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Hey, I just finished Cobra Kai and suspect I should say something about it before the next OT, because Culture War. Isn’t it sad that talking about a TV series has come to this?
That. Was. Fantastic.
How could a TV sequel to a film from more than 30 years ago, which itself was just the Rocky for Teenagers Picture Show, be this good? Well, two reasons. One, they’re taking their dramatic beats from Shakespeare rather than action movies. Two… it’s topical.
34 years after losing the under-18 karate tournament to Daniel Larusso, Johnny Lawrence is a working class deadbeat dad living in a poor neighborhood of the San Fernando Valley. Daniel is a new car dealer with a wife and two children in a good school district of the Valley (and you know what that means). The girl they fought over in high school left California after going to UC Whatever medical school (Johnny: “I knew she was smart, but I thought she was smart and hot enough to not have to work”).
Johnny learned that if violence isn’t the answer, you didn’t ask a coherent question. He’s also sexist, dislikes immigrants, and bad at the internet. So one night he’s buying dinner from a convenience store like the loser he is when his teenage Latino neighbor Miguel gets beat up in the parking lot by boys from school. Instead of dialing 911, he shoves one boy away from his Pontiac Firebird they were smacking Miguel into and when ganged up on, all his karate training comes back. As an economically insecure WWC man who just lost his job, he takes the unsolicited loan from his rich, verbally abusive stepfather (Ed Asner!) to open a dojo. Miguel becomes his best student, followed by an overweight black girl who loves science and a Jewish boy with a deformed lip. These are the kids who get tormented in high school and the leftist faculty has no clue how to stop it.
One of the cleverest parts is that Johnny starts out as an awful teacher. He tries to turn away a female student and he calls the Jewish boy “Lip.” He has to become PC enough to run a popular business or he won’t be able to pay the rent. But make no mistake: Johnny is the sympathetic POV and progressives get some serious mockery. It’s all about finding your balance?
Cobra Kai is sort of a comedy, but it has a dramatic heart, and as I said the dramatic beats are cribbed from Shakespeare. How does Johnny’s son Robbie fill the void of an absent father and a mother who splits her attention between him and going to bars on dates? By dropping out of school to work for Larusso Motors, where he studies karate under Daniel for brownie points and to anger his father. Who is Miguel’s love interest? Daniel’s daughter, of course.
The students take the confidence and discipline they learn from Sensei Lawrence to solve their problems with bullies, which is gloriously subversive of Hollywood morality. But Johnny hasn’t really redeemed his life, because his best student Miguel has learned everything he has to teach, including lessons from The Karate Kid villain Sensei Kreese that Johnny didn’t mean that way. “My Cobra Kai is different.”
I’ve just finished watching it myself, and I have to say that as much as I love the subtle subversion of traditional movie morality, from a writing perspective the part I find most impressive is how it manages to make Johnny and Daniel sympathetic, flawed, and sensibly motivated antagonists. Their conflict drives the story, and it arises out of legitimately perceptions of how things are happening in ways that are very plausible, if a bit convenient.
I also just finished and loved it too. (From what I read here, Impulse is good enough to keep your Youtube Red subscription going.) I think part of the reason it works so well is that it’s on Youtube Red, so when something seems a little contrived, you just think “well, it’s on Youtube, I should really just relax.”
Something I think is probably clever: (1) the kids often fall prey to the classic Ebert 1980’s “idiot plot,” where if they took a minute to talk through their problems, they would realize they don’t have any; (2) Johnny and Daniel often almost fall for an idiot plot, but being adults, they usually avoid it when someone else (typically Daniel’s wife) tells them “you’re grown men – maybe discuss your problems.”
It’s in a little bit of an alternate universe – Miguel mentions MMA once, and then it never comes up again. My family studies at a strip-mall dojo, and MMA has affected pretty much every school. Even you don’t have “Tae Kwon Do (or whatever)/MMA” on your sign, which you probably do, your sensei probably watches MMA, your students watch it, and the training has been modified by what works and doesn’t work in MMA fights.
Yeah, it’s smart writing how teenagers get into the classic “idiot plot” and it’s echoed but averted by their mentors.
Speaking of how teenagers think, I enjoyed how Eli “Hawk” Mascowitz has a rationalist-adjacent friend. “Why don’t you join Cobra Kai?” “Because I don’t like getting hit in the face, it costs money, and by hanging out with you I’m already getting the advantage of not being bullied.”
Yyyeah, that’s noticeably wonky. Another “alternate universe” bit is how car insurance doesn’t seem to exist.
@cassander:
Yes. There’s a key turning point where Johnny is a bad teacher and businessman and has to reform quickly to pay the rent. The way it’s set up, it would have been so easy to make it “he’s a bigot and deserves his suffering unless he learns to be progressive”; but he doesn’t. Instead of making a 180 degree turn in his life, he makes more like a 135 that attracts bullied minority kids while remaining flawed, sensibly motivated working class Johnny.
And I love how Daniel is sympathetic and flawed. The 17-year-old fatherless Jersey kid who found Mr. Miyagi as a surrogate father is disciplined, loves cars and is a bit of a otaku. He stopped practicing karate and has leveraged his former champion status into a gimmick for car ads. When his daughter brings home an Asian-American boy, he tries to show how hip and affluent he is by preparing fresh sashimi with authentic cutlery, being oblivious that the boy is thoroughly American and a bully.
Exactly. He turns his life around by doubling down on the things that made him a villain in the movie then teaching it to a bunch of kids, and it’s portrayed sympathetically! It’s fantastic.
It was a good series, a lot more nuanced than you’d expect from a young adult martial arts flick like the one it follows up on.
It’s clear that in the last episode Johnny’s students internalized “no mercy” a lot more than he had intended, and in the process subverted both the underdog makes good story of his starting the dojo, and the revenge of the nerds plot of the outcast students.
Daniel starts out unsympathetic but you rapidly see that he’s not the obvious villain the show could have made him and the reconciliation the two former rivals have is a believable fake out in the penultimate episode .
Has anyone here seen Solo? What did you think of it?
I watched it this afternoon, and it seemed, well, OK. I don’t regret seeing it, but I certainly won’t be seeing it again. The film seemed a bit too frantic, running from scam to scam, and it had a couple too many double-crosses to be really believable. Its attempt to have that bit about “making the Kessel run in 12 parsecs” make sense seemed sort of forced; better to have left it as an attempt by Han to bullshit an old man and a naive youngster from the sticks. But Han did shoot first this time, and it made sense that he did.
They got the characters of Han, Lando, and Chewie approximately right, aside from Ehrenreich not being a lookalike for Young Harrison Ford. But then, neither was Sean Patrick Flannery, and that worked OK-ish. And they wove the three into a semi-decent heist flick with some decent new characters, which was my minimum bar for “not bad”.
But that’s about all they did. To have gone beyond that to “really good”, they needed:
1. A suitably impressive villain for the heroes to contend with over the course of the film. Paul Bettany’s crime lord doesn’t count; he’s basically on the protagonist’s side except for the token “of course I’ll kill you if you don’t replace the shipment you lost”. Jabba the Hutt at least sent bounty hunters. The last-act betrayals by Jbbql Uneeryfba and Rzvyvn Pynexr aren’t much help either, in that they also spend most of the movie on the hero’s side. And the less said about Qnegu Znhy the better. Basically, the bulk of the movie was about the protagonists contending against the wholly impersonal security forces of two targets, and the wholly impersonal (also random and arbitrary) second group of thieves.
2. Less pandering to hard-core Star Wars geeks and their continuity fetishes. Yes, Han shooting first was a nice touch, and they did a decent job of his winning the Millenium Falcon in a card game. The whole bit with the fanwanked(*) explanation for the “Kessel Run” was tiresome. And the bit where one of the final-act villains is completely misplaced unless you happen to have watched the fourth season of the second animated TV series in the Star Wars continuity that Disney was supposedly ditching anyway, no, none of that please.
3. It needed to have been more fun than “Guardians of the Galaxy”, which is the obvious baseline for comparison. If you’re going to expend – and at this point I think they have been pretty much expended – some of the most mythic characters in the genre on a “let’s have some charismatic rogues do a sci-fi heist” flick, you really ought to do a better job of it than the team that used a third-rate comic book as their source material.
But I really did like Donald Glover as Lando Calrissian, and a particular shout-out to Phoebe Waller-Bridge as the “l337” droid with the accidental revolution. And if we are going to have more of these, I don’t mind seeing Emilia Clarke added to Star Wars continuity. Particularly if she can invoke a dragon or three to eat, incinerate, or otherwise properly kill off you-know-who and stand in as a decent villain for the sequels.
* And on that fanwank: The original script explicitly follows that line with the direction, “Ben reacts to Solo’s stupid attempt to impress them with obvious misinformation”. Possibly Guinness should have done more than just a subtle eye-roll at that point. But this movie should definitely have left it as stupid misinformation, possibly a shit-test by Beckett or Calrissian that Solo passes by calling them out on.
I’m with you on Glover as Lando Calrissian. I just wish Sabacc hadn’t so obviously been space-poker.
Emilia Clarke needs to learn to do fierce or threatening better. For some reason she made it work in GoT, but she couldn’t do it again in Terminator: Genisys and she couldn’t do it in Solo either, and she really needed to.
The newcomer I’ll be watching for is Erin Kellyman.
I haven’t seen the last two Star Warses, but this pretty much says it all. Disney doesn’t even need Star Wars unless it makes way more money than that third-rate comic book team that just made them $864 million. Now obviously even the controversial The Last Jedi beat that by a country mile, but if Ep9 doesn’t, stop beating this dead tauntaun. I knew by the time Starkiller Base blew up the Hosnian system that this has zero value as science fiction or as coherent art. Nothing of value will be lost if your $800+ million space operas are based on a Marvel comic instead of George Lucas’s work.
I liked it. I agree with most of your and John’s criticisms. The Kessel Run thing might have been the worst.
I thought both Han and Lando (especially Lando) were pretty great and convincing. I thought the plot was entertaining and the holes in it were tolerable. I like that they mostly managed to resist the temptation to over-fit it into the Star Wars universe. By that I mean there was very little mention of the Jedi/Sith, the Empire was just “an oppressive and militaristic government” rather than “this great big super-evil galactic thing” and we didn’t see many younger versions of existing characters (apart from those who actually should have been there). Instead it was just one of the stories that could be told in that universe, which is what I think it should be. Contrast to Rogue One, where they took what could have been a fun heist story and turned it into Episode 3.5, complete with Vader, Tarkin, Leia, Butt-Chin and a great big fucking space battle that totally hadn’t happened in the original trilogy.
I also liked seeing the shipbuilding at the start, and I wish there’d been more of that.
The returns from Solo are disappointing, so Disney will probably change plans somewhat. One thing they might do is to make the next back-story film with a lower budget, which would force the directors to focus more on the characters and less on big-ass space-whoo. Solo cost $300 million. I wonder what it might have looked like for the $75 million that was spent on Deadpool.
I’d never really thought about it like that before, but yeah, maybe a big budget is a bad thing for these films.
Can’t hate Rogue One for giving me more Vader and Tarkin, i love Vader and Tarkin, and i’m always up for more Vader and Tarkin. Also the movie works really well as Episode 3.5. You can finish watching Rogue One, start watching A New Hope, and enjoy a fairly smooth transition from one to the other.
Frankly my personal canon as it currently stands is: Episodes I-VI, Rogue One, and both Clone Wars cartoons. Oh and also the Dark Empire comics because i have terrible taste.
I haven’t watched the longer Clone Wars cartoon, but that sounds correct.
Fair enough. It felt shoe-horned to me.
As for watching Rogue One into Episode IV, I actually think it’s not at all smooth. Leia claimed her ship was on a diplomatic mission to Alderaan, and Vader wasn’t like “Dude, we literally just saw you escaping from the fleet we just beat the shit out of. Also gosh I feel tired. I guess I won’t be doing any lightsaber-fighting as energetic as I just did five minutes ago. I’m gonna spend the next few years resting…”
And then later somebody says “here are the Death Star plans – many Bothans died to bring us this information.” She doesn’t then go on to say “…in that great big fucking space battle that most of you were probably present at.”
Maybe I’m just being too nitpicky, though. 😛
The Bothans died to bring the rebels information about the second Death Star, in Return of the Jedi, not about the first Death Star, in A New Hope.
:O
Well that’s embarrassing.
Vader’s response was: “You are part of the Rebel Alliance and a traitor! Take her away!” He didn’t roll his eyes because
a) It’s undignified and
b) His mask wouldn’t show it anyway.
Yeah, Vader’s response is actually perfect in the context of the fact that her transport just fled a Rebel Alliance capital ship. Her protest is clearly 100% bullshit, she’s just stalling for time.
There was presumably at least one hyperspace jump between Scarif(?) and Tattoine, so Leia trying to sell “Not us, we’re a harmless diplomatic mission, you’re looking for the other courier ship, they went thataway” was a reasonable bluff that Vader reasonably rejected.
The bit where Vader phones in his lightsaber duel in ANH, and delegates most of the rest of the fighting to nameless Stormtroopers, is a legitimate discrepancy. They should have upped the ending to have Jyn and Cassian escape the Imperial facility to hand-deliver their data to the Rebel Flagship – and then get cut down effortlessly by Vader, along with the rest of the Rebel Scum, because they’re the B team going up against Darth Freaking Vader. But Cassian can get in a shot that visibly wounds Vader before being bisected, and Jyn can be the hero who hands off the Secret Plans(tm) through the blast door before the wounded but relentless Vader catches up with her. Instead, meh, we get the sappy sunrise-on-the-beach death scene ending.
It was still a pretty good movie, and it mostly works as a prequel.
Yeah having Vader get injured in Rogue One would have been a good way to explain his poor fighting in A New Hope.
That said, as cool as it was to watch Vader do the unstoppable walk of doom against the rebel scum, that whole sequence was basically fanwank. In the original trilogy Darth Vader is a deadly starfighter pilot who also happens occasionally indulge in laser sword duels in the manner of his ancient religion. He never engages in ground or boarding combat, nor shows any interest or inclination towards doing so. He doesn’t even draw his weapon outside of duels. Why would he? He’s a pilot, not a commando, and he has legions of elite mooks to handle infantry combat for him.
However, since i happen to like fanwank Vader, i am not complaining about his inclusion over OG Vader in Rogue One. Though yes, it does introduce some inconsistencies with the rest of the story.
I thought it worked as well as a film that had its history (director change, re-writes and re-shoots) probably can be expected to.
Unlike others, I don’t care about the making parsecs work in context of Kessel run. Fine, but make it work. But, I’m getting very tired of using ground bound action tropes try to work in space. Between the “bombers” in Last Jedi, and the “space tunnels” in Solo .. just ugh. The mine fields in fucking Galaxy Quest made more sense.
But, the fundamental problem with the movie is that they fuck up the arguably most important relationship in the whole movie, which is the one between Solo and the character played by Jbbql Uneeryfba. We get only the barest hint of why Gunaql Arjgba would essentially commit suicide for him/them. And the emotional impact the script requires to make it work just never materializes.
Deaths have to be earned in stories, or they do not work.
Kind of agree about the ground bound action tropes -> space. But haven’t they been doing that for all of the Star Wars films? Dogfights between fighters look just like they would in air, despite the fact that turning circles are not (or shouldn’t be) a thing in space. And there seems to be an awful lot of landing and fighting on planets considering all the space lasers they have kicking about.
The impression I got of the character who sacrificed themself was that it was necessary to save everyone else. I’m struggling to remember the details, so I could be mistaken, but wasn’t it a case of “either I kill myself now or all of us including me die very shortly”?
EDIT: Also, I like the triple-layered spoiler proofness. Refer to characters by the actors’ names, rot13 them AND spell one of the names wrong. 😉
IIRC, the train wrapped around both sides of the track, so to get the car they needed to get it off the rails, and the only way to do that was to blow it up. And if they didn’t get the cargo, the gangster was going to murder them all anyway, or if not all of them, at least woody harrelson
And we don’t find out that last piece of information until well afterwards, which is still weak sauce.
Sure, Star Wars has always played that game. All of sci-fi has played that game. For many reasons, not the least of which is that effectively simulating weightlessness is expensive, for many meanings of expensive.
But, they usually try and make a space ship look likes it’s lodged in a mine tunnel *in the middle of space*. They make it land on asteroid. The story-boarding and special effects were more “Hanna-Barbera cartoon” than big budget sci-fi special effect extravaganza. It was just extremely lazy.
As to the death, you don’t learn of a plausible motivation for it until well after the event. Thus, in the moment, you are simply thinking “well, there is an action movie trope. The ancillary team member sacrificing themselves”. It’s completely flat because we have no emotional investment in the need for it at that point.
Try John Holbo at Crooked Timber: http://crookedtimber.org/author/john-holbo/
He’s suffering a bit from TDS, but he can be very good.
Holbo’s review of David Frum’s Dead Right, written in 2003, is a masterpiece I keep coming back to when I read tradcon/reactionary arguments.
You have the opportunity to send a message to the past. The message may go to any identifiable historical person at a time in their life chosen by you. The message will be conveyed to them in a manner that inspires trust. The message must be in English, and fit within the old Twitter character limit of 140 characters. It will of course be translated into a language the recipient understands.
What message do you wish to send, to whom, and when should they receive it?
Kaiser Wilhelm, ca 1916. “The Bolsheviks and any other communists are not your friends. Do not fund them. Arrest and execute any you find, especially Lenin.”
You and everyone you know would never be born. Would you do it anyway?
Any interference in the past like this will prevent me from existing in the presumed ‘overwrite’ model of time travel. Even if the message would be to myself – the point is to make some change, rather than just shitposting at historical figures for lulz.
Let’s suppose this scenario comes with a guarantee that you will have a place in the revised timeline. The “you” in the new timeline will be as much like you in this timeline as possible given the changes in history, and will remember his or her life in this timeline.
I acknowledge that this is your thought experiment to do with as you wish, but I’m not even talking about some butterfly effect thing here. The calamities of the first half of the 20th century directly and massively influenced the lives of my great-grandparents and grandparents. There is no way that one set of my grandparents would have ended up in the same city if they had not occurred. And even if by some bizarre coincidence they had the many traumas one of my grandfathers suffered profoundly shaped his personality when my dad was growing up which in turn had a huge impact on my dad’s personality which in turn had a huge impact on mine.
I’ll answer your question.
No. I would not make a change to history so extensive that no plausible version of me would exist in it. I would settle for something more modest. For example, I could send the message to myself at 10 or 14, to reset some life choices I regret. But I would really like to do something more ambitious than that, although I’m not sure of what would do some real good.
Presuming the trust inspired by the note is strong enough, do you think there is any one message you could send anywhere to stop Communism from coming about?
Tell Marx that the ideas he is writing about are going to inspire a movement that with the best of intentions will bring tyranny, famine, and war on a vast scale. Tell him to write less about what is wrong with capitalism, and more about how it should be fixed. Suggest something like social democracy or the US New Deal.
With more guidance from their prophet, the Communists probably won’t go for what Lenin and Mao brought about in our history.
So Marx doesn’t write Das Kapital, the communist manifesto, what have you, and lives out his life in Trier quietly. How do you think this will change the future history of some literal hundreds of millions peasants in Russia, China, Ethiopia, various colonies, all of whom have no middle class to ‘civilise’ a revolution?
Marx dedicated his life to creating war and tyranny on a vast scale, in order to usher in the glorious utopia that would follow them. I don’t think this would dissuade him.
I’m a bit fuzzy on this, but my impression is that Marx was mostly a really potent critic of the capitalism of his day. He didn’t have a lot to say about that should replace it. And he was no great fan of what the Communists had in mind.
I’m hoping that if he spends a bit more time on what should replace capitalism and how to get there, he, as a bourgeois European, will suggest something more humane than the Russian and Chinese revolutionaries came up with on their own.
There will still be revolutions. I recognize that. I’m just hoping the resulting governments will be a bit more humane. And if the intellectual founder they are pointing to offers more guidance, I think they might be.
Would it work? No idea.
@johan_larson
Might be tricky to fit into the character limit. I think if we could send Marx a brief history post-him then he’d write differently. I’m sure he’d be fascinated to learn that the revolution didn’t happen in advanced countries first, that modern capitalism actually has a mostly ok standard of living and so on.
@cassander
No, he didn’t. Marx was of the (mistaken) belief that the revolution would be relatively peaceful and the transition period to the utopia would still be better than the war and tyranny that was the bread-and-butter of capitalism.
If you could actually convince Marx that so-called socialist countries were actually in some cases worse than capitalist countries his views would definitely change significantly.
@fion
This is flat out wrong. Marx explicitly envisioned a revolution modeled on the french revolution complete with its own terror. to quote him
the last is engels, not marx, but I think the point is clear. there was absolutely nothing peaceful about Marx’s revolution, it was explicitly violent not just in the sense of overthrowing an existing regime, but also in perpetuating mass killings on the model of the french revolution.
That’s about as fair of a deal as you might hope for, I suppose. Fair enough.
@cassander
Wow, thanks for the correction. I’m very surprised that I managed to get such a wrong impression from talking to so many Marxists. Where are those quotes taken from?
He was fairly specific that capitalism would/should (*) be replaced by a “dictatorship of the proletariat”, where the machinery of the state and other major institutions (Marx’s collective term for these is the “Superstructure”) would be seized by the working class, and that the transition would come in the form of a violent revolution.
The Russian Revolution tracked Marx’s prescribed revolution and Dictatorship of the Proletariat pretty well. The biggest departure Lenin made from Marx was the idea of a “revolutionary vanguard” dominating process: Marx was non-specific about the actual governing mechanisms by which the Proletariat would wield power, and may have envisioned a bottom-up system of workers’ council. Lenin’s system did have workers’ councils (the “soviets”), but they were eclipsed in importance by the Communist Party, which saw itself as acting on behalf of the interests of a Proletariat that wasn’t quite ready to wield power directly. Opinions differ over how big a departure this was.
Where Marx was really vague, and what you’re probably thinking of, is what would come after the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Marx predicted/prescribed that the State would wither away and be replaced by “True Communism”. He offered no details on how the State would wither away, and explicitly refused to describe True Communism on the grounds that it was too far away to predict clearly. Obviously, the Soviet state failed to wither away and be replaced by True Communism.
(*) Marx had a persistent tendency to equivocate between descriptive and normative claims.
@fion
In order:
Address to the Communist League (1850)
the victory of the counterrevolution in vienna
Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 301
the engles bit is from “on authority”
There has been a lot of white washing of marx by marxists, claims that it was lenin or stalin who introduced mass terror, but while lenin was more explicit about it than marx was, it’s simply wrong to say that marx didn’t envision and call for mass killing.
I don’t think so. Communism is just an instance of a recurring phenomenon in human history, when a civilization gets too civilized, and wraps around into evil. But even if I’m right in this, attempts must be made even when can there be no hope.
Kaiser Willy probably would have agreed with that sentiment, and in any case wasn’t the one who decided to fund the Bolsheviks, Arthur Zimmerman was. You’d have better luck with a message that said “Your idiot foreign minister is funding the Bolsheviks and communists, you should sack him.”
I’m not sure that would be enough to make a material difference. “Replace your brain, and then your entire government.” would be useful, but it’s hard to implement.
It’s not enough win the war, but it might be enough to keep Lenin off that train.
Honestly, “You should sack your idiot foreign minister” is just good advice for Kaiser Wilhelm in general.
On a related note, here is my time travelling tweet, intended for General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger to receive when he wakes up on August 1st, 1914: “The Kaiser will demand that you send the army east in order to avoid a two front war. It can be done. Hermann von Staabs is brilliant, trust that he is up to the task.”
This is the best bet i have for ending the First World War early. Yes with a German victory, but honestly i think the fate Europe rests not in who wins, but how quickly. The faster the war ends, the lower the chances that her grievously wounded powers will descend into utter madness. A plan for the Triple-Entente to win quickly would work just as well, but i don’t have any that can be compressed into a tweet.
Ugh, isn’t that the truth. You can be Bismark all you want, but a good foreign policy is one that can survive being handed off to a Caprivi.
But if a quick end to the war is all you need, I think kicking the can down the road a few years is probably good enough. 5 ish years and armies will have started mechanizing in a serious way, Austria hungary be weaker, russia will be stronger, and the brits will be more in bed with the french. And to do that, you’re better of sending a tweet to gavrilo princip about 10 minutes before the Archduke shows up in front of the deli saying “The authorities are about to raid this building, run!” Or, if not that, telling franz joseph to accept the serbian response to his ultimatum.
@Lilian:
Why not prevent WWI altogether, by preventing archduke Ferdinand about the atentate that will happen in Sarajevo? That would probably be my option if I were a Westerner. I hesitate because I am an Eastern European and for much of the Eastern Europe, the end of WWI and decomposition of Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires had some good outcomes, resulting in many smaller nations becoming independent or entire. Maybe if I can put in 144 characters both the info about Gavrilo Princip’s atentate and a convincing enough advice to federalize the empire when he becomes emperor, giving everybody / any ethnicity equal rights and large autonomy in areas were it’s a majority – so that the Empire becomes a kind of European Union with a monarch. But I doubt that would work.
It seems hightly implausible to me that remaining in the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have been worse, or even nearly as bad, for the various countries involved than becoming part of the Soviet Union was.
Preventing WWI would prevent both the Soviet Union and the Nazis probably – both of which were extremely bad for Eastern Europe.
@Cassander: The Second World War was pretty damned mechanized, happened two decades later, and lasted five and a half years in Europe. Pushing the first round back five years might not be enough to make it quick.
@a reader: Europe was a powder keg. If one thing hadn’t set it off, it would have been another. Even during its most peaceful times Europe would still have a great power war every few decades, and there were no real mechanisms around to truly prevent another one. Nor has there been enough of a shock to the system for Europeans to be properly terrified of having great power wars in the first place. Averting the First World War isn’t an option, at best you can avert the specific form it took.
Also you don’t need to convince the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to federalize the Empire, he’s already on board with that. According to historian Leo Valiani:
“Baron Margutti, Francis Joseph’s aide-de-camp, was told by Francis Ferdinand in 1895 and–with a remarkable consistency in view of the changes that took place in the intervening years–again in 1913, that the introduction of the dual system in 1867 had been disastrous and that, when he ascended the throne, he intended to re-establish strong central government: this objective, he believed, could be attained only by the simultaneous granting of far-reaching administrative autonomy to all the nationalities of the monarchy. In a letter of February 1, 1913, to Berchtold, the Foreign Minister, in which he gave his reasons for not wanting war with Serbia, the Archduke said that “irredentism in our country … will cease immediately if our Slavs are given a comfortable, fair and good life” instead of being trampled on (as they were being trampled on by the Hungarians). It must have been this which caused Berchtold, in a character sketch of Francis Ferdinand written ten years after his death, to say that, if he had succeeded to the throne, he would have tried to replace the dual system by a supranational federation.”
You might actually be best served by preventing the Archduke’s assassination. What happens after that is going to be very high variance, but as Creutzer says it would be hard to be worse off than being occupied by first the Nazis and then then the Soviet Union.
@Lillian
5 years doesn’t sound like a lot, change is happening incredible fast in this period. In 1910, there are less than a half million cars in the united states. In 1916, ford makes more than a half million model Ts. By 1920, they’d be making more than a million a year, and costs would have fallen more than half in nominal dollars and almost 80% in inflation adjusted dollars.
The armies of europe would not be mechanized by 1920, not even close. They weren’t even mechanized by 1939. But in 1920, the possibility of mechanization would be realizable in a way that it just wasn’t in 1914. Cross terrain trucks, artillery tractors, and maybe even armored fighting vehicles would be on the drawing boards if not actually in production, and the industrial techniques needed to mass produce them would have been widely disseminated. Assuming the armies would go to war largely unmechanized, they would almost immediately run into the 50 miles beyond the railhead problem, and unlike in 1915, trucks would be a viable solution to the problem. One of the armies would put together enough trucks and operational doctrine to achieve meaningful breakthroughs
I’ll grant you that 1920 is about the earliest possible date for this to happen and it might be a bit optimistic, but the sea change that made it possible happened in the US in this period despite the war.
As for ww2 taking 5 years, those are some very different dynamics at play, in particular a far wealthier (relatively) US funding the war effort. the actual fighting in ww2 was far more decisive, most spectacularly the battle for france, but also in lesser theaters.
It’s too high variance, you can very easily have a long destructive war that drives Europe completely off the cliff of sanity in 1920. There is zero gurantee that you won’t, just the hope that greater motorizatoin will somehow make it go by faster. The lowest variance way to get a short war is to send the German East. Even that is no grantee, but it’s got the best odds.
I think part of the trouble was that the whole funding and helping the Bolsheviks and Lenin was seen as worth it on the grounds that “they’re trying to destabilise Russia, if this works we can waltz in and scoop up all that Pan-Slavic sphere of influence they’re trying to build for ourselves”.
If you can convince via a tweet that yes this will destabilise Russia but you really don’t want that to happen with these guys left in charge, good luck.
If WW2 ended up happening, we’d probably lose it. Whether or not Hitler was allied with Russia or betrayed them part way through or whatever, the military power of Russia would be much less if it had never had the revolution. And Russia was mostly responsible for Germany losing. I’d be here in the UK speaking German.
How do the Nazis come to power in this scenario? A big thing driving Nazi recruitment and driving the belief among the conservatives that they could use the NSDAP to ward off communism. Without the communists to create the fear of communism, you don’t have the Nazis able to appeal to voters from classes that stood to lose or thought they stood to lose from communism, and you don’t have conservatives who think they can use Hitler while keeping him in line.
A Germany that is embittered after losing WWI (which presumably would still happen one way or another) but doesn’t have the rise of right-wing paramilitary elements to fight communist revolutionaries immediately post-war, doesn’t have the fear of what’s going on in the USSR, doesn’t have a USSR-aligned communist party to create even more fear, is still going to be screwed up (it’s not as though the existence of the USSR led to the economic problems in the early 20s or the Depression). There’s not the path that took the Nazis to power, however.
It was, by and large, the Nazis who wanted another war. The conservative elites who made up the pre-Nazi leadership, and who throughout 1933-1945 made up the bulk of the generals (at least, in the army), generally did not want another war. Had it not been for the Blomberg and Fritsch affairs and the events of the late 30s to 1940, the generals would not have fallen into line behind Hitler to the extent they did.
Oh yeah, good point…
But… there are still communists other than those inspired by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, right? As you put it, Germany is still going to be screwed up, it’s going to have extreme left and extreme right elements both trying to bring down the very weak government… If the extreme left loses their inspiration in the form of the USSR they’re still going to be there. And so’s the extreme right. I feel as though the “make Germany great again” will still be an incredibly strong feeling, and some form of nationalists are still liable to take power.
There were other communists, yeah, but Lenin’s path to power – vanguard-led revolution amidst the collapse of the old system – seems to be the one that works for communists. Without the USSR to point to as some kind of glorious worker’s paradise or whatever, it’s hard to see communists being able to attract the support they did. I don’t think a left-wing dictatorship in Germany would be that likely.
Conservative nationalists existed in Germany and would have existed following a WWI defeat, even without the fear of the Soviets. They did not do too badly seeking power electorally – eg, the DNVP got a fifth of the vote at one point. An authoritarian conservative nationalist dictatorship in Germany would be a possibility there.
When you look at the authoritarian right-wing governments in Europe, they simply weren’t as dangerous to world peace as the fascists in Italy were (it is often forgotten how nasty they were in attempting to build a colonial empire) let alone the Nazis. Their evils were primarily done in alliance with the Nazis. They were anti-Semites, but they were not exterminationists to anywhere close to the degree the Nazis were (and they often refused to hand over Jews with their national citizenship to the Germans – consider what happened to Hungarian Jews, who were relatively safe until the Germans seized control of Hungary following an attempt by the Hungarians to settle with the Soviets, and then were mostly murdered); their territorial expansionism was mostly limited to claiming land that they considered ethnically theirs (whereas the Nazis wanted not just to claim lands in Poland they considered German, but conquer pretty much everything east of a certain point, starve huge numbers of people to death, eliminate the intelligentisia, and reduce the remainder to slaves).
What would the outside goals of an authoritarian conservative nationalist government look like in Germany? They would likely be pan-Germans – but the majority of what they want would be what Germany had gotten by some point in 1938. Maybe they would push for some territory in Poland hard enough to start a war, and maybe they would really really want Alsace and Lorraine to be Elsass and Lothringe again enough to start a war. But Nazi Germany’s war aims went significantly beyond that.
Likewise, this government would definitely be anti-Semitic, but the attempt to exterminate the Jews (first by pipe-dream plans of mass deportation that would result in mass death, then by mass murder) was a Nazi thing, and a Nazi thing that did not escalate to the point of indiscriminate mass murder until 1941 – you can’t decouple the movements towards the building of death camps and deportation to them and the increasingly indiscriminate activity of death squads in the USSR from the war with the USSR (especially in fall-winter 1941 when it became increasingly obvious that quick deportation to the east would not be possible) and from the three million or so Jews who fell into German hands following the invasion of Poland (an authoritarian right-wing government might go for ethnically German parts of Poland, maybe a few other choice bits, but would be far less likely to invade the whole country). Imagine that this hypothetical government would not go further in anti-Semitic legislation than was in Germany in 1938 – that was still less harsh than black people experienced in the southern US into the decades after WWII.
National socialism was evil in a way that an authoritarian right-wing government would not be evil. We’re talking “greatest monsters of history” territory versus “tin-pot dictator” territory.
Thanks for taking the time to explain that. It made for interesting reading.
So would it be correct to say that the following two differences existed between Nazi Germany and other authoritarian nationalists?
1) Greater degree of expansionism – other authoritarian nationalists might have had an appetite for ‘recovering’ ‘German’ land, but wouldn’t have had the ‘take over all of Europe’ ambitions that the Nazis seemed to have.
2) More willingness to engage in mass-murder – other authoritarian nationalists might have disappeared some people and generally used fear as a means of maintaining control, and might also have passed oppressive laws against a whole group of people (such as Jews) but would not have escalated into extermination as the Nazis did.
(Obviously I’ve simplified what you said, but I guess I’m asking whether I’ve distorted it or whether this is basically what you were getting at?)
I don’t think that’s clear–it depends on what happens instead of the revolution that did happen. I may be mistaken, but my impression is that Russian economic growth during the decades before WWI was quite good, much better than in the decades after. So cancelling the revolution might well have resulted in a considerably more prosperous and advanced Russia.
That leaves the question of what the political system would have been, whether it would have been as capable of building a military and conducting war as Stalin’s government was. It isn’t an exact comparison, but it’s worth remembering that the attempt at conquering Europe in the previous century was also ended by a failed invasion of Russia.
Under the Tsars.
Russian economic growth in the early 20th century was very high. At one point before the revolution, they had the 4th-largest economy in the world, after Britain, Germany, and the US.
A czarist russia in 1939 would almost unquestionably have been a more prosperous place, but it also still likely would have been ruled by Nicholas II, who would only be 71. There’s no reason to assume that he wouldn’t show exactly the same weaknesses as a leader he’d shown his whole life. I think it’s an open question whether a materially better off but less ruthlessly governed Russia is better at winning the war than what we actually got.
Can you expand on this?
Lenin not being smuggled in by the Germans and being stuck in Switzerland seems dubious – entirely possible, or even likely, that he finds a way back home regardless. It also only prevents the October revolution, and not the February revolution in the first place. You’re still left with the Czar getting deposed and the chaos that follows taking place, as well as the crazies being the most likely to take over the mess that follows.
Would a Czarist Russia have had better, or worse, generals than the USSR had once Stalin eased off a little on political control of military decisions, and once doctrine discredited by association with guys who got purged had been brought back in?
@DavidFriedman @bean @cassander
It seems a little unreasonable to compare Russian growth before and after the first world war. The war hit everybody, and so did the depression that followed.
I accept that it’s not obviously true that Russia would have been less advanced without the revolution (although I must confess this is the first time the alternative has been put to me), but I maintain that it’s not obviously true that they would have been more advanced either.
Putting aside dndnrsn’s excellent point about how the nazis come power without ww1, you’re misreading the international situation in 1939. First, russia was the fastest industrializing power in the world in 1913. Given the immense damage done by the war and the russian revolution, the decade of industrial stagnation that followed, and the tens of millions who were killed by lenin and stalin, the bland assertion that russia was stronger in 1939 because of communism cannot be sustained. the most you can claim is that the soviet political system was more able to impose sacrifices on its people than the czarist one was. Nicholas II was a famously weak ruler who would have been only 70 in 1938, so he might very well still have been alive.
Two, according to paul kennedy, the US alone possessed about 40% of the world’s industrial warmaking potential in 1939, and that is largely why the west won the war, not russia. Russia killed the most germans, but the western allies destroyed vastly more materiel. And the german killing the russians did was done with massive quantities of american equipment and raw materials.
Only if the Royal Navy all decided that it wasn’t worth showing up for work, and the US decided to leave Germany in charge of Europe. Neither of these was going to happen.
Location and person: none in specific, but any ruler of any bronze age polity at all.
Forget bronze; melt the shiny, red ore into stronger metal. Inbreeding is awful for children’s health. Women equal men in smarts and virtue.
Congratulations, you just completely wasted the message to no benefit. Bronze is stronger than wrought iron, and also easier to work since it requires lower temperatures. The iron age started because the tin trade routes got disrupted, meaning that people were forced to use the inferior wrought iron in preference to the superior bronze. It’s only when iron is carburized to make steel that you get a better metal. Good luck trying to explain how to make steel using a single tweet.
Also it’s not like getting to the Iron Age earlier is going to boost human development. The Chinese tin supply was not disrupted, so they stayed in the Bronze Age much longer, to no disadvantage in technological development and sophistication.
Ah, but I get to decide where I send the message, and bronze is a very inflexible metal insofar production is concerned. Working iron provides no benefit to someone who has ready access to bronze, which per definition is someone with good access to the wealth needed to get both copper and tin; if I can get the message delivered to someone who cannot easily trade, who is at the mercy of his neighbours who do have bronze, introducing iron is a very good way of ensuring history can ‘move along’ quicker than it otherwise might have.
Again, things will not move along any faster as demonstrated by the Chinese, who were slow to give up bronze and did not at all suffer in their development for it. Moreover your proposed poor and/or isolated tribe that you intend to inspire to try producing iron will be immediately stymied by the fact that in order to work iron they need what are to them advanced high temperature furnaces, something their neighbours are more likely to have than them. This is why societies that skipped the Bronze Age tend to lag behind those that didn’t. Your effort is doubly futile, you can’t get people to take up iron earlier than they did, and even if you could it would not change the grand arc of human progress.
If it succeeds, it would just give to a random local bronze age ruler power to conquer other populations, in a time when that usually meant robbing and enslaving the defeated (the message said nothing about slavery).
Furnaces should be very well in reach of any settled peoples, and the furnaces to melt it down can be fueled with mere charcoal if you’re not trying to forge steel. I’ll grant, though, that it’s likely the tweet won’t change human progress very much; I might have been better off trying to get people to boil their water/make tea or some other similar technological matter instead.
They most likely know this. It’s not like they don’t have domesticated animals they breed and observe.
Why would you lie to them?
‘They’, generally, don’t.
I wouldn’t be. If I were, it’d be a lie with positive effects; I wouldn’t feel very bad about sending a tweet telling them that if you steal and cheat and murder in life, you will ABSOLUTELY suffer in the afterlife, either.
If you mean specifically the rulers, rather than whoever the court horse breeder or whatnot is, then fine. They might not know.
Ah, OK. Mistaken, not lying.
Doubtful.
How utilititarian.
Someone asked something a lot like this not too long ago. I don’t remember who.
I would deliver a message to myself as a teenager. The message would contain mostly advice, and very little or nothing in the way of specifics designed to make me instantly rich (lottery numbers, etc.).
Richard Nixon, early 1960:
“Kennedy will try to steal the election in Illinois. Don’t let him. McNamara is a communist.”
Only the first part is true, but I want two strings on my bow, and I have no compunction about lying to keep McNamara far away from the Pentagon.
Accusing McNamara of communism might backfire in the face of the fact that the’s clearly not, which may cast the rest of your message in a poor light. You would be better served by telling him that McNamara is unfit for public service, which is absolutely true.
Hillary Rodham, 1971: “He’s not good enough for you.”
Maybe it’s just me modeling her wrong, but judging by Hillary’s ambitions I think she got more of what she wanted out of life from Bill Clinton than she would have from any other man.
Like what other man would have been such a perfect stepping stone for Presidential ambitions (even if she didn’t quite get there)?
Precisely.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo. You are very clever.
And here I foolishly thought you were being nice.
Who says I’m not being nice? National politics is hell, just ask John Boehner. This would spare her from becoming Satan incarnate to half the country and the punchline of a thousand jokes. And I’m sure Bill and Hillary would do just fine without each other, as lobbyists or appellate judges or whatever. (Somehow I doubt Bill would stay in electoral politics after losing the 1980 election for governor without Hillary pressing him on.)
In the grand scheme of things, I think politics over the last 30 years would look much the same, just without a bunch of idiotic scandals. Then again, Jerry Brown might’ve become President Moonbeam, so who knows.
Something small enough to leave the larger timeline intact, but still likely to save 10,000 lives or more: Prevent the Musket Wars in New Zealand by ensuring a significant number of St. Patrick-like Christian missionaries get to New Zealand in the mid-1800s. Convert enough of the Maori to something like Christianity at that time, and the cataclysmic meeting of Maori culture and cheap rifles happens much less disastrously.
Alternately, the germ theory of disease to whoever is best situated to write that down in a place where it’ll be widely disseminated and remembered. Jesus comes to mind, somewhere further East and earlier is probably even better. That breaks the timeline completely tho.
I had high hopes that after Brexit, the EU would produce a more sensible CAP policy. The reasons I think it is possible are these:
1) Brexit is going to blow a big hole in the CAP budget, and the rich EU countries are unwilling to increase payments.
2) Emmanuel Macron won in France, while farmers were more supportive of LePen.
3) Farmers have become a much smaller part of the population, so they are a less powerful voting block.
4) The country that gains the most from CAP payments, Poland*, is highly unpopular in the EC.
5) Britain opposed CAP reform that would limit the payments to big rich landowners, because if these payments were removed, the balance of payments to the EU would increase further.
6) Productivity in the farm sector in the Netherlands is very high, hopefully showing that you don’t need subsidies to produce food even in a country as small as the Netherlands.
But then, after the migration talks this week, I am losing hope. Do you think we will be able to achiev something sensible, or at least smaller?
Is Britain going to have a more sensible agricultural policy after Brexit, when they will have to pay it with their own government’s money? The disfunctional nature of the current Tory governmen doesn’t give me much hope.
*EDIT: as a total, not as a percentage.
If Roberts is concerned about the institutional reputation of the court, I really can’t imagine a worse time to revisit the 100+ year old precedent concerning whether separate federal and state charges constitute double jeopardy.
You mean because Charlottesville? IMO, unless they have some sort of evidence that hasn’t yet been revealed that the killing was deliberate, neither the first degree murder charges nor the hate crime charges should result in conviction.
I suspect that what the prosecution(s) want(s) to do is introduce a whole bunch of evidence that the guy’s a racist, then the evidence that he killed the girl, and use that the prejudice the jury into ignoring the lack of proper mens rea for 1st degree murder in the first place.
Are you responding to the right post? Did you read the link?
If yes to both, then clue me in as to what you’re talking about.
I’m not sure if it’s what HBC means, but the most likely reason I can think of that _now_ is a particularly bad time to revisit the dual-sovereign precedent is the Charlottesville driver who killed a protestor being charged with a federal hate crime.
Do I really have to explain why this is particularly worrisome and germane at this moment in time?
Fine. I think you are trolling, but sure.
Mueller can only charge people in federal court. Trump can pardon anyone Mueller charges. However these individuals can also be charged in state court and Trump wouldn’t be able to do anything about it.
Unless the Supreme Court were to suddenly upend the precedent.
I’m not sure I want to see federal politicians being charged in state courts for matters that are pretty clearly of federal interest. I’m not sure you’re going to want to see it either, when it’s your team’s turn.
Just for example, Hillary Clinton’s infamous email server was located in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware over the course of its lifetime. I’m fairly certain all three of those states have transparency laws that make it a crime for politicians to hide government records from public view. Do we really want to say it only takes one state AG with a compliant grand jury to indict Hillary Clinton and maybe put her behind bars for the 2016 campaign season?
I’m certain you can come up with a bit of legal gerrymandering that says the precedent you are trying to set only applies to the politicians you hate, not the ones you like, but I’m not optimistic about that being the stable solution. And being the state AG who brought down the Other Tribe’s most hated politician, strikes me as a powerfully motivating sort of career-maker.
Not doing that, is one of the many, many norms that we will regret doing away with even if it does somehow get rid of Trump a few years earlier than a fair election would have.
@JohnSchilling:
This ain’t that. Mueller is and has been a Republican. He isn’t on anything like a political witch hunt. The leverage he has comes from the cooperation he has with the authorities in jurisdictions where the crimes occurred (most of them being related to the primary in the same way tax evasion was to Capone).
@John Schilling
Everything you say makes sense, but are you really saying our alternative is to have incoming Presidents be able to pardon any and all crimes that got them into office, and the only possible sanction is impeachment by Congress?
Maybe the norm of only using a joint state-federal investigation (whether for Hillary or Trump) is our solution here.
Right now we have a Congressionally approved federal investigation, which is partnering with state prosecutors to ensure that violations of state law are prosecuted where necessary to achieve justice and protect our elections. In the future, if we continue to have some good semblance of independence and professionalism at the U.S. DoJ, and the norm is that the DoJ goes *first*, but states participate… does that work for you?
