Addendum To “Economists On Education”

A couple of people have challenged my essay yesterday, saying that they didn’t find the article misleading (or that it was only very slightly misleading).

They argue that it pointed out that economists were overwhelmingly in favor of ride-sharing arguments like Uber, but only somewhat in favor of school vouchers. Therefore, it’s fair to say that “economists don’t generally buy school vouchers” in the same sense that they “generally buy” Uber.

This would have been a fine thing to say, but I think the article failed to make this point and instead phrased its argument in a way that made it unlikely to readers to conclude anything other than that economists generally were not in favor of vouchers.

First, I feel like you could write exactly the opposite headline. “Public School: Economists Generally Don’t Buy It”. You would cite the statistic that “only 19% of economists surveyed disagree with the statement that school vouchers would improve education over the existing public system”. Then you could explain some public choice theory about how economists believe government services generally do poorly. This would be exactly as honest or misleading as the existing article. Yet it would produce exactly the opposite impression in readers’ minds: the original article makes you think economists mostly oppose school vouchers, the changed article makes you think they mostly support them. If newspapers are allowed to interpret data so loosely that they can use it to draw two different conclusion precisely opposite each other, what’s the point of having data?

Second, the article uses economists “not buying it” as a segue into a description of why economic theory says school choice could be a bad idea. But it seems like the majority of economists are not convinced by this argument. That is, both the 1/3 of economists who agree and the 1/3 of economists who are uncertain don’t accept the author’s argument that economic theory proves school vouchers can’t work as obviously true (the uncertain ones may be uncertain whether it’s true or not). This gives it a credibility it doesn’t deserve.

Third, really, if this same article was on Breitbart, and it used a survey showing that 40% of economists supported climate change legislation, 40% were uncertain, and 20% opposed it, and it described this as “Economists Generally Don’t Buy Climate Change Solution”, nobody would think anything untoward had happened and they would all agree this was a perfectly fair and unbiased summary of the evidence?

Fourth, you can do this for anything because there’s no clear definition of “uncertain”. How sure does an economist have to be before she “agrees” with a statement rather than being “uncertain” about it. If you are 51% sure school vouchers help, are you pro-voucher or uncertain? What about 60% sure? What about 90% sure? Suppose that all economists believe with 70% probability that vouchers will be good. If your criteria for “certain” is “80% or above”, then as long as you separate them out into support/uncertain/oppose, you can “honestly” declare that “no economists support school vouchers” and convince everyone that it must be an economically absurd plan. Yet I would hope that on any controversial issue more complicated than Uber, most economists are at least a little uncertain about it. We shouldn’t view that as legitimizing us to say that the economic consensus is whatever we want it to be.

Fifth and related, if you look at the economists’ comments, a lot of the people who self-described as “uncertain” thought vouchers would be good on net, but didn’t like the question because they thought it implied that literally 100% of students would be better off. This was such a problem that the IGM redid the study a year later, this time asking whether vouchers would make most students better off. 44% of economists agreed, compared to only 5% who disagreed (again, 34% were uncertain). Weighted by confidence, >50% of the economists agreed that vouchers would improve things, compared to only 6% who thought it wouldn’t improve things – a difference of almost ten times more economists agreeing that vouchers would help compared to disagreeing!

In the face of all of this, the New York Times gives the field’s opinion as “Free Market In Education: Economists Generally Don’t Buy It”.

I’m trying to be more empirical these days, so if you disagree with me, let me make you a bet – and I seriously mean I’ll bet money on this if anyone wants to take me up on it. We find ten random people of ordinary intelligence and economics knowledge and show them this article. Then we ask them a question like “according to this article, what is the economic consensus on vouchers?” We assure them that this isn’t a trick question and they’re just supposed to honestly give the impression they get from the article. If they say something like “they’re generally against vouchers”, I win the bet. If they say something like “probably more economists support vouchers than oppose them, but many are uncertain”, you win the bet. I am willing to alter exact terms if you have a better idea. I am willing to make this bet at 10:1 odds, so if you think there is any chance at all this article is not misleading it should be easy money for you.

[EDIT: I am going to take a version of this bet with Noah Smith. I don’t need to take it with any more people. Offer is now closed.]

[EDIT 2: Noah Smith is apparently no longer willing to bet me on this, although he refuses loudly and at great length to say whether that means he now agrees with me that most people would get a false impression of economists’ position from the article. Is there anyone else who wants to take a bet on these terms or any others?]

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 86 Comments

Contra NYT On Economists On Education

[epistemic status: still having a hard time believing I am right about this, but have double-checked. Tell me if I’m missing something. Correction: I previously left the word “Generally” out of the title by accident. I have slightly softened a claim about ‘journalistic malpractice’ based on many people apparently finding the phrasing less misleading than I do.]

From today’s New York Times: Free Market For Education: Economists Generally Don’t Buy It:

The odds are good that privatizing education will be part of the agenda for President-elect Donald J. Trump’s administration. […] You might think that most economists agree with this overall approach, because economists generally like free markets. For example, over 90 percent of the members of the University of Chicago’s panel of leading economists thought that ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft made consumers better off by providing competition for the highly regulated taxi industry.

But economists are far less optimistic about what an unfettered market can achieve in education. Only a third of economists on the Chicago panel agreed that students would be better off if they all had access to vouchers to use at any private (or public) school of their choice.

While economists are trained about the value of free markets, they are also trained to spot when markets can’t work alone and government intervention is required.

This is followed by a long discussion of market failures and externalities, with the implication that this is the sort of knowledge that economists are using to come to their anti-voucher views.

But look at the NYT’s source for its claim about economists:

36% of economists agree that vouchers would improve education, compared to 19% who disagree. The rest are unsure or didn’t answer the question. The picture looks about the same when weighted by the economists’ confidence.

A more accurate way to summarize this graph is “About twice as many economists believe a voucher system would improve education as believe that it wouldn’t.”

By leaving it at “only a third of economists support vouchers”, the article implies that there is an economic consensus against the policy. Heck, it more than implies it – its title is “Free Market For Education: Economists Generally Don’t Buy It”. But its own source suggests that, of economists who have an opinion, a large majority are pro-voucher.

(note also that the options are only “agree that vouchers will improve education” and “disagree that vouchers will improve education”, so that it’s unclear from the data if any dissenting economists agree with the Times’ position that vouchers will make things worse. They might just think that things would stay the same.)

I think this is really poor journalistic practice and implies the opinion of the nation’s economists to be the opposite of what it really is. I hope the Times prints a correction.

[see follow-up post here]

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 337 Comments

Book Review: Mount Misery

[Content warning: psychiatric abuse (especially around borderline personality), rape, spoilers for Mount Misery]

I.

Last month I reviewed Samuel Shem’s House of God. The sequel, Mount Misery, is about his time training in psychiatry. This is obviously relevant to my interests, so I picked it up.

It’s weird to accuse someone of writing a cheap knockoff of their own book, but Mount Misery reads like a cheap House of God knockoff. There are all the same elements – a young doctor, an incompetent system, cruel hospital administrators, a kind mentor. But in the first book, it all came together perfectly. In this one, it was more hit-and-miss. Sometimes the imagery clicked; other times, it just seemed like caricatures. Creepy magical realism alternated with guys who announced “I hate patients! Let’s just pump them as full of drugs as possible and leave them to die!” and then zoomed away in fancy sports cars they bought with pharma money. Maybe it’s just less funny when it hits closer to home? I don’t know, but it was less funny.

The book’s frame story follows Dr. Roy Basch, who has left his abusive medical internship to do a psychiatric residency at the Mount Misery hospital, lured there by the kind and decent Dr. Ike White. But Dr. White commits suicide Basch’s first month of the job, the hospital administration ineptly covers it up, and nobody wants to talk about it – something something metaphor even psychiatrists stigma something metaphor. Having lost his mentor, Basch is thrown back and forth among various attendings – the one who thinks Freud solves everything, the one who thinks drugs solve everything, the one who thinks a thinly-veiled parody of Otto Kernberg solves everything, et cetera. The only sympathetic character is Dr. Malik, who tells Basch to ignore the theories and try to connect with his patients as human beings; Malik is of course loathed by all the other doctors and ostracized from all the good positions in the institution.

The typical psychiatric treatment in Mount Misery works as follows: Take someone who has some awful stuff going on in their life but is pretty much functional. Declare them to be a perfect example of whichever theory is popular that week (“this person clearly is obsessed with the idea of sucking their father’s penis”), then insult any underlings who don’t buy-in as being ignorami who refuse to understand the complexities of the human mind. Ignore all of the patient’s human needs in favor of the theory – if they complain that their room is cold, tell them that’s a reflection of the coldness of their father. If they protest that no, they’re really cold, then mark them as “resistant” and double-down on your theory since they obviously need a lot of help. The angrier the patient gets, the more you’ve obviously hit a nerve and the better a psychiatrist you are. Repeat the process until they are curled up in a ball, completely nonfunctional, which you will call “successfully regressing the patient” and “revealing the repressed pathology”. Then keep them in hospital until their insurance runs out, at which point discharge them to be someone else’s problem.

