastity, family, tradition, patriotism, martial valor. Lavishly dressed procurators and proconsuls were building beautiful marble temples across the known world, spreading the rites with all the pomp and dignity befitting history’s greatest empire.

The problem was, nobody really believed religio Romana anymore. Everyone believed it was important to have all the best values, like chastity and military valor and so on. But nobody took Jupiter very seriously, or thought the Emperor was legitimate in some kind of sacred way.

When the new religion of beggars and lepers encountered the old religion of emperors and philosophers, the latter crumbled. But as Christianity expanded to the upper classes, it started looking, well, upper-class. It started promoting all the best values. Chastity, family, tradition, patriotism, martial valor. You knew the Pope was a good Christian because he lived in a giant palace and wore a golden tiara. Nobody ever came out and said Jesus was wrong to love prostitutes, but Pope Sixtus V did pass a law instituting the death penalty for prostitution, in Jesus’ name. Nobody ever came out and said Jesus was wrong to preach peace, but they did fight an awful lot of holy wars.


We’re not a religion, we just want to spread our truth to every corner of the world

At some point it got kind of ridiculous. I don’t know how much clearer Jesus could have been about “rich = bad”, but the prosperity gospel – the belief that material wealth is a sign of God’s favor – is definitely a thing. The moral of the story is: religion adapts to the demands placed on it. If it becomes a civil religion, it will contort itself until it looks like a civil religion. It will have all the best values.

Everything happens faster these days. It took Christianity three hundred years to go from Christ to Constantine. It only took fifty for gay pride to go from the Stonewall riots to rainbow-colored gay bracelets urging you to support your local sheriff deparment.


No, I’m not making that up

I can hear my conservative readers getting apoplectic: what about families? Family values are the most important legitimizing, community-building, wisdom-encoding part of Christianity! Homosexuality is anti-family and therefore can never be a true civil religion. Sure, you can twist social justice into support for sufficiently progressive government officials, but fifty years of cultural evolution isn’t going to make it into a pro-family movement, right?

About that:

Yeah, sure, all of this has context. “Proud Of Our Families” is supposed to be about people not being ashamed of their non-standard family structures (eg two fathers), although realistically I saw a lot of pretty hetero-looking families marching along. “We Celebrate All Families” is supposed to mean “including families with trans and gay people”. My point isn’t that everyone has suddenly forgotten about homosexuality, my point is that the celebration of gay pride is expressing itself in very predictable ways, after only fifty years. Christianity will mumble something about loving your parents as we love God our Heavenly Father, but that doesn’t mean that its family values are fake, or just a fig leaf for theology. It means cultural evolution works with what it’s got.

In a hundred years, will social justice look exactly like Christianity does now? No. The world’s changed too much. Even if every religion converges on the same set of socially useful values, the socially useful values change. We don’t need to push chastity if we have good STD treatment and contraception; we don’t need to push martial valor if all our wars are fought by drones. The old religions are failing partly because they can’t adapt quickly enough; social justice won’t need to imitate their failures. And Christianity is far from a homogenous mass; it has everything from golden-tiara-ed monarchs to barefoot street preachers to corporate megachurches to tonsured priests.


We’re not a religion…but we do have Levites!

But I expect it to recapitulate the history of other civil religions in fast-forward. Did you know “pagan” is just Latin for “rural”? The pagans, the people who kept resisting Christianity even after it had conquered the centers of power, were the Roman equivalent of flyover states. Once Pride assimilates its own pagans (and kicks out its own Julian the Apostate), maybe it mellows out. Maybe it becomes more tolerant, the same way Christians eventually started painting Greek gods on everything. Maybe it encounters the same problems other faiths encountered and adapts to them the same way.

Maybe a decade or a century from now, we have all the best values.


“Though the cause of evil prosper; yet ’tis Truth alone is strong
And albeit she wander outcast now, I see around her throng
Troops of beautiful tall angels, to enshield her from all wrong.”

Style Guide: Not Sounding Like An Evil Robot

The saying goes: “Never offend people with style when you can offend them with substance”. This is the same idea as “weirdness points”: you can only bother people a certain amount before they go away. So if you have something important to bother them about, don’t also bother them in random ways that don’t matter.

In writing about science or rationality, you already risk sounding too nerdy or out-of-touch with real life. This doesn’t matter much if you’re writing about black holes or something. But if you’re writing about social signaling, or game theory, or anything else where the failure mode is sounding like an evil robot trying to reduce all of life to numbers, you should avoid anything that makes you sound even more like that evil robot.

(yes, people on the subreddit, I’m talking about you)

I’m not always great at this, but I’m improving, and here’s the lowest-hanging fruit: if there are two terms for the same thing, a science term and an everyday life term, and you’re talking about everyday life, use the everyday life term. The rest of this post is just commentary on this basic idea.

1. IQ -> intelligence. Don’t use “IQ” unless you’re talking about the result of an IQ test, talking about science derived from these results, or estimating IQ at a specific number. Otherwise, say “intelligence” (as a noun) or “smart” as an adjective.

Wrong: “John is a very high-IQ person”
Right: “John is a very smart person”.

Wrong: “What can I do if I feel like my low IQ is holding me back?”
Right: “What do I do if I feel like my low intelligence is holding me back?”