Impeachment is a somewhat weaker(*) protection than I would prefer, against abuse of presidential pardons. Fifty state AGs, or even sixteen, gunning for any administration official they can find a vaguely-plausible nexus to prosecute, is too much by far.
In particular, consider the necessary countermeasures that both parties will implement. Me, I think it’s a good thing that we can have a Republican president who hails from blue-state New York, or a Democrat from Arkansas. Bill Clinton didn’t have to face seeing his career torpedoed at the gubernatorial level because he didn’t go all-in on gun control, and Trump never faced an abortion litmus test beyond “at least he’s not Hillary”.
Going forward, when any Blue-state AG can indict any Red ham sandwich and vice versa, the only safe policy is for future Republican presidents to come from, and recruit their personal and professional staffs entirely from, Red-state residents with no strong Blue-state ties. And vice versa.
I’d rather see Manafort, Cohen, et al fully pardoned, than see that going forward. Because once you do that, there’s probably no going back.
* or at least clumsier by its all-or-nothing nature
@JohnSchilling:
Are you really saying that the 100+ year old precedent should be over turned by the Supreme Court specifically so that Trump can pardon his allies? Is that why you think the case has been taken up? Because, I really didn’t think you were that far gone.
Remember, if the state AGs really do go on a partisan witch hunt, that is still subject to final judgement by the Supreme Court, based on the particulars of the case. Bush v. Gore is even precedent (even though the Supremes declared it was no precedent).
@John Schilling
Hm.
I understand your concern about further fracturing politics into red states vs blue states. As you see it, state prosecutions of high-ranking members of presidential administrations would mean not only can’t you hire someone from the other party (who might be a leak) you can’t hire anyone from a state whose AG is from the other party (they might prosecute, which might mean subpoenas and etc., which is as bad as a leak), and that’s bad for political moderation.
I think a strong norm against frivolous prosecution, and a weak norm against politicized prosecution, and the general wisdom behind the rule that one should vet people thoroughly before you hire them to sensitive positions, and the risk that politicizing important governmental powers like prosecution can backfire–that’s all we’ve ever had, and it’s been sufficient and can continue to be sufficient.
In particular, I think this wasn’t a problem under Clinton or Obama or either Bush because no state AG really was so desperate to make their already-made political career that they saw advantage to risking a spurious criminal prosecutions. I mean, it’s not that NY or CA might not enjoy trying to prosecute Kissinger for something or other… the reason they haven’t, I’d assumed, was that he didn’t break the law.
Do you think there was lots of breaking of state law by previous presidential administrations, that other-party AGs knew about but didn’t prosecute, because of a norm?
I don’t see how that’s a charitable or even remotely plausible reading of my comments. I don’t even mention Trump, and you conclude that I am “specifically” seeking to defend or empower him? I think I have been quite clear that my concern is with the long-term consequences of the ruling that you want for the sake of a one-time win.
SCOTUS should decide this case specifically on the basis of whether federal and state prosecutors should be able to double-team some schmuck from Alabama in order to turn a lame-ass broken tail light traffic stop into a five-year prison sentence. Because that’s, you know, the specific case actually before the court. Or maybe you didn’t know.
If, along the way, the court should notice that there are high-level political implications, then I would say that the court should consider the long-term consequences, and not just the specific question of which ruling favors the Forces of Goodness vs. Donald J. Trump, in one skirmish of that crusade.
Right back at you. Because what I’m seeing here is full-blown Trump Derangement Syndrome.
Terance Gamble faces five years in prison, and you don’t even care whether that’s just or not, only whether the same law can be used as a weapon against Trump. If thousands more like him are given a double dose of mass incarceration, if the next Democratic president and his administration face retaliatory prosecution and persecution from red-state AGs, if the polarization of American politics is ratcheted another notch, that’s all collateral damage; the only thing that matters is Bringing Down Donald Trump, no matter the cost.
And if anyone dissents from your fanaticism, arguing that the cost is too high for the benefit you seek, you conclude that they are “specifically” seeking to enable some bit of petty villainy by Donald J. Trump.
You are not even trying to argue in good faith here.
@John Schilling:
First off, your argument about the merits of the case:
The principle that’s being argued here isn’t about whether Gamble deserves to be in prison. He was convicted of to being a felon in possession of a firearm, nor is anyone at the moment challenging whether four years is an unjust sentence for said crime. He hasn’t been acquitted, retried and then convicted.
It does seem to be true based on the petition that Ginsberg and Thomas both wanted to look at the separate sovereign exception. I can certainly see an argument that the Feds might come along behind the states and prosecute cases that were easy victories in order to apply harsher penalties and rack up wins for their prosecutors.
Now, on to the broader issue:
The very first sentence you wrote in this sub-thread was:
You didn’t seem to care at all about Mr. Gamble, and saw this solely in terms of what it might mean for federal politics. In other words, you think my reading of the concerns about the potential over-turning of the precedent is germane.
And my question, specifically, was why is the Robert court taking this challenge up right now. The contention above was that Roberts cared a great deal about the institutional reputation of the court and how it appeared to outsiders. It does not seem that the case in question is particularly novel, so why grant cert now?
This question was about the reputation of the court and how much Roberts cared about it. We don’t know who voted for or against cert, of course. Perhaps Roberts voted against cert. Given the petition, perhaps Ginsberg and Thomas were the prime movers.
But the appearance right now is not good. It’s a bad look. Which doesn’t stop the justices from taking it up and voting on it, nor determine how they will vote. So arguments about “institutional reputation” ring hollow when applied to claims about how justices will vote in future cases.
@HeelBearCub – Terance Gamble is serving two consecutive prison sentences for the same crime. He was put on trial twice and sentenced twice – both a one year sentence in Alabama state court and a three year sentence in Federal court.
It’s tough. It feels unfair to me, and contrary to the Fifth Amendment, but on the other hand, if you told me that someone was tried and acquitted in France of a crime under US jurisdiction, I wouldn’t want to surrender the ability to try her here.
It seems to me that a lot of SSCers, and perhaps especially the ones in this sub-thread, would enjoy “The Downfall Dictionary” a pretty regular blog covering how different U.S. politicians met their downfalls via scandal, violence, or criminal charge.
Reminds me of the saying, “Historians are just gossips with exceptionally broad tastes.” Anyway, it’s fun.
As a matter of legal principle, it should be double jeopardy. An acquittal on one charge should preclude being tried again on a fundamentally identical charge for the same incident, regardless of whether a different sovereign is bringing the charges. Correcting this ugly loophole in criminal procedure is well worth increasing the chances that certain individuals avoid consequences for their crimes from 98% to 99%.
Did you even read the article? There was no acquittal in this case. It was a conviction for multiple different charges, some federal and some state. As noted, this is precedent that is over 100 years old.
And the reason is this is particularly important is what that may mean for Trump’s ability to pardon his cronies for federal crimes and then render them immune from state prosecution.
Are people paying any fucking attention?
A conviction absolutely should preclude further prosecution for the same conduct.
Don’t think this is what means Trump and his cronies will walk. They were always going to walk. Impunity at the highest levels is as American as baseball and apple pie.
They were both charged at the same time. His argument is simply that since the state sentenced him to one year, the feds can’t sentence him to four. If the Feds had sentenced him to one and the state four, he’d be arguing to throw out the state conviction.
Regardless, the question is not “what should the ruling be in abstraction” but rather “if Roberts is actually concerned with institutional reputation (as asserted in threads above) why would they be taking this up 100+ year old precedent right now”
So what? This has nothing to do with the legal validity of the claim that separate state and federal trials are double jeopardy. Miranda was later re-convicted of kidnapping and rape, but that doesn’t mean he didn’t win his Supreme Court Case.
The people whose cases are test cases for civil rights are often not sympathetic or honest people. And lawyers aren’t famed for being sympathetic or honest either. Doesn’t matter.
The articles you linked have given an answer. They say both Ginsburg and Thomas may have been signaling they’d like to overturn the precedent.
Not everything is about Trump.
The fundamental concept behind separate federal and state charges on the same issue being a double jeopardy violation seems sound to me, regardless of conviction or acquittal. I don’t follow these kind of issues closely enough to have any idea how specific to Trump this coming up is. But I’m a bit confused by the state crimes aspect of the Mueller investigation. What state charges would be involved? And to be blunt, what reason do I have to believe that the state charges wouldn’t be essentially retaliatory in nature, New York or California expressing their displeasure with Trump’s pardon?
(My prior is slightly towards the latter, but I’m not a lawyer, and I’m genuinely curious on this.)
I take it you aren’t following the Mueller probe at all.
One of the key facets of the criminal investigation of any sort of organization is encouraging lesser participants to testify to what they know. The possibility of conviction on serious charges is always an inducement to doing so. Trump is in the fairly unique position of being able to pardon people who would be so charged. That significantly lessens the leverage Mueller could have against the multiple people he has already indicted, as well as those he may indict in the future, and the many who have already plead guilt to lesser crimes.
But, most/all of these people have committed state crimes as well as federal. This has been clearly signaled to all involved. Therefore Trumps pardon power looks less tempting to those who have yet to cooperate.
Merely taking this case raises the possibility that Trumps pardon power may be absolute.
Remember the double-edged nature of such instances; great, we have to do this and over-ride double jeopardy in order to defeat the ogre Trump.
Wonderful. And five/ten/thirty years down the line, when the Other Side are using this as blackmail/leverage against political enemies who are on your side? ‘Co-operate or we’ll stitch you up with the double whammy?’ you really think there won’t be any deal-cutting, and people too stupid/honest to lie about “oh yes indeed Smith told me Jones was a Moldovan government minister!” will be hit with “you want to serve two sentences, and we’ll make them not concurrent but consecutive, and we’ll make sure to push for the toughest sentencing in both the federal and state cases, and by the way we’re also going to try and get as many separate states as possible in on this”?
Hard cases make bad law, and so do panicky reactions about “but the ogre! we have to kill the ogre right now!”
I haven’t been following it that closely, no. But you didn’t really answer my questions. What state charges are they potentially facing? I’m sure that some state could come up with something, but how likely would they (whoever they are) be to face state charges in a more normal investigation of this type?
Look. I can think of concerns about overturning this that have nothing to do with Trump, and make me broadly sympathetic to the current state. The separate sovereigns doctrine meant that the Feds could charge people acquitted of lynchings by all-white state juries. And if we take a hard line that any acquittal means you’re forever protected, the situation very quickly becomes one where any level can effectively hand out pardons. That’s not a good thing. But if you want to convince people this is bad, you should do it that way, and avoid making it all about Trump. Because making it about Trump means a lot of people are instantly opposed, and even I’m suspicious that the state charges you talk about are essentially being filed out of spite. Which is the essence of double jeopardy.
@Deiseach
That’s a misreading of the situation. The status quo ante is to allow prosecution by both the state and federal governments, and has been for 150 years.
There’s a lot more here than even an average lawyer could helpfully answer.
1) What was the intent of the framers’ with the double jeopardy clause as written? To what extent will the court use stare decisis or related doctrines to skip even asking that, and just keep doing what courts have all been doing for 100+ years?
My humble opinion: laws are easy to change, so when the court gets a question of statute wrong, and sees (or thinks it sees) the mistake later on, it should usually just stick to the mistake, and let the legislature fix it. The Constitution is very much not not not easy to change, so when the court realizes it made a mistake (or maybe even when it realizes it can make a minor improvement in the direction of “let’s not have slavery” say) the Court should correct the mistake, because otherwise we’re stuck with it.
2) What are the optics of tweaking double-jeopardy concerns right now, given that everyone is suddenly noticing how expansive the pardon power would be if not for the current double-jeopardy rule? There are a number of things in the Constitution that aren’t very good, but have never been fixed. The state-federal distinction from 100 years ago may or may not have noticed the way that the pardon power overlaps with this question.
My humble opinion: the optics stink, but damn the optics. What actually matters is the *power*. The pardon power should not be extended to allow the President to pardon his own or his cronies’ crimes. I don’t see another way to achieve that result except to view the power to pardon/prosecute for state crimes should remain exclusively with the states’ governors or other state authorities as provided by state constitutions and laws, and double jeopardy doesn’t attach to bar state prosecution after federal pardon. This is true for obvious separation of powers reasons. I don’t care when the Court takes up the issue, as long as it gets the right answer; I’d be really pleased to see the court get the right answer *now* by way of a footnote or mild hypothetical.
The pardon power of the President should never have existed in the first place. It a complete mockery of the rule of law.
To your “retaliatory in nature” question…
1) If Russia moved money to pay for meddling in an election via a bank in NY, that’s quite likely going to involve some real crimes that harmed NY’s interests, such as its interest in not having its banks facilitate Russian payments to undermine the integrity of NY elections. It’s not “retaliatory in nature” if NY prosecutes people who (purely, purely, purely a hypothetical, of course, of course, of course) enriched themselves while committing crimes under NY and federal law by facilitating Russian payments to illegally interfere in U.S. election.
Some simple phrases to highlight the crimes potentially involved: wire fraud, money laundering, (mis)-use of state banking to commit crimes, tax evasion, perjury in sworn documents, racketeering.
This isn’t “come up with something” territory, at least for Manafort and some other major Trump campaign players. It’s a question of how many counts stick, and whether those counts are sufficient to get these people to turn state’s witness and cooperate.
Edited to add: From wikipedia: “On October 30, 2017, Manafort surrendered to the FBI after a federal grand jury indicted him and his business associate Rick Gates. The charges arose from his consulting work for the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine before Yanukovych’s overthrow in 2014. The indictment had been requested by Robert Mueller’s special investigation unit. The indictment charged Manafort with conspiracy against the United States, conspiracy to launder money, failure to file reports of foreign bank and financial accounts, being an unregistered agent of foreign principal, false and misleading FARA statements, and false statements. Manafort pleaded not guilty, and was placed under 24-hour GPS-monitored house arrest due to the weight of evidence in the cases against him. On June 15, 2018, Manafort’s bail was revoked and he was sent to jail due to charges of obstruction of justice and witness tampering that is alleged to have occurred while he was under house arrest. He pled not guilty to these additional charges, and as of June 2018 is currently awaiting trial in the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia.”
@bean
You might also find the wiki page on Rick Gates pretty helpful.
Edited to add: Even better, actually, is the wiki page on “Links between Trump Associates and Russian Officials”
That’ll link you to the Manafort and Rick Gates pages, but also the Michael Flynn, George Papadopoulos, and several other pages. Possibly nothing will stick to Trump or Kushner, but I think there may be a few more shoes to drop, and betting markets still seem to put some real odds on Trump being impeached in his first term, which I have to assume is mostly predicated on the Mueller investigation. This isn’t just spite.
@yodelyak
My question is not “did these people do bad things?”. It’s “did any of the bad things these people did normally fall under state law?” I doubt that the State of New York normally prosecutes people who fail to register as foreign agents. Maybe I’m wrong on that. And I’m sure that they can find a few charges which will stick. But from my perspective, your case looks more like “let’s see if we can find a way to get around Trump’s pardon power” than anything remotely fair-minded. Again, I’m certainly not in favor of making a change to the existing law/precedent on the basis of it helping Trump. There look to be good reasons for the status quo which have nothing to do with him either way. But you’re making a substantial portion of me want SCOTUS to overturn, and I don’t even like the man.
Also, “retaliatory” does not seem like the right word for a state prosecutor who prosecutes in this situation.
By analogy… Let’s say you owe me $500 to cover an injury you caused me by driving recklessly, and you also owe $500 to someone else (call them C) who you also injured with the same or related conduct. I knew that C had a more expensive lawyer than me, so I expected they’d make sure you regretted your behavior and stopped… but then I learn that C and you are family, and maybe they knew all along that you’re a reckless driver and you were driving recklessly in their employ, so they’re not charging you at all, but are instead deliberately letting you off the hook. So, I decide to steadfastly bring my own claim… am I retaliating? Or am I simply bringing a suit to vindicate my rights? Your prior seems to be that anyone who could be pardoned by the president should then not be subject to prosecution by a state that doesn’t like the president. But if Trump pardons Bob Loblaw of any federal crimes he may have committed, that doesn’t mean California can “retaliate” against Bob Loblaw–first Bob Loblaw has to actually break the law in California.
If not retaliatory, then politicized. I’m sure that there are state charges which technically apply. I’m almost as sure that in most similar cases, the state doesn’t bring them if the person in question beats the federal charges. John Schilling said this better than I could. The endgame here is that every state Attorney General starts looking for ways to bring charges against the other side. This is not a situation we want.
I don’t see how this works in practice. Even now there are cases where a state and the federal government tussle over who goes first. That’s going to get even worse when it is who gets to go at all.
And this goes both ways, consider the case of a billionaire that owns a major employer in a particular state being investigated for a federal crime. As soon as news leaks, the state government can effectively immunize him from federal prosecution.
@Bean,
You are right in your concern–and also that John articulated it quite well. I think politicization is the right word.
I don’t think the solution is to bar states from prosecuting violations of their laws when those laws happen to touch federal candidates or their campaigns, *and* when the federal government has brought charges and decided to involve state charges as well. If Donald Trump, two days before his inauguration, actually shot someone in public, as he famously bragged he could do with impunity, I think his prompt disarming and arrest by whatever law enforcement arrived first (including the secret service), and his subsequent prosecution by the feds–well, that sounds right. And if he pardoned himself upon taking office on January 21, then the state where the murder occurred could and should bring the charge that the feds could no longer bring.
@Brad
I already noticed that problem, which is why I’m not in favor of a really strict Double Jeopardy standard. It leads to all sorts of weird/perverse/bizarre incentives. But that’s exactly why you shouldn’t make this case all about Trump. Because I can feel it pushing me into wanting a bad decision, and I don’t really like him. Make it about lynchers and corporate executives who are powerful in their home states instead.
@yodelyak
The problem is that (to simplify slightly) half the country is certain that the Trump Campaign is guilty of everything up to and including sedition, while the other half is certain that they’re as innocent as the driven snow. If Trump shot someone on TV, that probably wouldn’t be the case. Again, I’m not in favor of total immunity from state prosecution for anything touching on politics. But I think that New York going after people Trump pardons sets a really bad precedent.
@bean:
Well, right now that the potentially biggest fish on the hook, from what little we know, is probably Michael Cohen, Trump’s putative lawyer.
Given that he has not seemed to actually be acting as Trump’s actual lawyer, much of what was seized from him in searches conducted pursuant warrants seems to have been admitted as evidence.
It is well within the realm of possibility that credible charges of money laundering for the mafia could result. That is certainly the kind of thing that NY prosecutors would generally be involved in prosecuting.
That’s only one of many possible non-political charges that could stem from the Mueller investigation.
You can also look at this list and see that much of what is being charged is bank fraud and identity theft, which is decidedly not “failing to register as a foreign agent” and the kind of thing that states frequently do prosecute.
@bean
I agree it’s a bad precedent. But I don’t think it is in the same league as Trump pardoning Manafort in the first place. We are already in the system is spinning out of control territory at that point.
As HBC points out elsewhere, everyone involved is a Republican: Mueller, Rosenstein, even the judge overseeing the trial. Whatever this is, it isn’t sour grapes from the party out of power. So we’d have a president using the pardon power to directly protect himself from an investigation that is not a partisan witchhunt.
I think worrying about some second order thing like a NY prosecution is presupposing that we will recover from the first order problems and return to some semblance of normalcy where second order problems are a serious concern. That’s not obvious.
bean:
The good and bad news is that this allows the feds to take another whack at you when they think the state court decided the case incorrectly. The good news is, sometimes the state court really did find you not guilty in error or by ignoring the law. The bad news is, sometimes the state court got it right, but the result looks bad politically so the feds decide to try to put you in jail anyway.
IANAL, but this seems kinda like the whole point of forbidding double-jeopardy. Courts can get the wrong answer, but they ought not to be able to keep prosecuting you until they manage to get some jury somewhere to convict you on something.
Brad:
Why isn’t this argument equally persuasive against double jeopardy within either a state or the federal court system? A corrupt prosecutor can bring charges and intentionally lose them against their favorite billionaire within this state, and thus block any other prosecution by honest prosecutors within the state, right? Or maybe the corrupt prosecutor will eventually be voted out of office, and we’d like the new honest prosecutor to retry those cases and win them this time.
@Bean
I missed this direct question, sorry. It looks like HBC and some others may have answered this, and maybe I answered it by accident already. FWIW, my understanding is that NY’s charges/potential charges are all of the form “money laundering,” “bank fraud,” and “tax evasion.” So, yes, I think all of those are very much so normally within the scope of NY law.
I think some federal laws have no good state analogue, and some of the actions involved may not have taken place in NY, so NY can’t bring those charges. E.g. I’m not sure if “crimes against the united states” or “failure to register as a foreign agent” or “lying to the FBI” really have direct analogues–likely if Trump offered a pardon for those, it would stick if that was all there was. Those were, I think, the substance of what Rick Gates plead guilty to.
@yodelak:
Rick Gates was also charged with bank fraud and money laundering. No surprise since he was in partnership with Manafort.
It seems like we’re going to break something important here no matter what.
Unless the SC upholds the status quo and Trump goes on to just let enough people fry that there isnt motivation for a state level accounting.
Is there a name for the opposite of the typical mind fallacy? Where you believe that thought is culturally conditioned to such an extent that, in reference to the Huey tzompantli you’d be able to say:
The view from nowhere?
There should be a name for “a decent argument ruined by a gratuitous jab at the enemy du jour“, since that sentence is a prime example:
Leave out the colonial clause, and you have a reasonable sentiment: how I see the world is irrelevant to understanding how they saw the world.
Leave in the White Man’s Evil stuff and you have only “I may have benefited from this and continue to benefit from this since I am, after all, a college-educated white woman with a white collar career but this lets me signal my wokeness without having to sacrifice anything”.
As she points out in her other tweets, lots of cultures practiced something similar for similar reasons. She acknowledges that she can’t put herself into the mindset of someone who would be willing to die for the greater good, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be so.
However, she then fails at the hurdle of applying such impartiality evenly: she won’t judge other cultures and times because that would be bad, and we can’t say that “killing people is bad” if the people doing the killing had very good reasons to think it wasn’t bad, but we can make judgements about the badness of other cultures and times as long as we’re talking about (our 21st century definition of what counts as) white cultures. I’m pretty sure she has no intention of including Aztec or Carthaginian ‘colonialism’ in her basket of deplorables: “But this was not a cynical use of some outdated or fringe religious belief during an imperial power grab. The religious function of sacrifice was the basis of everything”. You’re an Aztec noble engaging in Flower Wars to get victims for sacrifice (which has the convenient side-effects of keeping the enemy state in constant low-level attrition), that’s A-okay! You’re bringing True Gospel Religion to enlighten the Dark Continent, you’re cynically engaging in an imperial power grab, even if the British Protestant believed every bit as fervently as the Aztec that this was for the higher good.
I think the Carthaginians were a great people. I also think we can indeed judge that “sacrificing babies to Moloch is bad”, regardless of the fervent belief that this was for the good of the people involved (I’m also fairly sure Ms Wade would not be so tolerant about not making judgements of the past when it came to the question of burning heretics on the part of the Inquisition).
Yeah. The sentiment is not as unreasonable at it seems, but the speaker is so wrapped up in woke politics that she doesn’t really make the obvious connections about how empires or religions exhibit if not human universals, human “really-super-common behaviors”.
She later pulled it back a bit, but being twitter, the first stupid thing you say is always going to get more attention.
She contradicts herself in the very sentence: she’s quite happy to make judgements about the 19th century scramble for Africa being bad (“centuries of colonial oppression and destruction”), and it doesn’t matter that this is coming from a 21st century American viewpoint, but we cannot say that human sacrifice by 16th century Aztecs was bad because that was another time and another country (and besides the wench is dead).
16th century Cortez and the Conquistadores taking on the Aztec Empire: bad! 16th century Aztec Empire sacrificing prisoners of war: it’s all culturally relevant and not our place to judge!
If she considers herself part of a broader white culture that is responsible for the Conquistadors and the Scramble for Africa, and she believes that you may not criticize any culture but your own, then her position is consistent.
A charitable reading suggests that she’s making a sensible statement (I can’t imagine volunteering to be a human sacrifice, but people in a very different culture and set of beliefs may well have done so), and then tossing out some red meat for the more doctrinaire of her readers by making reference to colonialism or white supremacy or whatever. Yes, the beliefs of the doctrinaire readers may be silly. Yes, her beliefs may be, too, for all I know. But it’s 100% reasonable to recognize that people in a completely different culture with completely different beliefs and experiences might do stuff you’d never consider doing.
I guess I should suppress my evil white male biases and accept that people in Nazi Germany’s sphere of influence wanted to be gassed, or people in Soviet Union wanted to be worked to death in gulags. That’s exactly the same logic — hey, it happened to them as a part of their culture, therefore they surely wanted it.
The opposite extreme of “typical mind fallacy” is “I don’t consider those strangers to be really human”. (Horseshoe theory predicts that only racists and truly woke people would believe this.)
Imagine a parallel world where widow-burning was not made illegal in India by British government. In that parallel world, the woke people today are probably tweeting about how being burned as a widow is a sacred cultural tradition, perfectly voluntary, and should be considered an example of feminism.
No. The real world example is female circumcision, and I don’t thing the woke people are on board with that.
For a possibly fictional picture of how widow-burning might be voluntary, see Kipling’s poem The Last Suttee.
Recently I am not in contact with the young generation of woke people, but a few decades ago it was like this:
First there was a huge wave of outrage against female circumcision. It was assumed (I guess this is a default assumption for everything) that it is a horrible thing that men do to little girls. The woke people expressed proper outrage, and some said that men who do this should be punished severely.
After getting some more information, it turned out that it is actually something that women do to little girls. Suddenly there was no more talk about severe punishment of perpetrators; now it was a problem of the patriarchal culture. Then gradually the woke people stopped talking about this topic entirely.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
Or, in the real world, as seen on the subreddit:
https://www.worldcrunch.com/culture-society/in-brazil-activists-defend-infanticide-among-indigenous-tribes
He doesn’t post all that often, but Interfluidity has a somewhat left-wing POV and seems to be thinking hard about things and writing posts that remind me a lot in quality and style of Scott’s best posts. I feel like I consistently learn from him.
In the wake of Trump’s election someone came up with the description of “this is how the white working class riots”. I’m not sure it’s entirely accurate, but I thought it was an interesting take.
With the Kennedy resignation I got to wondering, what does it look like when the Blue Tribe riots? And by Blue Tribe I don’t mean the entire Democratic coalition, or everyone left of center, but specifically the arugula eating, Prius driving, thinks they should be watching the World Cup version of the concept.
Trump’s election doesn’t actually have the properties of a riot (a violent public disturbance), so presumably the person you quote actually meant something like ‘revolt.’
If so, a similar revolt would be to back an anti-establishment politician with a different and more extreme agenda compared to the Democrat establishment and using language that makes them upset by being too extreme, while being adored by a relatively small, but very committed subset of the left*. However, the arugula eating, Prius driving, thinks they should be watching the World Cup people are quite pro-establishment, no?
So it seems more reasonable to argue that the revolt would come from black Democrats (Alicia Garza?), working class Democrats (Freddie deBoer?) or angry women (Suzanna Walters?). The arugula eaters would presumably ‘revolt’ by electing another Barack ‘Hope’ Obama.
* Of course, this won’t actually work, because the Democrat primaries heavily favor establishment candidates, unlike the Republican primaries. So a Trump scenario probably can’t happen to the Democrats.
Perhaps an example of that kind of revolt would be the recent primary victory by Ocasio-Cortez in NY. She defeated a twelve-term incumbent Democrat, and apparently the general election in that district is basically never competitive, so she’ll be headed to Congress soon. See Atlantic article.
Of course, her policies strike me as pretty much a comprehensive list of “things that would mostly be nice if we had infinite resources with which to buy them,” but the arugula eating, Prius driving, World Cup watching people that I know seem quite happy about her electoral victory, so I think it fits.
Megan McCardle made basically this point about Ocasio-Cortez, h/t to Rod Dreher. I considered posting it when I saw Brad’s post but wasn’t sure to what extent social justice/democratic socialists really qualify as the arugula eating Prius drivers Brad meant, but, well, if someone else is going to say the same thing….
Super long quote from McCardle, with what I consider the most relevant bits bolded:
Strong disagree. The problem isn’t that we don’t have a “pragmatic, centrist party.” The problem is that we have two of them, and don’t have anything else.
Nick,
That was an interesting read; thanks for sharing it. I pretty much agree with the diagnosis. I’ll agree with Iain below that it’s important not to over-generalize from this one race — I don’t think the far-left reaction is not at the same level of influence as the Tea Party yet (although I partially think that’s because the mainstream of the Democratic party was more sympathetic to the far left than the mainstream of the Republican party was to the far right, but that may just be my perspective).
It does seem increasingly difficult for elected officials to focus on incrementalism / good governance. It seems like we now have large swathes of the populace where one side wants a substantial changes in one direction and the other side wants at least as substantial changes in the other direction, and neither side is willing to commit to incremental change: the other side is evil and must be utterly defeated. I think shifting more and more of the work of society into the government is just going to make this problem worse, and I don’t see any slowing in that tendency.
I like Nate Silver’s take on Ocasio-Cortez:
At the risk of making myself easier to dox, I’m in that district and I voted for Ocasio-Cortez. But consider that I’m more politically informed than most and I had no idea of her positions when I pulled the lever for her. Basically all I knew is that she wasn’t Crowley. And my problem with Crowley wasn’t that he was insufficiently left or wasn’t resisting Trump hard enough. It’s that he helped lead an old fashioned political machine, complete with patronage judgeships.
I wouldn’t have voted for a Trumpist over him, but I’d have strongly considered a Kaischite.
Thanks Brad for an inside view. It’s kind of like discussing why people voted for Trump — there’s almost as many reasons as voters. We should be careful of making broad judgments.
More to the point, Ocasio-Cortez’s polices strike me as a list of things that Blue Tribe directly wants for their own sake, which makes her election the figurative opposite of a riot.
Rioting is when you do things that are directly harmful to your own interests, because you think they are even more harmful to the outgroup’s interest and because you’ve given up hope for anything better, with maybe a side order of wishful thinking that maybe the outgroup will go away or start respecting you and somehow this will make your life better, but mostly because it feels good.
To the extent that Trump is about building a wall to keep out the Mexicans and the Moslems, about taxes and tariffs to punish the fat-cat capitalists, and above all else about saying coarse words that make the liberals and the RINOs and the media recoil in the full apoplectic symptoms of Trump Derangement Syndrome, none of these things directly serve any interest of an unemployed auto worker in Gary, Indiana. And while there may be people who are primarily motivated by their considered judgment that the indirect effects of these policies might end with someone offering them a good job, really, come on. Michael Moore has it right. People did this because hurting the outgroup felt good. For a day. And that’s the essence of a riot.
There’s no electoral equivalent for liberals that I can see. Something might come about, but it’s hard to imagine what form it would take given the fundamental asymmetry that the right wants less from government and mostly isn’t getting what it does want, so it’s harder to use the government as a tool to hurt them more than it already does. Not impossible, but the most effective tools to that end would probably be the judiciary and the bureaucracy and those are by design almost immune to riotous pressure.
Punching “Nazis” in the street, or cheering others doing the same, is classical rioting, but that only appeals to the younger and more extreme subset of liberals.
The bit where we chase Trumpists out of restaurants, etc, and ridicule them on the intertubes and on TV, is probably where we are now. The next step would I expect be to take this into the professional arena, demanding that known or suspected Trumpists be fired from any job where “decent” people work. Self-destructive, but it will hurt the outgroup and it will feel good.
Still, we should be looking for possible electoral manifestations, because Trump surprised the hell out of me and is causing a great deal of harm, so I’d rather not be blindsided by the left-wing equivalent. Ocasio-Cortez isn’t it; she’s just trying to build a better world that she can’t afford and that’s not the same thing.
You raise a good distinction. I mentioned Ocasio-Cortez as an example of the type of electoral revolt Aapje posited, but I think you’re correct that it’s meaningfully distinct from the populist pushback we’ve seen on the right with Trump, at least in its intentions/motivations (I’m not convinced that seriously attempting to implement Ocasio-Cortez’s policy wishlist wouldn’t be destructive to the very people who elected her, not unlike increasing tariffs hurting some of the people who voted for Trump).
@John Schilling
If a riot is something that a group does that they think hurts their outgroup, but also to themselves, because it feels good, does this mean that barely-controlled mob violence exclusively against the outgroup aren’t riots? Pogroms, one-sided incidents of communal violence, etc?
Violence always directly hurts both sides, albeit asymmetrically. And “barely-controlled” violence by people who consider themselves society’s losers, is almost certainly going not going to leave them unscathed.
If you’re talking about something like lynching or Krystallnacht, yeah, riot probably isn’t the right word there.
What about the classic pogrom – European peasants deciding based on some rumour or accusation or whatever to go bust up the Jewish part of town or a nearby Jewish village or whatever, and the local authority not helping because they can’t or don’t want to? Those peasants are not on top of society, but does the pogrom hurt them?
I’m not sure how you’re defining working class, but I assume it includes lower income than you’see in the chart.
http://www.businessinsider.com/exit-polls-who-voted-for-trump-clinton-2016-11#by-income-clinton-led-only-among-voters-with-a-2015-family-income-under-50000-a-group-that-included-36-of-the-voters-in-the-exit-polls-4
Actually moving to Canada.
I’m not sure if this was intended to be serious, but I do think there’s something to it. It’s what the analogous groups have done in places like Turkey or Israel, just left.
I think Aapje has it right. Basically, if we’re taking the “tribe” definitions seriously instead of just shorthand for left-wing or right-wing, or just the white versions of those – Prius-driving elitists vs pickup-driving good-ole-boys – by most definitions the “Republican elite” are relatively blue tribe. They can simulate red-tribishness as needed, but professional politicians tend to be fairly urbane, cultivated people. The average Republican leadership type person is probably more likely to go to the opera than the average Democratic voter.
After the 2012 election, one popular conclusion in the Republican leadership was that they needed to do a better job of attracting minorities, but especially Hispanics. Bush II had done quite well with Hispanics, and the hope was that someone like his brother could push it past 50% and set the Republicans up to win a majority of a fast-growing voter demographic group in future.
The sort of white people who reliably vote Republican tend either to be legitimately “red tribe” or to imagine themselves as such (middle-class guy in a Texas suburb who owns a pickup truck for the weekends, say – he likes to play at being blue-collar). They chose a candidate who didn’t want to go with “Plan Jeb!” – it was a revolt by the base (that looks to have picked up some of the remaining red-tribe Democrats).
The way the Democratic voter base works is different from the Republican. There’s more groups you can point to as big parts of the Democratic voter base. There’s no direct analogue to “working-class and wannabe-working-class of one demographic group doesn’t like the idea of their party tacking to appeal to another group” – I don’t think a coalition of multiple groups saying “the party leadership doesn’t prioritize us enough” could hold together (who do you prioritize?), and no one group is strong enough to make the Democrats a party focusing on that group.
I’m the one (or one of the ones) who called it a WWC riot. If you want to say “revolt” instead that’s fine.
The characteristics I used were:
1. a group that feels like it has lost. The other side has gotten all the victories and we’re losing.
1.1 note that it doesn’t matter too much whether it’s true or not. It’s obviously more likely for them to feel like they’re losing or have lost if it’s true, but it’s neither necessary nor sufficient.
2. the group takes actions to lash out at their outgroup
3. the actions are quite likely to not actually address or improve the issues in point #1 (burning down your own neighborhood, voting for trade protectionism that leads to job losses)
4. if the rioters are your outgroup, you will use the fact that they have harmed themselves more than you as proof of how stupid they are and how it’s not worth bothering reasoning with them. However, there is a socioeconomic explanation for how this is rational. I couldn’t find the term last time (think it was a Haidt or McArdle or TNC essay explaining riots, but I couldn’t find it using google) but it’s basically expensive signalling. “Yes, we caused 8 utils of harm to ourselves to only cost 5 utils of harm to you, but that’s how angry we are. Even though you have more utils than us and could win a war of attrition, we are still going to make you feel the pain we feel.”
So what does this mean for the arugula-driving and Prius-eating group? My first guess is more things like kicking people out of restaurants, spitting in the faces of people wearing MAGA caps, getting into negative-sum doxxing wars (see https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/houston-lost-mind-trump-shirt/ where everyone in the immediate scene lost), blocking people you don’t like from campus or kicking them off social media, calling everyone a Nazi. At the higher level there will be moves to vote in more extreme-left politicians, which the DNC will partially be able to resist. The major political parties have lost a lot of their power over the past generation so it’s not as easy for either of them to keep out the crazies.
I think calling this a riot is trying to import a bunch of emotive language to skew thinking. Of all the ways people can agitate for change in the world, the one we most want to encourage is organizing political movements and voting. The alternatives are all a whole lot worse.
Agreed. The calm and orderly and legal election of someone you don’t like is not a “riot” no matter how much you disagree with the outcome.
If you want to point to a right-wing riot, I dunno, maybe look more at Charlottesville (although they were certainly met by an equal-if-not-superior force of lefties)?
I thought that was the point?
edit: To expand, I thought “Trump is what a white working class riot looks like” meant that “these people don’t run around breaking things when they are angry or depressed, so you might overlook them, but that doesn’t mean you should overlook those feelings for they can manifest in tangible, if non-overtly destructive, ways.”
I’ll grant that you probably can find instances of organized violence by wwc, but the quote is implying it doesn’t happen with the same frequency or via the same provocation.
Do these fit the pattern though? Do they hurt the people doing the kicking off social media more than the people being kicked off?
Kicking people off social media probably does not fit the pattern of causing more harm to self than the other (unless it leads to an evaporative cooling cycle where you keep on kicking out the most right-wing who remain, which is possible but not required).
I have one more idea of blue-tribe riot:
Arguing for packing judge, WHILE THE OTHER SIDE HAS ALL THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.
Jane’s law: “The devotees of the party in power are smug and arrogant. The devotees of the party out of power are insane.”
Jane’s law was derived from experiences of a political reporter in the 1990s and early 00s.
With the further fragmentation of media consumption (yay Facebook) in this country, the law is now: “The devotees of both parties will be smug and arrogant in describing/defending their insane plans for what to do with the power they do not have enough of.”
@yodelyak
It’s from Megan McArdle, who was blogging as “Jane Galt” at the time she proposed it (I was reading her at the time of the original post). She didn’t get her start as a journalist until 2003, at The Economist.
@CatCube
Thank you for the correction. It’s funny, not only did I already know it was Megan McArdle who’d coined Jane’s Law, I’d even flipped to and skimmed her Wikipedia page a couple times when quoting her law, which I have cited a handful of times. What’s funny is, somehow I had always missed that she’d had a previous career including a world-view-breaking (lefty ->libertarian) at Nader’s PIRGs and an MBA before becoming a journo. I’d just seen she was born early enough to have finished college 10 years before she coined the law, and seen a line that she was a “journalist for __” at the time she coined it, and apparently just assumed the gap.
Oops.
I do think my proposed modification is a needed update. Trump derangement syndrome (I think that’s John Schilling’s phrase?) is enjoyable, but really both sides seem (from my bubble, anyway) to be retaining smugness, arrogance, and derangement.
Well, your comment makes me feel a little bit better, because I was just going through Google to find a previous comment I had made (regarding the brouhaha on the current OT) and stumbled across our previous discussion of Jane’s Law that I had completely forgotten about. I felt like an asshole for a patronizing tone in my previous comment in this thread when your comment was obviously a simple mistake and you already knew who coined it.
I also agree that the Law is being bent beyond recognition by the devotees of the party in power being insane as well as smug.
And the “Derangement Syndrome” has been a feature of at least the last three administrations. I recall when it was referred to as “BDS” for “Bush Derangement Syndrome”, exemplified by Dan Rather getting conned by Memogate. ODS’s exemplar is birtherism.
Yeah, much as I’d like to take credit for them, “Trump Derangement Syndrome”, “Obama Derangement Syndrome” and “Bush Derangement Syndrome” have been around long enough that I’m not sure who started it and who I cribbed it from.
I don’t think I heard anyone talk about “Clinton Derangement Syndrome” during Bill’s presidency, though there were certainly elements that would later become recognizable symptoms.
Apparently Bush Derangement Syndrome was first, coined by Charles Krauthammer in a Washington Post column in late 2003.
The college-age portion of the Blue Tribe riots by rioting. The others riot by cheering them on.
Unless we’re just using “blue tribe” as shorthand for “people who vote D, or would, if they voted”, this isn’t true. Even if, it might not be true.
Do you not think that colleged-age protesters – famous examples being Antifa and black bloc – in America come from blue-tribe backgrounds? Surely, they’re not red or grey.
A decent number of them are older than college-aged, and I don’t think even a slim majority of D voters approve of Nazi-punching when it’s not of people who are unquestionably Nazis or close (basically, Charlottesville yay, assaulting the prof who was debating with Charles Murray boo) nor of the classic “protest international capitalism by throwing a newspaper box through a Starbucks window” blac bloc style thing.
Further, is that the median riot in the US today, or the median riot by people who can plausibly be sided with the Democrats?
Using “blue tribe” as shorthand for “left wing” means you have a hard time placing people who aren’t latte liberals, but also aren’t tobacco-chewin’ good ole boys.
‘Further, is that the median riot in the US today, or the median riot by people who can plausibly be sided with the Democrats? ‘
I think so. the alternative is presumably race riots, but I think the college and economic ones are more common. Even if there not, I don’t think that is relevant to whether the blue tribe does riot by rioting.
‘and I don’t think even a slim majority of D voters approve of Nazi-punching when it’s not of people who are unquestionably Nazis or close’
But do you think a slim majority are ‘rioting’. It is only the actions of those that are rioting that are actually relevant.
(The best example of the ‘punch a Nazi’ is probable the original, Spencer who is certainly not ‘unquestionably a nazi’ – aside for literally in certain circles where questioning it is proof that you are also a Nazi nor particularly close; doesn’t support conquering Europe, gassing the Jews, probably is a supporter of the Autobahn. But that’s not really relevant either.)
I assume that blue tribe includes not having a taste for personal violence. Am I missing something?
Why do you think that? (I tried to find Scott’s original post on the issue, but couldn’t so perhaps there’s something in that that I do not understand.)
Having a moral objection to violence is very provincial (as well as racist) as one looks to the European continent to find your original Antifa etc.
The worry that if you’re violent then the other side will be violent so society will collapse is very non-blue.
To practice violence as a trade – maybe, is boxing particularly split? -or against animals is very un-blue, but this is violence for politics which is quite different.
Regarding the most common riots, college “riots” tend to be pretty piddly; a bunch of scream-crying students yelling in the face of a prof is far more common than balaclava’d guys punching people who came to a Milo Yiannopoulos event. Even the latter are pretty piddly by the standards of political violence overall. I’m not sure what you mean by “economic riots.”
The % of Democrats who approve of whatever sort of riot is relevant, because the initial claim was that the blue tribe (used possibly as shorthand for Democrats) cheered the riots on.
I’d call Richard Spencer unquestionably close to a Nazi. Those were my words. He’s a white nationalist, which I think is pretty dang Nazi-adjacent. If we’re using a historical definition, sure, we can argue over what fascism, national socialism, are, we can compare what white nationalists want or say they want to what Nazis wanted, said they wanted, did. But I think that “Richard Spencer is a Nazi” is truer and contains more useful information about Richard Spencer than “Charles Murray is a Nazi” or “Donald Trump is a Nazi” are and contain about their subjects.
EDIT: And “blue tribe” is groaning under the weight here. It’s not “people who vote left” it’s a particular SES, set of aesthetics, etc. The corporate boss is blue tribe, the guys in balaclavas trying to wreck his limo, are they blue tribe? How do they feel about opera?
By ‘economic riots’ ar mean the 1%, Occupy sort of thing. The piddliness is irrelevant.
No, the initial claim is that blue tribe rioting looks like support for riots. UNless you want to claim that most blue tribers are rioting then most blue tribers not supporting riots is not unexpected.
I might allow that Richard Spencer is the closest remotely major figure to being a Nazi, but ‘they only supporting hitting their enemies who are closest to being Nazis’ is an entirely different willingness to violence than ‘who are close to being Nazis’
THey’re not wrecking the ‘coporate boss”s limo. They’re wrecking the small business owner’s limo.
They might dislike the opera but for different reason than the Red Tribe. And their parents go to the opera. And they’ll go to the opera once they grow up. So I’d call that pretty blue tribe. You, to my eyes, are the only one who seeks to conflate the terms. I wouldn’t even expect the bluest of black bloc to even vote.
From a blue tribe background is not the same as in the blue tribe. Those guys left and joined some wacky subcultures rather than sticking with their parents’ culture. Maybe they’ll come back some day, and maybe not.
Was Occupy a riot?
And I doubt that initial claim.
Well, Charles Murray is clearly on the “liberals get upset if you try to punch him” side of it – the New York Times defended the guy, even.
“His limo” as in the one he’s sitting in.
Blue tribe was originally a cultural term more than a political term, though.
It was at least similar. Get together with like-minded people to publicly express displeasure with the outgroup in a manner that hurts both the outgroup and the protesters, because they no longer have any real hope of not getting hurt.
“His limo” as in the one he’s sitting in.
The point being, if you smash the windows of the limo, the corporate oligarch will simply switch to another limo hire company at the cost of some trivial inconvenience, while the small business owner of the franchise (be that a Starbucks which got its windows smashed in or a limo hire business) bears the costs of repairs (and maybe has to lay off staff/not give that pay increase/ask his employees to come in and work for nothing on their day off to clear up the mess).