When someone like Dr. Malik doesn’t do the typical treatment, the fact that his patients never get reduced to curled-up balls gets held against him. He’s so “superficial” that he just takes the patient’s complaints about being cold as a reference to real physical coldness in the environment! If his patients say they’re upset at losing their job, he’s so “superficial” that he just talks to them about their job and how they can support themselves financially! A janitor could do that! When his patients fail to be reduced to curled-up balls of rage, that obviously proves he’s not nailing their real emotional problems, not getting past their defenses, not successfully regressing people, and just generally incompetent.

The master of this kind of anti-treatment is Dr. Heller – the hospital’s specialist in borderline personality disorder – who believes that it’s psychodynamically important to bring out the latent negative transference in borderlines (ie make them hate you). When Dr. Basch, at Dr. Malik’s urging, tries being nice to a borderline patient instead, and gets much better results than Heller ever has, the expert lectures him on his mistake:

Heiler explained that his technique, “confrontation”, had evoked the anger that was hidden in each and every borderline. “She wasn’t angry at me“, he said, “it was her transference to me. She was distorting her real relationship with me based on early infantile experiences, with her bad mom, in the first year of life.”

“But she was angry at you,” I said. “Anyone would be.”

“Not that angry,” he said. “Not borderline angry.”

“How do you know that she’s a borderline?”

“Because of that incredible anger.”

“But she didn’t start out angry – you provoked it.”

“Who says?”

“I do! It was obvious.”

You? You, who’ve been a psychiatrist two whole months? You don’t know diddly-squat about treating borderlines. Your so-called ‘concern’ is going to be a real problem – you’re already overinvolved, imagining that you can rescue her. To you, what I did seemed cruel, right? […]

His voice softened, and he went on, “Look. I know that the first time you see it, this theory seems strange – it’s counterintuitive. If just being nice to borderlines worked, don’t you think I would do it? Of course I would! In fact, I tried, way back, at first. But it’s like dealing with difficult children: you’ve got to be firm. Everybody knows that if you don’t dig up the Latent Negative Transference in these gals, next thing you know you’ve got people killing themselves, or killing other people. For fifty years people have been trying to cure borderlines by being ‘nice and human’ to them. Everybody felt better, nobody got better. It’s easy to act nice, it’s hard as hell to stand firm and confront the rage locked up in borderlines. Borderlines are hell. There aren’t too many of us left who have the guts to treat ’em. I’ve specialized in borderlines for years and years, and I’ve seen what works: You go through that rage to the truth, to their miserable pain and suffering, and believe me, they get better.”

“But,” Solini said, “I mean, everyone agrees that the lady [did get better when we were nice to her]”

“In this case,” Blair said, “Better is worse. She’ll have to get worse – which is in fact better – in order to get better, which will still be worse. If she gets a little worse, she won’t get a lot better, but if she gets a lot worse, she may get a little better. Not smarmy-‘nice’ better. Borderline better…Don’t worry, Roy. Your overinvolvement with her is normal. Sick, but normal. Gals like her are experts at getting guys like you entangled. Read my paper, Rescue Fantasies In The Naive Resident

This speech could be a word-for-word transcription of something one of my attendings said to me during my intern year when I tried being nice to a borderline patient. There is a subtle sense in which this attitude can sometimes be helpful. But get the subtlety even slightly wrong and it devolves into being really evil, and Mount Misery brings out the worst in it.

Dr. Basch’s first therapy patient is a man named Cherokee, a rich WASP lawyer. He’s obsessed with the paranoid fantasy that his wife is having an affair with her psychoanalyst, a Mount Misery luminary named Dr. Dove. Basch tries everything with Cherokee – drugging him up, uncovering his latent homosexuality, suggesting he hates his father – but eventually Cherokee commits suicide anyway (“eventually he commits suicide anyway” will be a common theme among characters in this book.) In the aftermath, it is discovered that – surprise! – his wife was having an affair with her psychoanalyst, and also it was kind of coercive and bordered on rape.

Basch starts an investigation and learns that this same Dr. Dove is molesting a bunch of his female patients, and various other tangentially related people for good measure. He tries to expose Dove, but Dove denies everything, and he’s a bigwig who can get the administration to take his side.

The description of the ensuing investigation is beautifully done, precisely because it avoids some of the caricatures of the rest of the book. Dr. Dove isn’t portrayed as an ogre grumbling about “lying whores” or whatever. He sounds to all the world like a caring psychoanalyst, who understands that his patients are fragile and that stress of discussing sexual fantasies in psychoanalysis can sometimes break out into the patient’s consciousness and cause them to behave as if those fantasies actually occur. Yet all of this just serves to make him creepier and more hate-able.

In a particularly sharp scene, Dove capitalizes on the occasion to team up with a colleague and offer workshops about how to protect yourself from false accusations of assault in psychiatry:

The slide show ended. Dr. Shpitzer then made a heartfelt statement that patient-psychiatrist contact was absolutely off-limits. Touching the patient, but for a handshake, was off limits. A hug was totally out of bounds. Yet what was the psychiatrist to do when a female patient, maybe a borderline or dissociative or multiple, suddenly got up out of his chair and approached, intent on hugging him? Dr. Shpitzer asked Dr. Dove to demonstrate. Schlomo, ever the showman, popped to his feet.

First Shptizer said he would show us all what not to do, and told Shlomo to go ahead. Playing the woman patient, Schlomo started toward Shptizer, arms forward. Shpitzer crouched in a martial-arts stance and with a scream _ HYAH! – karate-chopped Schlomo’s hands down…The discussion then centered on variants of this technique. Dr. Shpitzer passed out his brochure, describing his video course – “Six Quick Steps To Avoid The Pitfalls Of Risk” – which we could all buy for $399.95. This would allow us to pass out risk-management requirements for state relicensure as shrinks in the comfort and privacy of our very own homes.”

A psychiatrist actually rapes a patient, he doesn’t get punished because he’s a very important guy who’s friends with all the bigwigs, but everyone has to feel like they’re doing something, so they ban all normal human contact with patients, and also sell $399.95 courses that you can use to prove you’re compliant with patient protection regulations. This may be the best metaphor for life that I have ever heard.

(it doesn’t hurt that I’ve had to go through courses on whether it’s ever appropriate to hug patients, or that I once had to finagle my way out of attending a conference that was basically this guy’s $399.95 video lecture)

II.

One of the main themes of this book is that psychoanalysis makes people worse.

The book doesn’t claim that psychoanalysis isn’t effective. It treats it as powerful and worthy of respect. The book’s psychoanalysts are consistently able to tell weird facts about a person from just a glance, to strip them down to their deepest insecurities in minutes. It’s just that people who are healthy and decent going into psychoanalysis end up cracked and nasty coming out of it. A lot of the worst doctors at Mount Misery were decent people before they started getting analyzed themselves. Of course, it would have helped if their analyst wasn’t a sexual predator, but the book treats the process as dangerous even aside from that.

When Basch asks his supervisor Dr. Lowell what to do about the man who believes Dr. Dove is having an affair with his wife, Dr. Lowell describes the analytic technique:

“But what about Schlomo fucking his wife? You don’t think it’s true?

“There is no truth, there is only the individual perception of experience.”

“Wait a minute. The truth is that I’m taller than you.”

“That’s not the truth, that’s your transference to me.”

“We can measure it. To see who in fact is taller.”

“You think ‘taller’ can be measured?”

I saw her point. She wasn’t only aware of the objective fact, she was also aware of the deeper meaning psychologically. “But I’m stuck,” I said. “I don’t know what to do.”

“You have to go deeper into his obsession, find the deeper meaning, the roots of it in his childhood, his past.”

This was exactly what Malik had warned me against doing. Suspicious, I asked: “How?”

“If he talks feeling, you talk thought. If he talks thought, you talk feeling. If he talks past, you talk present. If he talks present, you talk past. You the doctor talk constantly about what he the patient doesn’t want to talk about. This is the analysis of the resistance. Then, when he starts distorting his relationship with you and calling you a sonofabitch for not talking about what he wants to talk about, then you do the analysis of the transference, telling him he’s treating you like his father, his mother, his aunt Sally, whatever. On a deeper level still, you can analyze the resistance to the transference, and the transference to the resistance. Not to mention the countertransference to each – but that’s still way beyond you at this point.”

Finally I felt I was getting some concrete advice about what to do in therapy.

I highlighted this last line because this is seriously much more concrete and actionable advice than anyone has ever given me about psychodynamic therapy and I’ve been doing it for two years.

And a lot of this rings true. I remember one time one of my patients missed a session because his flight back from vacation was delayed. I told my supervisor this and he got angry with me, saying it was superficial to blame it on the flight instead of talking about which of my comments had triggered the patient and made him decide to miss his plane. I insisted that we’d had a perfectly good session the week before, that the delayed plane had just been a delayed plane, and me and my supervisor got angrier and angrier at each other for both missing what the other thought was the point. Finally I got on the Internet and managed to prove that my patient’s plane really had been delayed to the point where it was impossible for him to have made my appointment, at which point my supervisor switched the discussion to why it was so important to me to believe that his plane had been delayed that I would do an Internet search about it, and whether I was trying to defend against the unbearable notion that my patient might ever voluntarily miss one of our sessions. My supervisor’s treatment of whether planes ever get delayed seems a lot like Basch’s supervisor’s treatment of who’s taller.