Acceptable: “The average IQ of a Nobel-winning physicist is 155”.
Acceptable: “Because poor childhood nutrition lowers IQ, we should make sure all children have enough to eat.”

2. Humans -> people. This will instantly make you sound 20% less like an evil robot. Use “humans” only when specifically contrasting with another animal:

Wrong: “I’ve been wondering why humans celebrate holidays.”
Right: “I’ve been wondering why people celebrate holidays.”

Acceptable: “Chimpanzees are much stronger than humans.”

3. Males -> men, females -> women. You can still use “male” and “female” as adjectives if you really want.

Wrong: “Why do so many males like sports?”
Right: “Why do so many men like sports?”

Acceptable, I guess: “Why do male sports fans drink so much?”

Use “males” and “females” as nouns only if you’re making a point that applies across animal species, trying overly hard to sound scientifically credible, or arguing some kind of complicated Gender Studies point that uses “man” and “male” differently.

Acceptable: “In both rats and humans, males have higher testosterone than females.”

4. Rational -> good, best, reasonable, etc. See eg here. Use “rational” when describing adherence to a good cognitive strategy; use “good” etc for things that have good results.

Wrong: “What is the most rational diet?”
Right: “What is the best diet?”

Wrong: “Is it rational to invest in bonds?”
Right: “Is it a good idea to invest in bonds?”

Acceptable: “Are more rational people more likely to succeed in politics?” (if asking whether people who follow certain cognitive rules like basing their decisions on evidence will succeed more than those who don’t. Notice that you cannot sensibly replace this with “good” or “best” – “Are better people more likely to succeed in politics?” is meaningless (unless you switch to the moral value of “better”)

5. Optimal -> best. I feel kind of hypocritical for this one because the link above says to replace “rational” with “optimal”. But if you really want to go all the way, replace “optimal” with “best”, unless you have a specific reason for preferring the longer word.

Wrong: “What’s the optimal way to learn this material?”
Right: “What’s the best way to learn this material?”

6. Utility -> happiness, goodness. Use utility only when talking about utilitarian philosophy.

Wrong: “Will getting more exercise raise my utility?”
Right: “Will getting more exercise make me better off?”

Wrong: “What is the highest-utility charity?”
Right: “What is the best charity?” or “Which charity helps people the most?”

The same applies to “utility function”.

Wrong: “My utility function contains a term for animal suffering.”
Right: “I care about animal suffering.”

7. Autistic -> nerdy. Use autistic when referring to a psychiatric diagnosis or a complicated package of sensory and cognitive issues. Use “nerdy” when referring to people who are book-smart but lack social graces.

Wrong: “Haha, my friends and I are so autistic, we talk about physics all the time.”
Right: “Haha, my friends and I are so nerdy, we talk about physics all the time.”

8. Neoreactionary -> right-wing, far-right, reactionary. Use neoreactionary when talking specifically about the philosophy of Mencius Moldbug, if you think you’ve looked into it and understand it. If you’re just referring to far-right ideas, use far-right.

Wrong: “I disagree with neoreactionary ideas like traditional gender roles.”
Right: “I disagree with right-wing ideas like traditional gender roles.”

In general, beware of attributing very broad and complicated ideas to local bloggers. Local bloggers often repackage or reinterpret larger tendencies from outside philosophy. This is useful and important work, but if you ever say anything that could be interpreted as identifying them as inventing those tendencies, people will jump on that and make fun of you. There’s not a hard and fast line between inventing a (specific) idea and reinterpreting a (broader) idea. But most local bloggers aren’t glory hogs, so they won’t get mad if you err on the side of non-attribution, or just linking to their good explanations of these ideas without specifying they’re the inventors.

Relatedly, Blue Tribe -> Democrats/liberals/leftists, Red Tribe -> Republicans/conservatives/rightists, almost always. When I coined those terms I was trying to explain how Democrats/Republicans were the tip of an iceberg of related traits, but now that the message has sunk in I think it’s reasonable to call that iceberg by the name everyone else uses.

9. High probability of -> Probably. Use “high probability” when discussing probability theory; use “probably” when discussing the real world. You can also say “most likely”.

Wrong: “There’s a high probability I’ll get the job.”
Right: “I’ll probably get the job.”

Saying “50-50”, “90 percent change”, or “99 percent chance” casually is probably okay. In popular writing, you should avoid any more specific use of a numeric probability (like “70% chance I’ll get the job”) unless you really have some good reason for thinking it’s 70 rather than 75 (like that you used some kind of algorithm to calculate it), or unless you think your intuitions can really distinguish between 70 and 75 percent probabilities (superforecasters can!) and want to make a very formal prediction.

10. Meme -> idea, belief. Use “meme” only when analogizing ideas to organisms undergoing evolutionary selection (or for silly cat pictures).

Wrong: “Pro-military memes are everywhere in America”.
Right: “Pro-military beliefs are everywhere in America”.

11. Status -> popularity, respect. My feelings on this one aren’t quite as strong; if you really want to use “status”, use “status”. But I think if you’re trying hard to appeal to ordinary people, you’ll want to take it out.

Wrong: “He’s high status in this community.”
Right: “He’s well-respected in this community.”

Wrong: “Bob was really low status in high school”
Right: “Bob was really unpopular in high school”

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 560 Comments