The enthusiastic idiots who thought breaking the windows of businesses really meant injuring large corporations at all, and who jeered about those only concerned with “violence against garbage cans and glass” were clueless. They didn’t do anything except cause trouble for ordinary people, while the large corporations and banks just went on with business as usual.
@John Schilling
Sure, there were similarities (large # of people in a place refusing to leave) but it seems to me that the defining characteristic of a riot is the mob violence. If there’s no people attacked, property damaged, etc, is it a riot?
@Deiseach
Sure, depending on who owns the limo, who’s going to pay for what, it’s harmful to the little guys. I imagine there’s an intellectual justification for it, but I would bet that some % of the people involved are attracted mainly by cathartic violence. Smashing stuff is fun.
I think the difference is more about not getting their own hands dirty.
I don’t know how often do red tribe members vs blue tribe members decide to hurt their opponents, but I believe that when they do…
…the red tribe aesthetics is: “I’ll go and do it myself (or take my friends with me)”, and
…the blue tribe aesthetics is: “I’ll ask the policeman / employer / teacher to go and do it”.
Of course there are exceptions on both sides.
At the very least, we must be using “blue tribe” as shorthand for “however much of the blur tribe for which it makes any sense to generalize about how they riot”.
ETA: I am, however, forced to admit the unwitting accuracy of my “blur tribe” typo.
The hypothetical in the parent of this thread said
And by Blue Tribe I don’t mean the entire Democratic coalition, or everyone left of center, but specifically the arugula eating, Prius driving, thinks they should be watching the World Cup version of the concept.
It looks like Portland.
Don’t forget that, once in control of the levers of power, the extreme radicals who call for the implementation of all the policy promises about overthrowing privilege and establishing a new just order get disenfranchised and if they become troublesome, you execute a representative few to cool the ardour of the rest (“it was all the fault of the BernieBros/Jill Stein voters/white feminists that Hillary lost!”), while you then rally the troops with the fear of a resurgence of the enemy (Trump 2020 as the escape of Charles I?).
I’m not how accurate this prediction and the premises it flows from is but I enjoyed the post.
My reaction to this post is the words “Woke Cromwell” – I thought of this, and now you all have to know about it too.
I don’t fancy the Woke Model Army’s chances against the regular Army.
You’re not considering all of Strike’s faults here. Some of them make him great boss/detective but lousy romantic partner material. Plus his track record in romantic partnerships.
But nevermind that. In my opinion, the point is exactly that while they admire each other deeply, as is quite likely in such a situation of frequently intense and dangerous cooperation, they repeatedly decide against adding a romantic angle to their relationship. Which is all that can be asked of anyone, unless you expect Robin to totally suppress the side of herself that wants to be a detective. So I disagree that Matthew has ‘good reason to be suspicious’ unless the presence of another attractive man in Robin’s life counts as ‘good reason’, which is a weirdly possessive way of thinking. In fact, we are shown several times how Matthew learns that something that made him suspicious was in fact the result of Robin’s drive to become a detective, not a romantic interest in Strike or an attempt by Strike to draw her closer.
I have some questions about blogging. I would love to know more about your decision to blog anonymously, and whether this is a) stressful (because you always have to decide whom you tell what you posted), b) unsatisfying (because you don’t get the whole fame for you blog under your own name). Moreover, when you write blog posts close to your own field, I would like to know how you decide what becomes “just a blog post” and what you would instead write for a journal, a newspaper, anything else. (This seems an even harder choice because using it for both would reveal your real name.)
I’m neither Scott nor a blogger, but on your last question: Scott has re-purposed some of his field related papers as blog posts: see the post “The Case of the Suffocating Woman”. There was another post where he referenced a journal-published paper that lists his real name among the authors (I think), but did not link it directly and asked people not to link it directly or mention it by name in the comments. As far as I saw people complied (and I didn’t try to look for the paper so no idea how easy it is to find).
I think his old blog was less anonymous and that’s why he took it down.
I guess that in an alternative universe, where Scott is blogging under his real name, he is much more stressed now.
(My point is that something can be “stressful” and simultaneously “less stressful than the alternative”.)
Yes, and remember that usually there are more than 2 alternatives (e.g. not blogging, or only blogging about things you are sure you would post them under your own name.)
My impression is that at least American leftwingers (for whatever reason, I do think leftist is hostile and leftwinger is at least milder) tend to want Sweden but be weirdly fond of authoritarian communist countries. I’ve seen a shift from fondness for China to fondness for Cuba.
They want the things they like about Nordics, like the high spending. Not the things they don’t like, like lots of local control, high degrees of business and labor freedom, and relatively low regulation.
Are the Nordic social democracies harder places to do business than the US?
That’s weapons grade bullshit, and you know it.
The largest political organization in the US that advocates a system anything like that in Cuba has a national membership of five thousand. The major center left party in the US as a membership of forty four million.
The idea that the American left are Communist is a sacred belief among conservatives that is immune to all evidence to the contrary. It doesn’t matter that Harry Truman created the marshal plan over republican objections. it doesn’t matter that Kennedy Tried to kill Castro, or that Lyndon B. Johnson dropped metric tons of napalm on the Vietnamese, or that Jimmy Carter tacitly supported CIA backed death squads in Central America.
It persists because conservatives know that very few people would support their ideas if they did not think the alternative was Stalin. Because It’s either that or n*gger n*gger n*gger.
The only way the American left can be said to be sympathetic to Communist states is that some of us objected to the US government’s Cold War era policy of visiting indiscriminate brutality on innocent people because they might, possibly, have been sympathetic to some cause supported by Communists.
I don’t support the system of government in Cuba, I also don’t support destroying democratically elected governments because they were insufficiently enthusiastic about the anticommunist cause.
How about the idea that the American left has a long history of holding an unreasonably sympathetic attitude towards communist tyrannies? From “I have seen the future and it works” to Noam Chomsky writing apologetics for the Khmer Rouge. When Mao died, The Economist, not U.S. or particularly left but echoing a very general bias in the intellectual world, praised him for ending famine in China.
For the pattern in the British left, read Orwell’s letters and essays. The American left lost a good deal of its respect for Stalin’s government after he allied with Hitler, but recovered much of it a little later. It’s true that parts of the American left, in particular the labor unions, were anti-communist, but other large parts, most notably the academy, were not.
It is perfectly normal in American universities for students to wear shirts with pictures of Che Guevara, not all that odd to wear pictures of Karl Marx. Compare to the response to someone wearing a picture of Hitler.
Don’t we have a whole thread above about the “American left” not being remotely monolithic? If this is OK, surely it’s also OK for me to attribute to the “American right” a habit of murdering counterdemonstrators (Charlottesville), supporting polygamous sex/marriage to girl children who are barely nubile (one nut ball I read about on wikipedia, who got thrown out of the US libertarian party only after running for office on their ticket), and of course nazism (various neo-nazi groups) – plus any other atrocity I can think of ever committed by anyone who ever called themself Republican.
And truthfully, in some cases – not the first two I picked – some pretty bad things have been supported by loud groups claiming to be mainstream. You’ve got in-group bias – anything part of the outgroup does, with some support, and some opposition, is supported by most of the outgroup. Anything a member of your group does is only mainstream if you personally support it. I have the same kind of blindspots. But this is, frankly, getting old.
If we include everything that was ever popular among the American mainstream – never mind the American right wing – then you personally are responsible for kidnapping people in job lots and working them to death – assuming they didn’t simply die in transit. Or at least, this is what you favour, and would do again as soon as you felt you could get away with it. You certainly favour interning everyone whose families ultimately came from Asia. Etc. ad nauseam.
This is a bad argument, and you really ought to be able to see through your own blindspots well enough to realize that.
I was responding to a post which said, among other things:
That is not true if large parts of the American left were sympathetic, at various points, to Stalin and Mao, which they were. It isn’t even true if one figure prominent on the left wrote in defense of the Khmer Rouge after there was good evidence that they were engaged in mass murder–as he did.
As you can see by reading my comment, I explicitly said that not all of the left was sympathetic to communist states. But it doesn’t have to be all for the passage quoted above to be false.
The statement “the American right has a history of opposition to legal abortion” is true even though there have always been some on the right who did not share that position.
Were “large parts” of the American left sympathetic to Stalin and Mao? What’s a large part, what are we counting as the American left, etc?
The post you responded to also said
already acknowledging 5000 examples of leftists who support a Communist state. In context it’s clear that the argument isn’t that no one on the left supports or supported Communists, it’s that a small unrepresentative fraction do. Your examples don’t do anything at all to argue that Noam Chomsky or Lincoln Steffens or radical professors are a large or representative segment of the left.
And my response started with:
There is a considerable gap between advocating communism and holding an unreasonably sympathetic attitude towards communist tyrannies, and it was the latter I was referring to.
My claim isn’t about a small and unrepresentative fraction. It’s that a large and prominent part of the left has, historically, taken an unreasonably sympathetic attitude towards communist tyrannies.
Would you agree that praising Mao at his death for, among other things, ending famine in China–when he was responsible for one of the largest famines in Chinese history—fits the description of “unreasonably sympathetic attitude,” even if those who did so did not advocate the adoption of Maoist policies? And that was from a relatively centrist publication.
I pointed at Orwell’s writings for evidence for the British case. It’s pretty clear from those that he wasn’t talking about a small and unrepresentative subset of the British left but about the dominant view among left wing intellectuals at the time.
If the worst you can come up with ‘these people have strange sympathies’ as a response to the post that started this chain, it somehow doesn’t seem so bad.
That’s fair, though it still doesn’t demonstrate that widening your consideration to “unreasonable sympathy” enlarges the share of the left who are pro-Communist to an appreciable share.
If I’d ever gotten a roommate who did that, I was actually planning to get a Hitler shirt/poster in response.
Without meaning to downplay the leftist sympathy for Communists, it’s important to ask how representative Lincoln Steffens and Noam Chomsky are of the American left, since this is what’s actually at issue. It’s obviously true that of the Americans who have supported Communist states, almost all have been leftists, but that’s not sufficient to establish that the “left has a long history of holding an unreasonably sympathetic attitude towards communist tyrannies”; at most it shows that some on the left have such a history, but what’s at issue is whether this characterizes the left as a whole, or only a faction. And if a faction, how big and powerful is this faction. This is why the original comment’s citation of the anti-Communist actions of the left when actually elected is important: it’s evidence that the Cuba-loving faction of the left was not big or important enough to influence policy.
Compare with the American right: Henry Ford met with a representative of Hitler, Brent Bozell supported Francoist Spain, William Buckley wrote a defense of apartheid for the South African Information Ministry, etc., etc., etc. Do we conclude that the American right “has a long history of holding an unreasonably sympathetic attitude towards right-wing tyrannies” and so therefore we can minimize the intellectual distance between the average Republican and Pinochet, or Hitler?
I agree that a few prominent people are not sufficient evidence to support my claim, but I don’t think it was or is limited to a few prominent people. Again, compare the response that a college student wearing a Che Guevara or Karl Marx shirt gets to the response he would get wearing a Hitler shirt. The student isn’t the evidence I am offering. The university community’s response is. Support for a communist revolutionary and Cuba is within their Overton window. Support for Hitler is not.
Chomsky is, I concede, an extreme case–not many on the left supported the Khmer Rouge after evidence of what they were doing was out. But the fact that his doing so didn’t result in the sort of response from others on the left that a published defense of Hitler would provoke from either the left or the right is evidence. He retained his position as “radical but respectable guy on our side.”
Have you read Orwell’s four volume Letters and Essays? One of the many things that comes up repeatedly is the unwillingness of his fellow British left wingers to condemn Stalin or even openly concede what they knew about what he had done. It was Orwell who was the exception, not the others.
So far as the case of Henry Ford, “met with a representative” doesn’t amount to support. Ford was an antisemite, and Hitler courted him early on, probably in the hope of getting money for his movement. I don’t believe he got any, and I’m not aware of any public support for the Nazis by Ford once they were in power and doing things.
This clarifies your position, but to my mind introduces an extra unstated premise that I am doubtful of: that the action of university administrators owes to their ideological commitments, or to their own idiosyncratic Overton window. Do you think, for example, that right-wing spaces would regard a Che shirt as on par with a Hitler shirt? Or would they too treat Che as less offensive than Hitler? If so, does this mean that right-wingers, by having an Overton window that is more inclusive of left-wing atrocity, are apologists for leftist atrocities?
As for Chomsky, note also that he has also been entangled in a Holocaust-denial scandal, and a Srebrenica-denial scandal, both of which are atrocities associated with right-wing groups; and yet Chomsky remains “radical but respectable”, so it is not clear that it is his defense of specifically communist atrocities that make him borderline-acceptable to the left.
Finally, w.r.t. Orwell, the issue is not whether Orwell was an outlier in terms of the leftists he interacted with, it’s whether the leftists Orwell interacted with were outliers in the broader left.
To clarify my position a little, since I don’t want to actually end up defending Chomsky or Che or whoever:
I disagree with the original comment that fondness for left-authoritarian regimes is completely marginal in the “American left”, whatever that is. I think there are real segments of the American left that a) apologize for the horrors of Communist regimes for ideological reasons and b) apologize for the horrors of regimes that have been opposed by the US for anti-imperialist reasons, regardless of the ideology of the regime in question.
These segments are not completely trivial, though I agree with Hyperboloid that their influence is often overstated; still they’re worth paying attention to and countering. However, the response above seems to me to make two mistakes:
First, the two factions are conflated with each other (there is of course overlap, but they’re still distinct), which leads to arguments that I think imply absurd results. The implicit argument seems to be that if one is an apologist for the crimes of a Communist government, one is sympathetic to Communism as an ideology. But the people in Group 2 are apologists for the crimes of all sorts of regimes, not just Communists, and so the argument runs into problems.
Second, and more importantly, for reasons probably stemming back to the alliances in WWII, Nazism is more taboo in the west than Communism. This means that the pro-Communist western leftists are more vocal and apparent than pro-Nazi rightists; but this doesn’t mean that they are more powerful or influential within the left, only that there is less of a taboo on their visibility. In countries outside of Europe and North America, the taboo on Nazi insignia is less strong, and you do in fact see it being used as a way to be “edgy” and “provocative”. But I think it would be a mistake to attribute this to South Korea or Thailand’s greater ideological affinity for Nazism.
@David Friedman:
I think to react at Che Guevara or Karl Marx as to Hitler would be overreaction. Che Guevara didn’t kill millions and Marx didn’t kill anybody and would probably be shocked to see the deadly fruits of his idea. Maybe if the student had a Stalin or Mao t-shirt…
But I think you have a point. It would be interesting to see how people would react to a t-shirt with general Lee on it. Both Che and Lee were military commanders that allegedly had some personal qualities, but fought for very wrong causes – communism and slavery. Now maybe the comparison is unfair to Lee, because Che was an enthusiastic supporter of communism (he was the main cause why Cuba is communist, as I said before), but Lee allegedly disliked slavery, according to some of his letters. Also, I don’t know if Lee ordered any execution; Che surely did.
How many deaths can be directly blamed on Che? He’s pretty small potatoes by the standards of mass murderers. Anyone on the authoritarian or totalitarian right who would be recognizable by sight to the average person has a larger death toll – Hitler, obviously, and Mussolini also (smaller death toll than Hitler, but still pretty large once you include Italian attempts at colonial conquest); I’m not sure if there’s anybody else from that category as recognizable as Che, and plenty less recognizable with considerably greater body counts (hell, there are random SS NCOs with considerably greater body counts). So it’s hard to find someone who is both significant enough that there’s a decent photo of them, but who has what amounts to a fairly piddly body-count by the standards of 20th-century totalitarian evil. Is someone going to put on their Corneliu Codreanu shirt and scandalize the Eastern European History department?
The proportionate counter to Che is Pinochet.
Really? Aren’t over a thousand deaths laid at Pinochet’s door? Still not much by the standards of national-leader-level mass murderers (again, there’s SS NCOs who directly killed more people than that, let alone people who ordered murders) but isn’t Che blamed for dozens or low hundreds?
@dndnrsn
Pinochet’s regime killed about 3,000 people. Castro’s regime killed a minimum of around 10,000 after coming to power. They also sent che around africa and latin america stirring up revolutions with little success. Che didn’t personally order most of those deaths, but then neither did Goebbels, and we don’t consider that to let him off the hook.
@dndnrsn:
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (the Romanian far right leader you mentioned) killed “only” 3 people: a police chief with his own hand and two others – a prime minister and a student who left his movement – sending death teams. After these, he was arrested and killed (strangled) in prison together with his two death teams.
The number of people executed by Che Guevara can’t be known for sure before communism will end in Cuba and their archives will be open, maybe not even then, but it is surely at least about 60. He organised the summary trials and executions in the prison-fortress La Cabaña, in the first months after the victory of the revolution – and the prison’s priest said he assisted at 55 executions:
https://filmfreeway.com/atnightfall
He also executed a few people before victory, one of them (a traitor) with his own hand. Here is a list of his alleged victims, including some biographies (the youngest is 19 years old):
http://cubaarchive.org/home/images/stories/che-guevara_interior-pages_en_final.pdf
A lot of people on this thread seem to assume that a student would wear a Che T-shirt but punch you for wearing a Pinochet T-shirt is a result of a comparison between them, however irrational. That looks too generous to me. I think the reason for this is quite simply ignorance. I don’t know about American schools, but in Spain, what you learn about Che Guevara is a big fat 0. You don’t even learn much about Franco, as this is still too politicized. So unless you go study on your own, you will have a vague idea from songs, pop art and TV. Which means you will hear Che was some kind of hero who went fighting against regimes, and not about the people he executed.
If you go to countries that did not experience or witness Hitler’s atrocities and do not have a significant Jewish presence, you will get the romantization of Hitler.
What I find really weird is the fetishizing of Stalin in Russia, by the very people who suffered it. There will be a repressed person in almost every family in Russia, and even though these things are not talked about, it’s not possible to not know what happened. It’s not like most of them actually want to go back to communism; my best guess is that it is the same nationalistic pride that makes the French like Napoleon, even if he wasn’t a particularly nice guy.
@cassander,
Most people wouldn’t recognize Goebbels on a t-shirt either. I don’t think it’s a great comparison either. Goebbels would have hanged at Nuremberg; a decent number (dozens? Hundreds? Thousands? I’m not sure how I’d estimate) of Germans who were directly responsible for the deaths of 3,000 or 10,000 people who got away at most with a sentence that was quickly commuted away to be three or five years.
@a reader
I picked Codreanu because the best-known picture of his is rather similar in its general composition to the Che photo, they’re both youngish, etc.
@ana53294
People seem, after the fact, to like leaders who delivered nationalistic pride, yeah. On Stalin’s watch the USSR ended controlling half of Europe and being one of two great powers.
I said I think the American left wants Sweden, and I meant it. However, there’s still this weird fondness for authoritarian Communist states which I don’t think is likely to lead to action. It’s a matter of corrupted imagination, but I’m not sure how much difference it makes.
As for who counts as a central example of a contemporary left-winger, how about Terry Gross?
Do you think that starting off with an insult makes your argument more convincing?
How much does this fondness contribute to disasters like what we see now in venezuela, which was loudly applauded by much of the american left prior to the inevitable collapse? I don’t mean to imply that the US left is responsible for the decisions made by venezuelans, but it seems inarguable that if Chavez had gotten even as much criticism as, say, Pinochet got, his regime would not have gone as far, achieved as much, or brought as much ruin to Venezuela as happened. those sympathies might not lead to a communist revolution in the US, but that doesn’t mean they don’t have consequences.
I have strong doubts as to whether verbal or written criticism would make much difference to a regime in another country. Maybe there’s some sort of more aggressive action that would make a difference, but I don’t think I’d call it criticism.
It’s not just verbal criticism. It’s Jimmy Carter certifying their elections, it’s political parties being able to travel and raise money abroad, it’s not having a spanish judges order you arrested for war crimes and the london police to take them up on the offer. The left believes that their criticism can affect regimes like apartheid south africa, and I think they’re right, and it would affect regimes like Chavez’s.
Would it make sense for people to get a stool sample for themselves before a course of antibiotics so they can repopulate their gut microbiome?
I’d guess it very much depends on the intensity and duration of the course, but I’m not qualified to give that kind of medical advice.
Only to the extent that you
A. cared about having the exact same microbiome you had before
B. could precisely identify your pre-antibiotic gut microbiome
C. could take exactly the right probiotic to reconstitute it.
Or maybe D. you were willing to preserve a culture of your *ahem* gut microbiome, and thereafter perform a fecal autotransplant.
I don’t think that you have to care about that, though. Just take some decent, cheap probiotics. Or eat some yogurt.
The recent documentary series “The Vietnam War,” by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, is now available on Netflix. I just finished watching it, and believe it is the best documentary series ever made about that war. It is better than “The Ten Thousand Day War” and better than “Vietnam in HD,” the two earlier contenders.
It got me wondering whether there was anything the US could realistically have done differently to actually win the war. The one thing that comes to mind is closing the Ho Chi Minh trail by invasion, which would have made a huge difference by denying supplies going to VC and NVA troops fighting in the south.
The US certainly had enough troops in country — some half a million by the end of the decade — and US morale remained good until quite late in the war. Was there any reason this was not done?
The US could have done what it did in 1972 a lot earlier. We were able to force a settlement by bombing Hanoi, and put South Vietnam in a place where they could have held out if given supplies and air support. If we’d done that at a time when there was political will to keep supporting South Vietnam, then the war would have turned out very differently.
Could you elaborate? Suppose the US had bombed Hanoi in, say, 1967. Are you thinking that would have forced the north to ramp down its effort in the south enough that the south could have succeeded without US soldiers in the field? Or do you think there could have been some sort of settlement that ended the war earlier?
More of the latter. Particularly after 1968, the VC were gone, and the US was fighting the NVA directly. Forcing the North to stop sending their troops south would have ended the war, and did for a couple years. The South might have held out if we’d resupplied them and sent carriers and B-52s. In 1972, we proved that we could bomb them flat if we needed to, and that nothing they could do would stop us. (Seriously, the North Vietnamese invented integrated air defense networks as we know them today. Hanoi was better-defended than Moscow then.) Doing that in 1967 would have cut the support going to the VC a lot. Either it would have been a manageable insurgency or a complete victory.
Possible problem in that the North Vietnamese had SA-2s and MiG-21s and combat-proven IAD in 1968, while the US was still tinkering with first-generation Wild Weasels and SEAD doctrine. Rolling Thunder was bloody expensive for the USAF, and it’s not clear that scaling it up to 1972 levels wouldn’t have resulted in the US rather than NV calling the whole thing off.
But if the US could learn fast enough to make it work at a tolerable cost, you’re probably right as to the consequences.
Rolling Thunder was famously conducted under the RoE that we couldn’t attack SAM sites that were under construction or inactive. That does not imply that the air campaign was being taken seriously. The B-52 wasn’t sent north for fear of escalation. The bit where Johnson doled out targets slowly, making sure that the North Vietnamese had plenty of time to adapt and prepare themselves also doesn’t speak highly of his planning.
If they’d taken the gloves off in 1968, mined Haiphong and bombed Hanoi, I think it would have worked. Would the losses have been heavier than they were during Linebacker? Yes. But losses can be sustained so long as the other guy runs into trouble first. The strategy used during Rolling Thunder was almost deliberately engineered to make sure that didn’t happen.
Possibly, but “they didn’t really try, so they failed” is not evidence that they would have succeeded if they had tried harder. The USAF and USN tried hard enough to lose a thousand planes in the process, and I’m not convinced that this was even mostly due to the ROE.
The USAF and USN tried hard enough to lose less than a plane a day across more than three years. 1000 planes is a lot, but spread across enough time that I’m not sure it’s proof of trying that hard. Add in the utterly idiotic way Rolling Thunder (and the rest of the war) was handled, and I find it hard to believe that we couldn’t have done a much better job and forced a stalemate. How many mines were dropped in Haiphong Harbor during Rolling Thunder? How many B-52 sorties went north of Route Pack One? McNamara systematically mismanaged everything he touched, and I see no reason to assume that he didn’t take a winnable situation and lose it for us. (Seriously, I just read Friedman’s account of TFX, and the man was worse than I thought. Which is saying something, because part of me already suspected he was from the future, sent back to destroy our defenses. But the British are as screwed up as we are, and they never had his like.)
I don’t know. The stories of the American officers in Vietnam just remind me a little too much of all the German generals who insist they could have won the war in the East if Hitler hadn’t meddled so much. And just as those German generals greatly exaggerate how much Hitler meddled and how bad his ideas were, as well as how great their own ideas would have been, I can’t help but be skeptical of the claims of the American generals about how Vietnam would have gone if they’d gotten their own way. It’s entirely possible that the situations aren’t really parallel, but history is almost always more complicated than the narratives invented later.
@Protagoras
I can see where you’re coming from, but Vietnam was bad. I mean really bad. There were times when rudder orders were being issued to the ships off the coast from the White House situation room. Once, someone mistook the carrier USS Constellation for a Constellation AWACS plane, and ordered her to orbit at 30,000 feet.
This would be my answer as well. The Johnson administration’s gradual escalation, and frequent de-escalations, were just about the worst possible way of going about things. I remain somewhat amazed that LBJ of all people approved such a policy. the man understood leverage and negotiation, was legitimately brilliant at it, but utterly failed in vietnam.
The “official consensus” as reflected in Harry Summers’ On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War is that the pro-South side should have extended the Vietnam DMZ across the 17th Parallel all the way to Thailand, shutting down communication into the South as you point out. This would have required completely abandoning Laotian neutrality, the details of which Summers doesn’t adequately reckon with in his book.
Why this wasn’t done is basically because the US didn’t want to “escalate” the war. If this sounds stupid, it was, and there is a rich literature attempting to explain how this happened.
While this would be the ideal solution, I think if the propaganda aspects of the Tet Offensive and the PAVN presence in South Vietnam in general had been better managed then the 1972 Paris Accords could have been reached earlier (~1968-9) by a similar increase in strategic bombing of the North, and the South could have plausibly held on indefinitely with the sort of limited support they did receive with much less risk of it being cut off.
Did the US want to win the war? Wasn’t Korea the model outcome we were pursuing?
The Korea-style compromise division had already been made when north and south Vietnam were created and separated by the DMZ. The US was fighting to keep South Vietnam from being overrun.
I think the calculus was very different. Korea was essentially Stalin’s war. At the time, he was the undisputed leader of global communism. He was almost certainly responsible for the Chinese intervention, and was definitely the one who kept the war going. The war ended only five months after he died, despite there being no major change in circumstances on the ground for at least a year before.
AIUI, Vietnam got aid by playing off China and the Soviets, who by that point had split. But they were too smart and too nationalistic to want the Chinese actually in the country en mass.
Myth #6. That the rich have more influence over the free market than over the government. What determines the products for sale in the supermarket? It is the consumer who buys the products. If consumers in America all get cravings for apples, the stores will soon be sold out of apples. The stores will all clamor to get more apples, more apples will be imported, and as many as possible will make it to the stores. If this apple craving lasts for years, then more farmers will change over to apples, and the stores will have more apples on a permanent basis.
It is not the rich who determine what is being sold in the stores. It is the mass quantity of consumers. For almost all consumer goods, the rich buy only a small portion of the goods for sale, and so have only a small influence on what is in the marketplace. Only for luxury goods do the rich have a disproportionate impact on what is for sale.
Some will object that it is the rich who own the businesses that determine the structure of the free enterprise system. It is true that the rich own the businesses (for the most part. There are large investments in the corporations in this country by mutual funds and pension plans, which are mostly composed of investments of the middle class). But each business will only remain successful if they sell products that are desired by consumers. So these businesses are at the mercy of the large body of consumers.
It is clear that consumers determine what is sold. How about the prices? Any economist will tell you that an individual business cannot set its own prices. In order to sell its goods, it cannot sell above a range dictated by the market or it won’t be successful in selling its goods and will go bankrupt. This price will be only a little above cost, or else competitors will lower their prices to grab more business. There is a market price for investment returns, just like other parts of the market. If an industry provides more return than other industries, then companies will enter the industry to grab the extra profit while they can. Some of these new companies will grab business by lowering prices, which will eventually result in that industry making the same return as other industries. So all industries end up with similar returns on their investments. Therefore, margins (prices above costs) in all industries are dictated by the market of investors, and no industry can charge prices much above their costs.
Of course this is only the case where industries are competitive, and when other companies can enter the industry at will. So consumers don’t have as much effect on highly regulated industries such as utilities and banking. But almost all markets in which the middle class spends money are competitive. Consumers can easily switch to other companies if they are paying too much for food, clothing, apartment rentals, autos, or hardware. You may think these items are all too expensive, but they are sold for as little as they can be, compatible with an average profit margin. It is not the rich who decide what is sold or for how much.
However, the rich do have a disproportionate effect on the government. The rich own the media corporations that provide information to everyone in the country, and also provide most of the opinions that we all see. There are millions of news feeds and opinions available that don’t make the cut by the media, so the media definitely controls what the public sees. Some of the media owners claim that they don’t get involved in the media content, but overall, it appears that the rich have quite a bit more influence over the media than the rest of us. And even the rich that don’t own media companies often have a disproportionate effect on information disseminated to the public, because advertisements and other information outlets are expensive.
The rich also have more direct access to politicians through lobbying. It takes money to create lobbying groups. Also of course politicians need money to run campaigns, and they may easily become beholden to those rich people that provide most of their funding.
One solution to the problem of the political power of the rich may be to nationalize media companies and provide public funding of political campaigns. Unfortunately, that would cause even more problems by increasing the power of the political elite. If all the money for the media and political races came from the government, the government would be regulating itself. Such a situation always results in bad results. Better to have the rich holding the government accountable than nobody. At least in our current situation, the rich and government elite jostle for power. Having the government fund its own watchdogs and political races subtracts power from the rich, but does not add power to anyone but the government elite. That would create even more imbalance of power. At least now the rich can sometimes topple the political elite.
“Treat all economic questions from the viewpoint of the consumer, for the interests of the consumer are the interests of the human race.” – Frederic Bastiat
Votes are worth something, and those are distributed pretty equitably.
Also, if business owners can coordinate then consumers don’t necessarily dictate everything. Arguably there’s a historic undersupply of right-wing media, for instance, for this very reason.
Votes are not distributed equitably, if it were true you wouldn’t have large swaths of the population having to fight to get the right to vote, and you wouldn’t have large swaths of the population without the right to vote.
Compare Dorothy Sayers in Murder Must Advertise:
Could you please make your point instead of just quoting an overly stylistic mystery writer?
I see why I never started reading Sayers.
Are you saying that the poor are somehow directed by advertising for all their consumer demands? That sounds very unlikely to me.
Interesting question.
One thing I’ve noticed is that, particularly with concentration of ownership, every damn store sells substantially the same things, and getting what I actually want – rather than the least undesirable of what’s available – requires considerable time and effort. To the point where I often either “settle” for what’s available (if it’s something like food) or simply buy nothing at all.
I suspect that what’s going on is group think among the not-so-high-level employees making purchasing decisions, and additional group think among the producers, rather than e.g. some dastardly plot 😉 Every once in a while some new provider addresses a large unserved niche, does well for a while – and then gets purchased by the existing establishment and/or hires too many people trained in the existing establishment, and reverts to the norm.
At any rate, it’s one reason I favour measures against concentration of ownership. Lots of small stores, buying from lots of small manufacturers, gives me more chance of getting something I actually like ;-(
So the consumer gets a craving for apples, the stores run out, and the consumer has a choice between pears, oranges, plums or nothing. The store runs out of all fruit by the end of the day, and its buyers conclude that their current mix of fruit is working, and orders the same thing the next day.
My version of the story looks like what I routinely see at all 3 of my local grocery store chains. Except that I see it less in the fruit section, and more in others. And I suspect that wholesalers paying for “product placement” is part of the cause, not just loss of information due to sloppy monitoring and status quo bias.
I don’t think store managers are quite this stupid. If the apple craving did extend to all fruit in the absence of apples as in your example, the store would at least up the purchases of fruit, at least if it happened every day for a week. At some point they would discover that apples were always sold out even if other fruit went un-bought. Perhaps the food merchants in your area are pretty dense, but it doesn’t take a lot of intelligence to figure out the basic trends of consumer demand. Maybe not as quickly as you’d like. And of course maybe not to your desired ends, since your tastes may not match those of most other consumers.
Two interesting charts I saw this week. First, this chart from this paper. The background is that the author is the same guy who wrote this paper, arguing that the climate models don’t tell us much about policy choices (I agree with him on this, but I don’t think he quite groks the underlying theoretical issue completely). In any event, this motivated the paper which produced the headline chart, and his solution to the climate models not being very useful was to instead attempt to estimate the Social Cost of Carbon simply by asking experts some questions which would allow him to compute an estimate of SCC. (I have definitely expressed my displeasure with the “opinion poll model of science” here before, which frankly is the reason why I hadn’t seen the chart earlier; I didn’t bother to read the rest of the paper after having read the abstract.)
So anyway, when I saw the chart, I was instantly curious. It instantly made me think of a funnel plot, but it’s not really a funnel plot. Plus, it’s weird that everyone seems kind of comfortable with the fact that the answers span three orders of magnitude, and a large portion of them think it’s pretty close to zero… but yet, somehow, no one thinks the SCC is negative. I mean, you can’t get even one rando to say “$-1”, but you can find someone to say “$1000”?
I had two competing hypotheses – that he had put a really weird constraint in such that people couldn’t respond with negative answers or that there was some very strange group psychology going on. When I dug into the paper, I discovered it was the former.. In a parenthetical on page 14, he says, “[A]nd I impose a probability of 1 that the impact will be 0% or greater.” I want to say something strong about how I feel sad for the state of this science, but I’m pretty sure you can fill in that sentiment by now.
All this led to this week’s second chart (from here). It’s actually a funnel plot! I hadn’t seen one of these yet. I’m really not sure I want to comment much besides, “It’s nice to see a funnel plot,” and, “Boy, where’s the other side of that funnel plot?” Maybe I’ll end with a reference to, “This is what I’m talking about when I talk about how the dynamic IAMs are basically just taking a static, positive damage function and amortizing it. When you assume a positive damage function, you get positive damage. Uh, duh.”
I don’t have any links handy, but Robert Murphy has done a lot of work in this space. I seem to recall him suggesting that the IPCC estimates of the SCC use a discount rate that is much more aggressive than the government typically requires for long-term forecasting, and that if they used the “normal” discount rate, the SCC estimates would include negative values.
Yeah, Pindyck (the author of the first paper) harps on discount rates, too.
If by “aggressive” you mean a high discount rate, then you’ve got things backwards. Most of the expected really bad effects from global warming are far in the future, whereas the short term effects may well be positive on net. So if you use a high discount rate, those far off bad effects don’t play as much of a role and you get a low (or perhaps even negative) social cost of carbon.
I don’t see why the social cost would ever be negative, but I suppose it depends on what you want to use it for. For example:
FAA requires some new aircraft regulation that will increase fuel burn by X amount. The airlines are not happy and they want to make a submission on the new regulation, stating that the direct costs will be Y and the Social Cost of the extra carbon emissions will be Z, and so the total cost of the regulation will be Y + Z.
In that context the Social Cost of Carbon should only include harmful effects, since the only benefit of the extra fuel burn would be related to the new regulation.
The social cost of carbon is negative if the benefits of climate change due to CO2 are larger than the costs. Is there some reason why that is impossible?
I didn’t think of that. It doesn’t seem plausible since the vast majority of possible shocks to a system should be negative, but I suppose it is possible.
Good news! Basic timescale analysis from dynamical systems theory implies that we shouldn’t treat climate change as a shock! It’s a slow parameter in the economic/political systems, and the biggest theoretical problem with most people’s intuition (and behind all the IAMs that I’ve seen) is that they do the timescales the wrong way ’round like this.
Since my degrees are in aerospace departments, I like to give the analogy of fuel usage in airplanes. It’s a slow parameter to the fast system (of velocities/orientations). If we’re thinking about it the wrong way ’round, we can imagine it being a shock; heck, I can even simulate such shocks in flight sims (causing all kinds of problems, including instability). Nevertheless, that view is fundamentally wrong, and it leads to wrong conclusions in the case of powered flight. I’m not arguing that the effects of CC are negative/positive/zero; I’m arguing that the analysis most people use to get to one of those conclusions is badly broken, and we don’t actually have much reason to believe that we know which category it’s actually in.
For those who have a strong moral sense of animal suffering – what is your take on what humans should do for them (in regards to reducing suffering), particular wild ones?
This is NOT the whole cliche “why are you ignoring/not stopping predators from eating prey”. Rather that’s only a small part of it.
I’m asking of all the things humans do to reduce human suffering, what should be extended to animals/other life forms?
Humans spend a lot of effort to reduce human suffering. If people feel animal suffering is something people should be concerned with, how much of this effort could/should be extended to animals?
Some examples are thus –
Medicine – cures? vaccines? parasite reduction? CRISPR type genetic modifications?
Basic life amenities – Shelter, food, water – disaster recovery, drought, famine
Fairness/opportunity – comparative habit size, one species dominating over another
There’s a huge part in the preservation and restoration of natural habitats and species, but not much I’ve seen regarding improvement besides pollution reduction. Most ecological changes are for benefits of humans rather than the wild animals. Only one I can think of is the reintroduction of wolves in Yellowstone parks and even then that’s mostly for restoration.
The major argument/stance is responsibility (as in, only responsible for human actions/human caused suffering) and a sense to leave things alone. But how well has those arguments been played in regards for interventions regarding human suffering?
IMO, this is also “for the benefit of humans” in the sense that humans really like the idea of “natural” spaces for animals. Once upon a time, humans didn’t care for wolves running about, so we shot them. Now our values have changed, and we want the wolves back, so back they come!
This is a question I’ve found really interesting since I learned about https://was-research.org/. I’m far from any useful conclusions, but I have some immediate concerns about it (which hopefully are relevant to your question?). For context I’m a morally motivated vegetarian, though my conclusions on that front are pretty fuzzy and I’m mostly coming from a “killing fewer things for food is very unlikely to be a mistake” angle. I’m also pretty comfortable with the focus on non-wild animals, since it seems like (though this might not be a very utilitarian stance) not doing harm is a decent first step to focus on prior to eliminating extant harm.
As far as what to do for wild animals, I think the most important thing would be to first make sure no interventions just make things worse. Humans have a bad track record when it comes to shepherding ecosystems, and it scares me to think of people who think they’re doing good but are actually causing harm. “Prey animals are suffering” is almost certainly true, but preventing them from being eaten and causing an ecosystem to collapse is likely to still be net negative. “lets vaccinate animals” sounds like a fine idea, but only after ensuring that infections aren’t somehow playing an important role in ecosystems (possible hypothesis: if you assume predators need to eat, maybe the existence of infections biases that consumption toward the ‘weakest’ animals, measured in some darwinian sense).
@helloo
Evolution doesn’t minimize suffering, so if you let nature run its natural course, you get animal behavior that we would call horrible animal abuse if people did it to animals.
However, nature is very complex, so interventions are likely to backfire. For example, if you kill predators, you may get a lot of slowly starving animals which is probably a lot more cruel than a fairly rapid death at the claws of a predator.
I’ve seen a suggestion to make suffering less for both humans and animals by lowering susceptibility to pain by using genetic engineering.
I know there are disorders where people don’t feel pain, and I think those people tend to die young through not noticing dangerous injuries, and to accumulate a lot of damage through not noticing continual minor injuries.
OTOH, just turning the pain signal down a bit might work. It seems like you’d do just as well with a pain system whose signals went from “Everything’s fine” to “Uncomfortable and annoying” rather than from “Everything’s fine” to “Huddled on the floor whimpering for someone to please put you out of your misery.”
It seems unlikely to me this is a good idea.
Pain tolerance already varies between people. I think it’s likely this is at least partly because some people literally felt less pain.
If there was an advantage to feeling less pain in terms of reproducing, we’d probably already feel less pain. I don’t feel that confident that our environment is fundamentally different enough from a few thousand years ago to be worth turning that signal down even if we could.
Events that cause crippling pain tend to also be events that just plain kill you, so I wouldn’t expect a whole lot of evolutionary pressure to turn down pain at the upper end of the scale.
However, modern medicine is incredibly good at handling trauma, so I would bet that a modern person does have a better chance of surviving to reproduce than a caveman would have, if they’re able to fight through the pain and get themselves out of that situation.
It could also be that the evolutionary disadvantage is in engineering complexity rather than health benefits – i.e., it’s easier for evolution to design a pain sensor that scales linearly with the amount of injury, than to design one that has a cutoff at a certain level. If that’s the case, then it might be hard to implement such a change, but there isn’t a disadvantage if you have the tools to do so.
It’s actually kind-of weird to me that our pain system can do a denial-of-service attack on our brains, to the point that something can be painful enough to make someone lose consciousness or become incapacitated. It sure seems like there’d be a survival advantage to being able to say “yeah, that really hurts, but I’m going to go ahead and finish bashing your head in with my club before I worry about it.” And indeed, it seems like sometimes this actually happens, but other times, intense pain seems to actually incapacitate someone.
Maybe that means it was easier for evolution to do linear scaling than putting a ceiling on it, but it’s also possible that there’s not any point at which putting a ceiling on the impact of pain actually makes you more fit. (For example, continuing to run on a broken leg is probably not very good for your survival prospects, unless there is something chasing you that will certainly kill you, and that you can outrun on a broken leg. Maybe getting that signal to say “stay put and stop making your injury worse, dumbass” is a better choice.
@albatross11
That mechanism already exists and is called adrenaline. I can speak from experience that it greatly reduces felt pain. It also increases focus, strength and other things that are helpful when bashing in heads.
It is temporary though, which seems like a very good idea, because it discourages people from ignoring the need to rest/heal.
Pro athletes already show the capability to ignore medium-grade injuries and it is quite common for them to end up with permanent and fairly severe damage, which demonstrates why it is not a great idea to be able to ignore pain more easily.
I don’t expect the average person to make better decisions (or even be aware that they are making a decision) than the human body.
@Nancy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congenital_insensitivity_to_pain
I’d rather feel pain.
I was thinking in terms of lowering pain signals to low-normal, not turning them off completely.
Doesn’t that result in the same issue, just diluted?
There’s plenty of cases where trying to be charitable resulted in some unknown/unexpected negative consequences.
Donating cloth to developing countries pretty much prevented any possible emergent textile market and often reduced or eliminated existing local production.
Reducing parasites seems to be one of the possible causes in the increase of allergies in the modern world.
Calls to stop donations or increase parasites are pretty much always seen as minor or extreme.
Why would humans be this cautious regarding animal suffering to the point of not doing anything?
A mirror might be with GMOs and “organic” breeding methods. We seem to want much more strict and longer testing regarding the former, but I believe quite a few people here are confident with the existing tests to deem current GMOs “safe enough”.
Does anyone have an interest in defending Nick Rowe’s position here? Skimming the comments only one person (Nick Edmonds) seems to touch on what I think is a fatal flaw in the thought experiment but the post is 2 weeks old so I don’t expect any reaction from a reply. The flaw is here
The “shortage” of money only creates a recession if prices can’t move or “shortage” means zero money, AND the three producers cannot effectively create their own money through credit. Here is what should happen in the stripped down economy. The apple grower wants to sell his apples for enough money that will allow him to buy his desired amount of bananas, the banana grower the same but with banana and cherries and the cherry grower the same but with cherries and apples. All that matters is that the relative prices of the three goods remains the same and that each participant has access to the prices of his preferred good. If there is less money bidding on the apples then the price of apples drops, which reduces the amount of money bidding on bananas so their price drops, which reduces the amount of money bidding on cherries.
I think it is true that a sudden blip in the quantity of money might well cause a recession. Not because there is a “shortage” of money, even if the quantity of money goes down a bunch. It is because the communication power of pricing is messed up for a while, and before everyone gets it straightened out people buy less because of the uncertainty makes everyone more cautious. Even if the quantity of money goes down, it gets eventually sorted out by simply lowering the prices of everything. There are always smaller denominations one can use, so it doesn’t really make sense to have a shortage of money.
Nick Rowe seems to be implying no use of money at all in his parable. Yes, the economy greatly benefits from the use of money in eliminating friction. But what does that have to do with the modern world?
If you think that proportional deflation of all prices can fix this problem, I’m afraid that you are abstracting away from an important feature of capitalist production: the possibility of hoarding money.
Let us imagine that all three of the fruit producers have invested 100 units of some money at the start of a year in order to commence their fruit production. Imagine that, during the year, prices across the board deflate by half. Nevertheless, each of the fruit producers manages to recoup 60 units of their money at the end of the year, or products that are exchangeable for 60 units of money.
You might say that their “real” wealth has increased because now they can buy 20% more of what they want. But their nominal wealth has decreased, and this is a problem because capitalists are not forced to invest in anything at all. They can simply hoard money. And in this situation, it would have been optimal to simply hoard their 100 units. Their “real” wealth would have in that case doubled. And if they foresaw a good chance of a similar thing happening the next year, then they would be smart to hoard even if they made a mistake the first time.
This is why, regardless of what you think is capable of functioning as money (whether dollars, gold, etc.), society must see to it that the aggregate stock of money is always continually increasing. Only with an aggregate increase in the nominal stock of money is it possible for everyone to be able to make a nominal monetary profit on average. With a stagnant or decreasing stock of money, it may be possible for some producers to still make a profit, but only at the expense of others suffering a nominal loss somehow in their stock of money. To have any hope of making a nominal monetary profit, you would have to hold out hope that you are so much more efficient or savvy than the average producer. If you, instead, realize that not everyone can be above average, and that if you are a typical producer your expected value from investing in production rather than hoarding will be negative, you will wisely hoard.