And I don’t think these people are literally so stupid that they don’t understand that there are objective rulers that tell objective height. Trying to steelman this school of psychoanalysis, it’s a sort of as-if game, the professional equivalent of Crowley’s demand that the adept swear an oath “to interpret all phenomena as a direct dealing of God with his soul”. It’s an enforced fast from object-level discussion, where you treat everything as significant as an assumption. My first guess was going to be that this is so that you minimize the Type II errors where you miss something that really is significant, but after thinking about it more I wonder if it’s just that this is a bizarre and unnatural mode of thought that can get you places that normal thought can’t, sort of the same way some people have revelations on LSD not because LSD itself is magic but because it’s so different from normal thought processes that it can uncover things that are otherwise hidden. This could also explain the Freudian obsession with dreams – it’s not that they necessarily mean anything, any more than my patient missing his flight meant something, it’s that they’re a good source of noise to start scrying into.

(another Freudian technique is free association, asking the patient to just say whatever first comes to mind. In Mount Misery, Basch’s patient says “porpoises”, but has no idea why – something had to come to mind, and a porpoise was the first thing to pop into his head. This is a lot more like my own experience with free association than the textbook cases of people suddenly coming up with repressed childhood memories or something)

But this method also reminds me of something else. This is Christopher Hitchens:

“I think Hannah Arendt said that one of the great achievements of Stalinism was to replace all discussion involving arguments and evidence with the question of motive. If someone were to say, for example, that there are many people in the Soviet Union who don’t have enough to eat, it might make sense for them to respond, “It’s not our fault, it was the weather, a bad harvest or something.” Instead it’s always, “Why is this person saying this, and why are they saying it in such and such a magazine? It must be that this is part of a plan.”

The avoidance of object-level discussion in favor of meta-level discussion can get really nasty, really quickly. The book gives one example – if you psychoanalyze rape accusations (“what purpose is it serving in this person’s mental ecosystem to have them accuse their psychiatrist of rape right now?”) then you miss someone who is actually getting raped. This can be more insidious when complaints are less dramatic and less binary – I know a lot of psychiatrists who will respond to people saying their medication isn’t working (or is causing side effects), with analyzing their motives for wanting to piss off their psychiatrist or stay unhealthy. And finally, this is absolutely fatal to any kind of complicated social discussion – the thing where instead of debating someone else’s assertion, you bulverize what self-interest or privilege causes them to believe it.

Basch says:

I breathed in the cleansing sorrow of the rain and stared back up at the castle, and I saw clearly how through psychoanalysis you could know every nook and cranny of yourself and have no idea how to be with anyone, the seeming dazzle of the self blinding you to the connections with others…and I knew then I had once been in touch with people, and that it wasn’t inevitable that we are always shouting across an unbridgeable gap, but rather that the gap was in Freud and monstrous fabrications like [Dr. Lowell] herself who followed after, bereft souls floating untethered in pools of self like lilies in sepsis, the gap was in them, not in the essence of humans, nor in the essence of the whole world.

I stared up at the vigilant street lamp, the cone of glittering sleet in the winter night reaching toward me like a beacon, showing me as clearly as if it were the moment’s sun that the real perversion of Freud and analysis was to take the essence of something and reduce it to something eles – the present to the past, love to hate, joy to misery, life to death – and to do it under the guise of understanding and yet, let’s face it, all the while doing it to escape from what Malik kept saying life at heart actually is – being, without description of that being.

If the book is right about psychoanalysis being destructive, I wonder if this is why. Living on the object level is really good. That’s where all the problems are and generally where the solutions are. It’s a natural, healthy place to live.

III.

The last thing that really struck me about the book was its praise for Alcoholics Anonymous.

In the last chapter of the book, Dr. Malik is revealed to be a recovering alcoholic who relapses when he gets diagnosed with cancer. He ends up committed to his own hospital, where he is first pumped full of irrelevant drugs (of course), then subjected to random people telling him he is a bad person because only bad people would drink. All of this is finally contrasted with Alcoholics Anonymous, treated as a beautiful organization full of caring-yet-pragmatic people that tries to genuinely connect with people and give them what they need to stop drinking.

It’s pretty popular to hate on Alcoholics Anonymous these days. And not without reason – I did a sort of literature review about them a while ago, and while they’re no worse than any other treatment options, they aren’t any better either. Their insistence on acknowledging a Higher Power pisses some people off; their insistence on how they are the only way and if you abandon them you’ll just be a drunk for the rest of your life pisses off others. Yet there are some very smart and very compassionate people – apparently including Mount Misery author Samuel Shem – who absolutely love them. In fact, looking at the About The Author page in the back of the book, it looks like after finishing this novel, Shem wrote a hagiographical play about AA founders Bill W and Dr. Bob.

(I checked to see if Shem has ever been an alcoholic himself, sometimes a common feature of people who are really into AA, but it doesn’t look like it.)

There’s a link between AA and Shem’s constant theme throughout his books – people healing through relationships and human connection. But I was especially interested to see this quote, from an article on his AA play:

And what about God? At the time that the two of them met, neither one had much faith in a traditional, religious God. As Smith said, “I was forced to attend church four times a week. I vowed when I was free I would never darken the door of a church again—a vow I’ve kept, religiously, for forty-odd years.” Wilson, too, had more or less given up on God. Both men had pragmatic reasons: they had tried prayer to God, and it didn’t work to keep them sober. The key to their vision about “God” came from a man named Ebby Thatcher, an old friend of Wilson’s who said, “You don’t have to believe in God, you just have to admit that you’re not God. Use what you do believe in, whatever it is.”

Shem seems really into this. I can’t quite justify this from the text, but I get the feeling that he would even take this to the meta-level, something like “complaining about how AA is exclusionary because it requires you to acknowledge a Higher Power is a good sign that you haven’t completed the personal growth task that ‘acknowledging a Higher Power’ corresponds to.”

This was pretty close to what Dr. Basch decides is the essence of a good psychiatrist during his final-chapter epiphany: he realized that he had to get outside himself. The lesson is a little bit Buddhist, but it also ties in nicely to the condemnation of psychoanalysis – while he was being analyzed, he was focused on “his inner machinery”, focused on how everything he experienced was a reflection of his own mind and desires. The attitude Shem holds up as healthy is the exact opposite of that – being able to think about anything except your own problems and your own status, being able to connect to your patients because you’re experiencing them as human beings.

I’ve been trying to reread some of The Last Psychiatrist and better understand what he means by narcissism, something I haven’t been able to get a good feel for before. I think Shem’s idea of getting outside yourself and “admitting that you’re not God” is close to this, a kind of narcissism therapy, where you can work yourself out of narcissism which allows you to connect to your patients and maybe help them in the same way.

(it also sort of reminds me of C.S. Lewis)

It’s well-known in psychopharmacology that different drugs work on different people, for mysterious reasons. Prozac and Paxil are about equally good in general, but some people will hate Prozac and find Paxil a miracle drug, whereas other people will get better on Prozac and find Paxil does nothing. I wonder if there might be something similar for social interventions like Alcoholics Anonymous. Over the whole population, it won’t outperform any other form of rehab – but there will be a few people for whom it works miracles. Those people will go on to praise it to the skies in all kinds of books and plays and so on – not to mention starting the next generation of Alcoholics Anonymous groups – while everyone else watches bemusedly. Actually, now that I mention this it sounds obviously true and I’m not sure why I wasn’t thinking this way already.

IV.

One of the reasons the psychiatrists in Mount Misery are so bad is that they’re narcissistic, but it’s an understandable narcissism. Someone says “My mom just died”, and you say “I’m sorry for your loss” and let them talk about their memories of their mother? Anyone can do that! Why did they get borderline-tortured throughout their twenties and thirties getting a really prestigious psychiatry degree if they were just going to say “I’m sorry your mom died”? Being able to relate it all to wanting to suck your dad’s penis at least gives them some credibility for all their erudite Freud-knowledge and justifies their $200-an-hour fees. “I’m sorry for your loss” isn’t exactly $200-an-hour level insight.

But I don’t know if Shem has a good solution here. It doesn’t seem like he wants to destroy psychiatry as an institution – he is, after all, a Harvard psychiatry professor. But his fictional bigwigs are right. If all you do is be a decent human being and have one-to-one meaningful discussions with patients, then it doesn’t seem like there’s a point in having MDs for that.

I’ve had a lot of patients with this exact complaint – usually it’s about psychologists or therapists instead of psychiatrists. “She kept telling me to go to sessions, that she was going to help me, and all we did was talk about my problems. I could have had a friend do that. So eventually I just quit and I haven’t been back to see a therapist since. Bunch of quacks.” I hear this kind of thing almost every day. It’s a big fear of mine that somebody thinks it about me. Probably one reason I like psychopharmacology so much is that it makes me feel useful – prescribing imipramine correctly isn’t something that just anybody could do; my patients may or may not get better but at least they’re getting their money’s worth.

I don’t know if Shem thinks that well-trained psychiatrists have some kind of special ability to connect with other people. Based on how horrible every psychiatrist in his book is, plus his preference for self-help groups like AA, it doesn’t look like it. But his rejection of both official therapies and medication doesn’t leave him a lot of outs. Also, it seems pretty obvious even to him that a lot of conditions – like melancholic depression and schizophrenia – don’t just need a kind word and a smile, that they are really complex entities that need a lot of effort and probably a good biochemical understanding before you can do much to them.

If all that Shem is saying is that doing the complicated work of psychiatric treatment – therapies, medications, et cetera – has to be combined with actually caring about the patient and treating them like a human being, then fair enough. But the vitriol of his criticisms of therapy and medication make it hard to read that message. If he’s proposing something more radical, then I’m afraid I didn’t entirely get what it was.

Links 12/16: The Site Before Christmas

International Date Line In Judaism: Some authorities posit a “zone of pure doubt” stretching from longitudes 169W to 177E and containing Tonga, Samoa, and American Samoa, where it is so confusing when to observe Shabbat that Jews should just completely avoid that whole area of the world on weekends.

Science challenge: cure Alzheimers disease. Science challenge, hard mode: cure Alzheimers’ disease with an animated .gif. One team gives it their best shot (news article, paper). Here is a sample 30 Hz stimulus (warning: flashing seizure lights!)

Speaking of flashing seizure lights, Twitter is investigating claims that Trump supporters, angry at an outspoken liberal journalist, tweeted flashing “You Deserve A Seizure” .gifs at him and actually gave him a seizure. We are finally living in the cyberpunk dystopia we were promised.

The man who put up $1.5 million to save 200 Syrian refugees, plus a profile of Canada’s program allowing private citizens to sponsor refugee immigration.

Related to recent discussion of school costs: India’s private and public hospitals are both equally good (bad), but the private hospitals cost only 1/4 as much. Why is this so different from the US picture?

Some jails are banning in-person visits in favor of buggy video calls. Needless to say, a for-profit corporation with a dystopian-sounding name is involved.

More in the “early school starting age is bad” files: earlier school starting age increases crime in US, earlier school starting age increases crime in Denmark, earlier school starting age increases obesity in Australia. Meanwhile, on the other side, James Heckman proposes spending $18,000 per pupil per year to enroll all children in public preschool from birth. (but see here)

Smeed’s Law: London traffic will always travel at 9 mph. Accurate to within 2% over more than 50 years?

Current Affairs: Banning Smoking In Public Housing Is Just Another Experiment On The Poor. I agree with the article but disagree with the title; this policy is not an experiment at all, no one’s looking for any data, it’s just a badly-thought-out law that will control poor people’s lives in an ethos of “we know your values better than you do”. I feel the same way about smoking bans in mental hospitals, which are a bad idea and lead a lot of people who needs hospitalization to reject it; all they accomplish is to make mentally ill smokers miserable for a few days before they leave and go back to their cigarettes.

Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford (ie John Ioannidis’ team) is looking for interested postdocs who want to do a fellowship there.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to mild food shortages in Cuba, and the average citizen lost about ten pounds – making the country a natural laboratory for the health benefits of losing weight.

Buzzfeed: for profit mental hospitals commit people who don’t need hospitalization to increase the bottom line. Yet another example in the genre of “stop privatizing entities with coercive power”, also featuring a big corporation with a dystopian name. Although note that there are factors incentivizing the same behavior, albeit on a lesser scale, in every hospital system.

A warning that the ingroup can be just as vulnerable to bad science as the outgroup: Future Of Life Institute says that adding women to x-risk related groups is a top priority since higher % women “raises group IQ”. But this theory seems on shaky ground after better studies show group IQ is independent of gender of members, mostly just a function of individual IQ. [EDIT: do note that the FLI article was published before the study I cite]

Life imitating XKCD: the guy who runs Snopes.com is rumored to have defrauded the website to pay for prostitutes, and I have no idea where to go to figure out if the story is true.

New essay challenging the effective animal activist movement. Mixture of good and bad claims, not to be taken uncritically, but their point about the “number of animals helped per dollar” figures being wildly exaggerated seem broadly right.

Seasteading leaders meet French Polynesian president, receive positive signals about their plan to build a seastead in the area. I’m a little confused about this: if they’re building in French Polynesian sovereign waters with the approval of the French Polynesian government, how is this better than just building a charter city on land with the approval of that land’s sovereign government?

In 1997, the New York Times and Australian federal government investigated surprisingly plausible rumors that a death cult had detonated a primitive nuclear weapon in the Australian outback

Forget fake news. If you really want to see what’s going on with the media, check out the differing ways the Washington Post versus Marginal Revolution report the same study on historical Asian-American incomes, then read the study itself.

The Reichsbürgerbewegung are kind of the German equivalent of sovereign citizens, and believe that Germany is still legally under the control of the pre-World War II Weimar government; since this government doesn’t exist they believe that legal control devolves to anyone who claims to be the legitimate successor of that government (eg themselves). Some of them go pretty far, appointing their own cabinets, legislatures, etc, consisting of fellow conspiracy theorists.

David Shor: “Democrats’ decline among non-southern white working class voters started with Bill Clinton, not the Civil Rights Act.” (+ graph)

New study analyzes partisan bias in mainstream news sources, finds there’s not very much of it, with a few totally obvious exceptions like Daily Kos and Breitbart (Graph, graph, paper, h/t Anonymous Mugwump). Probably worth pushing and popularizing this; I had hoped that increasing criticism of mainstream media bias would cause papers to clean up their act and consumers to read critically; instead it’s mostly just pushed people away from slightly-biased mainstream sources to incredibly-biased alternative sources. Related chart.

A British journalist reporting on heroin addicts cultivated a heroin addiction to try to better understand his subjects (video link, Reddit thread). He ended up addicted for at least five years, though I’m having trouble finding out if he ever recovered. Relevant to eternal debate about “there’s no such thing as addictive drugs, just people with terrible lives”.

New study suggests female doctors deliver (slightly) better care than male doctors in some situations. As far as I can tell it looks sound and isn’t missing anything obvious. A lot of speculation as to cause, mostly repeating platitudes about women being “more nurturing”, but previous studies have shown female doctors spend more time per patient and I’d look into that first.

The Aztecs, Maya, and Inca never got out of the Stone Age before being conquered, but there was Pre-Columbian Native American tribe that technically made it into the Iron Age: the Dorset Inuit, who cheated by stumbling across a deposit of rare telluric iron which was usable without smelting. Also in “Inuit are cool” news this week: Inuit may have received cold tolerance genes by interbreeding with extinct human subspecies.

H/t Scott Aaronson: a new art form of seeing how complicated and attractive a video you can generate from a 4K exe file. Examples here and here.

Survey of expert opinion on the Flynn effect.

My home state of Michigan takes the lead in legalizing driverless cars.

Study finds that bias is common in introductory psychology textbooks, “particularly related to failing to inform students of the controversial nature of some research fields and repeating some scientific urban legends as if true”.

Ribbonfarm on the tragic history of prison reform.

Brazil has just passed the most extreme austerity measure in history in the middle of a recession, locked in with a clause making it impossible to repeal for 10-20 years. A…bold…choice. If nothing else, it’ll provide good data for future generations of macroeconomists. Register your predictions now!

Redditor describes why Trump’s tweet threatening to cancel the F-35 in favor of an updated F-18 is such a horrible idea.

A Muslim woman who claimed that a white man threatened to set her on fire for wearing a hijab just after the election of Donald Trump is to be charged with a felony for filing a false report after a police investigation. This one makes me angry because it was in Ann Arbor (where I work) and really freaked out one of my patients; it’s important to remember that these kinds of things have real-world consequences beyond The Internet Discourse. Related: during the election, a black church was set on fire and covered with Trump graffiti; a black member of the church has now been charged with the crime. Related: pro-Trump swastikas and KKK graffiti across Nassau Community College apparently drawn by Indian-American man. I do not want to cherry-pick/Chinese-robber false hate crimes, but I think these were the three top hate crime stories I hear during the election and it concerns me that it’s not being more widely reported that all three were false. Also related: SLPC investigation of hate crimes after Trump election covered up 2,000 reports of hate incidents against white students.

Obama signs law that gives protection to atheists, which isn’t that interesting, but I’m linking the article anyway because I like the picture.

Wrong Way Corrigan was a famous aviator who crossed the Atlantic solo a little after Charles Lindbergh’s famous flight. He won his nickname after constantly petitioning the authorities for permission to try the Atlantic crossing and constantly being refused; he did however receive permission to fly from New York to California. So he set off from New York, claimed to have “accidentally” gone the wrong way, and ended up in Ireland a few days later. No one ever proved anything, the worst punishment he got was a two-week suspension of his pilot’s license, and he passed into legend as the patron saint of people who go the wrong direction – with references in pop culture works like “Gilligan’s Island” and “Animaniacs”.

Myths Of Human Genetics, mostly of the sort “trait X is coded for by exactly one gene in a simple Mendelian manner”. They’re kind of nitpicky about this, though.

The latest Dweck paper on growth mindset vs. Stuart Ritchie.