And this is a problem, regardless of whether these producers judge that their (diminished) money can now purchase more use-values (utility). Even if this is the case, then it is still a fact that they would have been able to purchase even more use-values if they had hoarded their money, assuming average success in production.
But you might object, “At least if you engage in production, you might have inventories of real useful wealth, which you will not have if you simply hoarded your money.” Yes, and what good is it to you, a capitalist producer? If the combined exchange-value of those inventories is less than the exchange-value of the money that you would have retained had you simply hoarded that money (as is true by definition according to the parameters of our thought experiment where we invested 100 units of money but ended up with either 60 units of money or commodities exchangeable for 60 units of money), then you would still have more exchange-value, and thus more access to the real useful wealth (utility) on the market that you cared about, if you had just hoarded money.
Only if you directly produced the full suite of utilities that you personally cared about, and desired to consume, would it matter what kind of real useful wealth you had produced. Otherwise, the price the product fetches on the market is all that will matter to you.
Hmm, you make a good point, but I need to think about this.
Okay, here is my thought.
It seems to me that if a currency is going to have any dramatic change in value, in either direction, and an individual knows this it the case, then it doesn’t make sense for this individual to invest in production. If the value is going to be radically deflated, then the individual should hoard cash, as you say. If the value is to be radically inflated, the individual should obtain as much debt as possible, and use this debt to buy assets that will not decrease in value. So it is a bad thing for the economy if people expect a radical increase or decrease in currency value, regardless of whether it does so. SO this indicates a reason beyond the uncertainty it causes for changes in currency value to cause recessions; since any increase or decrease will make it appear more likely to do so in the future.
Beyond this additional bad result of a currency shock, I’m not sure what your comments are telling me. You give me the bad results that occur when producers predict the a rapid devaluation, and so stop producing. If no one predicts it, then hoarding does not increase, and the devaluation occurs as I stated in my comment, although likely only after everyone figures out the new equilibrium.
My (poor) understanding of the real world is that empirically speaking prices are sticky against downward movements. So despite the theoretical beauty of your solution, for whatever reason that doesn’t work out in the short run.
Consult a real economist for a better answer.
Yes that is one explanation for what happens in the real world, but since it is not an assumption in the thought experiment you can’t use it there. Rowe is attempting to show that a shortage of money will cause a decline in trade without any extra conditions.
I think Rowe is assuming it (since it’s empirically observed and it makes his claim make sense) but forgets to mention it.
I agree that without additional assumption(s), what he says is not true. It’s not false either though. You still have to make additional assumptions about how markets actually function to make it false. What you say should happen is only true in a specific economic model.
So I guess I would say that as posed, his thought experiment contains insufficient information to answer what would happen.
quanta413: “I think Rowe is assuming it (since it’s empirically observed and it makes his claim make sense) but forgets to mention it.”
That is correct.
But a better way to think about it is to ask whether sufficient price flexibility (hypothetically) could prevent a shortage (excess of demand over supply) of money. And that’s less obvious. Because (depending on the monetary system) a fall in prices might reduce the money supply too. And a fall in prices might lead people to expect prices to fall further, which would increase their demand for money. And I wanted to duck questions like that, because they distracted from the main message of the post, as well as being a bit hypothetical, since prices (including wages) seem to be not very flexible.
If this is true then we have to assume all facts that are empirically observed, and in this situation we have a monopoly seller of apples, one of bananas and one of cherries so we should be discussing their behaviors in the terms of monopoly pricing. Doing so would mean our results don’t generalize, so it would be petty to do so.
I’m confused. Prices tend to be sticky, but people also would expect them to fall, to the point where they change their behavior in anticipation of that fall? That is like setting up a model with irrational expectations.
Wages are very sticky, prices much less so. Which disconnect can cause no end of trouble.
People being loss-averse, we(*) remember price increases much more than we do price decreases, which leads to the perception that the latter never happen. But see e.g. your local gas station, for prices that show no stickiness against downward movements when that’s what microeconomic forces call for. Better still, your two local gas stations on opposite sides of the same corner.
* The “we” that aren’t merchants, at any rate.
Thanks. That clarifies a lot.
I didn’t realize that, but your example makes it so obvious that I feel a little foolish for not seeing differences. I remember gas prices from enough years ago, but the thought wasn’t going to occur to me without it being pointed out.
Not sure how well the producers can coordinate the price change.
Suppose all three grew 2 fruit and needed to eat 2 fruit per harvest.
If the initial price was $1 and they all have $2 to start with, they can all buy 2 and sell 2.
If they all have $1 to start with, a Nash equilibrium exists with buy 1 eat 1 sell 1 as if they sell their good for less than 1 or more than 1, then they might not expect to buy any next round.
Only if they somehow coordinated to lower their price to 1/2 could they return to the utility of the previous case, but not sure if there’s any incentive to change individual prices.
How did they coordinate the initial price? What ever mechanism they used for that first price should still exist for setting the second price.
Who said they coordinated the initial price? How does ANY product come to an initial price? Actually, where did you even come up with the “second” part? It wasn’t necessarily meant to be a continuation.
That just may be how things turned out to be based on historic values, heuristics or costs of similar products even if they never interacted in the market.
Here’s a possible scenario –
So possibly the apple grower first priced their good at 1 based on say the market value of pineapples despite never wanting to buy them. The banana grower may then also price theirs at 1 to insure they could get 2 fruit regardless of how many they sell. And so on.
But then suddenly a money bug came and ate half the money after the prices came to be.
And say they did in fact come together and talked to agree to a price initially. Who says they will ever do so again? or how long it will be between such meetings?
If there was an initial price it had to be coordinated in some way (different from collusion). An offer has to be accepted for a price to be set.
How is there a market for Pineapples? If there is one then the market price for Pineapples should fall when the money supply falls, meaning the apple grower will cut his prices, which means the banana grower will cut his market prices, and we have trade again.
You have to come up with an explanation where the prices are set by a very fragile system (ie not S&D at all), demonstrating that a fragile system can be broken brings no insight to the matter.
The initial price was arbitrarily set. If you have a preferred way to initially set it, state it.
The whole point of the pineapple is that it’s a completely separate market that they got a number from – it’s not a substitute good or intersects with this market at all.
Prices are changed “through” a coordination game with Nash equilibriums.
Not sure what you mean by S&D.
Hypotheticals that depend on arbitrarily set prices won’t generalize to those that don’t. If the example only tells us “economies without pricing mechanisms won’t adjust to changes” then it is a low value thought experiment for application in our world.
Seriously? I’m not sure if you are just looking past this or if there is something I’m not reaching to you.
The linked hypothetical does not use arbitrarily set prices.
*I* used them to create a textbook problem with actual numbers.
The mechanism to change them is the one YOU mentioned. Or the market, or whatever.
I’m just noting that individually, they might not want to lower prices as that will reduce their capacity to buy the thing they want. AND are pricing it at where IF they sold them, would have gotten them everything they want.
That is “If there is less money bidding on the apples then the price of apples drops” doesn’t happen as if the price of apples drop, then the number of bananas bought from the profit from selling apples is also lowered AND THIS IS EASIER TO SEE WITH NUMBERS (or for you to argue against this with your numbers/strategies). And before you start saying that the price of bananas will also drop – the next example would be when only one of the three occurs a money loss.
So last year how did they know the price they needed to take that would allow them to buy what they wanted?
If I want to get enough money for my bananas to buy a certain weight of cherries then before I go to market with my bananas then I need to be able to figure out the price per pound of cherries before I sell my bananas. If I can do this in year 1 to set the price then you have to specify in the example that I cannot make that same action in year 2. If I can make it then it is easy to coordinate the whole banana/cherry/apple triangle with the lower amount of money. If I cannot use it then the issue is not the decline in the money supply but the inability to convey information. Stopping information flow while holding the money supply constant will have the same effect, I will go to market blind with no way to know what price I need to buy to gain the amount of cherries that I want.
The linked hypothetical does use arbitrarily set prices.
They have information regarding the current prices, just not the future ones or overall money supply. If there is a method you want them to have to predict future prices or the overall money supply, state it. If you want no indeterminate states, just have it so that the prices and products are produced sequentially rather than all at once. As in, apples are harvested in time 1, B in 2, C in 3, A in 4, etc.
If you have in mind a particular way they want to price it initially or otherwise, explain how it would work. I really do not think it is necessary to explain the given state of a thought experiment, but go ahead.
There are ways to undermine it, but I’m not sure if those are any more applicable. For example – one way this can be broken is to have all the members borrow up to whatever their previous steady state was and just ignore all money supply changes. There are people that do that in the real world, but I doubt it is hardly what is expected of people by economists.
I did not see any numbers used in the article linked. It did not mention anything regarding pricing at all actually.
Prices don’t just exist though, they are set by market forces. Either the 3 people are the sum total of the market, or there are others in the market and the 3 use the market prices for their trades. Either way the complaint still holds. If they have access to current prices then the banana seller can look at the price of cherries before he decides to sell his bananas or not. If the 3 are the only people in the economy then each of them is a price maker and a price taker, and each has communication with the other 2, allowing for them to contact and find out the price of each of the three fruits.
The only way to make the example as stated to work is to artificially restrict access to information by market participants.
In such a scenario the 3 people could never have come to an agreement on prices in the first place. This is just another example of “assume that the markets worked, then assume they don’t work, then cut the money supply, see the markets stopped working!”.
Harlan Ellison died at the age of 84.
What were your favorite stories of his, especially ones that were underrated/not “I Have No Mouth And I Must Scream”?
Aside from “Adrift Just Off The Islets of Langerhans”, which I think is pretty well known, I loved “Grail”, about a man who consorts with a minor demon in search of True Love. The contrast between the everyday world — even when it’s pretty bad — and the demon Surgat is appropriately jarring. And Ellison gets the horror aspect just right.
I really liked his Star Wars stuff.
I’m only somewhat well-read in classic SciFi but all I can remember about Ellison is “Have No Mouth” and “was a huge asshole”. Like I *know* he comes up in history-of-sci-fi and hugo discussions but I can’t remember any of his other works…
Okay, I just checked his bibliography on Wikipedia and “City on the Edge of Forever” rings a bell… (I’m on the younger side of the age distribution here and I watch very little TV so I haven’t seen it.)
He apparently wrote over 900 stories, many of them great, but he’s increasingly remembered for being an ass. Lesson in there somewhere.
Don’t focus on short stories if you want to be a famous author? People do seem to take novels most seriously, and for some reason seem to hold the longer ones in higher esteem.
@Protagoras — worked for Conan Doyle though!
In Sci Fi (… I think?), Shirley Jackson is known primarily for short stories, but maybe that’s just because every U.S. high schooler reads “The Lottery” in English class.
@sfoil’s actual point — Are there any artists that are particular remembered for being nice people, or does legacy also suffer from a toxoplasma-type-problem? (Does Mr. Rogers count?)
@quaelegit Heinlein’s reputation looks like it might have been boosted a bit by his gracious/pleasant attitude, especially at cons.
I forgot the name (though I have a collection of his short stories I’m too lazy to find) of the specific story, but it’s of an ugly child in the land of the beautiful, who couldn’t leave the house.
“Eyes of Dust”
Obviously his greatest work is his performance as the voice of AM in the videogame I Have No Mouth And I Must Scream.
Hmm. Does this increase or decrease the probability of Last Dangerous Visions ever being released?
All joking aside, I think he was at least as important as an influence on other writers (editorially or otherwise) and on the SF community, as for his own writings.
I’ve heard the same thing, but I have zero personal engagement with either Fandom or SF writers’ circles as they stand now, much less in Ellison’s heyday and can’t speak much to it.
I loved the atmosphere and style of On the Downhill Side.
Silly hypothetical:
What would be the most good you could do if you had the ability to travel back in time 24 hours?
I’m using the model of time travel where you stay in your body but have the future-you’s memories (like About Time or Prince of Persia). But you can only go 24 hours (or less) and you can’t take anything back with you except what you remember. You can do it repeatedly, but not to get back earlier than 24 hours. (If you don’t see what I mean by this, it’s effectively a 24 hour cool-down. You could live the same day again and again, but you could never go back to the day before yesterday.)
The best I’ve come up with is making lots of money by ‘predicting’ the stock market and then donating to charity. But how quickly could you get rich? What’s the maximum return you could expect to get on your investments if you know which things are going up or down in the next 24 hours? I don’t really know enough about the stock market to answer this.
Any better/more inventive ideas?
You’d do much better with lotteries and other gambling mechanisms than the stock market, in a 24-hour period.
What about winning the lottery once and then investing your winnings? As Gobbobobble notes, winning the lottery multiple times will draw attention to yourself immediately, which might be a bad thing.
Online gambling might be a good way to stay anonymous and also win a lot…
I assume that like casinos, online gambling establishments consider consistent winning as conclusive evidence that cheating is going on, and have some methods of detecting and stopping such consistent winners.
But unlike casinos, I’d expect it to be fairly trivial to set up a new account and win again. Also unlike casinos, less risk of physical harm… but then maybe I’ve watched too many movies.
This is a question I have thought about a lot, for a long time. Like, at least 3 decades:
Even if you go back in time and try to change as little as possible, will the lottery still pick the same numbers?
I think sports gambling is less likely to be affected by the tiny changes you do in your day.
Are you saying the air I move when I walk around has a chaotic effect on the machine that tumbles up the little balls in such a way as to effectively re-randomise it every time I rewind? I’m not sure I have an answer to that. Maybe? I guess it’d be the first thing I’d find out.
Or did you mean something else?
Basically, yeah. I suspect the lotto machines are so random and so chaotic that they wouldn’t end up in the same position, based on your movements. Something based on radioactive decay, ironically, might be more predictable to a time traveller, although obviously we don’t know that.
I go back and forth on this every few years.
:O
(Your secret is safe with me.)
If I were to time travel to play the lotto numbers, here is the strategy.
1. Pick a lotto as far from you as physically possible (while still legal to collect your winnings).
2. Travel to the latest possible time to buy tickets. If the drawing is at 8:30pm and ticket selling cuts of at 8:00pm (it’s like they are defending against time travelers!), you would want to ‘beam in’ around 7:40.
3. Hire someone to buy tickets for you. They should be physically far from you and physically far from the ball machine.
4. Email or text them a list of numbers to bet. A list of 5 sets of numbers can provide you some noise.
5. Have him drop the tickets into an overnight FedEx store before the drawing.
6. You sit as still as possible for this entire thing.
How do you imagine the changes caused by your time travel affecting the lotto draw or the stock market or the outcome of a sporting event? I’d expect that to happen from chaotic effects on the atmosphere eventually, but that should take a longish time to have a big effect.
I think the Powerball lottery drawing happens somewhere on the East Coast, but a little Googling to find out for sure mainly netted me lots of state lottery sites and articles about how to pick winning numbers. If so, why not go back 24 hours in Southern California, where atmospheric changes will presumably not be able to reach the drawing site for quite awhile? Ideally, go back just before the deadline for buying a winning lottery ticket.
Sports betting is even better, since I’m pretty sure you can bet on events on the other side of the globe. No way are any changes you make by placing a bet in Australia going to reach the site of the next Superbowl in less than 24 hours.
I’m sure there are plenty of other chaotic unpredictable things going on, but probably also with low probability of changing an event like this within 24 hours. (Like, your bet slightly effects the gambling market/odds offered, but that probably doesn’t have time to change the behavior of the winning team in the Superbowl or the winner of today’s World Cup match or the next Powerball drawing or whatever.)
I think that sporting events are much less likely to change if I time travel, at least at any significant level. The pitcher might throw the ball a little higher but the batter will swing a little higher and it’s still a homerun whether he hits it 452 feet or 453 feet.
And keep in mind, even if you DO change the outcome of the sporting event… you can just travel back and then not place that bet anymore and bet on a different one.
This only presents a problem if you think that you will end up changing the outcome of every bettable sporting event. Which is not plausible.
I think the “chaoticness” of a lottery machine can be roughly quantified. I’m imagining something like an air blower machine, where a lot of little balls are bouncing off each other every ~100ms for tens of seconds. (I will make up a lot of specific numbers for my back of the envelope calculation, but the bottom line result is extremely robust to the choice of all these numbers. If there’s a problem with this line of reasoning, it’s conceptual rather than quantitative.)
When two spheres bounce off each other elastically, a difference in the direction of travel of either sphere is roughly doubled – a 1 degree delta becomes a 2 degree delta. After a second collision, a 4 degree difference. The lottery machine does hundreds of successive collisions of each ball.
A 1 gram object on the other side of the Earth (from the lotto machine) produces a gravitational acceleration on a lotto ball (or anything else nearby) of 4 x 10^-28 m/s^2. Shifting the 1 gram object 1mm farther away from the lotto ball changes this acceleration by 6 x 10^-38 m/s^2. After a typical free path of 100ms, the velocity of the lotto ball will be affected by 6 x 10^-39 m/s. Let’s say that shifts the direction of the lotto ball by about 10^-40 radians. After 13.2 seconds (132 collisions per ball, multiplying this angular delta by a factor of 2^132) we expect this to have completely randomized the motion of balls in the machine.
Basically, when comparing an exponentially growing effect with merely linear or quadratic effects, the exponential always wins.
The real situation is undoubtedly “worse” than this. All highly chaotic systems in the vicinity of Earth are interacting gravitationally at the speed of light. I expect that moving a single atom anywhere will, well within a minute, have completely randomized all of them. And this is all assuming a classical, deterministic physics – subjectively nondeterministic quantum effects presumably randomize all of these systems quickly no matter what you do or don’t change.
If your model of time travel is a consistent one – e.g. “worlds” in which time travel works consistently are postselected from the wavefunction – you might be able to predict lotto numbers with a time machine. But in the type of inconsistent model you are imagining, no way. Everything that’s chaotically random will diverge from your “memories”.
Now that was an interesting post, Actinide. Reminds me a bit of David Deutch’s Beginnings of Infinity which I’m currently trying to read.
@actinide meta
Thanks for your comment. That’s a really striking conclusion. Like, nevermind whether your body is close to the machine, or whether it’s an hour or ten hours between you buying your ticket and the draw… if your reasoning is correct then me lifting my finger on the other side of the world as the draw starts completely randomises the result in the time it takes light to travel 13000km?
I’m not 100% sure I trust that, but at the same time, I can’t see a problem with your reasoning.
If your reasoning is sound, then it’s a very lovely demonstration of the power of exponentials!
That comment was wonderful and resolves a question I’ve had for the longest time. SSC gold to you, sir!
How possible is it to make a lot of money on the market with a days foresight? If you see an unusual spike in the price of the stock of a medium to large company and go back that morning and want to put in as much cash as you can get your hands on, what is the maximum you could buy in it? And how would the sudden demand for that stock effect the price? What’s the maximum amount you can put it before it changes the valuation one way or another to an unpredictable degree? And how much would you have to make doing this before attracting (presumably unwanted) attention to yourself?
Yes, these are the right questions!
(No idea about the answers…)
You would be immune to the basic risks. Read the paper at the end of the day and identify a good rate of return on some stock. Go back to the beginning of the day and buy all the shares you can. Once you identify that stock will go bad, go back to the appropriate time and sell it, buying shares in something else. If you keep moving your money around like that, you could assure yourself continual gains. If that could persist, you don’t need a big seed to make a lot of money in a damn hurry.
For instance, if you start with $1,000, and you average a 6% rate of return (which shouldn’t be hard), you clear an order of magnitude about every 40 real days. Meaning, on day 41 you have $10,000, on real day 81 you have $100,000, on real day 120 you have $1,000,000, etc. You could be a quadrillionaire in under a year. Even if you hit the lottery and you invest a $10,000,000 seed, that’s simply a 160 day head start.
Granted, this would totally warp the economy and probably end up inciting all kinds of nastiness, and as such it probably couldn’t persist.
6% rate of return every day? How’d you figure that?
Assuming you don’t care if you attract the attention of the SEC, 6% per day isn’t hard at all. Here’s the list of yesterday’s biggest stock movers in percentage terms: http://www.barrons.com/public/page/winlose-nyse.html
Obviously, lots of those stocks don’t have the market cap to support a lot of movement so you couldn’t double your way to a trillion dollars every 40 days. At a certain point, simply knowing that you could generate magic money from the stock market if you need it would make you decide you have enough.
Yeah, I learned that lesson when we simulated stock trading in history class, trading on prices from the previous day’s paper. The teacher collected the papers from me, the library aid, every morning as I replaced them with the current day’s papers.
I was always surprised that he didn’t catch on to my method.
With perfect foresight, if you didn’t mind calling attention to yourself, you could get multiples of your money every day by using stock options. I don’t know how big the multiplier would be but it would certainly be very large – on a good day 20x or more. Of course if you did this too much you’d wipe out the whole options market, and no one would sell them anymore.
I think the SEC will destroy you. Even if your powers are secret.
They won’t know how you are doing it, but once they decide you are doing something nasty, they will just investigate you ruinously.
If you’re willing to steal a page from Scott’s book (from his story about the different pills with magical powers), you can chain together 24-hour time jaunts of time travel to create a way to send messages back as far as you like.
Start now and commit to spending the next 30 days on the project. A simple, slightly non-optimal version: At 8PM each day, you stand around in your living room waiting for your future self to show up and hand you a letter. Then, you immediately go back 24 hours and hand yourself that letter. On the last day of the project, you write your 30-days-past self a letter telling you want to you to have done.
This has the problem that you’ve got 30 days for chaotic effects of your choices to change things, but the benefit that you’ve got 30 days of lead time to make your killing in the stock market or whatever, instead of needing to do it in one day.
A fun version of this is that it’s just a veto function on the way the world has turned out for you. Let’s assume that chaotic effects on the atmosphere eventually change everything. I set up this channel to my past self that goes back N years, and commit to myself about how bad things must be before I want to erase the last N years. At the end of that time, if I’m unhappy with how things have turned out, I go out and buy a handful of firecrackers and send it back in my envelope. The N-years-ago me goes outside and sets them off, rerandomizing the world. Continue until I’m happy with how things ended up or something has broken the chain of transmission (I dropped dead from a heart attack, a plane crashed into my house, etc.)
If I want to end up in a world where things have gone well for me, I need to come up with an evaluation of “good last N years” that has a much higher probability of coming true than some random thing breaking the chain.
The obvious problem there is that I have to be willing to commit suicide for the last N years in the interests of another version of me being happy. Intuitively, I think I’d be willing to do this for a short span (like a week), but not for a long span, unless my last N years had really, really sucked.
This doesn’t work at all with the proposed method of time travelling, because it only sends information back to your past self. You can’t hand yourself a letter, you can’t even meet yourself, the only thing being sent back is your memories, and you can’t send information any further back than 24 hours before the furthest point you’ve advanced in the timeline. This means there’s no way to bypass the limitation.
@albatross11
I thought of that story when I was writing my comment. Still one of my favourites. I almost explicitly said “no doing that thing Scott did in his pills story”, but as Lillian says, I think my rules make it impossible anyway.
Assuming that the “random number seed” of the world is preserved, buying a lottery ticket on the day of the drawing would yield results faster the stock market. Would likely arouse suspicion to do so repeatedly, though.
For more long term schemes, with enough planning and patience you can cram the learning of several years into one day.
Only up to a point. You can certainly learn a lot of background stuff in a day, which is probably what you meant (reading, googling etc.) but you can’t try something and see what happens unless that something only takes a day to yield results.
True, I wasn’t thinking of actual research. Just getting a very broad base of knowledge and developing self-learning ability.
The scheme (stock market prediction) is morally equivalent to theft, IMO.
And even if you don’t care, because you think you’re stealing from the rich to give to the poor (*), there’s some economic damage. Other investors find the stock market slightly less profitable, which will affect capital allocation/investment decisions – are you sure the net cost of this is so slight? (Predicting lottery numbers is still theft, but probably has less adverse consequences than playing the stock market – especially given how few times you’d be able to do it for large prizes.)
(*) But if it’s still a net moral good, let’s decide it democratically. If we want, we can collectively decide to impose a tax on stock market transactions and direct the proceeds towards charitable ends.
To answer your question: in terms of doing good to others, and trying to avoid long term pitfalls (how long do I live after my gift is discovered?), I announce – then quickly prove – the ability to predict imminent natural disasters (and only those; I am careful never show my ability in any obvious way that contradicts that limitation.)
Good point to question the morality… I guess I consider stock market and lottery cheating to be less bad than other kinds of gambling. Perhaps because you’re stealing a little from many people rather than a certain amount from one person?
In any case, “morally equivalent to theft” doesn’t actually mean anything to me. “Theft” is not a single moral value. Ok, perhaps it’s always wrong, but sometimes it’s a little wrong and sometimes it’s very wrong. Jean Valjean is less evil than Charlie Croker.
I would have thought that one person cheating on the stock market would have a very small effect on the overall economics of it… I’m certainly not sure of this, though.
“But if it’s still a net moral good, let’s decide it democratically”
I mean, taxing the rich to spend on charity is probably something I’d vote for, but what if I lived in a society full of perfectly selfish people who would always oppose such redistribution? I don’t believe morals are decided by vote; if the majority of people are opposed to charitable taxes that doesn’t make them wrong. And if I have the ability to impose such measures without anybody knowing, shouldn’t I do it?
Your first objection is entirely right; I should have just said “is theft” (i.e. is an instance of theft, whatever variable significance that may have).
‘Shouldn’t I do it?’. You _can_ do it, and if it makes you feel good about yourself and is right by your standards, we can’t stop you (I think we should try, though), so go ahead. But it’s a bit cheeky to appeal to the outside world and ask for its approval!
A lot of taxes we raise go to ‘charitable’ ends (I’m counting redistribution in this); you happen to want more charity than we have, and are gifted with a magic ability to make this happen in effect. I don’t have to agree that societies chosen point is too little.
And even if I very strongly agreed with your desire for more charity, I can feel extremely unhappy that you do an magic end-run around democracy to get your way (effectively, impose a financial transactions tax). Rather, we should condemn this as strongly as possible no matter what your motivation. Even I happened to agree with your decisions, we don’t all the _other_ possible people with such superpowers mucking with society unilaterally based on their individual preferences.
Finally, and related to my previous point, if you have some awesome powers what about a bit of precautionary modesty? Do you really know the economic consequences of your act? You might not get enough money out of the stock market to affect it “much”, but isn’t plauslble that you reduce long term growth by 0.01%? (I don’t know, but I suspect you don’t either.) And would the economy-wide compounded effects of that loss really be smaller than your charitable deeds? Might they not possibly be far larger?
Perhaps the right answer to your question is: make no plan at all, other than spending countless 24-hour cycles educating yourself, building models, consulting experts, and so forth, so that when you do decide to fix the world only 24 actual hours will have passed, but you then will have a much-better thought out and closer-to-optimal plan (whatever it may be). Could even be your stock market scheme in the end, but now it’s been thought through.
Aw, but that’s *boring*! I want to be a super-hero *now*!
On a more serious note, your point is well-taken. Regarding the first bit of your comment, I think I have a bit more of an ends-justify-the-means attitude than you. The reason I normally oppose ends-justify-the-means-type arguments is because they break rules that I don’t want to see broken, because without those rules society would be worse. However, I think such arguments don’t apply when you can break the rule without anybody knowing you’ve done so (which isn’t ever really true in the real world, but perhaps it is in my hypothetical).
I don’t quite understand how using time travel to predict the stock market is morally equivalent to theft. The stock market seems to me like it is set up to pay large amounts of money to people to encourage them to make its predictions as accurate as possible. By accurately predicting the stock market one day in advance, I am effectively selling my skill at market prediction in exchange for monetary compensation.
In particular, how is performing vastly better than other investors because I own a time machine morally different from performing vastly better than other investors because I am good at statistics? (I’m assuming here that you think it’s okay to make money in the stock market by being good at statistics.)
If you believe this, then insider trading should probably be legalized (an argument that has been made coherently by a number of libertarian economists)
I’ve never come across a good moral argument for making insider trading illegal (though I’m very open to hearing one), so I guess I’d agree with those economists. 🙂
There is a good argument for making some, but not all, insider trading illegal. Consider an investment banker working for the buyer in a merger that is not yet public knowledge. Trading on that information would raise the price of the target company, contrary to the interests of the bankers’ client. This is a violation of the banker’s duty of care to his client. More generally, if insider trading by an agent harms the interests of the principal who gave the information to the agent, than that trading is morally wrong. Whether this should be considered criminal, or merely a civil tort is a separate question.
Obviously, this doesn’t apply to the time travel scenario.
I’ve never come across a good argument that insider trading even is illegal, except that the SEC will devote a lot of legal firepower to your ruin if they catch you at it.
But the central example of illegal trading that most people agree ought to be illegal and will get you the most adverse SEC attention, is trading on information you or one of your co-conspirators have a fiduciary responsibility to keep quiet. If I am president of (publicly-traded) XYZcorp, I have an obligation to keep our impending acquisition of ABCcorp secret, that third parties won’t use that knowledge to bid up the price of ABC. That would be detrimental to the balance sheet and thus the stockholders of XYZ when the sale goes through. So, my private purchase of ABC stock, which will not likely go unnoticed, is a breach of trust and a harm to my stockholders.
That’s the “insider” part of insider trading. It’s not a blanket prohibition on outsiders who know a lot about a company using that information to make better decisions than outsiders who know less.
The lottery and the stock market are both systems governed by rules, and people participate (at the risk of losing money) assuming everyone is generally playing by these rules. Using statistics is a given.
Insider trading? Maybe it’s not an economic harm (those arguments don’t convince me) but if it’s allowed, surely everyone would want it to be known to be allowed. If it’s illegal, and I’m caught, I don’t regard it as a useful defense even if you could find every economist in the world in consensus that it was desirable to allow insider trading; the fact is, other people traded assuming this was (even if unwisely) forbidden.
Likewise, and I guess debatably, I regard time travelling as ‘obviously’ against the rules. We just don’t write it down because it seems impossible (or already against the rules of nature). But ask yourself: if it were possible, would other investors/lottery plays want to know it was possible, and would they alter their behavior. _Of course_. Yes it is ‘technically’ within the rules; you might attach some weight to that argument (I wouldn’t).
The lottery is interesting because if I pick the jackpot numbers and end up splitting the price with some other non-time-travelling better, I can point to a specific person and say ‘I stole this specific amount of money from him’. Well I would, you might not; there’s no rule against using time travel to pick the winning numbers after all!
Less abstractly, suppose _you_ are the one doing the research, the statisics, and are going to trade on that. I look into the past, and see your research (if published) or at the very least see the trades and positions you take, and front-run you. Less/no profit for you, more before me, and I’m entirely parisitic on your effort. This doesn’t seem moral to me. It also shows how it will have an adverse affect on the market (who will actually do the hard work, if someone can peer over their shoulder and exploit their work before them?)
The scheme (stock market prediction) is morally equivalent to theft, IMO.
Content warning: violent and sexual crimes below
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Is it moral to kill someone and then go back in time and undo it?
Is it moral to rape someone and then go back in time and undo it?
Probably not, but what’s the connection? I think these sound awful, but in neither case is the ‘someone’ worse off _in the eventual timeline_ than they would be without your actions. If I split a lottery jackpont with someone who would have been an eventual winner, they are actually worse off in the new timeline than theu would have been without my actions. Likewise if I front-run someone’s hard-earned stock market research. Whatever your views on the morality of the various cases, this seems like an unarguable qualitative difference to your ‘undo’ hypotheticals so I don’t see the relevance.
By that argument, it wouldn’t be immoral to torture or rape someone in the real world if you knew that they would die an hour later (because, say, they’ll be executed): they won’t be worse off in the “eventual timeline” (i.e., the only timeline), because they’ll be dead.
Adrian, there’s an sf story where it makes emotional sense to keep doing science even as the earth is about to be destroyed. I thought it was Bones of the Earth, but probably not. Maybe it’s in a timeline which is about to disappear, maybe I’m completely wrong.
There might be another story about doing science even as expansion is accelerating– fast.
I didn’t necessarily mean to connect it to your theory about the morals of the market. But it’s a question raised by the ability to replay your day.
According to Maimonides, killing someone who is dying of an incurable disease isn’t murder.
I didn’t realize he was posting here.
I hope you don’t mistake me for holding that opinion? I was merely following pjs’ line of reasoning to its logical, absurd conclusion.
If you’re perplexed, I heard he has a guide for that.
@Nick — I appreciate this joke and that it finally got me to go read up on Maimonides 😛
The passage in question is worth reading. The logic goes as follows:
1. A witness whose false testimony leads to an innocent person being convicted of murder and executed is himself guilty of murder.
2. That fact is the reason we can believe the testimony of witnesses in a murder case.
3. Killing someone who is dying of an incurable disease is not murder.
4. Hence if someone who is dying of an incurable disease is falsely accused of murder, convicted, and executed, the witnesses whose false testimony led to that result are not guilty of murder.
5. Hence a court cannot trust testimony of a witness who claims to have observed a murder by someone dying of an incurable disease.
6. Hence someone dying of an incurable disease cannot be convicted of murder on the basis of the testimony of witnesses.
7. Hence someone dying of an incurable disease cannot be convicted of a murder unless he commits it in the presence of the court.
Maimonides is a lot of fun.
For All the Rude People
A man with an incurable disease and a mission.
No. Creating stable time loops dooms the universe.
It is somewhat less harmful to cause a rape that someone will experience briefly, than to cause a rape that someone will experience briefly and remember for a lifetime.
That this even might be morally OK to do, is something only a consequentialist would try to calculate and is part of the reason the rest of humanity basically thinks it is moral to round up all the consequentialists and put them in camps.
Well, maybe. Can we do a cost-benefit on that first?
So I think I agree with this, but I think it implies that raping somebody and then murdering them is less harmful than raping them and not murdering them. And I don’t think I do believe that. Am I missing something?
You’re missing the harm caused by murder(*). This would be like breaking someone’s leg, then breaking their neck so that they don’t have to feel the pain of the broken leg and proclaiming “Yay Me! I’m so much more considerate than all the other leg-breakers out there!”
* I hope you don’t need an explanation of why murder is generally considered harmful.
So what if I believed that the harm caused by murder was significantly less than the harm caused by rape? If I am somewhat reducing the latter by committing the former, then it could still work out
Better question, is it moral to reset all 7+ billion people on the planet to the point they were 24 hours ago without their consent? Are you even resetting all people on the planet to the point they were 24 hours ago? Perhaps the power be usefully conceptualized as virtual projection of how the world will develop in the next 24 hours, and there is no “true time” until it passes beyond your ability to affect.
The answers to these question will have bearing on the answers to yours.
Putting all the financial stuff aside, there are probably loads of preventable deaths you could stop.
Convince people who die in auto accidents to stay home that morning? Inform the police about murders that are going to happen?
Of course, establishing your credibility would be quite difficult. And whether you even want the authorities to know you have this power is probably questionable (based on what I’ve learned from the X-Men, the government doesn’t tend to respond well to this sort of thing).
You could always resort to doing slightly immoral things to save lives. Sabotage the car of the person who was going to die in the auto accident. Random 911 call to the scene of the murder shortly before it happens.
It wouldn’t be easy to do, but saving a human life is a pretty big deal. Even if you only got one a week, that’s definitely making the world a better place.
I think this is harder than you make it sound. You admit that establishing credibility would be difficult, but I think a better way to put it is that nobody would pay any attention to me unless they knew I was a time traveller. The person who dies in a car accident doesn’t stay home because a stranger says “I’m from the future; don’t drive today!”
I was about to say “I don’t know how to sabotage a car” but then realised I’d get *loads* of practice if I wanted it, so maybe things like that and anonymous 911 calls would do it…
I suppose one thing I could do (if I hadn’t seen X Men) would be to let the secret service be aware of what I can do and then they can use their clout to save people/inform the police etc. Of course, I definitely wouldn’t do this because I have seen X Men.
Easiest option (doesn’t require the car keys or any tools other than a matchstick, does no lasting damage, will work on most cars) is to let down some or all of the tyres.
Of course, this won’t delay the driver by very long, but I imagine it would be long enough that they avoid the accident. Also, it stops the car from moving *at all*, whereas something like putting sugar in the fuel tank (as used by WW2 Resistance saboteurs), as well as doing permanent expensive-to-fix damage, will allow the car to move initially- possibly enough to get into the accident, if it doesn’t cause an accident by killing the engine in high-speed traffic.
Most car accidents involve complex patterns of traffic. If Joe gets into his car at 8:30 and drives to work, at 8:50 gets stuck behind Larry who is aggravating because he’s soooo slooooowww, and tries to pass and crashes at 8:50 into Brenda, who wasn’t driving defensively enough. It is probably sufficient to just delay Joe by 1 minute. Or Brenda. Or Larry.
If you were to replay the day over and over, you would find that there are all sorts of things you can do everywhere that increase or decrease total traffic deaths that day in that city. Since the baseline is 100 deaths per day across the US, most cities will have zero on most days, so simply “re-rolling” by messing with any participants is usually enough to get the death rate to zero.
Yeah, that sounds like it’d work.
I’d love to see confused pundits discussing the fact that one city’s road traffic accidents have gone down to zero ever since such-and-such a date, politicians claiming credit, the city getting a reputation for being careful and respectful…
Also keep in mind that you could easily target the “low-hanging fruit.” Complex accidents may be hard to fully solve or prevent, or you might just change who dies and who doesn’t.
But things like “a drunken trucker killed a family of 3 by running a red light on a remote rural road at midnight” are probably preventable.
Or accidents in general. Small children drowning in pools? Call the parents beforehand! They don’t believe you? Defecate in their pool!
This should have been every episode of “Early Edition.”
Eliza Dushku didn’t have too much trouble with it, and left an entertaining series of instructional videos. Well, OK, it started getting troublesome when that guy from Beverly Hills showed up with his own time machine, but we never did learn his agenda.
Having never seen it, is that show any good? I’ve never been much impressed with Dushku in e.g. Dollhouse (Buffy she was OK–one note, but a good note) but I certainly want it to be good.
I enjoyed it, but I enjoyed Dollhouse as well so YMMV. She definitely wasn’t playing Faith.
You can give people advance warning of Very Bad Things about to happen, and eventually establish a reputation as a reliable
prophet“short-term superforecaster”. Probably best to do this anonymously. Whether you eventually want to trade on that reputation by making a few carefully chosen falsepropheciesforecasts is an interesting question.This tangentially reminds me of Ted Chiang’s story Understand.
Also, the movie Primer.
From the pure money-making perspective, the stock market isn’t the way to go – your activities are visible and if your returns are suspiciously good the government will want to have a word with you. Stocks might be ok for making your first few millions, but in the long run you’d want to get into something like currency markets – they have the capacity to absorb extremely large bets and no one suspects insider trading there.
If you run as a day-trader, you might be able to mask your really good picks in a sea of noise.
Currency markets are a good shout.
Done well, you look like a secretive hedge fund with real ‘alpha’. Billions or tens of billions over a (say) ten-year horizon could be easily made acceptable, but
have to know what you are doing. Forex is a good idea though. Simply massive bets
(e.g. well out-of-the-money derivatives) whose success depend on natural disasters would invite scrutiny, but you’d probably be able to survive the governmental kind because how can you be an insider? (There are other risks though.)
I still think an effective way is to prove/sell yourself as a reliable predictor of natural disasters (and only them) and though that might be good enough in itself, if you want more cash just charge a huge fee for your services (even contingent: buy my services, and if I predict disaster level X for your country, you pay me $Y(X) if I’m right, but get paid $Z(X) if I’m wrong; once I have a good track record, no-one will not be rationally willing to enter some such deal [and so in equlibrium I do all the good I would do even fully altruistically, but get paid as well])
You could probably wrangle a large retainer to, under no circumstances, provide military advice to any country. Then give that retainer to charity.
Or, you could go on a world conquest spree. In any other period but ours I’d say a 24 hour rewind would guarantee you winning any war you happened to lead. These days one day battles are less important but a complete strategic immunity to surprise attacks is one hell of an advantage. Not sure you can do much good with that ability, but if you fancy that you’d make a better despotic ruler than the alternative…
Didn’t the Other Scott or someone prove that you can use this to solve PSPACE problems in polynomial time?
You could solve any brute-forceable algorithm. As long as you can order the inputs, you can tell the computer at the start of the day “this is day N, go.”
This brings up another way to make money: crypto currencies. It’s been a while since I wrote any software here, but last I did, mining a block depends on solving a Very Hard Problem By Bruteforce, but that problem is well-defined by the answer to the previous block. So you could check that the problem was at the start of your time-travelling day, precalculate the next N blocks, and then go.
Someone more involved in the crypto currencies could tell me how full of shit I am here.
It won’t work to reuse someone else’s calculations for Bitcoin block hashes, because I’m pretty sure the block hash includes the Bitcoin address to which the mining rewards will go. Changing that to your address means the block hash isn’t good anymore.
OTOH, if you have mining hardware, you can spend 24 hours trying to compute the next block hash, then send that information back in time to yourself. Assuming your process for finding the next block hash is deterministic, this won’t mess up your calculation. You can also use the chaining trick, above, to get as big a multiplier as you need to get that block reward.
Yes, this (that a BTC solution claim includes the claimant’s address, keeping you from presenting someone else’s solution as your own) is essentially true. The iterative approach is technically possible, but impractical – back of the envelope, a million bucks worth of ASIC miners would get you about 1/4000th of the BTC hashrate, meaning that you’d have to re-live nearly a subjective month to win a 10-minute $10,000 block. That’s a looooot of time to think up ways to persuade the SEC you’re just really good at picking penny stocks.
Hmm, what happens if there’s an address collision, two people claiming the same address at very close to the same time? If Alice is observed to use an address to receive but not spend BTC on The Day, can Bob copy their work at the end of the day, go back to the start, have spurious BTC sent to Bob@alicesaddress, and then spend them for something suitably untraceable before Alice notices?
A quick google suggests that while addresses aren’t supposed to be reused, there are some careless Alices out there who do it anyway, and may present an additional attack surface for this.
@John Schilling:
Bitcoin addresses are 160-bit cryptographic hashes of a public key. To claim the rewards, you need the associated private key. Without a fundamental break in elliptic-curve cryptography, you can’t steal somebody else’s address, and without a truly phenomenal amount of work (much larger than just mining a block) you can’t find a hash collision that lets you use a different keypair for the same address.
Address reuse has serious failure modes, but I don’t think any of those failure modes become extra-vulnerable to people travelling back in time.
The more I think about this, the more limited it seems.
I feel like there is some analog of the Nyquist limit at play. You can only detect signals that arise within 24 hours. Your error-detection is “bandlimited.” Moreover, unless you are willing to find and integrate an enormous amount of information, your SNR is probably not going to be very good. All this despite being able to exert very powerful control over your sphere of influence, and being able to expand that sphere of influence through riskless gambling. So I worry that you could unknowingly work your way into an inescapable and broadly-reaching consequence, with no way to foresee or correct it. It’s Goethe’s The Sorcerer’s Apprentice. You would have to exercise a great deal of caution whenever you attempted to bend the world to your will.
You would also have to be very, very careful with partaking in any sort of worldly pleasures. As long as you came to within 24 hours, you could buy any drug, eat any food, drink any drink, take any risk, sleep with any person, and never have to
turn into a pumpkinworry about any consequence. You could binge on any pleasure, and then rewind to before the binge, having scratched the itch psychologically. Your main-sequence life could be one of perfect virtue. But, you would still have the memory of those binges, and the subsequent grooves ground into your psyche could be difficult to escape. You would have to be extremely judicious about hedonic experiences, and would not be able to – or even want to! – escape the potential for regret.Now, by replaying interactions over and over, you could learn what makes any particular person tick, and you would never be ambushed in any interaction. Effectively, this would give you a great deal of charisma. There would be far fewer missteps, because you could basically simulate every interaction as many times as you wanted. This would also provide you with a great degree of equanimity, for you would be confident that you could achieve an optimal outcome to any interaction. But, this too would become wearying, to yourself and to those around you. You would never know exactly when to stop iterating, and when to accept the outcome of an interaction, and so would live countless simulated days for every main-sequence day you selected for. And, the specter of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice would continually loom over you. Particularly because those around you would either get fed up with you always being right and always getting your way, or, they would latch onto you and become unhealthily dependent on your uncanny prowess.
There would be no escape from the burden – you would be Laplace’s demon with human emotional frailty and both hands tied behind your back.
If people have weird reactions to you always being right, you can do more iterations until you’ve folded in the right amount of error.
I’m not sure if there are any interesting problems associated with not being inspired enough to invent the variations that will lead to what you want.
But what if the weird reactions only really become apparent after at least 24 hours?
It feels like the money thing is a red herring.
Like, clearly Groundhog Day you can make all the money you could ever want, but ultimately that is just another Bill Gates situation. Time Travel should be able to give you better outcomes than some rich guy deciding to help.
What about spending the day obsessively gaining every shred of information about anyone who got into an accident or got crimed, and then going back and attempting to warn them? Then see how the warnings were received, initiate Groundhog Day.
Shoot for a day where you mitigated or prevented every tragedy you were able to gain information about. Then do it again the next day.
I got reminded by my conservative friends how many people get murdered in Chicago last weekend. Develop a good mnemonic for compressing that data so that you can remember it for one day, and you could tell the cops exactly when and where each murder will happen.
It would take some time to develop the reputation to be believed, but you just need to get email access to one officer with predictions that come true and he’ll take you seriously.
Naval Gazing returns to fire control with a discussion of methods of rangefinding.
And for Friday, the second part of the discussion on naval aviation.
Does this comment section have an atypical shared definition of “leftist”? As someone who’s relatively new to the comments, this is the most discordant thing I’ve noticed – “leftist” being used as if it were a specific group with a shared ideology, rather than a broad swath of humanity that includes a variety of conflicting ideologies. My bias, coming in here, was to assume that the sort of people who read a lot of Scott Alexander essays would eschew broad statements about vague group nouns, or at least aspire to, but that doesn’t always seem to be the case.
We’re highly educated contrarians. Those of us who don’t subscribe to an ideology within the narrow Overton Window (Overton Slit?) accepted by university administrators would lump that set of ideologies as “the left”, since it’s obviously not “the right.”
That doesn’t answer my question. Does “leftist” include everyone from Mao to Bernie to Stalin to JFK, or doesn’t it? I try not to say things like, “Leftists tend to…” or “Conservatives tend to…” but that’s because I value clarity and constructive dialogue, not because of my political opinions.
Mao to Stalin to Bernie. College-approved opinions. JFK would be centrist.
You don’t find many actual Stalinists on college campuses. Mao is more popular for a few reasons. Bernie is a social democrat by most standards; whether social democrats are leftists depends on who you ask.
My impression is that “social democrat” kind of smears across the spectrum in Western Europe. What distinguishes France’s Socialists from the Front Nationale is Culture War, not social intervention in the economy.
Here in America, it’s to the left of Hillary Clinton.
When I say “leftist”, I do mean “a broad range of people from the left-of-centre huddling down in the very middle all the way out to the ‘Enver Hoxha was the only true communist’ types” and not one monolithic entity that marches in lockstep and holds the same opinions on the same topics.
But when I see people talking about “the right”, they do seem to regard it as one big monolithic bloc of same talking, same thinking, same goose-stepping marching in unison, and whether you call them “Republicans” or “Nazis” it’s the same thing.
Which is really damn irritating when you’re a Republican but not an American Republican!
My own personal heuristic for whether or not someone is a “leftist” is how they answer the following question:
Do you think the fact that some people are very rich and other people are very poor is a problem that government should attempt to solve?
@Matt M
That’s an interesting heuristic, but I feel as though it’s a lot broader than most people’s use. In the UK, I think about 80% of the Conservative Party are “leftists” by your heuristic.
@Matt M
Is that relative to the current level of redistribution or compared to a situation with no redistribution at all?
As Fion argues, if it’s the latter then nearly everyone is leftist. If it is the former, then it’s little more than a statement on where you stand relative to the status quo. The exact same person can then be a leftist in the US and a rightist in Sweden.
As others have pointed out, this is almost certainly too broad: If I’m reading it right, this recent paper suggests that “substantial minorities” of Republicans support the proposition that “Government should reduce differences in income between rich and poor people”. Presumably these people should not count as the left.
Aapje:
+1
I think it’s useful to distinguish between political beliefs that are about the endpoints (what does your ideal society look like?) and beliefs that are about direction (given what our society looks like, which way should we move things?)
Put me in the US in 1900, and I’ll be a radical feminist, civil-rights extremist, crazy tree-hugger who thinks the government should care about pollution beyond nuissance law, etc. But here in the modern 2018 US, none of those labels really apply.
Maybe it works better if we take out the very poor people (which everyone agrees is a problem) and just ask, “Do you think the fact that some people are very rich is a problem that the government should attempt to solve?”
Or perhaps use “unreasonably” instead of “very”. Most people will at least wonder what’s inherently unreasonable about being rich and balk at the proposition; a “leftist” will implicitly invoke all the unstated very poor people and blame that on the unreasonably rich.
At least I think so, but I haven’t thought about this one very much.
There’s a lot to address in the replies here – but I’ll go for a few things.
1. IMO, the point of emphasis in my statement isn’t the “very rich” part, but the “government should solve” part (which certainly implies re-distribution). The point is to identify, via direct example, those who see economic equality as a terminal goal, as opposed to those who do not see it as such. That is, in my opinion, the major and most significant difference between left and right. If you see a really rich person and a really poor person, and your reaction is that this is morally wrong and that someone should do something about it I consider you a leftist. Period. If your reaction is that it’s wrong, but intervention is not appropriate, or that it’s not wrong at all, I consider you on the right.
2. The fact that this may imply that 80% of people are leftists does not concern me. Perhaps that is, in fact, the actual proportion of leftists in society. I personally believe that to be about right. I think a whole lot of people who are conventionally thought to be “right-wing” are actually economic leftists.
3. I’m not certain that seemingly quite different leftists actually disagree on the endpoints at all. I don’t think Hillary Clinton and Chairman Mao have significantly different concepts of what the ideal society actually looks like. I think they have tactical disagreements on how to best achieve that society, and they have moral disagreements on what tactics are acceptable in order to bring it about. But I remain almost wholly unconvinced that even moderate U.S. democrats have any particular moral respect for free trade, private property, freedom of association, etc. If you gave Hillary the opportunity to flip a switch that would transform the world into a fully Marxist society without any violent revolutions or concentration camps or whatever, I think she flips it. I don’t think she hesitates and says “Wait a minute, state-owned farming has proven to be a bad idea!” Anyone who has come to realize that state-owned farming is a bad idea is already basically out of the leftist category in the first place.
In the paper I referenced, people were asked to rate their agreement with the proposition “Government should reduce differences in income between rich and poor people” from 1-100. Do you have a sense (even a rough one, I don’t need a hard cut-off) of where you would draw the line for someone to be a leftist? Is any answer higher than 1 sufficient?
Well, surely the issue is whether “economic leftism” is necessary and/or sufficient to be a leftist. We might suppose that someone can be an economic leftist and a cultural rightist or vice-versa; whether such a person is then a “leftist” simpliciter will have consequences for the sorts of judgments one can make about the class “leftist” without being too general.
Finally, if you concede that 80% of humanity can be leftists, then I think you should agree with the original poster that ““leftist” being used as if it were a specific group with a shared ideology, rather than a broad swath of humanity that includes a variety of conflicting ideologies” is a pretty useless term; it is almost impossible for me to imagine that the term “leftist” as you define it can be useful for non-trivial generalizations about the group as a whole.
Eugene,
1. It makes little sense to me to use a 100 point scale for that particular question. As a result, it’s hard for me to answer. That’s why in my framing, I simply ask yes or no – leaving it up to the respondent to decide their own cut-off, whether it’s 1 or whether it’s 10 or whether it’s 50 or whatever.
2. I focus on economic left/right because I think that’s the only area where there is a consistent and logical framework in play. Cultural issues are just a downright mess with no sensible overall framework to use at all. Being a “cultural leftist” simply means “agreeing with the majority of economic leftists on most cultural issues.” I think it’s simpler to just strip the cultural stuff out and define left/right in economic terms. Yes, this can be problematic in terms of trying to describe say, anarcho-socialists or other incredibly fringe groups, but so be it.
3. Once again, I see no point in focusing on the size of the group. If the criticism of “leftist” as a term is that it’s not nuanced enough to define very small groups of people, then fine. I agree. But it’s not intended to do that. Is “Christian” a problematic term? Does it not fully capture the nuances of differences in beliefs, doctrine, and practice between Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Calvinists, Orthodox? It surely doesn’t, but it does separate people based on one simple and essential question: Do you believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, died for our sins, and was resurrected? (please rate your belief on this on a scale of 1-100 – just kidding!)
@ Matt’s Christian example —
I think if “Christians” were regularly discussed here in a negative light an no one pointed out that this covers a really wide range of beliefs and is obscuring important differences between, e.g. Roman Catholics, Lutherans, U.S. Evangelicals, and Mennonites, that would be a problem.
Instead, when Christians are discussed on here people are usually very good about being specific about which group they are discussing.
Judging by Matt’s question:
I am a leftist too – like everybody here…
If some people really are very poor – that meaning lacking their basic needs, for example having malnourished children – I thing that really is a problem that justifies some kind of governmental intervention.
But if the difference between “poor people” and “rich people” is that poor people have less cool (older) cars, TVs and smartphones than rich people – I think that is the case of some “poor people” in the West – I don’t think that justifies more government interventions. So, by John Schilling’s modified variant, I suppose I’m not a leftist.
I’ll begin by addressing the Christian analogy. First of all, Christians comprise roughly 31% of the world’s population–so your proposed group of leftists is, by your own estimation, twice as big, which presumably means it’s twice as hard to generalize about. But the point stands: it is certainly meaningful to judge membership in a group with a yes/no question. The question is, is it useful? Does it tell us much about membership in that group? Do you think there are statements more general than “Christians believe in Jesus Christ” that can be made of the group “Christians” without further qualification?
This question is especially pertinent if we leave your central examples of Christianity and ask about Gnosticism, Jews for Jesus, The Israelite Church of God in Jesus Christ, Positive Christianity, Theosophy, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, etc., etc.
Would it sound reasonable to you for someone to say, “I’m not certain that seemingly quite different Christians actually disagree on the endpoints at all”, and say that Torquemada, Hong Xiuquan, and Mother Theresa are in basic agreement on the important things, and only disagree on matters of emphasis, or tactics?
As a reminder, Christians are a group half as big, by your estimation, as leftists. I see no reason why you shouldn’t think that leftists should admit some non-trivial proportion of the variety exhibited by Christians.
As to numerical rating, I agree without an operational meaning it’s hard to know what the numbers mean, but as an example they can represent priority of an issue–so someone who believes the government has an interest in redistribution but attaches very little importance to this, and only enters into political coalitions with voters who share other preferences and are economic rightists–that person might be a leftist by your reckoning, but they shouldn’t count as much of one. They will take no action to advance economic leftism, and will enable others to roll it back.
Finally, whether or not you think economics is the only important dimension, other people often do not (I would guess, though don’t have any evidence, that culture is more a driver of political attachment than economics); if you include as “leftists” people who don’t consider themselves leftists, it will be very hard to generalize about the group; you argue that “cultural leftism” is just the cultural beliefs shared by economic leftists, but that only makes sense if such a set of cultural beliefs exists–the whole point of the argument is that they almost certainly do not. Hence, generalizing about “leftists” defined in your way is almost certain to miss a huge amount of variation.
@a reader
Isn’t the real debate between those who want to heavily tax the rich and those who want to minimize their taxes, on whether the positive externalities of rich people’s spending outweigh the negative externalities?
This definition of left and right leaves out the possibility that someone might be against government redistribution on the grounds that much of it will go to rich people, sometimes from poor people, and that there will be large dead weight costs.
One problem with a lot of political argument is that it is put in terms of whether you favor the objectives of some policy, not whether you favor the policy–it ignores the possibility that policies may have different consequences than claimed by their supporters.
An example is the minarchist/anarchist controversy among libertarians. Minarchists tend to state their position in terms of what they want the state to do, what laws they want passed. That assumes that a state set up in the way they want will act in the way they want, a somewhat odd assumption for libertarians to make.
Yup.
I try not to use it as anything but a broad term. But sometimes the broad term is an easy way to bypass decision making about specific groups who definitely exist but whose borders are irrelevant to the point. I made a comment in the last thread about how Piketty was basically mythmaking for a section of the Left. I couldn’t easily tell you with pinpoint precision what parts of the left. If you concede that this group exists, though, that’s sort of irrelevant until someone starts discussing which parts of the left.
Agreed, I was not complaining about your comment. But to be fair, that comment wasn’t exactly making a controversial claim – your conclusion was essentially, “if you assume Piketty is correct, then the beliefs of the people who agree with Piketty start to look pretty believable!”.
More generally, I think that broad assertions about group nouns tend to be bad except when they’re axiomatic, and your comment was the latter. It’s the former kind that I’m complaining about, and not just in the “someone said something mean about me” sense, in the “not contributing to a useful and constructive argument” sense.
This is a good question. I sometimes get a bit confused about what people here mean when they say ‘leftist’ but I guess I put some of that down to folk here mostly being American. (Your left is our centre and that sort of thing…)
I suspect you’re right that there’s a bit of outgroup homogeneity bias where most people here aren’t leftists so people on the left look more similar than they really are. As for your point about trying to eschew broad and vague characterisations of groups… Perhaps to be charitable to the commenters we could say that different discussions call for different levels of precision. Sometimes it’s very important to distinguish between the People’s Front of Judea and the Judean People’s Front, but other times they can be grouped together without losing much of the point.
Yes. One of my major beefs here is that “leftist” gets used broadly to mean “everybody on the left” – while this is one colloquial meaning, a better definition is “communists, anarchists, and anyone who uses ‘liberal’ as a snarl word from the left rather than the right.” Further, you identify this also, the comment section here tends to see norms of charity and precision fall to pieces when the left is discussed.
… Can you suggest another term to mean “everybody* on the left”?
Fill in the blank:” _______ usually support higher minimum wages and often worry about the effects of prejudice.”
*I don’t think anyone ever says anything about every anything, really; generalities are known to admit exceptions.
(Yes, including that statement)
“Left-wingers” works just fine. I don’t talk about “rightists” to refer to all right-wingers, because besides “rightist” being an unusual word, lumping together mainstream conservatives with authoritarian conservatives with fascists involves an enormous deal of historical ignorance. Likewise, lumping together Democrats (who would be considered on the right if you plunked them down in most western countries) and revolutionary communists ignores that there’s a lot separating them.
“left-winger” okay, if you like. I thought leftist, in addition to being more succinct and a near synonym, was more value neutral–probably because it’s used in formulations like “crazy wingnut” and so on. I’ll stand corrected, although miss the virtue of brevity.
Sure, and for a lot of contexts it would be absurd, and for some few others reasonable.
Help me out here. I’m literally not seeing a difference between “left-winger” and “leftist”, or the basis for being upset that one term is being used in place of the other. What roughly defines the set of people who are “left-wingers” but are not “leftists”?
Neither is a rigorously-defined term, but I think that if you say “left-wingers” you’re likely to be talking both about liberals and about the people I think of as “leftists”, who often use “liberal” as a perjorative.
To pick some well-known rationalist examples, I would tend to refer to unitofcairing and Scott Aaronson as left-wing, but not as leftists.
@Randy M
It’s a near-synonym by some colloquial definitions, but by other definitions, often a bit less colloquial, it’s a different thing. All liberals are left-wingers, all leftists are left-wingers, but not all left-wingers are either, and liberals are not leftists. The use of “leftist” to generally mean left-wingers seems kind of an American English thing, maybe?
@John Schilling
The majority of American left-wingers are liberals, with some people you could count as social democrats in most first-world countries. Liberals never minded capital that much, and social democrats have made their peace with it. Leftists tend to dislike capital and want to really change the way that production of resources works. The liberal would, these days, tax the owner of the farm and use the money to pay for a social safety net, etc. The social democrat of today would go further and tax more, to have public funding of more comprehensive cradle-to-grave social programs, etc. Depending on which kind of leftist you’re dealing with, they’d have different answers, but most of their answers end with the landowner no longer owning the land, at least not fully.
Some count social democrats as leftists, and they often started off as leftists, but got considerably more moderate as they actually gained power. People who identify as leftists usually have a grudge against the social democrats for not supporting various revolutionary attempts.
Well, what’s going on is that Marxism empirically failed. Leftists became anti-anti-Communists rather than Communists and pinkos. Foucault is the pivotal figure here. In 1979, the left acted as cheerleaders for the Soviet war against Islam in Afghanistan. After 1979, they slowly came to agree with him in being pro-Islam and in favor of skimming the productivity of markets rather than command economies.
If you say “McCarthy” with a smile to a member of the Blue (Wo)Man Group, you expect to be attacked, but it would be an error to conclude from that data point that they’re Stalinist.
OK, I may be losing something on translation, but aren’t “Leftist” and “Left-winger” essentially the same thing? They are both terms we would use to lump together people from USA Democrats to Communists, even though there is a distance between them (because there are also some characteristics that differentiate them from the Right, which is also a lumping up of people with different views).
Rightist is a clumsy word that may be a bit ambiguous (“right-winger” or “defender of Rights”?), but I see nothing of sort in Leftist. Does it have some pejorative sense in the US that Left-winger does not?
@moscanarius
It’s not pejorative, but it creates confusion when used to describe everyone from US Democrats to actual communists, to say the least. It also makes equivocation impossible to avoid. Talking about what “the leftists” want makes it seem like the Democrats and actual communists are some kind of good-cop bad-cop scenario, which is pretty inaccurate.
We should totally try this!
If it makes you feel better, neither does google:
Or maybe dndrsn is saying left-wingers don’t have left-wing political views, but merely align with those who do for political reasons? Which is quite confusing.
The definition you get through Google is the colloquial American definition. But someone who calls themself a “leftist” is signalling more than “left-winger.”
@John Schilling
This, mostly. Equating contingent support with ideological commitment isn’t that far from sneaking in a presumption that a group is definitionally irrational.
The difference between US Democrats and actual communists is primarily not a difference in type, but rather a difference in degree.
If someone hands me a cup of coffee, I might describe it as “hot.” If someone asked me to characterize the temperature on the surface of the sun, I might also describe it as “hot.” This does not make “hot” a useless concept. The coffee is hot compared to other liquids you typically drink, the sun is hot compared to the atmosphere of celestial bodies you are used to standing on.
Conversely, Barack Obama is leftist compared to the typical US Presidential nominee, while Fidel Castro is leftist compared to the typical violent revolutionary.
I don’t necessarily see a problem here.
Is Fidel to the left of typical violent revolutionary?
@Matt M
Is the difference between Pinochet and the average Republican a difference of degree, not kind?
I get the difference between “liberal” and “leftist”, at least in a fuzzy-bordered sense. But it is my experience that colloquial American usage of “left-wing” matches much closer with “leftist” than with “liberal”.
Maybe? I don’t really know much about Pinochet. I’d suspect probably this is mainly accurate, so long as we exclude explicitly libertarian-leaning Republicans.
Based on what I do know, I’d be fine lumping George W Bush and Pinochet into the same general category that way, sure. But not Ron Paul.
I think you are falling victim to outgroup homogeneity bias. It’s not a difference in degree between “tax the factory owner more, and pay out more welfare” and “take the factory away from the owner and run it as a collective or through the state or something.”
The factory owner might piss and moan about higher taxes and more government regulation, and might consider that tantamount to the means of production getting seized, but really, it’s not. The swing of modern liberalism and social democracy leads to annoyed factory owners who maybe make less money; communism leads to factory owners dead or in exile.
Isn’t it though?
Is the difference between a 99% tax and a 100% tax all that significant?
At what level of taxation do we suddenly flip from degree to type?
Because “100% tax and then it’s parcelled back to you in various ways” is still different from “you better hope you can flee before you are seized by the secret police; maybe you can fit some diamonds and US dollars in your underpants, but you sure ain’t gettin’ that factory back.”Communism has thus far only come to power through revolutions or foreign imposition, and so hasn’t really done much boiling the frog. “Kill the landlords and collectivize the farms” are fairly early steps.
You can take someone’s factory from them without killing them – and the method for doing so is the same method as for taking 99% of the income their factory produces without killing them. To me, the question of “whether it’s appropriate to kill them or not” is a separate question – of degree. It’s not a question of what the end-state should be (the state gets the factory) but rather of how far one is willing to go to achieve the end-state.
In the case of farming, you may very well be right. But history is full of plenty of nationalizations of entire industries, as well as specific assets, that proceeded without large-scale violence. They managed to get Suzette Kelo’s house without killing her, didn’t they? If she would have had some guns and told them to fuck-off, would they have given up? Let’s go ask one of the Branch Dividians – oh wait! Did that take place under a full communist regime? Or under a Clinton?
Look, if you think that the path that liberalism in the US or social democracy elsewhere has taken, is just a slow way of taking the factory, I don’t know what to tell you. Social democracy gets you to Scandinavia or Britain back when Labour was actually social democratic or whatever.
Kelo was not the means of production being sized by the vanguard of the revolution or whatever. It’s eminent domain used to take something from one private entity, and give to another, ostensibly for economy development. I’m not sure what the Branch Davidians have to do with revolution or nationalization of resources. They were a cult that was accused of child abuse and illegal weapon modification; the response by the government was bungled in several ways and it led to a bunch of people getting killed by the government.
@johansenindustries:
Fidel Castro wasn’t actually very leftist before the influence of Che Guevara – more like center-left. If he didn’t meet and associate with Che Guevara, he would have been probably a “normal” Latin-American dictator, maybe like Peron in Argentina. There is on Youtube an interview from his first days in power, when Fidel Castro says – in English! – that he doesn’t want communism and that there will be free elections.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5xRho3TauQ
Che Guevara, who had a great charisma and acquired a great influence on him, pushed him gradually to the left, until Fidel Castro understood that the power of a communist dictator is substantially greater that of a “normal” dictator – and from then on, he became a convinced communist.
@dndnrsn
I just don’t see how this confusion would be dropped by saying “left-winger”. Sounds just the same to me.
I’m not so sure of that, but even if you are right… who are communists more likely to support, the Democrats or the Republicans? Which part is more willing to concede to (some) of their demands?
@moscanarius
“Left-winger” means everyone on the left, “leftist” is best used to describe people who have a particular view of who should control the means of production, generally. (It gets a bit complicated when you add anarchists.)
Historically, the conservatives cooperated more with fascists, where fascists actually got power (as opposed to where authoritarian conservatives coopted or suppressed them, or where they never got a whiff of power in the first place), than the liberals and social democrats did with the communists. Communists are often rather bad at getting power through the system – they won’t bargain with more moderate left-wingers, or those won’t bargain with them, or either.
Where communists do get power, it’s usually through revolution, in which case it’s not going to be about who concedes with what demands: both communism and fascism only get a serious chance at getting power when things are already not in good shape. But communism is either total or near-total collapse and the communists seizing power, historically, or in some cases foreign invasion (or “liberation” in the case of Eastern Europe in WWII, etc). In the two cases where unarguable fascists have taken power, it was more conservatives thinking they could control a fascist coalition partner to keep the communists out.
I think part of the problem in this discussion is not distinguishing between different ways in which people can be similar. If the distinguishing characteristic of Pinochet is that he seized power in a military coup and then killed a significant number of his opponents, then he is no closer to Republicans than to Democrats but is closer to communists than to either.
If his distinguishing characteristic is that he implemented economic policies that were considerably more pro-market than those of the government he replaced, then he is more like Republicans than Democrats.
Similarly, if the distinguishing characteristic of communists is that they seize power by force and murder lots of people, then they are similar to neither Republicans nor Democrats. If it is that they want economic decisions made by the state, on the other hand, then they are like Democrats but go much farther in the same direction.
So far as “leftist” being a pejorative term, I think it’s the other way around. The people who most care about the distinction between leftist, left-winger, and liberal are the leftists.
It’s not that it’s pejorative, it’s that using it flattens out reality. It leads some people to a state of mind where “the leftists” have this grand plan and they’re all part of a coalition. It echoes the sentiment some people on the left have, where the conservatives are just the friendly face of fascism. It isn’t more correct when one side thinks this rather than the other.
@Randy M
I’m going to cheekily assume I can take a slim majority as constituting usually, and suggest “Republicans”. I’ll echo dndnrsn here in saying “left-winger” works better, because it casts the Left/Right divide as the conflict between political alliances it actually is, rather than a fundamental disagreement over ideology or even policy.
That’s what I think “leftist” means, I just don’t find many reasons to use it. What can you say about a group that includes Hillary Clinton and Chairman Mao and Jesus Christ and a couple billion other people that isn’t either wrong or tautological? It’s just not a very useful label to use in a fair, constructive, mutually respectful debate.
In an unfair, unproductive, and mean-spirited debate on the other hand, vague group nouns are great! You can find something nasty about a subset of leftists and ascribe it to “leftists”. You can construct a motte-and-bailey, varying your definition of “leftist” as needed. You can make subtle jabs at the outgroup to recenter your ingroup’s opinion of them.
Or, possibly worst of all, you can just say something that’s true for some definitions of leftist and false for others (“Leftists want to censor the internet!”) and then abandon the forum, never to return, leaving a pointless and unproductive semantic argument in your wake over what “leftist” really means. And in my opinion, arguing semantics over the internet is The Worst Thing In The World, so, I think of the value of narrow and precise labels and clear language as being self-evident, and I imagined that the sort of people who’ve read “weak men as superweapons” and “how an algorithm feels from the inside” and “i can tolerate anything except the outgroup” would already be with me on that. In fact, I’m super surprised that there’s not a norm around using “blue tribe” to mean “everyone generally on the left” since it was invented for that purpose, as opposed to “leftist” which could mean one thing to an academic and another to a US blogger and another to a Persian retiree and so forth.
If these people form a loosely bound confederation willing to put their internal disputes on hold to fight that other loosely bound confederation known as The Right, the terms can be useful even if not super-precise.
(that is, after we finish debating the boundary between them)
I don’t think what terminology we use matters so much; the problem is our habit of getting into stupid arguments along the lines of “Who is a bigger danger to free speech, leftists or rightists?” Substituting some other broad term for “leftist” in the previous sentence is not going to help much.
Yes.
@moscanarius
Have they?
‘What can you say about a group that includes Hillary Clinton and Chairman Mao and Jesus Christ and a couple billion other people that isn’t either wrong or tautological’
Nothing very much hence the desire of a word like ‘left-winger’ or ‘leftist’ so we discuss the group that includes Hillary Clinton, Chairman Mao and a couple of billion other people.
As mentioned before no category is perfect, but it seems to me that although the hard left and liberals differ on some issues (I can only think of ‘ought liberals be shot’ at the moment, but I expect there are others) for most issues* if you were tell me a handful of his positions people would be able to say if the person was a ‘liberal or hard left’ but not which.
* Is there much of an attitude on the hard left of actually being against liberal-supported policies like higher minimum wage? My prejudice is that even if one did say ‘that’s not enough we need to overthrow the system’ that come a public referendum, they’d shuffle in and put a check next to ‘yes’.
@dndnrsn
Jesus? Certainly not 😉
Are people who support Hillary more likely to support those who support the set of (Mao, Bernie, Fidel, Chavez, Morales) than the set of (Pinochet, Stroesser, Salazar, Franco)? Yes.
I (think I) get what you mean: Left and Right are both not homogenous, and there is more variation within the groups than between them. Which is true, but does not make the grouping useless. Within the group, as diverse as they may be, they still display more solidarity towards the radicals labelled as “Left” than to those labelled as “Right”.
The labels are not perfect, and if one keeps only them in mind (without also thinking about more-or-less orthogonal authoritarianism, degree of respect for law, compassion, etc) they can be misleading. But that can be said of many other labels commonly used in these discussions, which nobody would try to throw away. We talk about countries as “the West” and “MENA”, even though the groupings are imperfect and debatable and the countries are diverse, for example.
But that can be accomplished with “left-winger” and “right-winger”; broadly, everyone on the left shares some sort of levelling instinct. I would prefer to live in a society where Joe Average has a decent standard of living and I think it’s fine to tax and spend if it accomplishes that. I also worry about the impact of some people being insanely rich. But I don’t have a problem with some guy owning the factory and him being rich, as long as the factory is regulated, the workers have it decent, people aren’t starving on the streets, the factory owner isn’t completely cut off from the rest of society by his vast wealth, whatever.
Can you give a simple descriptions of different sorts of leftists, beyond more and less extreme? To me, liberals (modern American sense) come across as slightly watered down social democrats. What are the categories on the left that can’t be fitted into that sort of pattern?
In the case of the right, one obvious division is libertarian vs traditionalist. Some libertarians are more extreme than others—anarcho-capitalists vs minarchists vs limited state classical liberals—but all of those differ from traditionalists in the same way, just with varying degrees. On some issues, such as drug laws or immigration or the draft, libertarians are more like people on the left than like other people on the right.
What do you see as well defined divisions of that sort on the left? Freedom of speech liberals, the traditional ACLU position, vs Antifa leftists?
You could draw the line at whether their attitude towards rich people owning factories is degrees of “tax the factory” or degrees of “take the factory away from them” to be really crude.
The traditional ACLU position is exactly the sort of thing that leftists and non-leftists tend to disagree over. The leftist cluster tends to view laws that, as written, protect everyone equally, serve to protect the bad guys and the interests of the powers that be. Liberals, social democrats, etc tend to view those laws as important to uphold and that if there’s a problem it can be solved with being more fair in interpreting the law equally for everyone. If some group has to be treated better, it should be dealt with by little patches.
Leftists are far more likely to want to have radical change where the existing order is really smashed up. Liberals and modern social democrats tend to be reformist.
Something I think is common is leftist rhetoric with social democrat or liberal substance. American free speech discourse is a lot more absolutist due to the text – American free speech advocates would be foolish to give ground on the 1st. Canada has much less robust free speech laws, we have hate speech laws, but consider that a certain controversial Canadian prof who will remain nameless is fine with prohibited speech in the sense of Canadian hate speech laws, last I checked.
Having watched some recent interviews of his, he opposes hate speech laws, but less vociferously than laws that he feels compel speech. In particular, though he acknowledges downsides of hate speech, he notes that state regulation of hate speech also has downsides and considers them worse.
He’s also suing people for associating him with evil people, even though he associates his outgroup with evil people.
I get that no one likes being associated with evil people, but I lost a lot of the free-speech cred I had for him for that.
Edward Scissorhands:
I think most (but not all) free-speech advocates still support libel laws, and I don’t think that’s inherently contradictory. (Though there’s a point at which libel/slander laws become a means for wealthy people to censor some kinds of speech, that’s an issue that someone like Ken of Popehat thinks a lot about, and also that judges and legal scholars in the US have thought a lot about.)
It’s also possible Peterson’s changed his views on prohibited speech. We’ve been back and forth here several times trying to figure out his views on using trans folk’s pronouns—for all that he claims to be very precise about what he says, it’s hard sometimes to fit it all together.
@Nick
In this clip his position seems pretty clear. He opposes laws that compel speech. When it comes to addressing trans by their preferred pronouns:
Bari Weiss: You are often characterized, at least in the mainstream press, as being transphobic. If you had a student come to you and said and they said to you I was born female I now identify as male I want to go I want you to call me by male pronouns would you say yes for that?
Jordan Peterson: Well it would depend on the student and the context and why I thought they were asking me and what I believe their demand actually characterized in all of that. Because that can be done in a way that’s genuine and acceptable in a way that’s manipulative and unacceptable. And if it was genuine and acceptable then I’d have no problem with it and if it was manipulative and unacceptable then not a chance.
So and you might think well who am I to judge? Well first of all I am a clinical psychologist and I’ve talked to people for about 25,000 hours and so and I’m responsible for judging how I’m going to use my words. I judge it the same way that I judge all the interactions that I have with people which is to the best of my ability and characterized by all the errors that I’m prone to. So you know I’m not saying that my judgment would be unerring but I have to live with the consequences. So I’m willing to accept the responsibility.
They compared him to Adolf Hitler. That sucks, and it’s stupid, but free speech means I get to call you Hitler and you get to call me Hitler.
It’s Canada, where hurting someone’s feelings is illegal[1], so he has a good chance of winning. But it’s bullshit from a free-speech perspective.
If you gave me this quote and told me it was from a SJW, with just a few noun substitutions, I would totally say that it’s in violation of free speech.
or his lawyer
[1] I exaggerate a bit.
@IrishDude:
But see also the follow-up discussion Peterson has with John McWhorter about how you can tell whether a demand is genuine, as transcribed near the bottom of this article from Conor Friedersdorf. Friedersdorf’s summary:
@Iain
Well, I basically agree with this youtube comment from a video of the interview (never thought I’d say that!):
“Firstly, Peterson did answer eventually – the devil’s in the details. There aren’t any given psychological ‘tools’ because the variance from person to person is practically infinite. How do you apply a general tool in situational contexts? There’s a concept in psychotherapy termed by Irvin D. Yalom – “Create a new therapy for each patient”. Whilst this is not necessarily the case, the point is that each person has their own unique set of problems, personality, experiences and so on. So when you try one intervention which works on one person, it might fail on the next or work to a lesser degree because of the variance from person to person.
As a result, any psychological ‘tool’ to help identify genuine pronoun users from attention-seeking SJW quite simply isn’t demonstratably accurate to any real degree. You notice multiple signals simultaneously – body language, tone of voice, facial expression and so on – but there isn’t really a universal application that is accurate to everyone. You interpret them subjectively and reach a conclusion of your own.
Psychological ‘tools’ in the sense that the linguist is asking for is susceptible to the risk of over-generalizing. Peterson is fine accepting the responsibility for his judgement, but he doesn’t really want to give people things from the discipline that are very easily misapplied (even by professionals). It’s extremely easy to misuse so honestly speaking, I definitely understand why Peterson would also be hesitant to talk about specific ‘tools’ had they even existed. People are very ignorant to how clinical psychology works, so it’s very understandable that people think that there are specific ‘tools’ and ‘techniques’ like a surgeon uses, but actually therapists often try to avoid confining their clients within a box which has an ‘appropriate treatment’ which will sometimes limit the therapeutic process.
Finally, there’s also the fact that this fine-honed sense of other people comes from years and years of clinical experience AND THERE’S NO SUBSTITUTE FOR IT. Honestly. The theories you study are worthless when you’re actually confronted with the patient and suddenly everything you’ve learnt from a textbook goes out the window. Yes, you can learn theories and case examples, etc, but, as I said, people are infinitely variable. What applies in one case may not apply to another even if they are similar. Thus, there is no replacement short of actually conducting a clinical practice yourself. And even seasoned therapists with decades of experience will commit even basic errors.”
Note also that Peterson says in the video that so far, he has never denied a request to use a trans person’s preferred pronoun. He just wants to reserve the right to do so in the future, if his judgment suspects manipulative behavior.
IrishDude, my point was that it’s not easy to fit everything he’s said together. Of course one comment at one time is going to say one thing, but how do you put that up against what he’s said elsewhere?
Douglas Knight and I went back and forth on this a few months ago, and we weren’t entirely sure by the end. Douglas can weigh in if he’s more certain now; I think he has once before, but I can’t find it.
To my mind, the key phrase in Friedersdorf summary is “…nor articulated any reason to conclude that being manipulated into pronoun usage by a student falsely claiming to be trans is a likely or harmful event.” In that light, Peterson’s big claims about his ability to handle a situation in which he’s admittedly never found himself aren’t a point in his favour.
McWhorter’s being very Socratic here, and letting the audience work out the conclusions. Unpacking his argument more explicitly: Peterson claims that some people make pronoun requests in a “genuine and acceptable” way, and some people make pronoun requests in a “manipulative and unacceptable” way. McWhorter agrees that this is, in his experience, probably true — but that he consistently errs on the side of assuming people are asking in good faith, because he can’t be certain and the harms of getting it wrong are higher on one side.
How, he asks, do you reach a level of confidence where you are so certain that your interlocutor is full of shit that the potential emotional costs of misgendering them are outweighed by the costs you pay by saying “they”? What are Peterson’s tricks? Can other people attain the same level of confidence? Peterson is not just arguing for his own conscience — he’s arguing about what the law should be. If these situations are so rare that even Pterson, a brilliant clinical psychologist, has never seen a situation that would justify refusing to use somebody’s pronouns, and he can’t give any advice on how we mere mortals should assess that situation, then maybe the risk that somebody somewhere gets away with being called “them” does not justify Peterson’s Martin Luther act.
Peterson tries to circumvent the questions about his expertise by saying that he’s not guaranteeing that he’s right:
This is, in one sense, quite admirable. At the same time, though, proclaiming your willingness to suffer the consequences of your error is more impressive when you aren’t campaigning against the system that would impose said consequences. What consequences is he actually willing to suffer?
@Nick
If you provide a specific quote of his that seems to contradict what I provided we can discuss, but the quote I provide is consistent with the view I’ve seen him espouse on other occasions: he’s opposed to compelled speech but open to pronoun requests on a case-by-case basis, using his judgment of which requests he considers good faith or not.
Did you click the link to the old thread? It’s a few posts down before I quote him, but I do:
This sounds like a hard no. If this were the only quote from Peterson you’d heard, I think you could reasonably conclude he wouldn’t use them at all, which is in complete contradiction to what you’ve quoted. Now, we speculated after that that by “alternate pronoun” he just means neologisms like “ze/zir” and not “pronoun alternative to what the person looks like,” but that’s surely not obvious from the context.
Another one from that post:
If this were all you’d heard from Peterson, you might reasonably conclude he has a big problem with made-up pronouns, and you wouldn’t have any idea how he feels about other requests. Again, maybe this can be made consonant with the rest of what he’s said, but 1) he’s obviously not just saying the same thing every time, and 2) you do have to sit down with all the quotes and work out what his view really is. And that’s not even getting into the possibility his views have evolved over time, if you find it impossible to reconcile it all.
Semi-devils advocate; isn’t JP comparing folks to Soviets and folks comparing him to a neo-nazi substantively different libel-wise, because a ton of people literally believe it when people say he is one?
I’m not a particular fan of Peterson (but I haven’t read/listened to/watched much by him, so maybe I’m missing the boat), but I thought the specific issue that raised this discussion was a law that Peterson believed would require him, by law, to use someone else’s desired pronouns. And I can absolutely understand a willingness to do something as a courtesy combined with an unwillingness to have that same courtesy imposed by force of law.
@Iain
From my recollection, Friersdorf’s quote ““…nor articulated any reason to conclude that being manipulated into pronoun usage by a student falsely claiming to be trans is a likely or harmful event.” didn’t reflect a question from McWhorter (I think it was Weiss’ question amidst the questions coming from McWhorter?), as McWhorter’s question seemed to me to more directly probe Peterson’s claim that his extensive clinical psychology experience informed his judgment of when a request might be good-faith or manipulative, and whether Peterson could share his ‘tools’ so everyone else could have that informed judgment. To which Peterson’s response that the devil’s in the details seemed reasonable to me. I’d be interested in a long form conversation between the two where they could more deeply discuss this and other issues.
Pretty much every situation someone finds themselves in is one they haven’t encountered before, as context always changes slightly. Instead, people use similar prior experiences to inform their judgment, and in Peterson’s case this would be his thousands of hours of clinical psychology experience that inform his judgment of whether someone is being genuine or manipulative. Just because that experience of detecting manipulation might not have occurred in a context of a trans person asking for a preferred pronoun yet, doesn’t mean his prior experience won’t be useful at some point in the future. The point for Peterson is that he wants to retain his right to use his own judgment rather than have the state impose on him to compel particular speech.
The use of nuclear weapons is extremely rare but their existence changes the calculus of actions around the world. A decision to disarm yourself, because you’re unlikely to use nuclear weapons, will have an impact and not necessarily in a positive way.
A policy to always use a person’s preferred pronoun has the potential for negative consequences, and retaining the right to not use a pronoun, even if this right is rarely used, seems to me a good protection against manipulative behavior.
The State is only one system that doles out consequences, social judgment is another. Peterson is opposed to the first system and seems open to the second, should he err in his judgment.
The risk isn’t “somebody somewhere gets away with being called ‘them'” – I don’t believe Peterson has ever said anything that indicates that he has anything against someone “being called ‘them.'” The risk is somebody somewhere being legally compelled to call someone else “them” when they don’t want to, for any reason whatsoever. It doesn’t matter if literally every time he’s asked to, he concedes to using someone’s preferred pronouns, the point is that he gets to make that choice. And if he suddenly has an aneurysm or some cosmic particle randomly hits his brain and causes him to refuse someone’s preferred pronoun in the future, he should be free to act on that decision and face the social consequences of doing so, without the government stepping in.
He’s not campaigning against the system that would impose said consequences. He’s campaigning against the system that would impose legal consequences, which are distinct from the system that imposes social consequences, which unavoidably emerge in any social interaction involving 2 or more individuals. Of course, it’s understandable how if one sees the world in terms of power differentials between groups rather than in terms of individuals, that one might not be satisfied with the social “consequences” he would face in this situation and thus want legal recourse.
(Aside: I personally don’t think this distinction is as much as people tend to make it out to be; punishing someone socially – including merely avoiding contact with them – for having bad opinions is almost as reprehensible as punishing them legally in my view – but I accept that reasonable people find this distinction very important)
Given his perspective, it seems pretty clear to me that his lawsuit against Rambukkana is very hypocritical, and if there’s anything that his detractors should hammer him on, it’s this lawsuit. Not that being a hypocrite weakens his prior arguments about compelled speech, but it certainly discredits him as a principled defender of free speech going forward. I mean, I guess I’m open to an argument for how what Rambukkana said is libel, but the idea that comparing someone to Hitler (an opinion) in what he thought was a private conversation (not meant to defame) could come anywhere close to libel seems so absurd that I wouldn’t know where to start in making such an argument. Which I guess makes me really curious as to what his lawyer will come up with. Also, I’m not familiar with Canadian law.
@Nick
I don’t see an issue if from one quote you only know how he feels about one issue, and not another related issue. And I don’t see anything from the two quotes you linked that contradict the quote of Peterson’s I posted.
From your quotes, he seems opposed to alternate pronouns and neologisms, and as I further watched the link you posted he talked about ‘otherkins‘ and how some people wanted to be referred to as “worm-self”. He probably has a strong presumption that requests to use these particular pronouns aren’t in good faith, as opposed to a trans woman asking to be called “her/she” which is more likely in good-faith.
He also seems to be more highly sensitive to other pronouns like zie/zir that he seems to think are linked to radical political activism and power plays.
Right, he seems to address some aspects of the issues in some interviews and other aspects in others, so depending on what issue he’s addressing he’ll have different things to say.
As you do with anybody. Give someone a sentence and you’ll know a tiny bit about their views. Give them a paragraph and you’ll know more. Give them wide-ranging long form interviews across time and you’ll really start to understand the nuance of their views.
This is why I like Joe Rogan’s long-form podcasts that go 3 hours and don’t like news interviews that last 5 minutes. You miss tons of nuance and context without asking lots of probing follow-up questions and giving people time to elaborate their answers.
This is certainly possible! Since I’ve followed him his position has seemed consistent to me, but it’s possible I missed some growth in his views or it’s possible he had different views before I started following him.
@lvlln
Agree, particularly your point about the absurdity of private conversation bring considered libelous. I’m always interested in hearing more details, but on the face of it the libel suit seems poor form.
IrishDude,
First, thanks for engaging with me on this. If I sound annoyed with you here, sorry and I’m really not. I’m more annoyed with myself for bringing this up again and starting this argument all over again. And sorry again, but post is in the same semi-exasperated tone, because I’ve written all this now and I’m not rewriting….
Okay, but the line between using regular pronouns vs “made up” pronoun is one drawn by Peterson, not by us. Sure, we might agree with him when we hear where and why he’s drawing this line, but it’s not as though if we hear him say he’d honor a request he thought was genuine we would conclude “Ah, of course, Peterson is here only talking about ordinary pronouns like he and she and not singular they or ze/zir.” So I don’t think we can just say one statement was about one issue and the other was about a related issue. They are, viewed from an uninformed lens, just the same issue.
Let’s look at another case, which was also brought up in that thread: the channel 4 interview with Cathy Newman. There the exchange goes:
Now again, since you’ve heard a lot from Peterson on this, you can hear this and say, “Ah, Cathy’s example used ‘she.’ See, Peterson was just being precise, and if you drew a conclusion to pronouns like ze/zir you’ve misinterpreted him.” Well, how the hell am I supposed to know I’m misinterpreting him? I didn’t know I was supposed to distinguish the two. How could I know, when he doesn’t even bring it up there? Was all that stuff at the end there about “ceding the linguistic territory” about the neologisms, or is it just about the acceptability of demanding she instead of he?
I agree that if Peterson had just fifteen seconds or something to speak it wouldn’t be fair to assume that was the entirety of his views, and longer interviews are definitely better. But you started by posting a 75 minute interview and Q&A, and then a clip from a 90 minute conversation at the Aspen Institute, and meanwhile in that old thread I linked to a TV discussion that was only a few minutes long, but also an interview that was 30 minutes long. So on the one hand, okay, maybe my first TV discussion link wasn’t an appropriate place to expect to get the totality of Peterson’s views. But surely in that 30 minute channel 4 interview Peterson’s got the time to be more clear about his views, maybe say something like “Now saying I would call her ‘she’ doesn’t mean I would call her ‘ze’ or ‘xe,’ I won’t use made-up pronouns” instead of (presumably) only gesturing in that direction with stuff about ceding the linguistic territory to radical leftists, or even just mention his distinction between genuine and manipulative requests, which also don’t come up there. Or in either of those more than hour long interviews he can clarify that he’s not going to use made-up pronouns.
Peterson’s frustrating habit, if I were to diagnose it, is assuming that precision in one context is all he is required to do to be understood. It’s emphatically not. Even for well intentioned, sympathetic people like us who know how to read and to apply the principle of charity, it’s remarkably easy to misunderstand him, as the thread I linked earlier should demonstrate: Aapje, Douglas, and I all have different readings. The obvious solution to this sort of problem, as used by everyone else in the world, is to preempt and rebut common misunderstandings. Peterson never seems to do this.
@Nick
Our discussion seems civil to me so no worries. 🙂
It seems to me that Peterson finds certain aspects of the trans pronoun issue most salient (compelled speech, power plays by radical activists) and, in shorter form interviews focuses sharply on those aspects. In longer form interviews with probing questions from the audience, he discusses his nuanced view on other aspects (e.g., how do you decide when to use the preferred pronoun?).
I can understand why someone with an uninformed opinion might not understand context (like what a neologism is) when trying to interpret Peterson’s views, or why an informed person might not understand all aspects of his view from his responses in one particular interview, but that just doesn’t seem like a big deal to me. While I might appreciate Peterson writing an essay on the topic that discusses all the nuances of his views, or providing comprehensive responses within an interview, I don’t think he has any obligation to do so. And no matter what he says or writes, there’s likely to be someone out there that doesn’t feel he addressed some aspect that seems important to them.
I think a reasonable person interested in good faith understanding of his views can look at a few interviews and get a pretty good idea of where he generally stands on trans pronouns, though of course on a complex topic there’s always room for misunderstanding and it’s possible that my interpretation of him is incorrect.
On any topic whatsoever as far as I’m concerned.