Stuck with gift cards you don’t want after the holidays? CoinStar offers a cash-for-gift-cards service. I hope someone got rich off of this idea.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 585 Comments

OT65: The Early Thread Gets The Worm

This is the bi-weekly visible open thread. There are hidden threads every few days here. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. Also:

1. New ad on the sidebar: 80,000 Hours, an effective altruist group that tries to help people find the highest-impact and best-fit altruistic careers. In particular, check out their book on the same question, which is FREE for TODAY ONLY for SSC readers.

2. Comments of the week: this thread where people explain and evaluate the conflicting claims that global warming is worse than vs. not as bad as IPCC predictions; TheContinentalOp on the Electoral College, Alex Zavoluk on the role of selection in the altitude/obesity link.

3. There will be a meetup at the lobby of the Conrad New York Hotel, 102 N End Ave, New York, New York 10282, at 12 noon on Sunday 12/18. Please watch this space and the Facebook page in case any of this changes.

SSC Journal Club: Mental Disorders As Networks

I.

Suppose you have sniffles, fatigue, muscle aches, and headache. You go to the doctor, who diagnoses you with influenza and gives you some Tamiflu.

There’s some complicated statistics going on here. Your doctor has noticed some observable variables (sniffles, fatigue, etc) – and inferred the presence of an invisible latent variable (influenza). Then, instead of treating the symptoms with eg aspirin for the headache, she treats the latent variable itself, expecting its effects to disappear along with it.

Psychiatry tries to use the same model. You get some symptoms – depressed mood, insomnia, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, suicidality. You go to the psychiatrist, who diagnoses you with depression and gives you an antidepressant.

The psychiatrist is implicitly assuming that the causal structure of her field matches the causal structure of better-understood diseases like influenza. Generations of psychiatrists have noticed that different symptoms all tend to show up together and follow a similar pattern, suggesting some kind of deep connection between them. So psychiatrists follow the influenza model and attribute this collection of linked symptoms to a latent variable called “depression”.

This gets complicated really fast. Psychiatric disorders are diagnosed through clusters of symptoms, but we don’t expect every person to have every symptom in the cluster. For example, we diagnose depression when a patient has five out of nine symptoms on a list including fatigue, guilt, sleep disturbance, suicidality, et cetera. Each of these symptoms is often but not always present in a patient who has most of the others – for example, 75% of depressed patients have sleep disturbances, but 25% don’t.

But all psychiatric disorders are hopelessly comorbid with each other. If someone meets criteria for one DSM disorder, there’s a 50% chance they’ll have another one too. 60% of people with major depression also have an anxiety disorder. This is awkward when compared to eg the 75% sleep disturbance rate. Why are we calling sleep disturbance a “symptom” of depression, but anxiety a “comorbid condition” with depression? If we’re trying to cluster symptoms together to identify conditions, how come “sleep” is grouped with a bunch of other symptoms in the depression cluster, but “anxiety” gets to be a cluster of its own? Are there really two conditions called “depression” and “anxiety”, or just one big condition that has various symptoms including low mood, sleep disturbance, and anxiety, and some people get some of the symptoms and other people get others? I’m told that the people who write the DSM have long conversations about this using rigorous methods, but to the rest of us it seems kind of arbitrary.

The problem isn’t that nothing ever clusters together – depression, for example, is a very natural category. But so are various subtypes of depression. And so are various supertypes of depression, like depression + anxiety, or depression + psychosis, or depression + anxiety + psychosis. Choosing to draw the borders around depression and say “Yup, this is the Actual Disease” isn’t a bad choice, but it doesn’t jump out of the data either. When people try to use sophisticated clustering algorithms on psychiatric disorders, they usually come up with something like this, where there are only three supercategories instead of the 297 different diagnoses in the DSM. And even three supercategories are pushing it – people with psychosis are far more likely to have depression too! Having any number of categories starts seeming arbitrary and fuzzy.

So Nuijten, Deserno, Cramer, and Borsboom (from here on: NDCB) ask: what if that’s wrong? What if there isn’t a latent variable like “influenza”? What if it’s symptoms all the way down?

Consider a network in which each symptom is a node, connected to all the others by pathways with certain weights on each direction. So for example, “sleep disturbance” might be connected to “fatigue” by a strong path – people with disturbed sleep are much more likely to be tired. These might both be connected to “low mood” – people who don’t sleep well, or who are tired all the time, start feeling down about themselves. And this path might go the other way too: people who feel down about themselves might have more trouble getting to sleep on time. And maybe all of these are connected to suicidality, because if you feel bad about yourself you’re more likely to commit suicide, and if you’re suicidal you might feel bad about it, and if you’re tired all the time then maybe you can’t accomplish anything useful with your life and so death might seem like a good way out, and so on.

A sample image from the paper, showing two possible simple networks of depression symptoms

Also from the paper. This shows a more complicated (and apparently empirically validated) network of symptoms. MD is major depression. GAD is generalized anxiety disorder. The nodes are all different symptoms – for example, “inte” is “loss of interest in activities” and “musc” is “muscle tension”.

Not from the paper. But if you figure out a good way to calculate weights on this one, email me.

Each node might affect the others with a certain delay. Being suicidal might make you feel guilty, but even if your last suicidal thought was fifteen minutes ago, you might still feel guilty now. Maybe it would take months or even years before you no longer felt guilty about your suicidal thoughts. So there could be loops: in a simple model, your low mood makes you feel suicidal, your suicidality makes you feel guilty, and your guilt makes you have low mood. This type of loopy network might be stable and self-reinforcing. Maybe your boss yells at you at work, which makes you have a bad mood. Then even if the direct effect of your boss would go away quickly, if it causes suicidal thoughts which cause guilt which cause more low mood, then the cycle can stick around forever.

In NDCB’s model, all possible psychiatric symptoms are connected like this in a loose network. Particularly tight-knit symptom clusters that often active together and reinforce each other correspond to the well-known and well-delineated psychiatric diseases, like depression and schizophrenia. But there are no natural boundaries in the network; low mood and poor sleep may be closely connected to each other, but they’ll also be more distantly connected to anxiety, and even more distantly connected to psychosis. This corresponds to the fact that some depressed people will develop psychotic symptoms, even though psychosis isn’t usually associated with depression. The paths aren’t usually as strong as those between low mood and poor sleep, but they’re there, and in some people with a predisposition to psychosis or some idiosyncratic factor strengthening those paths beyond their usual level in the population, that will be enough.

There are lots of good things about thinking about psychiatric problems this way:

1. It helps explain how life stressors can cause depression. Some people who have a bad breakup will get depressed. This should be mysterious if we think of depression as a biological illness – and we have to at least a little; some people who take the drug interferon-alpha will get depressed afterwards too. But if depression is a symptom network, it becomes easier to explain. The bad breakup causes low mood, which under the right conditions and genetic predispositions can activate all of the other depression symptoms and create a stable, self-reinforcing depression. Likewise, poor sleep is a risk factor for the development of subsequent depression, which is hard to explain if we just think of it as a symptom of some latent-variable-style condition.

2. It explains how treating depression symptoms can treat the depression. I’ve heard a lot of different perspectives on this, but at least one of my attendings (and some studies) believes that treating poor sleep with a sleeping pill like Ambien can help dispel an underlying depression, including symptoms seemingly unrelated to sleep like “feelings of worthlessness and guilt”.

3. It explains how therapy can treat depression. If eg cognitive behavioral therapy helps you stop thinking of yourself as worthless, then you’ve de-activated the “feelings of worthlessness and guilt” node and made it a lot harder for all the other nodes to coalesce into a stable self-reinforcing pattern.

4. It explains the polygenic structure of mental illnesses. If a mental illness were one specific thing, we would expect it to have one specific cause, or at least be limited to genes active in one specific area or process. In fact, it’s hard to come up with anything that genes involved in these illnesses have in common other than “they’re mostly expressed in the brain” – and sometimes not even that. In NDBC’s model, genes might be involved in any of the symptoms, or in the paths between the symptoms. A gene involved in poor sleep could predispose to depression. So could a gene involved in low energy levels. Even a gene involved in anxiety or psychosis could have some effect. And so would any gene that influenced the probability that, given poor sleep, a person would have low energy levels; or that given anxiety, a person will have psychosis. The end result would be everyone having a slightly different network, with different amounts of work needed to activate each node and different weights on each of the inter-nodal paths.

5. It helps explain why so many brilliant people searching for The One True Cause Of Depression have come up empty.

II.

Actually, this last one deserves more explanation. NDCB think of these symptoms as visible patient complaints (“poor sleep”, “feelings of worthlessness”), and treat the connections between them as common sense (“if you don’t sleep, you’ll probably be fatigued”, “if you feel very guilty, you might attempt suicide because you think you deserve to die”). But their theory also works for networks of biological dysfunctions, or networks that combine biological dysfunctions with common-sense observed symptoms.