@Brad
Sorry, we’re back to oral tradition as normative.
@Nick
I think that Peterson has the issue that he likes to reason out things afresh, making him somewhat inconsistent.
@Brad
Perhaps an article on the mating rituals of the north american wasp.
@Brad
He’s written two books, which are extended essays on topics that he finds important.
Here’s a shorter essay called “Peacemaking among higher-order primates” I found by googling. I haven’t read it so can’t attest to its quality, but it satisfies your request for him to write an essay on “any topic whatsoever”.
I’ve got a tab open of a journal article of his entitled “Neuropsychology of Motivation for Group Aggression and Mythology” that I have yet to read, but you might find also satisfies your request.
@dndnrsn
Peterson has interesting thoughts on podcasts/youtube/etc., considering them doing for the spoken word what Gutenberg’s press did for the written word. He finds this new medium particularly appealing because, unlike the written word, people can do other things while absorbing information transmitted orally. You can commute, do dishes, and cut grass while listening to a podcast, allowing the every day person an opportunity to learn new things without having to give up any of their other normal activities; it’s a powerful new technology for transmitting ideas that he’s keen to exploit.
I suppose technically correct is still the best kind of correct.
That aside I strenuously disagree about the value of podcasts, and even worse, talking head youtube videos. Beyond aesthetics and efficiency, as discussed a couple of open threads ago, I find the insistence on mediums where charisma is an important factor to be suspicious.
@Brad
If you’re interested in his written thoughts on topics, you’ve got hundreds of pages of material out there in two books, many scientific journal articles that evaluate evidence on psychological phenomena and articulate his conclusions, and at least one essay tackling his pet subject on how groups with differing values can coexist peacefully. Yet you still seem dissatisfied, which, I guess is okay but doesn’t make complete sense to me.
If you want more writings from him, here’s his blog which has short writings from him and transcripts of his audio interviews.
There’s all kinds of podcasts and youtube videos out there, from cat videos and RPG podcasts to complete college video lecture series on youtube and historical analysis podcasts. For those interested in using the audio format to educate themselves when they’d otherwise be zoning out on hour commutes, the existence of interesting and informative audio on just about any subject is a modern wonder.
This critique seems misplaced, as it seems to imply that charisma isn’t an important factor in writing. The visual medium, from pictures to text, is full of opportunity to use emotional persuasion. Anyways, there’s no ‘insistence’ on oral mediums, just a note that modern technology has made it an additional avenue to absorb information that has a unique positive characteristic (you can listen and learn while washing dishes).
The standard for left here is something like “how closely it resembles the opinion of the privileged Yale student Hillary voting purple hair SWPL SJW” and you get more “moderate” the more you disagree with that sort of person. Including an argument from Marx or Lenin etc. is generally less provocative than unironically agreeing with Lena Dunham or talking about privilege theory
I don’t remember much Leninism here, but I bet people are more willing to listen to Marx than SJWs because he was so analytical.
Bit of a tangent, but I have the suspicion that said stereotype would be less common at more prestigious universities. That goes for the critical-theory-professor archetype, too. I’d love to see some data one way or the other.
I have no solid data, but an interesting exercise when encountering one of the more extreme critical-theory professors is to look them up on Rate My Professor. I’ve found that their ratings are generally quite poor (and reading the comment entertaining).
– Suzanna Walters (of the WaPo piece on hating men). Multiple raters make statements like: “Do you want a good grade in her class? Then, agreeing with her is mandatory.”
– George Ciccariello-Maher (of the “All I Want for Christmas is White Genocide” tweet). Multiple raters call him disrespectful and rude.
So (extreme) critical-theory ideology may result in and/or attract the kind of people who are poor at teaching. The more prestigious universities may not be willing to tolerate this.
PS. It’s interesting to contrast these ratings with SJ-critical firebrands, like Jordan Peterson and Bret Weinstein.
Or with Jonathan Haidt, the founder of “Heterodox Academy” (that tries to protect freedom of thought in universities).
Suzanna Walters – 1.7 (most ratings Awful, 1 Poor and 1 Awesome)
George Ciccariello-Maher – 1.0 (all ratings Awful)
Jonathan Haidt – 4.5 (most ratings Awesome or Good, although a few raters say he is too “arrogant” or “cocky”)
ermh *headdesk*?!!
(1) Your sample size sucks
(2) Your measurement sucks (both in terms of distortions through fame/attention, i.e. you’d have to use pre-prominence data and in terms of these rate-your-X site generally having poor reliability and known biases and thrid in the raters not being the same people)
(3) Your theory sucks (at best something like critical theory ~> classroom behaviour ~> ratings, with maybe a sideorder of ‘personality type’ somewhere in there. Massively underspecified, not paying rent in experience at all)
(4) You have a forking paths problem. At the very least in that an opposite finding could have gone unreported (Not accusing you of dishonesty at all. But this is the sort of cutesy finding which people in general report and repeat when it comes out in line with their biases and conversely are likely to dismiss as semi-serious, flawed attempt not work reporting/repeating, when it doesn’t allign with their biases) and that theory is sufficiently weak that an opposite finding could have been explained as (i) caused by pre-selection of students, (ii) preaching to the choir (iii) data for Peterson and Weinstein corrupted by SJW etc. Also, subject removals/inclusions on non-pre-registered grounds.
In short, yes, this is totally uninformative and a waste of everyone’s time. If the above is not convincing, consider what it would take to fix the flaws in data collection and measurement, imagine spending 2-6 weeks on the project and whether, given an unchanged theory you’d then consider the result worth anything.
@brmic
1. It’s a hypothesis, not a theory
2. I added quite a bit of caveats and assume that most people here are wise enough to not believe that my hypothesis has strong evidence for it
3. It was mostly intended as a bit of levity
PS. FYI, I didn’t cherry pick. The four people that I presented are the first 4 that I came up with and the only ones that I looked up.
PS2. It is possible that Peterson and Weinstein have non-student fans that leave ratings despite not taking their classes.
If one is assessing a professor who has become heavily involved in the Culture Wars, one should probably make the cutoff for prof-rating sites before they became involved – so, for example, cutting out Peterson reviews from after he got in the news (in which case, what you’ll see is a lot of undergrads who really liked his intro to psych or whatever course).
You can filter out the noise from fans/haters by only looking at the data before they got famous and then run the numbers again yourself. It’s really annoying, but it’s doable.
Walters, for instance, has four reviews from the last few weeks, all after her Washington Post article, and three reviews from 2013. The three from 2013 are awful, awesome, and poor.
Edit: Dammit, dndnrsn beat me to it.
The 4 most recent ratings of Suzanna Walters are probably not genuine: they appeared this month, after her article about men-hating in Washington Post, and 3 of them are very short. But the other 3 seem genuine – they are from 2013, long before the scandal – and they are more bad than good: 1 Poor, 1 Awesome and 1 Awful. And the ratings of George Ciccariello-Maher seem genuine, they appeared along 2017, long after his “white genocide” tweet from December 2016. and most are quite long and informative.
3 more data points for the most extreme SJW professors:
Jessie Daniels 4.2 (many Awesome)
Jessie Daniels wrote on twitter:
Piper Harron 3.5 (1 Average, 1 Good)
Piper Harron proposed that:
Rochelle Gutierrez 2.8 (very divisive – quite as many Awesome as Awful)
Rochelle Gutierrez wrote that:
Afaik, those professors kept their jobs and didn’t have to confront angry mobs of students, like Bret Weinstein.
I agree with brmic: I doubt we can learn very much about anything from this data. Even restricting it to pre-internet-fame data, I doubt this teaches us much.
Well, most of these SJW people are infamous for writing terrible crap and the right-wing people you mention (actually not sure how right-wing they are really) are famous for being brilliant thinkers, so it hardly seems a fair comparison.
@Cliff
Can you come up with examples of SJ-critical professors who are crappy and who were at the center of controversy?
Due to the current situation in academia, I would expect SJ-critical professors to be far more wary about speaking out, leading to a selection effect.
PS. My comparison was not left- vs right-wing, but pro-SJ vs SJ-critical. I would argue that the latter distinction doesn’t map cleanly on the former, but that the currently dominant left- and right-wing narratives are pro-SJ and SJ-critical, respectively.
PS 2. I don’t rate Camille Paglia that highly as a thinker and she has a 3.5 rating as a professor (what is that? mediocre or decent?)
The research tends to find a negative correlation between student evaluations and teaching effectiveness. So while it’s interesting that the conservatives are more popular with their students (may indicate that some assumptions about what students are like on average are wrong), it probably doesn’t show what a lot of people here seem to be suggesting it would show.
For that matter, in my mind the stereotypical “purple hair SWPL SJW” either voted for Jill Stein or rejects voting altogether as participating in an inherently corrupt, patriarchal system.
I remarked on this yesterday in a different thread, so I feel like it might be worth restating my complaint here: that “Leftist” as it’s often used here is a case of sloppily grouping over a century’s worth of ideology and political alliances under the same label. It’s an even more egregious form of the “Statist” label Scott criticizes in the opening of the Anti-Libertarian FAQ.
I haven’t been participating much in the last few months but on the basis of the prior couple of years, all and anyone left of center-right on social issues is part of the homogenous hated outgroup and any of Scott’s writings on steelmanning or charity or so on are totally disregarded. You can see some of that in some of the terrible responses you query has already generated.
It’s pretty exasperating.
The reason you can’t figure out what the definition of “leftist” is here is because it’s more often than not just being employed as a boo light. The most frequent type of commenter here is “people who really don’t like feminists and other people who are SJWs”. Even the people who are ostensibly left of center are far more left-libertarian than center-left.
Does describing oneself as an “ist” make one feel a part of a group? I suppose that’s useful when you need to vote in a coalition. But why elsewhere?
It’s a uselessly vague grouping most of the time.
I was surprised how strong the reaction against Piketty was since economics is normally less of a nerve here, but a lot of the commenters were not the ones I usually see. I think the signal to noise ratio was worse than usual although some of the signals were pretty good.
In a more typical thread averaging across commenters, there’s a strong net dislike for typical social justice things here but not as much argument about economics. I suspect this is partly because a lot of the people here disagree with SJ but live in communities where it’s a strong ideology. You could think of SSC as partly functioning as argument club but partly functioning as safe space for nerds who are near to but are the outgroup of social justice. Even a significant chunk of “leftists” here have only a sort of half-hearted love for typical social justice.
But bad statistics is definitely a nerve. I don’t know if those accusations are correct or even objectively raised, but it seemed that a lot of the objections were about him doing the math wrong rather than making unwarranted conclusions. That’s very much the kind of thing that will get objections around here.
I did not find the claims of bad statistics that convincing. Even if Piketty made mistakes, they weren’t egregiously bad. They were more inside baseball empirical issues than outright mathematical mispractice.
Except maybe his claim that there are a horde of undetected super-rich heirs. That’s less statistical malpractice than conspiracy theory though.
As with leftists, let’s not inappropriately conflate different types of Piketty critics. IMHO, there were two relevant groups of reactions to Piketty.
1) People who found at least one of the points Scott summarized implausible or unsupported and challenged that point, and:
2) People who were surprised or outraged that anyone is still taking Piketty seriously after some critics found what they asserted were bad-faith inaccuracies in the book.
IMHO, Group 1 was much larger, and is pretty typical for this forum. If you assert a statement of fact, someone is bound to show up and want to discuss whether that fact is accurate.
I think there’s an interesting parallel between this and the “is race a valid scientific concept” discussion above. In both cases, “left/right” are fuzzy categories that lose a huge amount of resolution, and yet are sometimes useful for describing or predicting things.
Agreed.
I think that’s a problem with any group. “Libertarians” or “Alt-righters” or “Communists” or “Taylor Swift fans” are just buckets of people with different opinions. Sometimes, people make the mistake of actually assuming that all the people in one bucket actually hold a coherent opinion, but more often, I think that it’s just loose speech.
Generally, IMHO, if someone says something like “leftists are comfortable chasing people off campus for disagreeing with them”, they really mean “many leftists” or “apparently a lot more leftists than non-leftists,” but I agree more precision would be good.
Don’t a lot of the proposed definitions for “leftist” include the pope?
Sure, he is pro-life, anti gay marriage and does not support divorce (although he does try to reapproach divorced people to the church). But other than that, he does try to support the poor, the immigrants, and he does acknowledge our responsibility to the environment.
It is my understanding that there are several pro-life Democrats, Obama was not too keen on gay marriage in 2008, and most people don’t like divorce, even if they think it should be legal.
I can’t say about pope (ex-pope?) Benedict XVI, because he wasn’t there for long, but John Paul II was definitely leftist if being pro-refugees, poor people and anti-war is being leftist.
As a first approximation, how about defining “leftist” as a person who, if they lived half century ago, would post blogs about Soviet Union being a paradise on Earth, and all rumors about communist death camps being merely American propaganda.
Trying to find a similar example today… I guess something like “white people have never been slaves / only white people owned slaves”, “Islam respects women”, etc. Something not merely wrong, but aggressively the exact opposite of reality; aimed against the western civilization. — Which does not imply that those people do it knowingly; most of them truly believe it, and feel morally superior to muggles because of that belief.
It is not 100% correct, but I suspect that as a first approximation it fits better than what most people would propose as a definition.
Probably the biggest difficulty here is that it’s a completely counterfactual criterion. I would like to believe that I wouldn’t have believed Communist propaganda, but how do I know? This also seems insanely restrictive: a Trotskyist in 1968 could have believed every bad thing about the USSR, and so by your criterion would not be a leftist.
how about a person who, 5 years ago, praised Hugo Chavez’ economic agenda? That seems to require a lot fewer hypotheticals.
That doesn’t work for two reasons. First, only a small minority would have seen the Soviet Union as a paradise on Earth, although a sizable number would have seen it as something more attractive than it was—an imperfect attempt at building a better society. Second, a large number, although perhaps a minority, of left of center people then were critical of the communist societies, Orwell being a notable example a little earlier.
@Viliam
Historical quibble: gulags were concentration camps, not death camps. People were worked until they died of starvation/disease/the elements, but there was a continuous prisoner population. Death camps didn’t have this – the only prisoners kept alive were the ones forced to do stuff like deal with the bodies (they were generally later killed themselves) and most people who were shipped there were killed fairly quickly upon arrival.
Yeah, it’s not exactly the same.
Death camp: You have 10000 prisoners. You try to kill them all during this month, because the next month you get 10000 new prisoners to kill.
Gulag: You have 20000 prisoners (and food for 10000). You try to work to death half of them during this month, because the next month you get 10000 more prisoners (and no more food).
And, technically, the prisoners in gulag are there for limited time, so if they survive enough rounds of elimination, in theory after 10 years they are allowed to go home. (In practice, after 10 years they will get 10 more years and stay where they are, because we do not want to spread the information about gulags to the average population. Also, slave labor is convenient for the socialist economy.)
I use it as a synonym for “progressive”. To me, if your primary motive is reducing suffering, you are ultimately on the left. If it is reducing unfairness, you will end up on the right. The sorting process may be longer than the human lifespan tho.
@Walter
I can’t fit “primary motive” in my model for people at all. That’s not how we work.
I do think people on the right are more likely to have a strong “disgust” reaction. Libertarians are outliers on the right because they are right-leaning, but don’t have that disgust reaction.
Toward the original post, I see “left” and “leftist” as ambiguous terms, and immediately look for more contextual clues to indicate what’s meant. It can mean something very similar to “anti-fa” or “marxist” where the struggle–and the only struggle–is between labor and capital. Or it can just mean people who currently own/project an identity that puts them on the leftward side of many issues, such as being pro-choice or anti-death penalty or favor state-funding of [anything but the military]. I think if you want to understand what’s different about the SSC commentariat compared to other commenters, I think the fact that we’re relatively good at noticing ambiguity might be a good thing. This is the sort of place where people start by acknowledging that the rest of the world needs to be more libertarian, but that the sort of people who read anti-libertarian FAQs do, in fact, generally need to be less libertarian.
With the last thread, we spent a lot of time bagging on Piketty. And, to be fair, I think he deserved it. I don’t think all left-wing economics is bunk though. So, who wants to talk about the things left-wing economists get right or right-wing economists get wrong?
I’m convinced that MMT is basically correct. It may be in governments’ interest to pretend that money spent must be raised or borrowed but that’s not how it “really” works.
Are MMTers considered leftist? Do they consider themselves leftist?
I don’t think MMT is an inherently leftist project, but I do think most or all MMTers are left of center, some quite a bit.
That really only works for 1st world countries. The US may be able to print money with reckless abandon, but when Argentina tries it, you end up with 20%+ inflation rate.
I think you are somewhat mischaracterizing the theory, or at least portraying a version of it pushed by enthusiastic but ignorant boosters.
I take the most basic conclusions of it to be:
1) the constraint on money creation is inflation–not anything else, and
2) no economic theory (including MMT) currently has a good model for predicting inflation rates, so policy makers should observe it empirically and react accordingly instead of trying to use various purportedly predictive proxies
I don’t think anyone denies that net money creation should be reined in or reversed in the face of observed inflation.
This assumes that empirical observation is a good model for predicting inflation rates, which is increasingly unlikely to be the case as you depart from boringly conservative economic policies.
If would think that the people would have given up on this idea after the Fed and the Treasury managed to successfully pull off everything they did post 2008.
Certainly printing money can lead to inflation, there are too many examples of this to deny it. But at some point the cries of “this will surely cause inflation” should start to seem ridiculous. Fear of large numbers seems to play a part as well. Everyone loves to report things in nominal dollars, which really does no one any favors.
I think this depends on the version of MMT you’re talking about. There is a version I hear that amounts to “Debts don’t matter if they’re issued in your own currency because a currency issuer can never go bankrupt.” This is technically accurate in the sense that the US government can never run out of dollars, but that doesn’t mean the government can’t run out of purchasing power. The consequences of defaulting on debts are effectively identical to those of printing money to cover those debts. The former means paying people pennies on the dollar, the later means paying them in dollars that are worth pennies.
Is MMT the same as Market Monetarism? Because I’m definitely persuaded of the latter but it doesn’t seem to fit with your conclusion (central bank magically creates free stuff?) or left-wing ideology, so I guess not.
No MMT is very different from Market Monetarism.
For a market monetarist’s take on MMT, see Scott Sumner’s blog posts on MMT:
http://www.themoneyillusion.com/category/modern-monetary-theory/
@Erusian
The idea that lowering income tax will increase government revenue. The economists who argue for that seem especially popular among Republicans.
Now, you don’t even need a leftist economist to debunk that, but a right-libertarian one is sufficient. He is opposing very high taxes in that article, but he accepts that current taxation levels are below the revenue maximizing point. He just argues that the government should not maximize revenue, but the GDP, which he equates with quality of life, which is a subjective/debatable claim.
Interestingly, the implication of the Laffer curve being different between nations and for different kinds of taxes is that there is no optimal level of income taxes in general, but that the specific taxes, policies, culture and/or other things matter to what extent the taxes suppress the GDP.
For example, I think that people are less prone to feel that taxation is unfair in a Nordic Model where a considerable part of the government spending benefits everyone, not just the poorer people.
Agreed, at least in the short term. The Laffer Curve is unambiguously true, but it’s virtually impossible to stray onto the right side of it without promptly falling off the cliff into total fiscal or economic collapse. So if you’re in a society that’s not yet in the abyss(*), you’re almost certainly on the part of the curve where if you reduce taxes you reduce government revenue at least a little bit.
You may still be in the relatively flat area where any increase in taxes risks finding that cliff, and where reducing taxes reduces state revenue only a little while massively increasing private wealth, so there’s still an argument for lowering taxes. But you have to either cut spending or expect an increase in next year’s budget deficit. We’re looking at you, Kansas.
* If you are in the abyss, the point is moot because you can’t pay for honest tax collectors any more.
I don’t think you fall off a cliff. Wasn’t the 80% tax rate of the U.S. on the right side? And the 75% rate in France? Wasn’t Piketty explicitly arguing for a tax rate on the right side of the laffer curve?
Revenue falls off a cliff when you tax everyone at that rate. If you merely tax a small elite at that rate, you only lose a fraction.
Furthermore, those people will start evading taxes if they can, so their effective tax rate is likely to be less than the official tax rate.
As Aapje notes, those rates were a polite fiction that basically said “do something we like with your bags of money, or hide them out of our sight, we won’t be looking too hard”. Government revenues as a fraction of GDP, which are a pretty good proxy for average tax rates actually paid, stayed at or below 20%.
Well you’re the expert!
Let’s not repeat myths about what happened in Kansas. Despite popular reporting, kansas did absolutely nothing radical, and suffered no radical consequences. Kansas had budget deficits, at the peak, of less than four hundred million in state that had a cash balance of almost 800 million,and which spends 18 billion a year. Just counting general fund (with is only 1/3 of the kansas budget) revenues were above pre-cut peaks within 4-5 years of brownback’s supposed massive cuts, and spending basically only went up. There was no grand experiment in Kansas, there were some really very modest tax cuts that shockingly produced deficits when combined with spending increases and which got blown way out of proportion by innumerate reporters ideologically pre-disposed to love writing stories about how tax cuts are terrible.
Taxes are much less progressive in a Nordic model. For many EU countries, top tax rate is quite similar with the U.S.
GDP may be a poor measure, but if a large increase in tax rates results in a tiny increase in revenue, it’s pretty obviously bad thing.
I don’t think many economists believe that tax rates are usually above the revenue maximizing level, although it’s obviously possible for them to be. Adam Smith discussed that in the context of customs duties so high that everything got smuggled and Ibn Khaldun mentioned the idea of higher taxes producing less revenue long before Smith.
To extend on this point, I recall a recent discussion here where it was pointed out that it can be hard to compare relative tariff burdens between countries, since high enough tariffs just kill the trade altogether, which can then be excluded from the measurements.
E.g. if you put a 5% tariff on cars imported from another country, you probably won’t kill the importation market altogether, so observers have a fair amount of data with which to analyze the tariff. But if you put a 200% tariff on cars imported from another country, then you’ll probably get zero cars imported, which can end up making it appear that the tariff doesn’t impose any costs.
I expect people would notice that problem if they looked carefully at each individual tariff, but that it will be easy for individual items to get lost in the mix of complex tariff regimes. I recall someone here saying that Canada, for instance, exempts a certain amount of a specific good (milk?) when imported from the US, with an extremely high tariff on any overage. That makes it look like the tariff isn’t imposing costs, since no one will do any importation beyond the exempted amount.
Any views on Kenan Malik in general or this piece in particular? Not sure if he’s great or I’m overexcited by finding someone who is pro free speech and open debate, on the left, and willing to talk about the more contentious issues. But those things aside it does seem to explain some things helpfully e.g. That races can differ on average but this doesn’t mean our categories of race break humanity down in a logical way biologically
ttps://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/why-both-sides-are-wrong-in-the-race-debate/
While he is more accurate than most, Malik is kind of rambling so it’s not clear to me what’s he for exactly.
Malik is wrong that scientific terminology has to be precise or that the system used to define species is precise, accurate, and a true reflection of reality. Even if he had been more concise and clear about what he was arguing for, this still would have given me a lot of pause about his other arguments.
Science isn’t always precise. The concept(s) of species suffers exactly the same problems as the concept of race. It’s fuzzy, imprecise, ill-defined, has many inconsistent definitions, etc. Are species defined by morphological differences? Paleontologists sometimes use a “morphological species” definition because that’s all the data they have to work with. Sometimes two fossils are mistakenly thought to be separate species but then turn out not to be when more fossils are dug up. Are species defined by the ability to interbreed? In that case, the species relationship isn’t transitive. There exist some gull populations far north where population A breeds with B and B with C and C with D but not A with D even though A and D live right next to each other. It’s basically a cline of variation on a circle. Is species defined by genetic similarity? No. Bacteria of the same “species” can share a smaller percent of their genome than chimps and humans.
The principle that works best for organizing things is to try to make sure that where life has an ancestry structure that’s tree like (which is almost all of life now) that a species (and other higher taxonomic units) doesn’t include only parts of two separate branches of the tree of life. See cladistics. This doesn’t cleave reality at the joints perfectly, but it doesn’t violate the best organizing principle we have for understanding natural history (evolution). This organizing principle does run into issues when we get to tiny sexually reproducing branches of the tree of life because your ancestry isn’t really a tree. Since animals that reproduce sexually have two parents etc., there can be complicated interconnections. With sex, you get weird things like the gulls mentioned above. It gets less useful and more fuzzy as a lone organizing principle if you want to define subspecies (which is a level of difference a lot like race).
So basically, the race realists who want to define races in terms of inbred family groups have the most biologically defensible idea although that idea of race should be understood to be pretty fuzzy. You’re making categories by basically drawing shapes around parts of an interlinked tree-ish structure, where branches can merge at any time. This definition might not always divide things up the way people care about.
We could invent an entirely new word to mean “populations with mostly distinct ancestry that are genetically different enough in some way that someone would care”, but it wouldn’t change much. For cultural affiliations, the government uses the term ethnicity, so we’ve already got a good term for people sharing language, beliefs, etc. even when those people are less genetically related than randomly selected humans.
I thought a lot of the points he made were good, but found the piece distractingly long and rambly. Not surprising given that it’s a (albeit edited) transcript of a talk. I think it would benefit from being re-written into a proper article.
All models lie; some models are useful.
It’s certainly true that social categories of race are fuzzy and imprecise. But they’re still quite useful for many purposes. Your doctor should pay attention to your race when diagnosing and treating some illnesses–declaring the concept of race meaningless would make him less good at those jobs. Based on what we can observe in the past, if you want to predict how the grandchildren of some immigrant population to the US will do in school, race (a fuzzy and imprecise category we can all agree isn’t all that great) will help you make better predictions. Observationally, some Olympic events seem to be dominated by people from the same racial group[1] in ways that are hard, but not impossible, to explain by cultural factors. Observationally, the population of Eastern European Jews[2] (like 20 million people mostly spread out over a couple dozen countries) has more Nobel prizes and Fields medals than whole large countries and continents. Observationally, populations derived from sub-Saharan Africa seem to be doing pretty badly relative to everyone else, whether in countries where they’re the whole population or in countries where they’re a minority[3].
If you want to make correct predictions about the world, right now, race is a highly useful category to include. Finer gradations than are usually thought of as race are often even more useful, if they’re available. And maybe what we’d really like is a DNA test, but that’s not always available and doesn’t really work for talking about large amorphous groups (“which kids in Portland, Oregon will get at least a 3 in AP Calculus?”).
IMO, the strongest reason to want to discard race as a concept in science is that it imports a bunch of assumptions that may not be correct in many cases. But the reason to retain it is that there are a lot of cases where it’s imparting useful information that’s cheaply available, even though it’s imprecise and fuzzy as a concept. There are places where it makes a big difference. ISTM that the right answer here is to know the limitations of “race” as a category and take them into consideration when you’re using it. And it sure seems to me that a lot of the push to eliminate race as a category with any scientific meaning is ideological in origin–the desire to win some political/social battles by defining what is and isn’t scientific.
[1] On the other hand, this also shows a problem with broad racial categories: Blacks dominate distance and sprinting events, but they’re different groups of blacks, derived from different source populations in different parts of Africa.
[2] Again, not obviously a race, but genetically and culturally distinct enough to matter for making good predictions. Similarly, I suspect there are caste/jati differences among Indians that are as big a deal as the difference between Europeans and Ashkenazi Jews, but I don’t know enough about Indian society to be sure.
[3] Though in this case, there are some pretty big historical differences in how those folks were treated that may account for some or all of the observed differences.
Predicated on Trump getting his first nominee confirmed, what odds do you give that SCOTUS will roll back the Roe-Wade 24 weeks time limit? How about rolling it back quite substantially?
Also, how soon after do you think Obergefell will be challenged? Will Robberts vote for SCOTUS to take it up? Will he reverse his earlier vote?
I think an Obergefell challenge is unlikely to go anywhere – I don’t think there’s much political appetite for it.
I’m much less optimistic about Roe vs Wade, though – if Trump gets his first choice in, I’m confident it will be challenged soon, and think that the balance of probability is that it will be struck down.
Political appetite?
It requires merely a few cooperative government individuals, as most states still have laws banning gay marriage.
I’d also add that there is what I consider a “better” argument in support of legalized same-sex marriage, that is that prohibiting it constitutes sex discrimination. If Adam can’t marry Steve solely because of his sex, it’s sex discrimination. I believe that there’s much more support among conservatives for that interpretation of the 14th Amendment than some form of “equal dignity” or “privacy” concern.
‘Dignity’ is just awful. I think that there is some suggestion in the recent travel ban case that there is a recognition that ‘dignity’ is awful. I don’t think that Robert’s would want to leave the courts with that stain.
And there is definitely enough political will that he would be given that chance, if he wanted it.
Roe v. Wade was 28 weeks, not 24. And Planned Parenthood v. Casey modified that to “whenever the scientists say fetuses are generally viable”. I don’t see the Supreme Court having any interest in arguing the numerical value; “viability” is as strong a Schelling point as you are going to find if you are not going to use conception or birth, and when viability occurs is the sort of factual argument that is traditionally left to scientists with district or appellate courts acting as referees.
The battles will be over, A: who has to pay, and B: how many hoops a woman will have to jump through along the way, and C: how much of this can be delegated back to the states. The answers to all of those will probably be the same for one-week embryos and twenty-week fetuses.
So what is your prediction vis-a-vis the law Iowa just passed?
My prediction is that it will be struck down by the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court will deny cert.
There are abortion time limits being passed in the states everywhere from 6 weeks to 20 weeks.
I predict SCOTUS will take those up as a group.
What hls2003 says, or else a very narrow ruling by the Supreme Court that says “don’t bother us with nonsense like this”.
Wouldn’t “birth” be a stronger Schelling point? It’s extremely unambiguous, either the baby is still inside the woman, or it’s not. You don’t need any kind of specialist to determine it, whereas an n-week limit does require an expert to opine on how old the fetus is based on its development. You also don’t need a scientist to determine what “n” is going to be. Frankly if it were up to me, that’s where i would put the limit for two reasons:
1) The Christian reason is that a person does not become ensouled until they take first breath. The Bible is pretty consistent on the idea that breath is life. “And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” -Genesesis 2:7
2) The scientific reason is that babies don’t achieve the capacity for self-awareness until 4-5 months after birth, meaning they’re not quite people until then. Notionally this means infanticide is fine, however since you have to draw the line somewhere, and birth is the best place to do so for the reasons given above, you might as well draw it at birth. Also i don’t want to live in a society in which people’s reaction to someone throwing a baby in a dumpster is, “How old is that baby?” and not “HOLY SHIT! SOMEONE THREW A BABY IN A DUMPSTER!”
Yes, and it’s the one I would personally prefer, but it’s also unacceptable to a lot of people. Conception is likewise a stronger Schelling point, but is also unacceptable to a lot of people (including me). Viability is the strongest Schelling point that enough people can more or less live with that it works as a compromise.
Yes, as would conception. Hence the “if you are not going to use conception or birth” clause in my original statement.
Also, we are not going to use birth or conception. People trying to impose one or the other of those standards have caused more harm to the US political system than any other factor, over the past half century or so, and still have nothing to show for it. Knock it off, already.
Oh, somehow my eyes glided right over the “or birth” part and didn’t see it, my apologies. Also, the fact that i prefer the birth line doesn’t mean that i’m unwilling to compromise at viability. Seen as a struggle between the “conception” and “birth”, setting the line anywhere north of 20 weeks is a slight win for the birth side given that pregnancies normally last around 40 weeks. It’s not my ideal, but i will definitely take it. We do after all need to share a country with people on the other side, and i was taught in pre-school that “i get everything and you get nothing” is not what “sharing” means.
Nonetheless in a negotiation you start with what you want, not what you’re willing to compromise to.
I have a quibble about your 1) point. I would say that your view is held by the vast minority of theologians who have studied the issue. I would say that Bible in multiple points talks about babies pre-birth as people. There is Romans 9:11-13 (ESV) “11 though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad—in order that God’s purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of him who calls— 12 she was told, “The older will serve the younger.” 13 As it is written, “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.”” and Psalm 139:13 “For you formed my inward parts; you knitted me together in my mother’s womb.” (see also Isiah 44:2,24 49:5 and Jeremiah 1:5).
Overall on a more practical level, Christian’s count it as a really bad thing to kill an innocent baby so they would much rather draw the line at conception and be sure then draw it later and let a few babies get killed.
It’s worth noting that fervent anti-abortion sentiment is a relatively recent phenomenon among American evangelicals, mostly post-dating Roe v. Wade. There’s a good set of examples here:
One possible standard would be the point at which, if the fetus was born prematurely, it could survive–which has gotten earlier over time as medical treatment of preemies has gotten better.
Isn’t that what the Court meant by viability? Or am I misunderstanding the term?
Yes, I believe that was basically the ruling in Casey. Roe’s “third trimester” standard was interpreted as a coarse approximation as to the limit of survival for premature births per 1970s medical science and should not be treated as carved in stone. The court’s ruling suggested 22-23 weeks as the appropriate benchmark in 1992, and in a way that didn’t rigidly fix that date against any future changes.
This is incidentally my primary concern with the viability threshold, it keeps dropping lower and lower as a function of medical science. Presumably eventually we will have exowombs and there will be no viability threshold at all. We could potentially use a “viability without medical intervention” threshold, which wouldn’t move but may prove unacceptably high for opponents.
@Lillian, in that hypothetical, would an abortion ban be so great a burden? Instead of an abortion, a woman would sign some paperwork to give up her parental rights and responsibilities, and then have early labor induced; the doctors would then move the baby to an artificial womb.
Yes, it’d be somewhat more burdensome, but it’d still provide a quick route to no longer be pregnant or a parent. The biggest objection I can see would be cost, but perhaps – as long as we’re talking idealistically – the government could cover the cost for all (un-)willing mothers as part of a compromise.
That would very much depend a lot on details that are not presently available given the hypothetical nature of the scenario. The more pressing concern is what happens in between. If we reach a compromise on say, 22 weeks, and then viability drops to 18 and later 16 weeks, that represents an ongoing and unegotiated loss for my side. Willingness to reach an agreement is somewhat predicated on the expectation that the terms of the agreement will be maintained.
@Evan Þ
The mother/parents may feel morally obligated to care for the baby if it is born, while an abortion gives no such obligation. So it’s more complex than you make it out to be.
@Evan Þ
>Instead of an abortion, a woman would sign some paperwork to give up her parental rights and responsibilities, and then have early labor induced; the doctors would then move the baby to an artificial womb.
And also they’d need to find foster parents for the next few decades. All in all, that’s a heck of a lot of work to save the life of something which may be microscopic and incapable of even thinking to begin with.
If you really don’t like abortion, and you’re thinking about hypothetical future scenarios, maybe it would make more sense for the government to place everyone on birth control until they openly agree to raise a child.
At least in California, and I believe almost every other US state, any mother can drop off her newborn baby at any hospital and walk away, no obligations, no questions asked. Definitely no need to arrange twenty or thirty (WTF “few”?) years of foster care. I see no reason to believe this would not hold for babies being transferred to exo-wombs; it is the obvious political compromise position and it is already black-letter law.
@Lilian:
It seems you are too much a conflict theorist about it. As I said in the other comment, in almost all Europe the limit is fixed at 12 weeks (except special cases like malformation or danger for the mother) – and it’s ok from a practical point of view.
@maintain:
Of course nobody will go through such trouble for a microscopic morula or blastocyst. But for a healthy 4-5 months old fetus who already looks (and acts) more or less like a very small baby, I think Evan’s solution could be the ethical one, when it will become possible. I think it is easier to find adoptive parents for newborns than for older children. But probably there will be few such cases – in that future, the methods of preventing unwanted pregnancy would also become better.
Hm, I think that may be a good – although quite eugenicist-sounding – idea: to offer free temporary sterilization to any young man over 18 who is single or already has 2 children – and reverse it for free just before marriage. Maybe even reward it with some money, to encourage young men to do it. That will prevent not only abortions, but also lots of children that grow without fathers from the start and are at risk of poverty and even crime. But many will say it’s eugenics.
This, and to contradict Iain’s point, this is not a new belief. Catholic’s have condemned abortion for a very very long time. You can debate whether they had condemned it as early as the 1st century (as they themselves claim), but there’s basically zero debate that they have condemned it since the 5th century, with famous Church doctors such as St. Augustine vigorously condemning the practice.
Conflict theoriest doesn’t quite seem like the right framework for someone who is viewing it as a negotiated agreement, since this necessarily assumes some amount of good faith on the part of the other side.
If i come to an agreement about what the price of bread is going to be, and i’m the one buying, i’m not going to be happy if we pegged it to some measure that is expected to increase. Nor for that matter, do i particularly care what other people negotiated their prices to, i want the best deal for myself. Certainly we can renegotiate in the future as circumstances change, but i want to retain control of the agreement, not let it change by itself.
It’s business, not war.
I think it’s more balanced, actually, Lillian: the date of viability moves earlier and earlier, but contraceptive and abortifacient methods grow more effective over time too. Technology both hurts and helps your side.
Also, correlatedresiduals, be fair to Iain. He said American evangelicals, not Christians in general. He’s right about evangelicals, who really were more tepid on abortion then than they are now.
In my opinion, conception and birth are obviously not the correct answers. To regard a fertilized cell, or a morula (an amorf group of identical cells) or a blastocyst as a human being requires the same kind of suspension of disbelief as regarding the eucharist as the body and blood of Jesus, although you see it’s bread and wine; but also, to see a fetus that looks like a miniature baby and acts like a baby (sucking thumb etc.) but not consider it a human being requires similar suspension of disbelief (except for people that, as I saw in a comment above, don’t consider newborn babies human beings!).
But I can’t say exactly where to put the limit. Maybe between embryo and fetus, at 8 weeks – is that a clear enough Schelling point? I think that an important element would be (like in deciding about the end of life): does it have a brain (that works)?
In most of the European Union the limit is 3 months (12 weeks):
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6235557.stm
The problem with “brain that works” is that there is no clear definition of “brain working”. You can get cases of people who, as long as they are kept fed and hydrated, the body will keep living, but all the higher thought functions have been destroyed. The lights are on, but there’s nobody home. Some people think this is still a person worth saving, other people think it is not.
Anencephalous babies are literally born without a brain, and while about half of them are stillborn, another half manage to survive hours or days before cardiorespiratory failure. The latter cases are due to having a functional or semi-functional brain stem, which allows for reflex actions such as breathing and response to external stimuli like touch and sound, but without a cerebrum they will never develop any actual awareness.
Personally, i think it is precisely the capacity for self-awareness that makes the person. Given that this doesn’t happen until months after birth, it seems pretty obvious to me that we can safely put the limit at birth. Though as i said above, i’m willing to compromise if necessary.
However, a lower standard along a similar line logic could be attained by using cerebral cortex development. The central nervous system in a fetus develops from the bottom of the spine up, so the cerebral cortex, which governs thinking and feeling, develops last. Now i’m having trouble pinning down a specific week number around which this starts happening, but premature babies do show some baseline electrical activity in their neural cortex, and third trimester babies are capable of learning. This would suggest placing the limit somewhere in the late second or early third trimester, if you were using that standard.
Technical point. “Conception” isn’t really a thing, medically. You either have fertilization or implantation.
Fertilization has the advantage of being an almost binary thing, in that the transition between unfertilized to fertilized occurs so fast that there’s no human-timescale in-between state. The down-side is that something like 50% of fertilized eggs fail to implant without any intervention. So if you pick that point you have to account for that fact.
Implantation occurs about a week after fertilization. It has the advantage of being the point at which there’s actually a connection between the mother and the fertilized egg and so is “permanent”. This process is also one which is discouraged via IUDs, so that it ensures that form of birth control is not a problem. But it’s also a process which takes a few days to complete. It’s possible that this could lead to some mid-implantation legal complications, though I can’t imagine how at the moment.
1) There is no 24-week limit in current case law, as I understand it. Greater restrictions are allowed following viability.
2) I would bet a lot of money that Roe v. Wade will not be overruled (as in, the “right to abortion” under the penumbral privacy reasoning first articulated in Roe) anytime in the tenure of the next nominee.
3) Any tinkering will be at the margins – e.g. a “feels pain” threshold, or parental notification being revisited, etc. at the state level.
4) What do you mean by Obergefell being “challenged”? I am confident that there are test cases being considered right now; but any such case (in order to squarely challenge the ruling) would probably have to be a state or federal law banning same-sex marriage. I think that there is little political appetite to [Edit: enforce] such a law, even in very red states. But I would also bet a lot of money that the Court will not squarely overturn Obergefell anytime in the tenure of next nominee. More likely would be marginalizing it as an outlier.
5) Speculatively, I do think Roberts would vote to deny cert on a test case squarely designed to overturn Obergefell. In my opinion, Roberts would view that as a negative for the Court’s reputation, for which he seems to care a great deal.
Re: Roe vs Wade, I don’t think there will be any messing about with it unless some case really needs to go all the way to the Supreme Court. Nobody really wants to touch it; the legal reasoning seems to be shaky (emanations of penumbras belongs in a poem by Blake, not a judge’s decision) but so much law has been based on it, and it is such a toxic subject, that just letting the mess fester is the least worst solution.
Arguments on viability (e.g. that advances in medicine mean unborn younger than 24 weeks can now survive) aren’t going to go anywhere because if you’ve passed laws for late second/early third trimester abortions on the grounds of fatal foetal abnormality and the like, meaning that pregnancies after the cut-off point can still be terminated, then you’re reversing your decision and saying that a pregnancy that results in a viable birth should go ahead, even if the infant only lives a short while after birth. Prepare to be eviscerated for holding such an opinion.
There’s enough of the mushy middle “abortion should be legal but only for extreme cases and up to a certain point” that there isn’t the support for the “abortion at any time up to the day before giving birth for any or no reason” crowd or the “make it illegal again crowd”, so there’s no chance of even the Republican party trying to get a judge who will decide to ban abortion. Why would they do that – to pander to the Evangelicals/religious pro-lifers? There may be enough of them to swing elections but there aren’t enough of them to win elections if they’re the only ones turning out to vote for you.
We’ve just had the abortion referendum in my country. I fully expect the eventual legislation, whenever the government gets around to writing it, that is going to be all “only up to twelve weeks and after that for exceptional cases alone” to go the way of the dodo, and a lot of people who voted ‘yes’ on the “be compassionate and trust women” grounds to go ‘hey hold on, I never voted for that‘ when the activists get their way*. They may be extremely surprised and shocked, but once that stable door has been unbarred and the horse is out, there’s no way to bolt it again.
Note that even if Roe were overturned in its basic principle (it has been largely superseded in the details of its holding), all that would do is allow restrictions, not outlaw abortion itself. HBC above links to an Iowa law banning abortion past 6 weeks, which I admit is surprising to me (though less surprising given the electoral demographics of Iowa – it’s got even a bigger rural/city split than most states, and the rural areas tend to be very conservative and the liberal cities very liberal). But that is an outlier, and I expect most states would not adopt a zero-tolerance position or anything close to it.
@Deiseach:
The idea that there is no political appetite for challenges to Roe v. Wade is patently false.
There are abortion time limits being passed in the states everywhere from 6 weeks to 20 weeks.
ETA:
In addition, SCOTUS has taken up multiple abortion cases in the last several years, and in each case the issue at hand was further restricting the ability to obtain abortions. In multiple states there is now only a single abortion provider due to restrictions passed by state legislatures. It’s a very live issue.
In Hungary abortion is legal, and there is not much debate about it, but the limit is 12 weeks (20 weeks in case of fetal defects). I haven’t heard anyone argue against this, and I think many people who support abortion think it would be problematic after 12 weeks (and even more after 20 weeks). I suspect many countries are similar.
Indeed. One of the more popular/controversial/famous PragerU videos is about how many European nations have much more stringent controls on abortion than the US does.
Even in the most conservative states?
Roe v Wade : “Nobody really wants to touch it;”
Why do you think that? The pro life movement has been an active force for decades.
A week ago I would have agreed that Roe was safe, but I’ve been reading pro-choice Libertarians who say it should die.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/07/03/let-roe-go/
As bad as Roe was from a governance POV, I worry that taking the knife out will cause more damage than leaving it in there.
A demographic that makes up, what, 2% of the US population?
I agree with the pro-choice Libertarians as a matter of legal principle, but I also understand that about 98% of the population is going to want this decision made on the basis of object-level pragmatism, which will be a mix of “Abortion must be fully legal no matter the cost”, “Abortion must be banned no matter the cost”, and “This sort of disruption is too high a cost, leave it alone”.
My guess on abortion case law by the time the dust settles:
(a) States can ban abortion entirely, and 20-30 of them do
(b) They can’t ban crossing state lines to obtain an abortion, or purchasing abortifacient medicines by mail order, because that’s solely within Congress’s powers
(c) Congress does nothing [always a safe prediction] so existing federal laws stay in place
(d) North of the border, Morgentaler remains good law and weekend trips to Vancouver suddenly become all the rage for rich men’s mistresses
Obergefell is more secure,
what with all 5 justices who voted for it still sitting on the court.what with the massive swings in public opinion in its favor (unlike views on Roe, which have been remarkably stable) and the difficulties involved in sorting out the thousands of involuntary divorces that would result. Possible but unlikely we end up with states being able to ban same-sex marriage but having to recognize them from out of state. But I think it stays put.Obergefell was 5-4 with Kennedy being the deciding vote and writer of the majority opinion. Roberts voted against .
Oh, right, it was the ACA case that Roberts was the swing vote on.
The right-to-life crowd has spent a generation fighting tooth and nail against Roe v. Wade by every political means available to them. They are going to want to put a capstone on that project now that they are within striking distance. I expect there will be some heavy maneuvering behind the scenes in the Republican party to put a hard-core right-to-lifer in the bench this time around, and then bring a series of cases before the court that give the court plenty of opportunities to narrow Roe v. Wade or overturn it entirely.
Some more details, here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-coming-battle-to-overturn-roe-v-wade/563936/
Right. Just like they wanted to put a capstone on that project when Stevens was appointed to the court, like they wanted to when O’Conner was appointed to the court, and again when Scalia was appointed to the court, and yet again when Kennedy was appointed, and once more with Souter, and once more again when Thomas took the bench, and then they took a break for a while, and then it was Alito’s turn, and then Roberts.
Each time it was different. Each time, this time, it was a solid conservative judge replacing one of those pinko commie Democrats or treasonous RINOs, who was going to put the capstone on the roll-back-Roe-v-Wade project. And each time, the whining from the other side of the fence was that if they let the damn dirty Republicans nominate even one more judge it would be Handmaid’s Tale forevermore.
0 for 8, guys. But this time it’s going to be different. Somehow.
Why should it be so hard to find a judge who is against Roe v. Wade and put them on the Supreme Court?
I think after the Harriet Miers debacle GWB was more concerned with finding someone qualified beyond all doubt than someone that was perfect on Roe. And it isn’t like Roberts is Souter, while I don’t expect him to strike down Roe (technically Casey) in one fell swoop, I do expect him to vote in favor of narrowing the right significantly over the course of several decisions.
Alito and Goresuch have given us no reason to think that they won’t vote against Roe. So the question is more what happened in the 80s and early 90s rather than why is this so hard in general.
Stare desisis is a big part of it. While there’s a fair amount of support in conservative legal scholarship for revising or replacing the substantive due process doctrine that underlies Roe and Casey, the doctrine has been baked into so many precedents for so long that a fundamental revision of it would require unsettling a huge pile of what’s currently considered settled case law. Not many judges (other than Clarence Thomas) are willing to go that far, regardless of what they think of substantive due process in the abstract. The further we get from Roe (45 years, now), the bigger the case against reconsidering its conceptual underpinnings: Rehnquist and Scalia were willing to overturn Roe, albeit on narrower grounds than Thomas’s, but they were both older judges who were well along in their legal careers when Roe was decided.
There’s also a political angle. There are currently 49 pro-life Republicans in the Senate (Collins and Murkoski are pro-choice), which is not enough to confirm a justice who refuses to affirm that Roe and Casey are settled law. And the 49 pro-life Senate Republicans include some wild cards like Rand Paul, who might vote against confirming a judge who’s apt to vote to overturn Roe on political rather than legal grounds.
The confirmation angle is both harder and easier than it’s been in the past. Easier because there’s currently a Republican majority, since fewer of the Republicans in the Senate are pro-choice, and since the SCOTUS confirmations are no longer subject to filibusters. But it’s also harder because the norms of voting to confirm a well-qualified but ideologically inconvenient judge have been steadily breaking down since the 80s.
There’s also the question of the candidate pool: conservative schools of Constitutional interpretation have gotten a lot more traction in academia over the past 50 years or so, and the pool of lawyers and judges with strong resumes and well-formed conservative legal philosophies is a lot larger than it used to be. However, Roe is far enough in the past that the current crop of potential SCOTUS appointees were still in diapers when Roe was decided, and as such they generally have much stronger stare decisis priors against overturning Roe than previous generations of judges. And there was a big filter on the pipeline for a long time, as Arlen Specter was one of the senior Republicans on the Judiciary Committee for a long time and he had a reputation for torpedoing any judicial nominee who didn’t affirm a belief that Roe was settled law.
Scott,
It doesn’t have to be, but it does take intentional effort. There’s a fairly clearly understood tendency where justices drift to the left over their tenure on the Court. Picking people who will remain on the right is not a trivial task, even though it isn’t impossible.
(People posit varying reasons for why justices drift leftward, but I’ll set that aside. The tendency is quite clear though.)
A major project of the last few decades of conservative legal efforts has been to identify and promote people who would be consistent when appointed as federal judges and, eventually, Supreme Court justices. Whatever people think about whether that project is good, the people running it are quite intelligent and very dedicated. It would be foolish to expect modern Republican appointees to drift as much as those in the past.
(See Thomas and Scalia as examples of this trend. Gorsuch is also generally viewed as quite reliable.)
On the object level issue, I’m confident we’ll see a direct challenge to Roe, and I think that a decision fully overruling it is not implausible (i.e. a full-throated “wrong the day it was decided” overruling). A massive number of conservatives abhor Roe in a way that simply isn’t true for, say, Obergefell (which I expect is safe). The people calling the shots in making these decisions in the WH care about this issue in particular, even if Trump probably doesn’t care (and Gorsuch’s appointment shows that that group has decisive influence in this process).
I think Roberts will be the swing vote for the next case reconsidering Roe, which bodes poorly for its survival.
ETA: If Roe survives, I think Eric Rall is correct that it will be primarily because of stare decisis, not because the actual reasoning of Roe or Casey (where stare decisis was also decisive) is persuasive.
That said, I think it’s easy to over-estimate the import of stare decisis in this context. Roe is the most divisive case in the last century, and it is at absolute best highly debatable as a legal matter. Despite the predictions of the Casey plurality, refusing to overturn Roe has hardly ended the debate over abortion.
The Court has also shown a somewhat greater willingness to overturn precedents of this kind recently. Janus, decided this term, struck down Abood, which is approximately as old as Roe and also dealt with a politically contentious issue (mandatory union fees).
I’m not sure that it’s more likely than not that Roe gets overturned in the next few years, but it’s genuinely probable at this point. There is a generation of conservatives who have diligently worked for this moment, and it’s actually within reach.
Well, we’ve had I think four Republican presidents conspicuously fail at that task (for “will actually vote to directly overturn Roe v Wade” levels of “oppose”), so there seems to be something a bit tricky about it. At a guess:
Supreme court candidates are de facto screened early by the Harvard and Yale law schools, and later by the American Bar Association, who can give opponents of an “unqualified” justice enough ammunition to block the nomination of any justice they really don’t like. As Brad notes, the Harriet Miers nomination shows that Republican senators aren’t just a rubber stamp for whomever POTUS picks. Harvard, Yale, and the ABA are all dominated by people who, while they may be OK with some expressions of conservative politics, are not going to look favorably on ideological firebrands who are going to overturn fifty years of foundational precedent because their God told them to.
Also, Supreme Court candidates pretty much have to be US Appellate Court judges, or something of similar stature. Achieving and holding that job is is a strong filter for the sort of political acumen that understands how massively disruptive it would be to overturn Roe v Wade and how much it would harm conservative political causes in general.
Also also, anyone who is truly willing to see the world burn for the sake of unborn babies, is going to have numerous opportunities to set the sort of fires that burn their own career to ash long before they get to SCOTUS-candidate level. And the bit where people carefully suppress their true political beliefs and inclinations all through their career until they reach the very top of the ladder, is not something real people do.
Obligatory cynical answer: because hatred of Roe v. Wade is the thickest chain holding evangelicals and other religious voters in the GOP at this point. Obergefell is an implausibly popular ruling to target at this point, and we already have enough of a court presence to give at least some resistance to the “not baking cakes is tantamount to Jim Crow” crowd. Homeschooling seems fairly safe, everyone knows creationism and school prayer are simply not on the table anymore; what other hot issue is there? Trans? Promising but not delivering the destruction of Roe is the biggest cookie the GOP has to offer. Just about the only cookie.
(I don’t know if anybody actually reasons it that way, though)
It’s possible to graduate from a left of center law school without accepting its views—Clarence Thomas managed—and a degree from Harvard or Yale is not a requirement, although it helps.
The ABA has a history of politically biased judgements–both Posner and Easterbrook got low ratings despite both impressive academic credentials before and very high performance as judges, judged by citations, after. Given how ideologically weighted the abortion issue is, I’m not sure an ABA refusal to endorse a candidate whose only visible disqualification was his view of Roe would carry much weight.
My preferred candidate is Michael McConnell, who got generally favorable treatment by scholars when he was up for the appeals court, including ones left of center. He is on record as supporting a constitutional amendment to reverse Roe—I don’t know what his view is on whether it should be reversed without one.
He is also a very nice guy, and one of the leading experts on church/state legal issues.
It only has to carry enough weight to delay one Senator for a few months. The GOP currently has two explicitly pro-choice Senators who would be looking for an excuse to block an explicitly anti-Roe justice, and insisting on debating an “unqualified” nominee deep into election season would almost certainly be enough for that.
He’s not on the list, unfortunately.
I don’t know what you mean by ‘when the dust settles’, but my prediction has always been that ultimately technology will give us some manner of external baby growing device, and the pro life cause will triumph. I don’t think it will be for a long time though.
If we had extreme control over reproduction, such that a woman couldn’t get pregnant unless she really consciously wanted it and met with her doctor to make sure it happened, the need for abortion would die out, the desire to fight for the right would die out, and people would be shocked at how the primitives acted in the old days.
Like if we could lab-grow meat for cheaper than factory-farming animals, that would win, and people would be shocked at how cruel we ever were to animals. And I say that as a meat-eater.
This day is coming fast. I think cheap, non-invasive, non-hormonal reversible male birth control will be here soon.
Five years? Ten?
Link
Link
…For what it’s worth I think that we are there. Women who don’t want to be pregnant have all the tools they need at their disposal to keep from getting pregnant.
What they lack is a responsible adult minder to force them to use those tools.
As committed as I am to getting rid of elective abortion, I would not trade putting the autonomy of every woman under the control of a minder in this manner to do away with every last excuse for ‘unintended’ pregnancies.
…not preemptively, at any rate.
It would cost a significant amount of energy, and thus money, to keep an artificial womb running. This would certainly have political implications. Especially if the cost of the unit itself were high, which it almost certainly would be; there’d be a lot of anger about only the rich being allowed such a basic life function, and angsty reflections over the cost of keeping one baby alive vs. feeding X poor people etc.
My strong impression is that Roberts doesn’t want big splashy decisions outright overruling major precedents. I expect to see a lot of nibbling and hollowing out.
What would that look like for Obergefell, do you think?
I expect we’ll see cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop come out the same way, but with stronger protections for people who make religious objections to the application of public accommodations laws in this context.
I would be very surprised if there was a serious effort to get Obergefell overturned. Trying to reverse the tide on same-sex marriage seems futile, and in my experience the mainstream of conservative legal thought is fairly divided on same-sex marriage anyway. I know plenty of people who, despite thinking that the reasoning in Obergefell was awful (which it surely was!), were perfectly content with the outcome. And that includes card-carrying members of the Federalist Society (the primary conservative legal group).
For all the hand-wringing happening on Twitter right now, Obergefell is here to stay. Kennedy’s retirement likely just means that more breathing room will be left in our society for people who disagree with same-sex marriage.
I was really disappointed with the logic of Obergefell. I’d been expecting a decision using Scalia’s dissents in Lawrence, Romer, and Windsor as a template. Basically, admitting that the court had been applying something more akin to intermediate scrutiny to cases about laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation (as Scalia’s dissents had argued), defending it on the basis of sexual orientation meeting the criteria for a semi-suspect classification (which there’s a pretty good case that it does), and ruling that an opposite-sex-only marriage rule didn’t hold up under the standard of scrutiny applied in the other three cases (also as Scalia’s dissents had argued in each of the three cases).
The logic i wanted in Obergefell is the marriage is nothing more than a legal contract for forming a household. It is demonstrable fact that same sex couples form households in a substantially similar manner people of opposite sexes, and for substantially the same reasons. There is no compelling reason to keep them from doing this, or to deny them legal recognition for having done this. The government can’t bar people from doing things just because it feels like it, so absent any compelling reason, the ban is unconstitutional. Yet, instead of treating it as a straightforward contractual matter, we instead got Kennedy waxing poetic about all this love and human dignity nonsense that has nothing to do with it.
@Lillian
If marriage is just a straight contractural matter, the states have the power to regulated it absent a reason not to. And the Fourteenth Amendment does not mention sexual orientation. So there’s no grounds for Obergefell there.
There lots of things the Fourteenths Amendment does not mention which have since been read into the Constitutional penumbra. That’s the benefit (and downside) of having judicial review.
That said, my specific argument does rely on smuggling in a second principle into the Constitution: That the government should not forbid things without a compelling reason, and that there’s a fairly high standard for what constitutes a compelling reason. It may not be possible to make it work without it, in which case my hope that the Court would use may been in vain.
40 year precedent for union fees didn’t seem to be an issue for him.
Obergefell, having passed through his court, seems more likely to trigger that reaction, I agree.
Aboud was pretty obscure and only applied to public sector workers. I’m talking about on the decisions that the general public knows about. All bets are off on the low visibility stuff.
@Brad:
So, it’s not so much a matter of legal principle as … what? Desire to appear to be principled to people who aren’t paying attention?
In other words, why is the “obscurity” of the principle in the eyes of the general public germane?
For whatever reason, the public respects the Supreme Court as an institution. There’s a theory that this legitimacy will be degraded if the court is seen as acting too overtly politically. The more obscure the issue, the less likely the court is to attract public notice and the more politically it can behave.
That’s the theory, anyway.
Roberts is generally viewed as substantially concerned about his “legacy” and especially the institutional legitimacy of the Court. Viewed this lens, the distinction makes sense.
Striking down the ACA would have incredibly high-profile and contentious, potentially undermining the perceived authority of the Court. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court is only powerful because it is viewed as basically legitimate. If the Court overextends, it risks causing the other branches to push back on it (see FDR’s attempt at Court packing).
Overturning Roe raises these concerns to a substantial degree. It’s reasonably plausible that even if Roberts thinks that Roe was wrongly decided, that he wouldn’t want to expend the institutional capital to strike it down now.
Overturning a less prominent case, such as Abood, will make some people angry, but it feels more like legal debate / inside baseball and less like the Court injecting itself into the political governance of the country (regardless of whether that’s true or not).
This institutional legitimacy point is also a large reason I expect that Obergefell would be safe, even if Trump replaced both Kennedy and another of the liberal justices (Ginsburg or Breyer) — the same-sex marriage debate is largely settled and at least that aspect isn’t as contentious anymore, so I suspect the justices would elect to expend their institutional capital striking down other things (affirmative action, abortion, free speech restrictions, etc.).
For whatever reason, the public respects the Supreme Court as an institution.
I’ve got to say, Mitch McConnell killed any respect I had for the institutional legitimacy of the court after whole Merrick Garland thing. I wonder how many people felt the same way.
Alphonse wrote pretty much what I would have. Note that it isn’t a defense of that position just a description.
@Chalid: How would you have felt if the Congress had voted on Garland, and voted “no”?
About half, I’d guess.
But don’t worry, the other side will feel that way too when the political parties in power change.
Agreed. If Roberts was willing to join the left on health care, what makes anyone think he won’t do the same for abortion?
See, the thing is, the decision on the ACA was about as nakedly political a decision as you are going to see outside of Bush v. Gore. It seems to me that it’s not to Roberts’ credit that he only stuck the knife in part way.
No, but it does have predictive value w/re how deeply the knife will go into Roe v. Wade.
I think Roberts is perfectly happy to make the right to abortion so small that it can be drowned in a bathtub. As long as there is a nominal right, he will consider stare decisis to be satisfied, no matter how actually unavailable abortion becomes in states whose legislatures are controlled by those with antipathy to the right to choose.
But the ACA hasn’t yet been drowned in a bathtub, in spite of obvious judicial avenues to that presumably desired end.
@John Schilling:
You seem to be misinterpreting what I am saying.
The ACA rested on much firmer footing, constitutionally, than the right to choose. Broadly, the case against the ACA was seen as essentially a joke.
But Roberts still couldn’t vote down the case without inventing something to hand to the right wing opponents.
This does not give me any confidence that he won’t simply follow the same pattern, especially when we already know that his belief, as a lawyer and a person if not member of the Supreme Court, is that Roe should be overturned.
HBC,
Perhaps this is because we were familiar with it from different angles, but I don’t think the ACA case was generally seen as a joke. The legal argument certainly wasn’t a slam dunk, but it wasn’t unreasonable. Congress has expansive Commerce Clause power, but upholding the ACA under it would have represented eliminating pretty much the last constraints. The majority agreed with this and said the ACA could not be justified under the Commerce Clause, which was the theory based upon which it was enacted.
Using Congress’ Tax and Spend power to affirm the law was a clever dodge. But it wasn’t clever because it was easy to reach a result that upheld the law.
There were some later cases challenging specific portions of the ACA that were more longshots, so perhaps that’s what you’re referring to. The challenge in NFIB v. Sebelius, however, was not a “joke.”
@Alphonse
Oh come on, what last constraints after Wikard and Raich? If Robert’s III-A had held that those cases should be overruled I could have respected it quite a bit. But as written it is a disgrace.
The reasoning used to strike down the medicaid example is likewise well described as a joke.
Brad,
The distinction between economic activity and economic non-activity. Granted, you don’t have to find that distinction persuasive, but it is a decently workable distinction and one that would put Wickard on one side of the line and the ACA on the other. Dissolving that distinction would also grant the federal government something essentially indistinguishable from a general police power (and the absence of a general police power in the federal government’s authority is a basic principle). Lopez already represented the Court stepping back from some of the more expansive conceptions of the Commerce Clause, so making an activity vs. non-activity distinction was hardly a novel point.
The Medicaid portion was reasonably predictable in terms of legal analysis. South Dakota v. Dole prohibited Congress from attaching coercive conditions to funding grants made under its Spending Power. The ACA’s Medicaid portions placed incredible pressure on the states. Unless the Court interpreted “coercive” to mean “states literally can’t say no,” in which case the doctrine is worthless since it would never apply, then the ACA Medicaid expansion was at minimum near the outer edge of what could be acceptable, which I don’t think makes striking it down a “joke.”
It is always a treat to realize how different the mindsets of different parties/tribes are.
For a conservative this question reads something like “If someone is willing to jaywalk, what makes you think they won’t kill people and eat their bodies?”
Like, Roberts was appointed by a republican. Presumably beforehand they pulled him aside and were like “So… if you ever get the chance, you’ll stop them from slaughtering babies, right?” , and he gave them the serious, close mouthed nod that is deniable but means “obviously”.
To put it another way, ‘join the left on health care’ is working with them, ‘join the left on abortion’ is just ‘join the left’, full stop. It is the only important moral issue to about a third of the Republican party. You don’t mess with the ladies of the pro life movement.
Others have mentioned that Planned Parenthood v. Casey already revised the Roe v. Wade trimester system substantially in favor of a viability standard. That said, I put very low odds on a substantial revision to the core findings of Casey, probably less than 5%. By my count, there’s only one firm vote on the Court currently to overturn Casey (Thomas), and one potential-but-unlikely vote (Gorsuch). Every judge on the court has now ruled on an abortion case, and only Thomas has written or joined in an opinion expressing an inclination to overturn Casey. Gorsuch is still an open question to a degree because the only abortion case he’s ruled on (the recent ruling about crisis pregnancy centers) was tangential to the core findings of Casey, but I’m counting him as unlikely because in his confirmation hearings he emphasized that he puts a lot of weight on the stare decisis value of Roe and Casey.
Roberts and Alito both said similar things in their confirmation hearings, and both of them have ruled on a case that applied the Casey precedents (Gonzales v. Carhart). In that case, Roberts and Alito joined in full Kennedy’s majority opinion which upheld the statute in question (a federal ban on certain late-term abortion procedures) on basis of an argument that it wasn’t disallowed by standards established under Casey. Thomas wrote a concurrence expressing reservations about the validity of Casey, which Scalia joined, but Roberts and Alito both declined to join.
I’d expect Kennedy’s replacement and any future supreme court appointment made by Trump and confirmed by a Republican Senate to be ideologically similar to Alito or Gorsuch. Thomas is really an outlier in terms of his willingness to reconsider major precedents (*), enough so that I doubt we’ll get another justice in the same mold. And even if I’ve read Gorsuch wrong and Kennedy’s replacement also defies my expectations, that’s three votes to overturn, and I very much doubt that both Ginsburg and Breyer will both leave the court before Democrats regain control of at least one of the Senate and the White House.
(*) The heart of this is that he rejects the substantive due process doctrine entirely, instead favoring a doctrine rooted in the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment to cover similar ground. This has a fair amount going for it from a theoretical perspective, but putting it into practice would require revising just about every individual liberties precedent from the past 60 years. Just about everyone other than Thomas is unwilling to go that far.
I suspect that affirmative action (among generally left-supported issues) will be in more immediate trouble than either Roe or Obergefell.
I completely agree with this. Kennedy’s vote was decisive in Fisher II, and I would be shocked if his replacement didn’t fall into the Roberts/Alito/Thomas camp on the next go around.
The ongoing case against Harvard also provides a particularly attractive vehicle for the Court to completely reconsider allowing affirmative action (NYT article). When that case, or another similar to it, reaches the Court, I think the minimum we’ll see is a substantial contraction in what affirmative action policies are permitted, and we may see the complete prohibition of race-based affirmative action.
That would be great (and ironically very classically liberal).
I’d like to see affirmative action ended (I’m not sure the SC is the place to do that, though–I think the SC makes policy way too often for an appointed body). And it seems likely that it will be ended or further limited, given the sequence of previous rulings that have basically required universities doing it to pretend they’re doing some more wholistic thing while still, in effect, keeping a quota for various minorities.
On the other hand, public support for affirmative action in education is pretty widespread and has increased over time. (I assumed the opposite till I looked for some polling data.)
Pew Center numbers.
I generally agree that the Supreme Court should be much less involved in political decisions. Of course, complaints about an “activist Court” are hardly new, but I do think they still have a lot of merit.
That said, affirmative action doesn’t strike me as an area where the Court need feel that restraint too strongly. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment doesn’t have an exception for race-based classifications that help minorities, and I don’t think the Court’s precedents should either. Even for proponents of affirmative action, I think it’s fairly clear that affirmative action is an in-bounds legal debate as a matter of constitutional law (whereas it’s a real struggle to ground, say, Obergefell, in the text of the Constitution).
Ending affirmative action is also reasonably consistent with stare decisis. The stated justification for permitting such race-based actions by the government has primarily been to ameliorate past harms, and the Court has indicated that’s a time-limited basis. Affirmative action isn’t supposed to run forever. I think the evidence is also reasonably clear that giving universities a blank check to discriminate in the name of “diversity” will lead to aggressively illegal conduct unless the federal courts police them constantly (as demonstrated by the ongoing Harvard case and even a passing familiarity with admissions at competitive institutions of higher learning). My preference would be to recognize that whatever positive integration results affirmative action could achieve have largely been accomplished, and that at this point “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Interesting. I would have assumed the opposite as well.
I feel like the Harvard case has the potential to overturn this, if not legally (I have no idea what the court is going to decide) than at least in the realm of popular opinion. The main difference today is that it’s not unsympathetic hetero-white males claiming “reverse discrimination,” the victims are much more sympathetic hard-working Asian students.
Regardless of what the court does, Harvard is backed into a corner where it’s going to have to go into public court and defend the notion that it’s “personality assessment” accurately concludes that on average, Asians just have worse personalities than whites, who have worse personalities than Hispanics, who have worse personalities than blacks.
The concept of “increasing diversity” is popular, particularly when you don’t explicitly make people aware that the way to do this is to punish more qualified (but less diverse) people. This was fine when the victims were assumed to all be evil white men. But once you start getting more sympathetic victims… I think opinion is about to sour on the entire enterprise.
I think it’s fascinating that we’ve somehow decided that the Harvard mess is all the fault of affirmative action, when AA is really just a relatively minor part of the picture.
In 2013, Asians made up 19% of Harvard admissions. If admission was purely based on grades, that would have been 43%. If you take athletics and legacy applicants into account, that number drops to 31%, and the proportion of white applicants goes up. (Based on the percentage of Harvard’s admissions that are legacy applicants vs athletes, roughly three-quarters of that effect is from legacy admissions.) Taking extra-curriculars and the infamous “personal ratings” into account lowers the number further, to 26% — again, to the benefit of white applicants. (I haven’t found any evidence to show that Hispanic or black applicants get an advantage over Asian applicants at this point. If somebody has a source, I’m open to correction.)
Only the last 8% gap is the result of affirmative action. The personal ratings that everybody’s angry about are a separate component. Somehow, though, a leaked report showing that Asian applicants are discriminated against relative to equally qualified white applicants has become a justification for ending affirmative action.
(The fact that the exact same thing happened a century ago, with Jews in the place of Asians, should also cast doubt on the idea that affirmative action is the culprit here.)
Iain,
I’m not sure about the legal definition of AA. I’m not really interested, to be honest.
As far as I’m concerned, this mess at Harvard is an indictment on the “diversity as a terminal value” mindset. Which is utterly ubiquitous at every major university, and most major employers.
Like I said, I have no idea what the legal outcome of this case will be in terms of what specific admission practices will or won’t continue to be legal. But I think that’s almost beside the point. The more we put cases like this in the public spotlight, the more scrutiny that is applied to “diversity” programs in general, the more the public will become aware of the fact that “promoting diversity” means, in a very real and practical sense, denying opportunities to well-deserving people, many of whom aren’t even the hated white-man.
I’m not confident the public is interested in that sort of thing, whether it manifests itself as AA, admission quotas, personality assessments, whatever.
@Iain
We live in a different time from then, yet somehow Harvard has gotten away with discriminating hugely against Asians? How? perhaps, times have not changed as much as thought, but I think it is obvious to a lot of people that Harvard got away with racial discrimination because we permit racial discrimination in affirmative action.
Iain,
Without getting into all the details, it isn’t really accurate to treat the “personal ratings” as distinct from the broader affirmative action program run at Harvard. The Asian applicants score just as well on the personal ratings by teachers and administrators at their schools and by the Harvard alumni who actually interview them in person. The only people who give the Asian applicants lower “personal ratings” are the admissions officials at Harvard, who never meet them. And the only metric that predicts those lower ratings is race. The plaintiffs allege that the “personal ratings” are just a thinly veiled way of applying a minus factor to Asian applicants, and there’s little in the record to dispute that claim (even if it hasn’t been conclusively proven, yet).
Harvard’s insistence on increasing the admission of favored minority groups also explains the entire system. If Harvard wants to use affirmative action to boost a large number African American and Hispanic applicants into the student body (which it clearly does), then it has to pull those slots from somewhere. Either those seats get taken away from Asians (as in the status quo) or from white students, with no caps on Asians, in which case the number of whites admitted would fall dramatically.
I think Harvard’s experience with Jewish applicants supports the plaintiffs quite nicely. Harvard built its admissions system with the goal of not letting in too many undesirables who would otherwise qualify. In the early twentieth century, the undesirables were Jews. In the early twenty-first century, the undesirables are Asians.
Granted, the discrimination against Asians is not solely because of affirmative action. It seems reasonably likely that Harvard would be denying qualified Asian applicants for spurious “personal ratings” reasons even if race-based affirmative action were entirely illegal. But the discrimination would be less severe – Harvard admits many otherwise unqualified African American and Hispanic students because of their race, and those seats have to come from somewhere. For the most part, it appears that those seats get taken away from much more qualified Asian applicants. I expect that most people will look pretty disfavorably upon that as that gains more publicity.
Finally, as others have said, I think the main reason Harvard can get away with this kind of nonsense is because race-based affirmative action is legal. End the permissibility of that, and you make these kinds of schemes much harder to operate (not impossible, but much, much more difficult).
The way it looks to me is:
a. Harvard manages its admissions to get a desired racial mix.
b. Different races perform differently in school and on standardized tests, on average.
c. The specific mix they want is the result of a political / social discussion. I
d. There is basically no chance that the racial mix they’d get by race-blind admissions happens to be the same as the result of that political process.
e. The only way Harvard can get its desired racial mix is thus to apply different standards to different racial groups.
f. It’s politically acceptable (IMO for dumb reasons) to discriminate against whites in admissions, but not to discriminate against nonwhites.
g. Asians outperform whites in grades and test scores (and in intellectual performance in general) on average.
h. Thus, Harvard, in order to get their desired racial mix, has had to discriminate against Asians. Now that this has become visible, they’ve got a problem, because while discriminating against whites is okay, discriminating against Asians really isn’t.
I think there are three ways out for Harvard:
1. They somehow tweak their admissions scheme to be more opaque / plausibly deniable while still getting their desired racial mix.
2. They stop discriminating against Asians. They will then have lots of Asians being admitted, and those places will have to come from somewhere. That breaks down to two further sub-choices:
2a. They maintain current levels of black and hispanic admissions, and take the seats from whites. The admissions requirements for whites go up, for Asians they go down, and fewer whites are let in.
2b. They abandon the whole racial-mix idea and more-or-less go with student merit.
In practice, I predict that (1) is the most likely outcome (add epicycles to the model until it just happens by random chance that Asians with 1600 SATs and perfect grades in their four AP courses/year just aren’t as good Harvard material as blacks with 1400 SATs and good-but-not-perfect grades). But if we go down (2), I think we’ll get (2a). And I think this will become another point of culture war tension, with a lot of ink spilled to explain why smart middle-class white kids should be okay with not getting to go to Harvard so that we can keep getting the benefits of having Harvard get enough black and hispanic students, and lots of whites being pretty resentful about it.
As an aside, it’s worth noting that admissions by race are inherently a zero-sum game–assuming next year’s Harvard class is the same size as last year’s, more Asians getting in means fewer of some other group getting in.
In general, taking seats from whites and giving them to Asians is likely to be more politically and legally acceptable than taking them from blacks/hispanics and giving them to Asians (which is mostly what will happen if you go to race-blind admissions).
But I think the long-term political consequences of doing that will not be anything that the sort of people who value affirmative action programs will like. I think if you want to encourage whites at the high end of wealth and intelligence and education to start thinking in terms of white racial interests, this is pretty much the perfect issue to do that on. If, on the other hand, you think racial identity politics are poison (as I do), then this is about the worst policy you can imagine.
Further, in 1990 you could sort-of keep the raw zero-sum nature of the thing out of the public consciousness, because most respectable media sources were very careful in how they covered the issue to avoid giving the wrong sort of people cover. But in 2018, that’s not going to work at all–every kid applying to an Ivy League university is going to know about this, and so will their parents.
I wonder if, in the long run, affirmative action proponents will just bite the bullet and make the categorization into Whites-and-Asians and not-Whites-and-Asians for groups that it’s OK to discriminate against and for, respectively. I’ve been sensing a sort of shift like this bubbling for a few years as the theory has had to get in contact with reality, but it also seems possible to me that it’s the sort of thing that might always just keep bubbling without ever producing an actual shift. I think this Harvard lawsuit might be a high volatility event that could shift things really hard in some direction. There’s also the recent Google lawsuit by a former recruiter contending that they were explicitly told to discriminate against white and Asian men.
@lvlln
Wuith the Chinese railroads and the Japanese camps, I think one can only discrimate against Asians in favour of Hispanics by saying some frank things about hispanics.
lvlln
That change already happened, some time ago, at least in most admissions arenas which I am familiar with. For law school, the relevant criteria isn’t “minority” or “non-white” but “under-represented-minority” (commonly abbreviated “URM”). The general understanding was that affirmative action wasn’t white applicants versus non-white applicants, but URMs getting boosted over non-URMs.
Of course, African-American URMs still got a bit of an extra boost, but the basic division (URM vs. non-URM) was quite clear. Harvard’s admissions appear to pretty much follow this model. Asians just get screwed twice, since admissions counselors don’t want to let too many of the merit-based slots go to Asians such that whites are getting too obviously excluded, so the admission standards for whites get lowered some as well (even if remaining much higher than for URMs).
Back in the day when affirmative action was mostly about boosting non-white applicants over white applicants, the proponents could at least claim that it was about correcting for historical wrongs or some such. But that’s a much harder line to advance when you’re disadvantaging Asian students, which is why the opponents of affirmative action are focusing on these types of cases.
I think the political consequences will be pretty much as albatross11 predicts. Either affirmative action will be allowed to finally die, and explicit discrimination on the basis of race will diminish in influence, or the groups who are disadvantaged under the current system will start to identify that way and organize (even more than at present).
@Alphonse
It seems to me that greater AA discrimination against Asians than against whites strongly undermines the claim that poor qualifications reflect past harms. After all, Asians get more AA discrimination because they are more qualified than whites, while in the past, Asians obviously got more discrimination than whites. So not only did Asians catch up with whites, they surpassed them.
It seems to me that the best person to challenge AA in front of the supreme court would be an Asian person, preferably one who can show evidence for racial discrimination against their ancestors.
@Iain
I consider legacy and athlete admissions to be absurd elements of the US college system…however, AFAIK there is no (agreed upon) constitutional prohibition against favoring the elite or athletes, while it is agreed that it (normally) prohibits favoring one race over the other.
So AA is a constitutional issue, while legacy and athlete admissions are an issue on which the administration and/or Congress and/or colleges have the legal freedom to create the policy or laws they desire.
@lvlln
This is already true in fact although not openly stated. The long run looks like it’s arriving in NYC to me though. When Richard Carranza said, “I just don’t buy into the narrative that any one ethnic group owns admission to these schools” he wasn’t talking about whites. He was talking about Asians.
I agree this is going to be a tough sell to the general public, but I would think the audience that would be most receptive to it would be the one that already likes to talk about psychological differences and race.
It’s too bad that personality constructs are relatively worthless for predicting anything important. And that it’s a lot easier to fake a personality on paper than most things.
I mean the following sincerely-
It really would be nice if there were meaningful objective assessments of personality that helped people sort themselves/ helped institutions sort people into good career paths. And it would be even more convenient if these measures just happened to somehow balance out the disparities found in other measures.
But if we were looking at delaying gratification or something, Asians probably do better at the marshmallow test too.
Aapje,
You’re exactly correct, which I think is why we’re starting to see a shift by anti-affirmative action groups toward using Asian plaintiffs. Foreclosing the argument that the affirmative action program is justified to remedy past discrimination is one of the particularly attractive aspects of the case against Harvard (for opponents of affirmative action).
Brad,
Even if you’re right about the audience most likely to be receptive, those aren’t the people Harvard needs to persuade – I expect the proponents of such views largely disfavor affirmative action already (at least as it exists in modern America). In any case, whatever one thinks of the accuracy of such stereotypes, Harvard’s program seems like a pernicious way of reaching them. It’s worth reiterating that none of the people who actually meet the Asian students rate them worse in terms of personality traits – not their teachers and not the Harvard alumni interviewers who talk to them in person. The only people who give them worse ratings are the Harvard admissions administrators, which is why it ends up looking like a less than subtle dummy variable for penalizing Asian applicants on the basis of their race.
quanta413,
Note that Harvard would be stuck in the unenviable position of arguing that not only can personality be meaningfully measured despite people’s attempts to fake it, but that it’s easier to fake in person than on paper, since the people who meet the Asian applicants in person don’t believe they have worse personalities. I think that’s pretty much an impossible sell.
I don’t think so.
Non-discrimination law is part of modern liberalism, not classical liberalism, since it’s a sharp restriction on freedom of association, contract, etc. In my view, Harvard should be free to discriminate in its admissions any way it wants, including the way it does. Affirmative action should be illegal only for state schools.
There would be a certain pleasure in seeing leftish schools hoist by their own petard, but that’s not coming from my classical liberal views.
Harvard isn’t a state actor. Rules against private discrimination come from legislation, not the constitution.
David Friedman,
You are certainly correct that Harvard is not a state actor and therefore is not directly subject to the Constitution. My commentary on that point was imprecise.
My understanding is that private universities largely end up operating under the same rules as state institutions with respect to this issue, however, so long as they accept federal funds. Since virtually every college and university in the country accepts federal funds, there isn’t much difference on the ground. I think the legal theories against Harvard are pretty much the same as those against similar state universities, although you are correct that the route to get to that point is more circuitous.
(I would also prefer a system where the federal government is pretty much entirely removed from the realm of higher education – no guaranteed federal student loans, etc. – but we’re a long way away from that point, and so long as we have this system, I’d prefer to have it without the government providing funding to universities that discriminate on the basis of race.)
I’m pretty sympathetic to the view that private entities should be able to discriminate how they please (e.g. I am sympathetic to the plaintiffs in Masterpiece Cakeshop), but if we’re going to require private actors to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race in any area, I think higher education seems like one of the more reasonable ones to apply anti-discrimination rules to both public and private conduct.
Brad:
I wouldn’t be surprised if there were some genetic and cultural personality differences across racial groups in the US. I’d certainly be interested in any research along these lines. And I’d be very happy to see it discussed in public, if, say, Harvard would like to make a defense based on racial differences in personality test scores.
However, I very much doubt that would explain the pattern that has appeared in news stories w.r.t. Asian applicants to Harvard, where, as I understand it, the people doing the in-person interviews rated Asians as having about the same personality as anyone else, whereas people in the back office who hadn’t met the applicants rated Asians extra low on personality, in a way that just happened to justify making it much harder for Asians than whites to qualify for admission.
What I don’t understand in this case is Harvard’s motivation in keeping the number of Asians down. It makes sense to me that they would try to bring up the numbers of various mistreated minorities. Trying to compensate for past wrongs has a certain nobility to it. But why worry about the balance of whites and Asians at all?
I work in software, where the workforces tend to skew heavily Asian, both south and east, and I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone complain about there being too many of them. Just saying such a thing would be deeply suspect. Critics tend to focus on under-representation by blacks, Latinos, and women.
The only way this makes any sense to me at all is that Harvard, in an effort to raise the number of blacks and Latinos it recruits, implemented various rules and practices that inadvertently affected Asians more than whites. But that doesn’t seem to be what happened. So I am left puzzled.
My first instinct would be to follow the money.
I think Brad may be correct.
In the sense that “Harvard alumni who donate don’t want to see a campus that’s 50% Asian because these alumni are subtly racist” or “rich white people are subtly racist and won’t want to go to Harvard as much if it becomes 50% Asian”. I think it likely is the Jewish admissions fiasco all over again.
But given the size of Harvard’s endowment, this may be the equivalent of Jeff Bezos deciding he needs to turn tricks to increase his income.
And affirmative action towards other minorities obviously doesn’t explain the results, since Harvard is also easier on white applicants than on Asian applicants.
@johan_larson
It seems to me that slavery caused a special feeling of guilt towards black people that doesn’t exist towards Asians. Furthermore, Asians severely muck up the narrative that is used to explain why black people are still doing so poorly.
So ironically, it would then minimize cognitive dissonance to harm Asians until black people manage to get proportionate access on merit.
@Brad
That may explain discriminating in favor of whites at the expense of Asians*, but not discriminating in favor of black people.
* Are Asians much less likely to donate to their former university? The statistics suggest that they have the income to donate, but it may not be part of their culture as much as for white people.
@Quanta413
I didn’t go to Harvard but my alma mater dear has 10 figures in the bank and that doesn’t stop them from obsessively fund raising.
Charities in general and universities in particular have serious principal-agent problems that lead them to be as money hungry as any openly for profit company.
The goal of Harvard admissions is not to have the most academically impressive student body, it is to have a student body consisting of the future leaders of America. This is correlated with academic success, but far from perfectly. I do not know if Harvard is correct that academically successful Asians are less likely to be part of their intended target group than academically successful members of other ethnic groups, but such a belief (or a more complicated set of beliefs with the same consequences) is surely responsible for their policies.
I have, both put that way and complaining about H1-B (and it’s not European H1-Bs they’re talking about). Much more in the lower-tier business software and IT world than Silicon Valley tech, and especially in consulting. There are both good and bad reasons for this.
However, when the usual “diversity” pushers complain about too many Asians in tech, they usually phrase it as “too many whites” or “too many white males” (whereas if you look at the numbers, whites are underrepresented), or by complaining about too few “marginalized people” or “URMs” (underrepresented minorities)
@Brad
They aren’t sitting on the endowment; a lot is invested. They gotta keep hustling. I think it’s different in the US, because y’all care more about university athletics, but in Canada the highest-paid person on campus is frequently the investment advisor, and we don’t have anywhere as rich as the Ivies – the best and richest Canadian institutions are public universities; there’s a couple that are on par with the best American public universities.
Right. In the bank was proverbial. Though now that you bring it up, some universities are way out of their league. Cooper Union was essentially destroyed by hubris on the part of the president / board which enabled them to be conned by Wall Street bankers.
I did go to Harvard, and I still get fund raising messages from them. There are few charities I am less likely to donate to.
Interesting conspiratorial theory I saw regarding Asian admissions – it’s not that over representation of Asians vs. whites is per se a problem, it’s that Asian students heavily self select into hard sciences and engineering programs. Letting in too many would gut the student populations of social science and humanities departments, so in some sense this is a power play by those departments to keep their budgets and influence.
If that’s the issue, I don’t see what the problem is with doing it openly. Put the STEM subjects into the engineering school, have separate admissions, and not let students transfer between schools.
This would draw more attention towards the even stronger disparate impact among STEM majors.
Preventing transfers would also create problems given the enormous efforts to increase women and URMs in STEM subjects; universities would either have to cut back on those recruitment efforts or dropout rates among those demographics would increase in the absence of the ability to transfer out.
Both of these would result in the sort of scrutiny and ideological crises that the education system prefers to avoid.
@Brad
I think you’ve pretty much nailed it. To go into more detail, I think it’s the same problem companies experience with CEOs who may be incentivized to boost short-term metrics at the expense of the long-term.
In the long run of a couple generations, I don’t think it would hurt Harvard’s prestige and fiscal position to admit more Asians. But in the short run, it’s very plausible. So risking some long term institutional reputation looks good to whoever’s in charge, because Harvard has so much of that built up they could lose a lot of it before the problem became obvious. And they aren’t going to get blamed for the loss of reputation. They’ll be long gone.
@Education Hero
Women have been doing better than men at colleges and if the same thing is true for Asians, would’t admitting more Asians be the easiest way to get more women in STEM?
Asian-American women are actually less likely to go into STEM relative to Asian-American men than American women are relative to American men, despite the opposite trend when comparing American women to Asian women from Asian countries. This appears consistent with the fact that women from more egalitarian societies are actually less likely to go into STEM (likely because reduced economic pressures facilitates women following their sex-linked preferences). Thus, admitting more Asian-American students would actually magnify the disparity between male and female STEM students.
My anecdotal experiences as an educational consultant strongly corroborate that even among Silicon Valley students, Asian-American girls rarely pursue STEM majors. I’ve also crunched some of the numbers for you below.
Using the latest (2014-2015) data available for bachelor’s degrees conferred to females and males, we can do a few calculations (with a few assumptions such as disregarding differences with foreign student demographics), to see through the deliberately opaque presentation of data:
– Females represent 57% (1,082,276 / 1,894,945) of college graduates.
– Males represent 43% (812,669 / 1,894,945) of college graduates.
– Asians represent 6.8% (128,960 / 1,894,945) of college graduates, (despite being 5.6% of the US population).
– Asian females represent 6.5% (70,079 / 1,082,276) of college graduates.
– Asian males represent 7.2% (58,881 / 812,669) of college graduates.
Disregarding the life sciences, health professions, and psychology degrees commonly used to pad STEM statistics, we can see that:
– Females represent 39% (119,876 / 308,028) of STEM college graduates.
– Males represent 61% (188,152 / 308,028) of STEM college graduates.
– Asian females represent 5.3% (16,282 / 308,028) of STEM college graduates.
– Asian males represent 8.1% (24,996 / 308,028) of STEM college graduates.
– Male college graduates are 1.4x more likely to graduate with a STEM degree than female college graduates.
– Asian male college graduates are 1.8x more likely to graduate with a STEM degree than Asian female college graduates.
@Education Hero
Thanks for the response.
I agree that there are no pain free options here (from the perspective of college administrators).
However while some (many?) on SSC that seem to strongly think that colleges ought to run admissions with the sole aim of achieving a class with the highest average SAT score possible, I think outside SSC most would think that it is perfectly legitimate for Harvard or Yale to want to have English and History majors instead of transforming themselves into MIT and CalTech because the kids with the highest SATs disproportionately don’t want to study English or History. I think relatively few people across the political spectrum would see attempting to achieve such a distribution of majors be a stalking horse for discriminating against Asians.
So going back to what gbdub if the real problem is skewed majors it makes more sense to acknowledge that and put solutions in place that directly go to it then to secretly discriminate against Asians in hopes of indirectly fixing that problem, given that almost everyone is going to be more offended by the latter than the former.
I thought about it some more and making the anti-transfer rule asymmetrical solves most of the problems. The original problem is that the university wanted sufficient liberal arts and social sciences majors. In order to ensure that you can have separate admissions for STEM and the liberal arts and social sciences sub-schools. Then the issue becomes people that want to game the system by applying to the sub-school that they don’t really intend to graduate from. So you ban transfers. Then as EH points out you have the problem of people that can’t hack physics and are forced to drop out of the whole university. But people moving from STEM to liberals arts or social sciences aren’t an issue for the problem at hand. On the contrary. So the schools only need to be transfers in the other direction — to the STEM sub-school, not from it.
With that solution you have sufficient English and History majors and no elevated drop out rate. Admittedly you still have the “problem” of demographic differences between the sub-schools, but it isn’t like there’s any solution for the analogous problem now.
Although the given example of majors is a weaker one (see the last portion of this post below), I agree that colleges have a compelling interest to select students for non-academic factors (such as expected future influence and donations, which do not correlate as strongly with the test scores of Asian applicants). Moreover, I would support their freedom of association regardless. The complaint about affirmative action, however, is that it is neither applied transparently nor consistently.