For example, we know that there’s a link between depression and inflammation. But it’s not a very good link; not all depressed people have increased inflammation, not all people with increased inflammation get depressed, and drugs that decrease inflammation don’t always cure depression. There’s similarly good evidence linking depression to folate metabolism, serotonergic neurotransmission, BDNF levels, and so on. Suppose we made a graph like the ones above, except that instead of putting things like “poor sleep” and “feelings of guilt” on it, we used “inflammatory dysfunction”, “folate metabolism dysfunction”, “serotonin dysfunction”, and “BDNF dysfunction”. There are a lot of reasons to expect these things to interconnect – for example, folate helps produce a cofactor necessary for serotonin synthesis, so any dysfunction in folate metabolism could make a problem with serotonergic neurotransmission more likely.

In a best case scenario we could merge the biological and psychological perspective, replacing “disturbed sleep” with “disturbance in the orexin and histamine systems that regulate sleep” and “tiredness” with “disturbance in the dopamine system that regulates goal-directed action”, and so “poor sleep makes you tired” with “disturbance in the orexin system causes a disturbance in the dopamine system”. In practice I expect this would be a terrible idea and that common-sense concepts mostly don’t have simple well-delineated biological equivalents. But what I’m saying is that the model where all of these things are observable symptoms, and the model where they’re all disturbances in brain chemicals and metabolism, aren’t necessarily in conflict.

So we can expand point (5) to say not only that it explains why nobody has found the One True Depression Cause, but why they have found so many promising leads that never quite pan out. Just like depression has a bunch of different symptoms, each of which is often-but-not-always involved, and each of which reinforces the others — so it has a bunch of different disturbances in biological systems, each of which is often-but-not-always involved, and each of which reinforces the others. Maybe there’s a nice correspondence between one disrupted biological system and one symptom, or maybe they sit uneasily together as different nodes on the same big graph.

III.

Are there any problems with this theory?

There are a couple of disorders that really don’t fit this model. Bipolar disorder, for example, doesn’t quite work as a collection of self-reinforcing symptoms. It’s marked by depressive episodes that can give way to years of stable mood before the person has a manic episode months or years later. I can’t think of any way to model this except as some underlying unified tendency toward bipolar disorder – although the ability for this tendency to cause a depression that looks just like normal unipolar depression is a point in NDCB’s favor, since it suggests there can be many different causes for the same syndrome.

The impressive success of ketamine also counts as a point against. NDCB imagine psychiatric disorders like depression as gradually fading out on a symptom-by-symptom basis, eventually reaching a point where enough symptoms are gone that the rest of them aren’t self-reinforcing and just sputter out. This matches the course of eg SSRI treatment, where the medications will gradually improve a few symptoms at at time over the space of a month or so and maybe cause a full remission if you’re lucky. It doesn’t really match ketamine, where every aspect of depression vanishes instantly, then returns after a week or so without treatment. There are a couple of other equally impressive things – staying awake for thirty hours straight, for example, can have an immediate and near-miraculous antidepressant effect, which unfortunately vanishes as soon as you go to sleep. Both of these treatments seem like direct strikes against the One True Cause Of Depression, and both suggest that an underlying tendency toward depression can exist separate from any symptoms (or else why would the depression come back after the effects of the ketamine wore off?)

I don’t think it’s possible to cure depression by blasting every symptom simultaneously. That is, suppose somebody is depressed with symptoms of poor sleep, poor appetite, low energy, suicidality, and low mood. Ambien can make them sleep. Pot can make them eat. Adderall can give them energy. Clozaril can make them stop wanting to kill themselves. And heroin can perk up mood. So if you gave someone Ambien, pot, Adderall, Clozaril, and heroin at the same time, would that cure their depression? I’m pretty sure no one has ever tried this, but I don’t think anyone’s reported exceptional results from less extreme cocktails like Adderall + trazodone + pot, which I’m sure a bunch of people end up taking. This along with the stuff from the last paragraph suggests that if we want to go with this model, maybe we should think less in terms of actual poor sleep and more in terms of dysfunction in the biological system of which sleep is a visible correlate. In that case we could say that Ambien helps the sleep itself but not the underlying dysfunction. But that takes some of the elegance out of the theory.

Despite these issues, I feel like something along these lines has to be true. There are too many things that sort of kind of cause psychiatric problems, and too few things that look like One True Causes. Things that look a lot like schizophrenia can be caused by viral infections in utero, by genetic factors, by hitting your head really hard as a child, by hypoxia during the birthing process, by something something something intestinal tract, by something relating to immigration which seems like it might involve psychosocial stress, and so on. Studies of the immune system, the dopamine system, the glutamate system, and the kynurenine system have all found disruptions. There have been so many really brilliant attempts to reduce all of these to a single brain region, or the levels of one specific chemical, or something that’s simple in the same way that lack-of-insulin-causes-diabetes is simple. But nobody’s ever succeeded. Maybe we should just give up.

I guess I’ve felt for a long time that some kind of weird change in attractor states of biological systems is the best way to explain these kinds of things, but I was never able to express what I meant coherently besides “weird change in attractor states of biological systems”. NDCB offer a clear model that suggests good avenues for future research.

(And I wasn’t joking when I said that little diagram with the two pentagons was the solution to 25% of extant philosophical problems.)

Might People On The Internet Sometimes Lie?

From Reddit: Parents Of Children Who Claim To Have Had Past Lives, What Did They Tell You?. Some sample comments:

When he was 6 years old my son described in great detail my grandmother’s house he never been to. This was in 1986 or so, pre-internet. There are no pics of the place that I’m aware and no one owned a camcorder in our family, so video is out of question either. It’s a small house with red roof and a purple door (grandma painted the door every couple of years). He described all of it – that it had one big room with a fireplace across from the window, he explained where the doors are located, how there always were some boxes under the stairs, that there always was a faint smell of apples in the house (grandma ran a small time apple sauce business). That there was this cat almost completely white with a black spot around his right eye (that’s mr. Whiskers, my grandma’s cat!).

My grandma and Whiskers both died in 1977, 3 years before my son was born. To this day I can’t fathom it and can’t even get a remotely sane explanation on how does he know all this. I never told him about it, my wife has never met my grandma and never been to her house and in 1986 we were stationed in Germany, so none of my old friends could have reached my son, so this is definitely not someone’s prank. Best part of this is my son says he doesn’t remember telling me that, but my wife heard him saying that too, so if definitely happened!

And from Reddit, What Is The Creepiest “Glitch In The Matrix” You’ve Encountered?:

When I was in school I had this hippie teacher who would always tell us that the universe can help if you just ask it.

She told us one time her daughter had lost something very important and when she asked the universe to help she suddenly had a massive pulling feeling towards the sink. She walks over and immediately stuck her hand down into the garbage disposal and pulled the item out in perfect condition.

So I think it’s total bullshit of course, but later that day I was searching for a thin little booklet that I really, really needed for school. I spent 3 hours looking for it and had no luck. Finally out of frustration I almost sarcastically said, “I need your help universe.” I immediately walked over to this bookcase filled with books from my step dad. I had never once used this shelf or any book on it.

I grab a random book I’ve never seen from the middle of a huge pile. I open it to somewhere around page 200 and right there is my booklet smashed in between the pages. It was incredibly thin so you couldn’t even tell there was anything in there if you looked at it from another angle.

I’m sure there’s a good explanation, but it’s been well over a decade and I still remember the incredibly freaky vibe I got the moment I saw the book.

I don’t believe in reincarnation or paranormal forces. When I read stories like this, my first impulse is to try to think of reasonable explanations or ways they could be a coincidence. Maybe some kids have instinctive talent at that sort of cold-reading thing TV psychics do sometimes. Maybe your unconscious can remember where you put a booklet and then repress it from the conscious mind for some reason.

But these kinds of claims are often themselves far-fetched. If I told you in normal conversation, unrelated to compelling reincarnation theories, that kids have a natural talent at cold reaading, you’d scoff and demand proof. And it’s not just reincarnation and booklet-finding. If you read Reddit enough, you’ll find hundreds of equally compelling stories of telepathic contact, cryptid sightings, UFOs, et cetera.

So. Alternate hypothesis. About one million people view Reddit every day. Let’s assume 10% of those see threads like the above – which were pretty popular and which I think both made it to the front page. That’s 100,000 people. Now let’s assume that even 1/10,000 people on the Internet are annoying trolls, which is maybe the easiest assumption we’re ever going to have to make. If each of those annoying trolls posts one fake story to a thread like that for the lulz, that’s enough for ten really convincing stories per thread – which is really all there are, the other fifty or sixty are just the usual friend-of-a-friend-had-a-vague-feeling stuff.

(it’s true that in a site read by a million people, there will also be far more people who have experienced a genuine one-in-a-million coincidence, but that shouldn’t scale nearly as quickly; after all, liars can invent coincidences way more far-fetched than the sheer numbers would allow)

This hypothesis seems obviously right. If I ask “what’s the chance that at least one in ten thousand Internet users is an annoying troll?” you laugh hysterically and tell me that nobody has even invented numbers that high. It perfectly explains mysterious events that would otherwise require impossible coincidences or weird theories about hidden brain functions. So why is it so hard to make myself believe?

I think part of it is a failure of scale. Reddit looks a lot like a normal forum or blog comment section, the sort of BBS I used to go on as a kid with twenty or thirty regulars who would dominate all the discussions. If indeed 1/10,000 people is the sort of jerk who would make up a story like this just to troll people (or even 1/1,000 or 1/100 people), the chance that I’d run into them on my little BBS/comment section/Dunbar-number-group is pretty low, and I can safely ignore the possibility that five different crazy paranormal comments are all by pathological liars. It’s only when you get a place like Reddit, which manages to feel like a community while also having a million readers a day, that you have to start thinking about these things.

This suggests a more general principle: interesting things should usually be lies. Let me give three examples.

I wrote in Toxoplasma of Rage about how even when people crusade against real evils, the particular stories they focus on tend to be false disproportionately often. Why? Because the thousands of true stories all have some subtleties or complicating factors, whereas liars are free to make up things which exactly perfectly fit the narrative. Given thousands of stories to choose from, the ones that bubble to the top will probably be the lies, just like on Reddit.

Every time I do a links post, even when I am very careful to double- and triple- check everything, and to only link to trustworthy sources in the mainstream media, a couple of my links end up being wrong. I’m selecting for surprising-if-true stories, but there’s only one way to get surprising-if-true stories that isn’t surprising, and given an entire Internet to choose from, many of the stories involved will be false.

And then there’s bad science. I can’t remember where I first saw this, so I can’t give credit, but somebody argued that the problem with non-replicable science isn’t just publication bias or p-hacking. It’s that some people will be sloppy, biased, or just stumble through bad luck upon a seemingly-good methodology that actually produces lots of false positives, and that almost all interesting results will come from these people. They’re the equivalent of Reddit liars – if there are enough of them, then all of the top comments will be theirs, since they’re able to come up with much more interesting stuff than the truth-tellers. In fields where sloppiness is easy, the truth-tellers will be gradually driven out, appearing to be incompetent since they can’t even replicate the most basic findings of the field, let alone advance it in any way. The sloppy people will survive to train the next generation of PhD students, and you’ll end up with a stable equilibrium.

The weird thing is, I know all of this. I know that if a community is big enough to include even a few liars, then absent a strong mechanism to stop them those lies should rise to the top. I know that pretty much all of our modern communities are super-Dunbar sized and ought to follow that principle.

And yet my System 1 still refuses to believe that the people in those Reddit threads are liars. It’s actually kind of horrified at the thought, imagining them as their shoulders slump and they glumly say “Well, I guess I didn’t really expect anyone to believe me”. I want to say “No! I believe you! I know you had a weird experience and it must be hard for you, but these things happen, I’m sure you’re a good person!”

If you’re like me, and you want to respond to this post with “but how do you know that person didn’t just experience a certain coincidence or weird psychological trick?”, then before you comment take a second to ask why the “they’re lying” theory is so hard to believe. And when you figure it out, tell me, because I really want to know.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 317 Comments

Links 12/16: Site Makes Right

The town of Monkey’s Eyebrow, Kentucky is supposedly named because it’s in a county whose shape looks like a monkey’s head, and the town is around where the eyebrow would be.

A man involved in a homophobic hate killing and a fellow prisoner who also murdered a gay man have become the first couple to gay marry in prison.

Claritas Prizm helps companies analyze consumer demographics using their system of 66 US social classes with cutesy names.

Ribbonfarm offers a live video blogging course aimed at “beefing up [their] pipeline of potential contributors”, complete with assigned reading, homework, and a fee. It’s already over, so don’t bother applying. I guess I’m just linking this so that one day, when I get put in jail for blogging without the appropriate licenses and certifications, I know where things started to go wrong.

NASA is publishing their paper finding that the EMDrive produces meaningful thrust; more skeptical friends have recommended this and this picking-apart of some of their methods. I know nothing about physics, but the little I know of social sciences recommends extreme skepticism about effects so small that it takes heroic effort to distinguish them from noise, especially when they don’t respond to manipulations in predictable ways.

Time-waste subreddits for the week: /r/nononoyes, /r/yesyesyesno, /r/nononoawwww, /r/nonono, and various things along those veins.

Prescient Marginal Revolution post from last year on how celebrities and CEOs make better politicians than politicians

One of the better post-election-handwringing pieces: Nathan Robinson, What This Means, How This Happened, What To Do Now?

The Atlantic: are transgender people more autistic? If so, why? My thoughts on this deserve a full blog post, but for now I’ll just leave this paper on autism in congenital adrenal hyperplasia and let you draw your own conclusions.

Ben Carson declines a role in Trump’s cabinet on the grounds that he is a doctor and knows nothing about politics and would probably screw it up. On the one hand, this is admirably humble and clear-thinking. On the other, I am kind of confused what he thought he was doing when he ran for President. Update: Trump picks Carson to lead HUD.

Reddit asks people who randomly ran into Donald Trump before he was President what he was like in real life. A surprising number of New Yorkers had encounters with him, and all gave pretty much the same picture.

Kanye West: I didn’t vote, but if I did I would have voted for Trump. Possibly related: Kanye West hospitalized, placed on psychiatric hold. Old, but relevant under the circumstances: Scott Adams: The Odds Of A Kanye West Presidency Are 90 Percent.

The North Pole is 36 degrees warmer than usual right now, with extreme effects on sea ice.

Chinese scientists claim they can use machine learning to predict criminality from facial appearance. Still needs a lot of double-checking before accepted, but basically believable. Maybe related to mutational load: “The variation among criminal faces is significantly greater than that of the non-criminal faces. The two manifolds consisting of criminal and non-criminal faces appear to be concentric, with the non-criminal manifold lying in the kernel with a smaller span”.

Less Wrong is trying to regain its status as a good discussion hub and it’s actually going pretty well. Among the posts there worth checking out: A Return To Discussion, Double Crux: A Strategy For Resolving Disagreement, and Sample Means: How Do They Work?

Related to the Return To Discussion post: is an intentionally confusing interface the secret of Tumblr’s success?

Ozy at Thing of Things did a social justice Intellectual Turing Test.

NEJM: genetic risk and healthy lifestyles are independent determinants of cardiac disease. That is, whether you have a high or a low genetic risk, living a healthy lifestyle will decrease your risk of heart disease about the same relative amount.

SSC reader Fiona van Dahl, some of whose other work has been mentioned here, has a new novel out, New Night.

Remember Trump’s claim that millions of non-citizens voted in the election? It comes from a journal article in Electoral Studies (article, popular summary) calculating that several hundred thousand non-citizens probably voted in the 2008 election. But further research has challenged that claim (study, popular article), and it now seems to be very much in doubt. [EDIT: National Review defends the study, and relevant SSC]

Related: the studies above form part of the backdrop of Nathan Robinson’s excellent article The Necessity Of Credibility: To Prevent Fake News You Have To Offer Real News. I think it says a lot of important things, but it does miss the important question of when you should or shouldn’t report on exciting-sounding but not-yet-replicated studies – and so fails to have a good theory of whether the villains of the piece even did anything wrong.

In my post on Daraprim (the toxoplasma drug Martin Shkreli hiked the price of), I noted that the Daraprim molecule looks easy to make and somebody could probably cook up a batch for pretty cheap as an act of civil disobedience. Now it’s been done: Daraprim Drug’s Key Ingredient Recreated By High School Students In Sydney For Just $20.

Looking for a good charity to give to over the holidays? Aceso Under Glass makes the case for Tostan.

The wit and wisdom of new Defense Secretary pick James Mattis: “Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet.”

Andrew Gelman: How Can You Evaluate A Research Paper?

A lot of Castro retrospectives were along the lines of “Cuban communism could be brutal, but at least it brought people good affordable healthcare”. But Cuban healthcare and other public services actually underperformed most other Latin American countries during the Castro period.

Big Macs vs. The Naked Chef – on problems of scalability. And Miranda applies this to nursing.

Today in “forced to have grudging admiration for people I don’t respect very much for speaking out unexpectedly eloquently against people I respect even less”: Sarah Palin denounces Trump Carrier deal as crony capitalism. I have a really bad feeling that this ends with every company that was planning to do something good anyway crediting Trump in exchange for free Presidential goodwill, and we get a neverending string of apparent Trump victories that are very hard to disprove.

The surprising popularity of the (American) far right in China

Internationally Comparable Math Scores For Fourteen African Countries. African countries’ math scores are “significantly lower than predicted by African per capita GDP levels, and converging slowly, if at all, to the rest of the world during the 2000s.” Apparently the African economic boom is not going to solve educational problems on its own. Best case scenario: we just need more deworming.

Also in bad news: South Sudan “on the brink of genocide”

kontextmachine on the history of county power in the US.

I’ve previously criticized Vox in general and Sarah Kliff in particular for their pieces on drug regulation, so I should give credit where credit is due: their latest article, The True Story Of America’s Sky-High Prescription Drug Prices, is pretty good and well-balanced (aside from using stick figures, which I find condescending and annoying). It also uses the word “trade-off” seven times, which is how you know you should trust it.

Globalization Not To Blame For Income Woes, Study Says. But you can mostly skip the article itself in favor of this convincing re-imagining of the famous “elephant graph”.

US labor productivity still increasing at same rate as always, apparently.

The new King of Thailand, Vajiralongkorn Borommachakkrayadisonsantatiwong Thewetthamrongsuboriban Aphikhunuprakanmahittaladunladet Phumiphonnaretwarangkun Kittisirisombunsawangkhawat Borommakhattiyaratchakuman (Vaj to his friends). Interesting fact: he got second-class honors (= a B grade) on his law degree in a Thai university. I feel like when someone feels safe giving the Crown Prince a ‘B’, that’s a good sign that your country is sufficiently non-corrupt.

New study on Swedish intergenerational mobility finds somewhere in between Clark and his critics.

Trump’s election victory raised interest in epistocracy, a hypothetical system of government where only well-informed people can vote. A new blog post pops that bubble, calculating that Trump beat Clinton among well-informed voters by an even bigger margin than among the general public, although note that the methodology uses broad demographic bins and can’t prove this is true of individual voters.

Lord Dunsany wrote a sequel to The Tortoise And The Hare, where there’s a forest fire and the animals need to send warning quickly. Since they have already determined that the tortoise is faster than the hare, they send him to spread the message, and everybody burns to death. This is probably a metaphor for life.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 837 Comments

Thin Air

The International Journal of Obesity (h/t amaranththallium) points out a correspondence between US topography and US obesity rates:

It’s easy to see the Rocky Mountains on the obesity map. Not too hard to see the Appalachians either. Squint a little and you can even see California’s Central Valley vs. its coastal ranges.

This doesn’t seem to be related to poverty or population density. It does look a lot like the map of exercise level, but apparently it stays significant even when you control for that.

The IJO study finds that people living at sea level are five times more likely to be obese than people living at 500m elevation, even after controlling for “temperature, diet, physical activity, smoking, and demographic factors”. I don’t always trust controlling for things, but in this case the effect is big enough, and similar enough to the results of eyeballing, that it seems pretty plausible. Also, European studies find the same effect in high-altitude areas there, as do studies in Tibet. And someone did a study on US soldiers, who are randomly assigned (via deployment) to different areas, and found the same effect controlling for BMI at enlistment.

(on the other hand, a study in Saudi Arabia finds the opposite. Whatever. I didn’t even know Saudi Arabia had mountains.)

So what’s going on? There’s a well-known phenomenon called altitude anorexia where lowland people going to a high altitude suddenly can lose a lot of weight. Unfortunately most of the studies just stop at showing an acute effect; it’s not clear how long it lasts or whether there are more general principles involved. One study on rats found that they ate 58% less one day after being transported to Pike’s Peak, and were still eating 16% less per day two weeks afterwards. An article in High Altitude Medicine noted without further details that altitude anorexia seemed to persist after initial acclimatization. Pugh et al note weight loss of 1 kg/week up to 5-10 kg over a several week Everest ascent, reversing quickly as the climbers descended. A controlled experiment where obese subjects were ferried to the Swiss Alps, told to eat as much as they want, and banned from exercising resulted in weight loss of three pounds after a week, mostly sustained (?!) after a month at low altitude. It seemed mediated by eating less, which was independent of altitude sickness and persisted after people were no longer altitude-sick.

The active ingredient of altitude seems to be hypoxia. The air is thin at high altitudes so the body gets less oxygen. Being in low oxygen conditions in normal pressure seems to cause weight loss too – see here and here for studies of people exercising in low oxygen conditions. I don’t know of any studies where people were just kept in low-oxygen environments for a long time without exercise to see what happened to their weight. It’s not really clear how reduced oxygen makes people eat less. A lot of people mention leptin, but the studies seem pretty unconvincing, and people try to work leptin into everything.

This BMJ editorial suggests that hypoxia should get credit for smoking-related weight loss. But it reads like a completely unhinged screed from the tobacco lobby of an alternate dimension (“Might the aggressive anti-smoking lobby have contributed to the costly epidemic in obesity and type 2 diabetes that Professor Sir George Alberti have warned us about?”) so maybe we shouldn’t take it too seriously. Also, nicotine gum works just as well as cigarettes here, so it’s probably an effect of the nicotine itself, and in fact we have some pretty good ideas how this happens. Maybe unhinged screeds by alternate-universe tobacco lobbies aren’t the most trustworthy source of information.

Anyway, this is boring. Let’s move on to a more interesting question – did global warming cause the obesity epidemic?

The arguments in favor: there’s a lot more carbon dioxide in the air now than there was just a few decades ago. The obesity epidemic began around the time carbon dioxide concentrations really started getting worrying. And there are various body functions that are exquisitely dependent on CO2 levels. Bierworth (2014) has a good run-down of some of these and how they might be affected by increasing atmospheric CO2 levels (dear conservatives who always talk about Chesterton’s Fence and principle of precaution – has it occurred to you that doubling the concentration of a major bioactive atmospheric gas might be a bad thing?). I see some conflicting claims about how much atmospheric CO2 could affect average blood pH. Neurons that produce obesity-regulating chemical orexin are potentially very sensitive to blood pH, so maybe this could be involved?

Wild animals are affected by the obesity epidemic too, even though they eat far fewer Big Macs. Even lab rats and zoo animals, supposedly kept on a well-monitored diet, are heavier now than they were decades ago. It’s hard to think of some obesogenic factor so prevalent that it could seep into laboratories and zoos unnoticed by scientists and zookeepers. If it were a chemical, it would have to be really prevalent. The xenoestrogens in the water are one possiblity. But the other is the atmospheric gas breathed in by every living thing which we already know has been increasing for decades.

This at least is the theory of epidemiologist Lars George Hersoug. He did a study where he put some people in a high-CO2 room and found that they gained weight. It got a decent amount of press.

I really like this theory. It’s elegant. It’s clever. It’s at exactly the right level of contrarianism to be fun. If it were true, it would solve global climate change – once tabloids covers trumpet THE ONE SECRET TO A TIGHT BELLY DOCTORS DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW – TELL YOUR CONGRESSMAN TO PASS THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO LIMIT CLIMATE CHANGE TO WITHIN 2 DEGREES CENTIGRADE OF PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS, we will finally get Middle America on board. Insofar as scientific theories can be “fun”, this theory is fun.

But I grudgingly acknowledge that it’s probably not true.

For one thing, the study involved kind of sucks. It has a sample size of six. The six people were in a chamber that elevated CO2 levels about 50x higher than human industrial activity has elevated them in the atmosphere. And it got a non-significant result. In fact, food intake decreased in three of the six subjects, with almost all of the (nonsignificant) positive trend coming from one guy who apparently was just really hungry that day. There is a decent study showing CO2-related orexin effects in mice, but it’s at 2000x atmospheric concentrations. Also, when I look at the orexin neuron calculations, even if their hypothesis is true it suggests that orexin neurons might fire a little less than 1% more often now than they did 100 years ago. Unless there’s something really nonlinear going on, this is not enough to cause an epidemic.

For another, it doesn’t seem to line up geographically. Zheutlin, Adar, and Park try to correlate the geography of US obesity with the geography of US atmospheric CO2 in the same way that some of the studies above successfully correlated US obesity with US altitude. Here they fail. After adjusting for appropriate confounders, there is no clear relationship between CO2 levels and obesity. I think this might also reflect a more general point, which is that CO2 has been rising all over the world but obesity hasn’t; Japan, for example, is a very high CO2 emitter but has almost totally avoided a US-level obesity crisis.

(but while we’re talking about this study, it did find that serum bicarbonate has been increasing over the past decade or two. No proof as yet that this is a real effect or related to CO2, but have I mentioned that increasing the concentration of a bioactive atmospheric gas worldwide is a really bad idea?)

One last counterargument. A global warming skepticism blog points out that submarines are a natural laboratory for the effect of high CO2 on human health, since they usually have CO2 levels up to ten times atmospheric (and several times worse than even a poorly-ventilated building). I don’t see any formal tests of their own argument, which is that submariners don’t suffer any cognitive problems, and I’m not sure they’re right to use intuition and failure to notice gross impairment – after all, the original studies showing impairment were done in office buildings, and there’s no grossly noticeable differences there. But in any case, the Navy actually did a formal study and found that submariners do not gain weight. This seems pretty fatal for a CO2 = weight gain theory.

So my guess is that Hersoug is wrong and CO2 doesn’t cause appreciable weight gain in normal concentrations. We should abandon the beautiful theory of climate-change-induced obesity and go down a level of contrarianism to blaming boring normal-person things like xenoestrogens and gut microbiota.

(I’ve heard there are theories of obesity even less contrarian than those, but I’ve never been to such low contaranianism levels and wouldn’t be able to tell you what they might be.)

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 127 Comments

OT64: Openn Thread

This is the bi-weekly visible open thread. There are hidden threads every few days here. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. Also:

1. Thanks to Brendan Long for doing some work to make the blog appear better on cell phones. Cell phone users, please let me know whether it’s actually better now.

2. I would like to do a new SSC Survey soon. If you have any ideas for interesting questions, let me know. I’m not going to include very many reader-requested questions, but if someone comes up with a really good one I find really interesting it might make it in.

3. I will be at this meetup in New York City on December 18. If anyone else wants to come, I’ll see you there. ADDED: Also, we are still looking for a location, so if anyone has a big house in New York City and wants to help us, we can figure out some way to make it worth it for you. Please let me know or email schnaigs@gmail.com

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | 674 Comments