It is not the case that admissions committees use other variables to predict success and Asians simply don’t measure up on those variables (although this would probably be true); instead, admissions committees functionally use race as a minus factor to achieve their desired demographics. Colleges certainly don’t acknowledge that they have a compelling reason to discriminate because Asian students tend not to achieve future success proportionate with their high academic performance. Instead, affirmative action purports to correct historical discrimination against disadvantaged groups, which clearly isn’t true when you consider Asians. All of this blatant dishonesty would provoke incredible scrutiny in the case of any favored minority group.
Further, no one would dare to apply these policies or arguments to favored minorities. Colleges aren’t permitted to discriminate against Jewish students because they want fewer business majors, nor have fewer women’s sports because they want a certain distribution of athletes. Businesses aren’t permitted to make less than a Herculean effort to recruit favored minorities, let alone attempt to justified disparate impact on the ground that they want a certain distribution of technical to non-technical jobs. Sports teams can’t mount efforts to recruit less qualified Asian athletes on the grounds that this would benefit them financially by bringing in Asian fans.
Yes, but only because Asians are not a favored class. If Black, Hispanic, or female applicants were passed over in favor of less-qualified White, Asian, or male applicants to achieve a particular distribution of majors, there would be significant social, political, and legal backlash. Cf. the popular tendency to see any explanation for disparate impact as a thinly-veiled excuse for discrimination.
Skewed majors are probably only a small part of why colleges discriminate against Asians. After all, colleges could easily accept more Asian non-STEM students, but in practice they discriminate against these students as well, if not as heavily as they do with the Asian STEM students.
Even assuming the disparity is entirely due to STEM/non-STEM differences (which I highly doubt), splitting admissions by major would probably still result in having more Asians compared to the current plan because people respond to incentives.
A Harvard degree in any major is still a big deal. If Harvard is explicit about splitting admissions into STEM and non-STEM people will notice one of these is easier to get into and some Asians will respond by switching from STEM to non-STEM. There may be a few years of breathing room, but with the Asian population of the U.S. growing proportionally to the total population it’s not gonna last. With high schoolers as applicants, the qualifications for college admission are largely the same for most majors (sans things like music performance or composition) so it hardly makes any difference.
You could solve that problem by simply limiting the number of seats in the STEM programs.
What does that solve?
I’m not at all saying I think colleges should only select on maximum test scores. I am saying that I’m broadly okay with two different sets of rules for society:
a. Private organizations (companies, universities, etc.) may discriminate as they see fit, for any reason or none. Freedom of association for all, and let the chips fall where they may.
b. Private organizations (companies, universities, etc.) may not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, sexual orientation or identity, etc. Antidiscrimination law for all, and let the chips fall where they may.
Either of these rulesets is acceptable to me, but I’d like us to choose one and stick with it. What is unacceptable to me, as a matter of justice and consistency, is a situation in which it is acceptable (and maybe mandatory) to discriminate against people who look like me and my kids, but forbidden to discriminate against people who don’t look like me and my kids.
If Harvard can discriminate against Asians and (to a lesser extent) against whites, to ensure enough blacks and hispanics, and Google can discriminate against white and Asian men in hiring, then Wal-Mart can decide that only married WASP men with gray in their hair will become store managers. Freedom works pretty well, and irrational discrimination doesn’t pay, so I think the result of this will be very little actual discrimination. On the other hand, I definitely see the case for antidiscrimination law continuing for the forseeable future. But it should apply consistently, not selectively to favored groups.
@albatross11
I don’t think colleges ought to discriminate against Asians or be legally allowed to discriminate against Asians. Nor should they be allowed to get away with thin pretexts to the same end–which is what this Harvard personality thing looks like to me.
But on the other hand I think they have zero obligation–moral or legal–to matriculate a class in keeping with the dominant monomanical view here of what constitutes “merit”. Imposing such a rule is throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
@quanta413
gbdub posited that the discrimination against Asians was motivated, at least in large part, by a desire for non-STEM majors. What I laid out solves that problem.
You can certainly disagree with his premise, but it seems like you are just talking past it instead of explicitly arguing against it.
@Brad
There’s various things a school can select for. However, intentional vagueness in what the element of “character” or “leadership” or whatever is, seems designed to provide a smokescreen for some kind of discrimination, or at least to enable it. In general, vague criteria are a strong adjunct to discrimination.
@Education Hero
Thanks for doing the calculation, very interesting and unexpected! Perhaps the Asian women that do go into STEM go into IT relatively often, leading to my misperception. However, I don’t understand your reasoning why Asian women would choose STEM less than white women. It seems to me that Asians have a more traditional culture than whites, so one would then expect more Asian women to choose STEM.
Perhaps Asian women are so desired on the dating market, including by white men, that they can pick the most providery men and thus have less need for a high personal income than white women?
@gbdub & Brad
If Harvard et al are trying to get more people to study History and English, rather than Computer Science and such, then I would argue that they are evil.
There is already a surplus of college graduates in those fields compared to the available jobs, while STEM is mostly begging for more well-educated graduates. Without that discrimination, more people would have a good income and less stress, the fields that drive economic growth would do better, etc. So if they are doing that, they are harming both individuals and the US as a whole.
Finally, I think it is immoral for Harvard et al not to openly say what their actual goals are, so society can decide whether they like this.
That’s frankly a really stupid comment. Harvard’s entering class is something like 3000 people. There’s more than 3000 18 year olds every year that want to study liberal arts and the social sciences. Picking some them for their matriculating class rather than filing the entire class with people that want to study STEM isn’t creating English and History majors out of whole cloth, isn’t harming those students, and isn’t harming the United States.
If Harvard has some stand alone moral obligation to train as many people as possible in STEM and straying from that obligation to do anything else is evil, then you have a moral obligation to be out there educating people in STEM instead of writing so many comments here. So why aren’t you?
@Brad
Sure. That’s not the world we live in. I’ll elaborate. If this was the problem, Harvard could have done what Berkeley did in the 1970s when its admissions numbers led it to be afraid of being sued based on the claim that it was discriminating against women for graduate program admissions. Note Berkeley was never actually sued as far as I can find; this was just due diligence. Just release enough information on admits by major, race, and qualifications to prove that it’s actually all just Simpson’s paradox and Asians are equally likely to be admitted into any given program given qualifications. Then the government case would fall apart, and we could all have a good laugh.
On top of that, gbdubs explanation for the disparity totally fails to explain the voodoo magic by which Asian candidates have personality scores that drop on paper but not in person.
So you aren’t actually solving Harvard’s real problem which is that their short term incentives are to maintain a certain racial composition. You’re just reassigning a few Asians from STEM to non-STEM. Which doesn’t really change anything.
The constant tacit assumption that Asians are somehow inferior at some unspecified criteria is unfounded. The people who actually interview candidates don’t give Asians worse personality scores. Give a criteria and provide some proof.
I highly doubt there are enough student athletes at Harvard to really shift the numbers much here.
@Aapje
It’s ridiculously over the top to say that Harvard wanting some English majors is evil. Harvard majors in anything do well later in life. There could be a Harvard major in underwater basketweaving and that’d still be viewed as a plus with a lot of employers. The degree is mostly signalling anyways.
@quanta413
I don’t think I made that assumption, tacitly or otherwise, anywhere. I specifically said that I thought Harvard’s personality thing was a likely a thin pretext for racial discrimination which I think is both wrong and ought be a illegal.
That doesn’t mean I think they have an obligation to publish criteria that you and dndnrsn think are sufficiently objective. I don’t think colleges in general have an obligation to open themselves up anymore than they already are to gaming.
The current legal framework seems entirely reasonable to me. Show intentional discrimination *or* show a disparate impact, in which case the burden shifts to the school to demonstrate a non discriminatory, bona fide educational purpose for the rule.
Based on the, admittedly relatively small amount, reading I’ve done so far the Harvard plaintiff’s have a decent case on both prongs. And if Harvard is adjudicated a discriminator it might well be reasonable as part of judgement against them to limit the discretion they are allowed for a time given that they would have been found to have abused it. But that’s not the same thing as saying that colleges in general should or should be forced to publish “objective” admissions criteria.
Finally, with respect, the tail end of your post seems to be edging dangerously close to racial supremacy. You seem to be claiming that any reasonable criteria would produce a class that’s disproportionately Asian as compared to the overall population of the United States. Am I missing something?
@quanta413
Perhaps I took it too far. Yet it seems to me that Harvard is a model for many lesser universities. Will the basketweaving/English majors at Evergreen find jobs that easily?
quanta413:
If the justification for establishing higher entrance requirements for Asians than for everyone else is that the Asians will all want to major in STEM fields and nobody will take History anymore, then limiting the number of seats in those fields (or raising standards for staying in those fields) will solve the problem.
Brad:
I don’t object to Harvard selecting students with some more complicated scheme than just looking at SAT scores and grades, but I do suspect that more complicated schemes are often ways to obscure racial discrimination done in order to get the desired racial mix of students. I also strongly suspect that SAT scores are much harder to game than most of the other stuff that admissions departments use (essays, resume-building activities, etc.)
That is, you can improve your SAT scores a little with minimal test prep, or a bit more with lots and lots of test prep. And that’s a way for your parents’ money to improve your chances of getting into a top school. But another way for your parents’ money to improve your chances is to have a great-looking transcript because the private school you were sent to knows exactly what the top schools are looking for and makes sure they see it. And another way is to make sure you get lots of resume-building activities because your parents can pay for you to have them, or your stay-at-home mom with an MBA can help you organize them.
My guess, which I’ll admit isn’t all that well-informed, is that test scores are probably about the least gameable thing the admissions officers see for most students. That’s not true for a kid who’s published an academic paper in a real journal, or won a serious math or science competition (admittedly, that kind of kid does apply to places like Harvard), but I think it’s true for a lot of the stuff that goes into the application package.
[ETA]
That makes me suspect that the more holistic the admissions criteria are, the more opportunity there is for the requirements to be gamed, and for the biases of the admissions officers or the school to come out. And as I understand it, standardized testing for college admissions was a *huge* step forward for social mobility.
@Brad
Most fun first.
You’ve caught me. I’m a white-presenting agent for a Chinese government troll farm laying down FUD for a Manchurian takeover of U.S. institutions.
Well, nice try anyways.
But I don’t think grades or test scores determine moral or legal worth. They are merely good indicators of academic ability. Harvard is primarily a
hedge fundschool. Is it racial supremacy when I claim that a fair criterion for NBA basketball players leads to a disproportionately African-American population compared to the whole U.S.? Please note I’m asking a question about a claim I am making. I’m pretty sure that claim is true. And this outcome is good. But no one would think I’m a black supremacist for thinking this.Obviously, Harvard could pick a criteria like height and have a very different student population in every way. It could decide it wants to focus on college athletics or the glorious proletarian revolution or painting, but it doesn’t and it won’t.
The idea that it’s “racial supremacy” that almost any reasonable criteria a school in the liberal arts and sciences (or engineering) could come up with will lead to Asian over-representation is nonsense. Asians are over-represented at Harvard relative to their demographic share of the entire U.S. already. And you also believe that it looks like there is a case against Harvard for discrimination against Asians not that Harvard is an agent of Asian supremacy.
More fun later maybe.
@albatross11
I agree that SAT scores aren’t especially game-able. But, to steal an argument from the late Scalia, neither is a lottery. A perfectly non-game-able criteria that doesn’t actually produce the outcome you want is useless. And there’s nothing at all wrong with a wanting outcomes other than highest average SAT score. “Not too many Asians” is not one of those things that there’s nothing wrong with wanting, that’s quite wrong, but after eliminating that we are still left with a near infinite multidimensional space of legitimate preferences.
At a slight tangent …
If colleges really want to defend against gaming, there is one pretty simple thing they could do–make sure that the essay an applicant submits is actually written by him. That makes sense given that writing ability is a valuable skill for a college student and one very poorly tested at present.
Many applicants visit the school they are applying to. Provide them with an hour in a room with a word processor and a list of essay topics. For ones that don’t visit, arrange the equivalent monitored by an alumnus living near them. If many schools were doing this, someone would set up locations in every major city for monitored essay writing, serving any school that wanted to use them.
So far as I know, no school does that. That means that the essay submitted could be written entirely by the student, could be written by the student and heavily edited by someone familiar with what schools want, could be entirely written by someone else.
It’s a bit weird to see someone who argues against racial discrimination be accused of racial supremacism, for possibly believing in Humanoid Biodiversité. If they don’t seek to advantage a racial group, then there is no discrimination, so at most one can then argue that this person mistakes discrimination for innate differences and thereby blocks remedies for the former.
In that case, doesn’t it work better to offer evidence that the former hypothesis is correct, rather than try to shame someone for believing in the wrong hypothesis?
Right.
It seems very bizarre, and a poor strategic decision, to use racial quotas as a proxy for ensuring the true goal of field of study quotas. If what you want is to ensure you have X number of students majoring in specific individual fields, you could easily simply make admission decisions at the major-level, rather than at the university-level. And from a PR perspective, nobody would get up in arms about that. Harvard could then, correctly, claim that it’s relative lack of Asian students is due to the choices of Asian students to all pick popular majors.
@DavidFriedman
Doesn’t Oxbridge do that? Or at least some colleges within it? Although the questions, as I understand it, are not saccharine like those used in American university admissions.
Slight disagree.
To the extent that the SAT and various other tests are rough approximates for IQ tests, then yes, studying can only take you so far and not studying can only punish you so much.
That said, in the short term it’s probably the most “gameable” major admissions criteria that exists. The only other one I can find that comes close is essays – and as far as I know, essays aren’t really considered that strongly in most cases.
Consider a hypothetical high-school junior. They go to a mediocre public school – a decision made by their parents that they cannot affect. They got poor grades in their freshman and sophomore year. They haven’t yet signed up for any extra-curricular activities of note. What can they do – in the next year and a half – to dramatically improve their shot at getting admitted to a good school?
Cram for the freaking test! Your GPA is already halfway determined. Suddenly deciding to become good enough to make a sports or band or debate team isn’t likely to work. Your biggest “bang for the buck” in effort to reward ratio is definitely test prep. And you can control it. There’s tons of free test prep materials available online and in libraries. Are these materials equally as good as $1000/hr private tutor sessions that we assume every Chinese student has access to? Maybe not. But it’s definitely your best prospect for improving your odds quickly even with little to no support from anyone else.
@David Friedman
My understanding is that such test centers exist and are available for contracting. Pearson VUE is the one that I know of, but I don’t know if any other companies compete with them. Their video on the website details their security measures for a testing center.
They’re used by the NCEES for the Fundamentals of Engineering Exam, and I believe the PE exam is moving to their computer-based system.
Harvard is qualitatively different than lesser universities, in a matter that is rather important here.
“Lesser” universities, and in this context that may include even MIT and Caltech, provide some combination of specialized knowledge, skills development, and the signal “this person is intelligent and conscientious”.
Harvard and Yale, provide some of that plus the additional signal, “This person has been selected as one of the American Nomenklatura“, and the opportunity to build a personal and professional network among the same.
For reasons beyond Harvard’s control, the future cultural, political, and economic elite of the United States of America are not broadly perceived as being 40% Asian. And the value of a Harvard degree, to most of its traditional customers, is marginally diminished by every student for which the expectation is that they will probably go back to China or Japan to manage a business there, or become a Silicon Valley techbro handling the boringly computational side of the intertube economy. And that expectation doesn’t have to be accurate.
Even for the Asian customers of a Harvard or Yale degree, I suspect a big part of the value proposition is hobnobbing with Future Rich And Powerful White Dudes rather than their fellow Asians or Asian-Americans. They can go to MIT for that.
@Aapje
I may not have expressed myself sufficiently clearly in my long post.
To clarify, Asian women actually do go into STEM more often than American women in general. However, the gender disparity in STEM is greater among Asian-Americans than among Americans in general. To put it another way, Asian men go into STEM by a much larger margin relative to American men in general, than Asian women do relative to American women in general.
Thus, the counter-intuitive result is that more Asian-American enrollment will actually magnify the gender gap in STEM, even though Asian-American women are more likely to go into STEM than American women.
How much is that also the explanation of the earlier discrimination against Jews, implemented in part by promoting geographical diversity?
@Education Hero
That makes sense, thanks.
@John Schilling
Why is it OK for there to be a over-representation of Jews, but not of Asians? Is that an actual choice that is being made, which would be racially discriminatory; or does Harvard forget that Jews exist because it is much harder to visually identify a Jew than an person of Asian descent?
Ah, just racial discrimination then. How is this meaningfully different from people who don’t want the elite to be disproportionately Jewish?
Is it actually particularly common for Asians to go back to China/Japan? Or is this a false stereotype?
What about Asian-Americans? They are born in the US and my perception is that they don’t migrate to China in large numbers.
Silicon Valley is where a lot of innovation and money is…
If the expectation is that Harvard graduates become leaders in their field, why would this not be true for Asian Harvard graduates in tech?
Ellen Pao did become CEO of Reddit before she sabotaged herself by acting/being crazy. If Harvard actually teaches leadership skills, then why would Harvard graduates not be more likely to get into leadership positions, rather than be programmers?
—
The thing is: because of the secrecy, there is little public debate with actual data to corroborate any of this. So why would I believe that this is anything more than: ‘I hate the slanty eyed’?
You won’t find the word “OK” anywhere in my comment, nor I think anything that would be taken for a synonym. But for the sake of understanding Harvard’s behavior, and hoping we don’t have to do the thing where trying to understand someone is automatically taken as an endorsement:
Jews are distinctly overrepresented in the American Elite as it is traditionally understood. 33% of Supreme Court justices are Jewish, 8% of Fortune 500 CEOs, even 2% of Congressmen, vs. less than one percent of the population. And at this point, pretty much only the almost-literal-Nazis have any problem with that. If Jews came with yellow badges permanently affixed to their right arm for easy identification, Harvard’s selling point of “look, see, Future Leaders of America right here!” would be enhanced by making sure they enrolled an extra dose of clearly identifiable Jewishness.
Asians make up about 6% of the US population. And 2% of the ranks of Congress, 2% of Fortune-500 CEOs, zero Supreme Court justices ever, etc. Maybe that’s down to “just racial discrimination”, but if your goal is to hobnob with the Future Leaders of America and the group you’re hanging out with is 20% Asian, you’re either making a long-odds progressive bet on the future or you’re doing it wrong. And if you’re looking for someone to be on the leading edge of progressivism, an institution that predates the reign of Oliver Cromwell probably isn’t going to be the one.
Yes, but Harvard’s customers only care about the “money” part, and won’t even admit to that much.
And in Silicon Valley, it’s disproportionately the Asians who write the innovative code and the White people (including Jewish ones) who handle the money. And tell the disproportionately-Asian STEM nerds what is or is not an acceptable sort of innovation for them to make, and get invited to the table where the rest of the Elite get to make the big decisions.
The thing where Silicon Valley’s success changed the rules so now the Elite want to hang out with the STEM nerds who are going to change the world, no, that was always only a lie and you should never have fallen for it. Harvard certainly hasn’t.
@John Schilling
By that logic they should discriminate against blacks, instead of in favor of them, since black people make up 13% of the population, but a smaller percentage of the leaders.
I don’t see how there is a consistent policy, not based on illogical dislike of specific groups, which can explain their behavior, based on the facts.
Now, that doesn’t mean that I am accusing them of being intentionally racist, because a strong misperception of the facts seems quite common.
Blacks are 9% of Congress, 1/9th of the Supreme Court, and 14% of US Federal District Court Justices. Compared to Asians who are 2%, 0/9, and 3%. So if Harvard is optimizing for the future leaders of America, they absolutely will want a significant fraction of their student body to be black. Currently they seem to be comfortable with that fraction being 9%, which sounds about right given the above figures. If they weren’t discriminating in favour of blacks, the student body would be only 1% black, which is much too low for Harvard’s purposes.
@Lillian
That seems logically consistent then, although it still is inconsistent with dominant left-wing beliefs, so it’s still hard to believe.
I doubt that there’s going to be any major changes. But the core of Roe. v. Wade is pretty much untenable.
Many people think that the decision went something along the lines of:
Constitution + judges we like = legal abortion.
Instead, it’s more like:
Constitution + judges we like = “Right to Privacy”, which as applied = legal abortion.
Now, creating the name for a right out of abstract principles as a way to solve a class of judicial problems isn’t that big of a surprise. “Freedom of Association” comes up occasionally, despite not actually being mentioned in the text. Outside of a few cases like public accommodations law, this doesn’t really conflict with anything else and so isn’t that controversial.
Looking instead at a “Right to Privacy”, however, is pretty much incompatible with a whole pile of our bureaucratic and legal system. Were this to be held as a real right, the Court would have to strike down a whole pile of law. At the top of my head:
* Marking anything as a Schedule I drug (if my doctor and I can choose abortion, why can’t we choose heroin?).
* Reporting of cash transactions over $10,000.
* Probably most provisions of the Internal Revenue Code because it requires divulging private information. * Firearms registration requirements.
Then you can start getting into the “out-there” category, like arguing that domestic abuse shouldn’t be a crime because it’s occurring in the privacy of the home, etc.
Alternatively, the “Right to Privacy” as constructed in Roe. v. Wade can be discarded. But then we’re left with a question over abortion. The Court could still strike down any Federal abortion restriction as outside of the power of the Federal legislature, applying breaks to the abuse of the Commerce Clause. But that conflicts with Gonzales v Raich. And all it would do would be to punt the issue to the States.
In-practice, I don’t think that would go anywhere – I suspect a lot of the current work on State abortion laws is an attempt to “get back” at the Federal government rather than because it’s a serious policy issue which has been considered by the populace of the States.
That seems like a pretty great compromise to me.
It’s always seemed to me that Roe v Wade was a pretty classic example of the SC deciding what policy they preferred, and finding an argument to get there. Which seems pretty fundamentally wrongheaded to me–the SC is a group of unelected lifetime-appointed people, immune from feedback from voters by design (and for very good reason!). They are a wonderful place to put our “make sure the elected officials don’t trample on the constitution to chase votes” function, but a really lousy place to put our “decide what policies we shall pursue as a nation” function.
I wish there were some way to get ourselves out of the pattern of having the SC effectively make policy. For example, I think we’d live in a better world if gay marriage had come about from normal democratic mechanisms. A much narrower ruling just saying that states have to recognize each others’ marriages wouldn’t have been a huge policy shift, but would have been within the scope of what I think of as the proper role for the SC.
Long term, I kind-of suspect that the expansion of the role of the SC is partly a result of the dysfunctionality of Congress. (The expansion of executive power is, IMO, both a symptom and a result of Congress not working very well.)
The constitution makes Congress dysfunctional. Partly deliberately and partly though poor design choices. It’s a good litmus test to see who is blinded by reverence to watch who defends the Constitution even when it is so clearly harmful as in cases like this.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately designed a legislature that interfaces poorly with political parties in the hopes that there would be no political parties. What they actually got, pretty much immediately, was both political parties and a legislature that interfaced poorly with them. This is however not an insurmountable problem, historically speaking Congress has come up with various norms and traditions intended to patch the problem, with varying degrees of success.
The issue we’re having now is that the latest set of these norms and tradition are breaking down, and nothing is rising up to replace them. Worse, it’s an iterative problem, as more unwritten rules are broken for the sake of political gain, the greater the willingness to break further ones. In game theory terms, we are stuck in a slow moving defect cycle.
Congressmen (and Congresswomen) make Congress dysfunctional. Without some form of oversight you are one bad election cycle away (or 10) from “Hey, lets pass a low to ensure all current Congressmen have great job security”, or “Lets restrict the speech of our political opponents because lets say ‘Communism'”.
@baconbits9
Yet there are countries without a supreme court (cough**Netherlands**cough), that have not become communist and where politicians don’t have that much job security.
And those countries almost all (all?) have some person or group in power with the ability to effectively veto any legislation.
To me this sounds like a great endorsement for enshrining the the right to privacy into law. Most of the things in that list are things i’m in favour of. The war on drugs and the scheduling system are a dumpster fire and ought to be discarded in their entirely and not replaced. Reporting of cash transactions of $10 000 hurts innocent people much more than it hurts criminals. Especially since making cash transactions under $10 000 is also illegal if the government suspects you’ve structured them such as to avoid the limit, so you’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Firearms registration has historically been a way to impose restrictions on people’s 2nd Amendment rights, and i am therefore very suspicious of it. So yeah not seeing the downside for these.
The Internal Revenue Code is more complicated in that i’m not opposed to its existence though i do not like its current form. However, i expect it would survive relatively intact given that the Court’s ruling would have to be compatible with Article I, Section 8.1 and the 16th Amendment of the Constitution, both of which give Congress the power to impose taxes.
Can you explain this a bit more? Is there a common, legal use case where people need to transfer >$10,000 in cash and it’s very important that nobody in the government hear about it?
It’s not that it’s very important that the government not hear about it, it’s that the government regularly abuses the Bank Secrecy Act to seize and keep the assets of innocent people. Which i guess is a reason why it’s important that the government not hear about it.
A better question is what’s so important that the government know about every cash transfer above a certain size. Most of the illegal commerce that this law is intended to go after – drugs, gambling, prostitution – are things i strongly believe ought to be legal. As far as i’m concerned, going after people for what they choose to do with their persons and their money is nothing short of tyranny.
Adam Smith argued that an income tax or a wealth tax was not a realistic alternative because no free people would put up with the violation of privacy it would require.
Turns out that people who strongly value their freedom are far thinner on the ground than Enlightenment thinkers would have hoped.
Guys, does the “WW2 was badly written” joke ever get old?
Ridiculous anime superweapon was used as a Deus ex Machina and then never again.
Are there any good fictional treatments of this?
Scott did it on his Livejournal 8 years ago, which seems inaccessible. 🙁
Did anyone watch the Spanish Civil War, the sequel to World War (1) that was half-funded by Spanish broadcasting because of the big Spanish fever the original show caused? They did the entire “Commies and Anglophones against Fascists” narrative on a much smaller budget.
The Internet Archive solves all problems.
Plus cameos from half the famous authors of ten years later.
>the big Spanish fever the original show caused
oof.
Hey, suppose we rehash all the atrocity propaganda from the previous war, only this time it turns out to be real?
Just chiming in that while the WWI Germans were nowhere near Nazi-level bad in terms of atrocities, there were absolutely atrocities and the Germans were a primary perpetrator (though of course not alone). For example, the Rape of Belgium was a real thing that happened. Allied propaganda certainly exaggerated portions, but more recent historical appraisals tend to agree that it was serious.
I’d say the Ottomans were the primary perpetrators of atrocities in WWI. But the allies weren’t particularly well-behaved, either, and the fact that the Germans look worse on the whole than the French or Russians probably had more to do with the latter not spending much time occupying large chunks of enemy territority the way the Germans did.
Possibly the best story of WW1 allied atrocity propaganda:
When Antwerp was captured by the Germans, a Cologne newspaper reported (truthfully) that church bells (meaning church bells in Germany) were rung in celebration.
A Paris newspaper, citing this article, claimed that the priests in Antwerp had been forced by the Germans to ring the church bells there (which could be an innocent mistranslation).
A London newspaper, citing the Paris newspaper, said that priests in Belgium who refused to ring church bells to celebrate the capture of Antwerp had been expelled from their churches.
An Italian newspaper, citing the British newspaper, said that the priests had been sentenced to hard labour.
Whereupon the same Paris newspaper, citing the Italian newpaper, said that the priests had been hung head down and used as clappers to ring the bells! Of course, it didn’t mention its own earlier report, merely saying that the Italians had got the news “from Cologne via London”.
EDIT: The original source for this is Arthur Ponsonby’s Falsehood in War-Time, which may not be trustworthy. One would have to go through the archives of the papers concerned (Koelnische Zeitung, Le Matin, Times of London, Corriere de la Sera) to check…
Wikipedia also has this issue. In fact, the rules can make it especially hard to correct things that are fully made up.
For example, someone wrongly wrote on Wikipedia that Sacha Baron Cohen had worked at Goldman Sachs. The Guardian added this to an article. At this point, there is a notable source (WP:NOTE) and the Wiki guidelines say that those are to be believed. Questioning that without another notable source is ‘original research,’ (WP:OR) which is normally not allowed on Wikipedia. However, of course you are generally not going to find an article that denies a made up factoid, unless it is so outrageous that a reporter asks Sacha Baron Cohen about it and finds his answer important enough to publish.
An example of false news becoming reality is that pranksters added the nickname “The Millville Meteor” to the Wiki page of Mike Trout. This was then picked up by articles and baseball reference sites, which then provided notable sources for this claim.
And to think I thought Randall Munroe was joking.
But now it is his nickname, making the false news correct!
Remember how the superpower vs. Afghanistan plot so dominated Cold War after 1979 that once they wrapped it up, they had no idea what to do with the Soviet Union? So they not only tore down the Berlin Wall and Warsaw Pact, but had the Union break up into 15 nation-states?
I feel like everything after the shocking 2001 season premiere where they let Islamic terrorists destroy the Twin Towers is becoming a retread of that. You think they’ll mix it up by having President Bush 2 invade Iraq to prove himself to Daddy, or are we in for another 10 seasons focused on Afghanistan?
There will be an SSC meetup this Saturday, June 30th at 616 E St NW in Washington, DC. We meet from 7pm to midnight in the 2nd floor lounge to talk about the past month’s posts and eat snacks. If you live in the area, consider coming to one!
We have a Google group if you are interested and want updates by email for future monthly meetups.
What are the ideological arguments in favor of gerrymandering?
The fact that it is impossible not to gerrymander.
Any particular set of borders will have some set of attributes at the expense of some other set of attributes. Different groups will care about those attributes to different degrees. Some of those groups will therefore be advantaged.
There is no ‘compromise’ solution; there’s only the choice between drawing the borders at random (which is just gerrymandering for high-variance random elections) or you can draw the borders based on some coherent plan that necessarily favors some groups over others.
I don’t think that’s right.
Firstly, there are lots of electoral systems – proportional representation, top-ups and the like – where seats received are strictly a function of votes received, rather than of their distribution.
Even if you think that not tying seats directly to constituencies, the first definition of “gerrymander” that the internet gives me is “manipulate the boundaries of (an electoral constituency) so as to favour one party or class.” So algorithmic seat-drawing using an algorithm chosen for abstract properties rather than to give a particular preferred outcome in this case – or even just “have a non-partisan committee do it” doesn’t meet that definition.
To answer the original question, the only argument in favour of gerrymandering that I can think of is “they started it” – a country where half the seats are gerrymandered by one party and the other half by the other party will probably have electoral results thatare a less biased estimator of the will the electorate than one which has half its seats gerrymandered by one party and the other half ungerrymandered
Don’t know what you mean by random boundaries gerrymandering for high various random elections?
Also you can have a plan That you make based on other reasons (e.g. keeping whole towns part of the same constituency where possible) and that are ‘natural ‘ in some sense. Then don’t change this natural basis whenever another natural basis would suit you better!
Most people care far more about local politics, e.g. what schools their children go to, than about who their legislative representatives are. If you demand that legislative district borders correspond to city or county borders, then you should get suitably un-gerrymandered districts and probably local pushback from both sides if you try to tinker too much for legislative purposes.
Down side is, you’d then wind compromising the ideal that all districts should have the same population for purposes of equal representation. There’s probably a compromise position there if you require that e.g. each legislative district should consist of contiguous cities or counties with at most one additional simple(*) border for population-balancing purposes, but I’d have to think about it so more.
* Straight line, river, etc.
Is that true? My impression (UK bias) was that people don’t give a shit about local politics but do care about who has a majority in parliament.
People do care a lot about particular local issues, like if a vacant lot is rezoned leading to more traffic, or some rent control policies change, or a noise ordinance changes, or the borders determining to which school their children go change and so on.
Which issues will get media coverage and which of those will arouse passions is complicated; local politics might effect peoples lives, but there’s not as much of an audience for stories about Yourtown, USA as for those with implications for nation or state wide policies, even if some of those don’t really impact your life much.
As far as tax policy goes, people will care about whichever hits them highest, of course states and localities can’t print money.
I think state and local governments in the US have a lot more actual power than local councils in the UK, which makes people care more. State and local government in aggregate control almost as much tax money as the federal government, state governments set and enforce most of the criminal laws that affect day-to-day life, and local governments are responsible for a lot of major services that people tend to care about directly (police and fire protection, local road repair, schools, parks, trash collection, sewers, etc). There are varying degrees of state oversight on the local services, but not a huge amount of federal oversight, and the usual path of escalation if you have a problem with, say, your local school is to complain to the responsible local government body (the school board or the city or county council, depending on the jurisdiction), not to complain to your congressman or your state legislator.
How much attention people pay to local government varies wildly. In general, homeowners tend to care more than renters (partly because homeowners are more attached to a specific area, but also because local governments rely heavily on property taxes, which are mostly invisible to renters), parent tend to care more than childless people (mostly because of schools), and people in major cities tend to care more than people in suburbs/exurbs (major cities have more extensive services, as well as an entire media market dominated by a single government so there’s more press attention).
First, Fallacy of Gray?
Second, I disagree with how you are defining gerrymandering in 2 ways.
1. I think intent needs to be involved. I would not consider random borders gerrymandered, since by definition there is no intent.
2. Borders that favor some group does not necessarily mean they are gerrymandered. A ‘fairer’ map favors the group that was being gerrymandered against, but that doesn’t make all maps gerrymandered.
I often see studies of gerrymandering that say it’s X amount bad by comparing real districts to hypothetical districts drawn with some algorithm that makes them as close to circles (squares?) as possible without having any empty space (or something like that).
Why couldn’t we use those algorithms to create the real districts?
Well, most immediately, the Supreme Court has determined that redistricting that privileges a group in one the highest protected classes (race, gender, religion, or national origin) is illegal. This effectively necessitates packing and cracking to ensure certain communities are represented. Likewise, the general guidelines for redistricting emphasize things like community and representation of groups rather than pure geographical or statistical beauty.
More widely, who writes the algorithms? What do they maximize for? Who decides what they maximize for? Why is maximizing the area of the district what we want?
One of the obvious properties of a decent algorithm is that it should generally return seats in approximate proportion to number of votes, regardless of geographic distribution of voters.
If there are two algorithms that each come close to that, neither has very strong incentives to care which gets used, so hopefully choosing between them shouldn’t be too controversial or partisan.
That is neither uncontroversial or obvious to me. Can you make a case for why that should be?
That isn’t possible. Consider any districting map. Rearrange the geographic distribution of voters so that some districts contain only members of party A, the others 55% party B, 45% part A. Party B will now get a much larger proportion of seats than of votes.
Say we made California into three districts. Pretend it’s also evenly populated.
1. You could make it into three zones on top of each other, called Northern, Central, and Southern. 2. Or you could make three stripes down the length, called Western, Middle, and Eastern.
The first model gives you zones that are less stretched out and minimize the diameter of any zone. But what if there is an issue important to people on the coast? Spread onto Northern, Central, and Southern, the coastal people don’t have a majority everywhere and can’t speak up. Spread into stripes, they can.
(Or maybe we don’t want the coasters to have their own district, because they’d cut off coast access or something.)
Right there we have a choice to make, a value judgment, and one way isn’t clearly better than the other.
I would certainly be in favor of reducing the craziness of district shapes. Like, districts must go along existing city and/or country borders. But there may be good reasons I don’t know about that make that a dumb idea.
Some example algorithms:
“I cut you pick.” This (and the variants for > 2 parties) works great for assigning portions of a cookie/pie/etc among kids. Make the oldest cut, and have them pick among the cut pieces in reverse birth order.
@John Schelling is very close to what Colorado already does…
The upshot of that “communities of interest” provision is that party insiders in both parties spend some amount of time years prior to redistricting recruiting volunteers to show up at hearings and describe particular transit corridors or floodplains (say, highway 36 from Denver to Boulder, or the various counties all fed by the Poudre river, or what-have-you) as “communities of interest” that must be preserved. Is the “community of interest” that ultimately carries the day in that debate better than the one that loses? Ask five locals and you’ll get five answers.
Historically CO’s redistricting commission (3 Dems, 3 Reps, and one “nonpartisan” appointee) has been unable to choose between Dem-submitted and Rep-submitted maps in a way that didn’t lead to litigation, eventually resolved by the CO Supreme Court… but generally the court has maps that look very similar, so even if it just flipped a coin, the above rules *mostly* determined what map would be chosen.
“I cut you pick.”
How does this work for district cutting? If I cut the map into two slices where my party has a 55-45 advantage in each, what’s left for you to choose?
I have a different possible approach to the problem. A proposal for redistricting must take the form of an algorithm implemented in a specific programming language, using a specified set of inputs not including how people voted in previous elections, and there is a limit to how long the program can be. Make the limit reasonably tight and the people designing the algorithm won’t have enough freedom to do an effective job of gerrymandering.
@Edward Scizorhands
“I cut you pick”… there are lots of ways to use this. One specifically and readily google-able, and quite specific way: link.
Another solution would be to use a two-step process to fill in the blanks in a sentence of the form “the ideal district map will aim to maximize the number of districts that favor party __ over party __ by __%.” First one party fills in the % number. Then the other party can choose which party goes in each of the first two blanks. Then have some bureaucrat draw compact districts that achieve those numbers about as perfectly as is possible with compact districts.
For an example of this, if it were the Democrats’ turn, they might say “the ideal district map will aim to maximize the number of districts that favor party __ over party __ by 55%.” The Republicans could then choose either to draw the highest possible number of R+10 districts, (meaning there will be a small number of extremely safe D seats) or the Rs could then choose to draw the highest possible number of D+10 districts.
More generally, the “I cut you pick” idea is to avoid the need to even define “gerrymander” or “not gerrymandered” by letting one person write a definition of their choice (“cut”) with the knowledge that the definition will be applied against the one party by the second party.
@David Friedman
I don’t really think it adds much to say “program” instead of saying “law.” For purposes of drawing districts, we need principled reasons for doing it one way instead of another, and once the principles are settled, drawing the maps is just working out the details. I mean, we could either have a judge who orders all county clerks to consult a map generated by a computer program that applies the relevant principles, or we could have a judge who personally draws the map by conducting all the computations a program would compute in applying those principles… same map either way. The thing we need is the principles.
I block quoted the CO rules because I think they are pretty good ones–compact districts along County Lines, precincts that aren’t split up among multiple districts, communities of interest as a tie-breaker. Would you suggest some other principles for your program/law for drawing districts?
@DavidFriedman
Von Neumann famously said, “with four parameters I can fit an elephant, and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk.” (In the news recently is a formula to draw an elephant with only one parameter, but the one parameter is a real number with vast precision, so this criticism doesn’t apply to your proposal which limits the number of parameter bits). But the basic idea is right: a surprisingly small amount of freedom is sufficient to enable shenanigans.
Your comment is 442 bytes long.
Here is a video produced by a 256 byte program. Here is another.
You are right that “length of shortest computer program” (Kolmogorov complexity) is a good measure of “complexity”. (I’ll also assume that a refined version of this proposal would put some kind of limit on the time and space usage of the program) But the lengths that correspond to the level of complexity you must restrict to prevent gerrymandering aren’t “reasonably short”, they are incredibly short. This produces a bunch of practical problems which I think are insurmountable:
1. The choice of programming language, form of inputs, etc only affects the length of a program by a constant, so asymptotically we can talk about “the” complexity of a program. But for extremely short programs, these effects matter. If you limit redistricting programs to be, say, ten bytes long (which might still be too long to prevent drawing a gerrymander!) you are probably just giving the power (and shifting the problem) to whoever specifies the details of language and inputs.
2. Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable. There is no systematic way to find short programs to do something. It’s a subject of creativity, with both steady progress and breakthroughs possible. So if you write a length limit into your constitution based on a guess or theory of how short a program should be required, you may not be able to get any working redistricting program at all. And if you set the limit based on the best sane redistricting program you can write, over time people will manage to squeeze whole universes of complexity into that length.
Concerning US gerrymandering problems and computational approaches, I liked the general gist of the idea proposed in this Arxiv preprint I spotted Moloch-knows-where: arxiv.org/abs/1704.0336. It does not provide a method for drawing the districts (okay, it does if you like “reasonable” random redistricting) but a cool analysis nevertheless.
The obvious issue with the particular methodology of that particular paper (or any particular chosen methodology) is that the question “what exactly constitutes a ‘reasonable’ redistricting and which definition we should use to construct our sampler” is still going to be political one; if one picks a definition that disfavors one party over another, the losing side will find a way to argue anyway that the chosen method is not truly bipartisan. However, the hope is that all the truly reasonable definitions for “geographically compact district” or “avoid splltting counties” would yield similar results if the underlying concepts are meaningful in any way.
Here is a simple proposal for redistricting. A submitted map for (say) state representative districts must be such that, if the distribution of votes were the same as it was in the most recent such election, the number of candidates elected from each party would be proportional to the number of votes for that party, within some small range of variation.
That attacks gerrymandering directly.
If a state has enough districts so that, say, the Libertarians are entitled to one, the map you’d have to draw to make it happen will look a lot more gerrymandered than any actual gerrymandered map.
@David Friedman
I like the elegance of “such that, if the distribution of votes were the same as it was in the most recent such election, the number of candidates elected from each party would be proportional to the number of votes for that party, within some small range of variation.”
But on reflection I think this is functionally identical to “the districts shall never change, or anyway, not much.” To the extent gerrymandering is already a problem, this will tend to lock it in place. Also, when a state does change dramatically, this will not work to guide map-makers for drawing a new map–there will be many wildly different maps where the best guess for the outcome under the new map is about the same partisan outcome as the old map, but they will not all be equal for purposes of power politics, so partisan games will ensue.
[What I mean is, whether the “the number of candidates elected from each party” is defined as the median, the mode, or the mean of your monte carlo simulation, or whatever you are using to estimate partisan performance, there will be many wildly different maps that return the same estimate. This remains true even if rule 1 and 2 are included, unless rule 2 is extremely demanding.]
I think a good system (unless it uses an “I cut you pick” trick to avoid needing to define ‘fairness’) needs at least three rules, and usually has four:
1) an equal or roughly equal number of voters per district,
2) some mathematical basis for optimizing for compactness of districts (e.g. ban concave districts or require the minimum total sum of all districts’ perimeters) OR some default configuration (e.g. county lines or natural barriers or perfect square shapes)
3) some third basis for grouping voters (communities of interest, maximizing competitiveness–aiming for exactly the same outcome as last time would go here, maximizing majority-minority districts also would go here).
4) some fourth basis to serve as a tie-breaker if needed (all the same things as 3).
@nimin.k.m.
Hadn’t seen that specific study. Fits with the others I’d seen! Also seems to agree with my sense that Colorado is doing this one right… so naturally I’d like it. 🙂
@Paul Z
Playing with one word from your comment…
True enough! But I think it shows something different than what you maybe meant it to show. What does it mean to say any of these groups is “entitled to” a district of their own?
I don’t think there’s actually any good principled reason to use existing political teams for drawing political district lines. (That goes for Dems and Rs as well as Libertarians and Greens and NRA voters and what-have-you.) I’m sympathetic to “maximize the number of competitive districts” and I can speculate about some positive possible motives for “maximize the number of majority-minority districts” but ultimately I think the best districts are *governance* districts–draw the district around the problem, not around the people who all already agree about the solution. So use counties (or some other already-existing governance district), and where you can’t use counties, use geographic boundaries like rivers, or big transit corridors like highways, or places that all have the same multi-county sewer line or all are served by the same water supply… or what-have you.
That we cannot complete the work to be done does not mean we ought to abandon the work we can do.
Edited to add: forgot to mention. @nimin.k.m. your link is broken, points wrong place. correct link is: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03360.
No it won’t. The criterion isn’t that the same distribution produces the same number of winners as it did in the previous election. It’s that it produces a number of winners for each party proportional to the overall number of votes for that party.
Mandating a focus on distributing winners isn’t so much attacking gerrymandering as it is baking it into the foundations
@David Friedman
Oh, I see. Interesting, and very much not within the usual suggested solutions for gerrymandering. Very direct. I think I still see some problems.
1. Because ballots are private, the only data available to make this determination (to my knowledge) are county-level vote totals. Using only the knowledge of who voted last time, and what the overall county totals were, it’s not easy to draw any different map without making it a question of broad speculation how that will affect partisan performance in the new district. Once broad speculation is involved, how do you avoid a battle-of-experts and a prolonged court battle (if a court is involved)? I envision one side just coincidentally drawing new maps that are “expected” to result in proportional results, but, uh, by strange coincidence, never quite do? (Colorado’s system has longish legal battles too, so I guess by the time you’ve got actual court battles, that’s a step up from the states right now that gerrymander aggressively and never have to explain themselves.)
2. Punishing individual enemies.
A further problem is that map-drawing can be used to punish individual legislators, or whole sets of them, personally, mainly because you can re-draw maps to exclude an elected’s address from the district they want to run in. Say next year NY does some snap redistricting (I know nothing about redistricting in NY, and assume this is unlikely and would be extra-legal) and re-draws Crowley’s old district to exclude Ms. Ocasio-Cortes’s voting address, or even her whole precinct, but otherwise keeps the district the same. She’ll have to move to stand for election in the district. For candidates with national profiles and plausible shots at Congressional salaries, maybe moving is financially justifiable to keep one’s office… for state legislators, in most states, not so much.
Something aimed at Ms. Ocasio-Cortes so blatantly would probably create a public outcry. But for a more under-the-radar thing, one could just do everything possible to ensure one’s own party’s incumbents get to run from mostly un-altered districts (yay incumbency advantage) while pushing several of the other party’s incumbents to choose between 33% of their district over here, 33% of their district over there, and 33% thataway–and all of them have to jostle/finagle a way to avoid primarying each other.
Variations on this kind of problem are pretty endless, so the best thing is to mix having a nonpartisan arbiter for the final map, and some sufficiently constraining standard for that arbiter to use other than partisan performance that the arbiter can quickly narrow down to something like the idealized “most fair” map (at least by that standard). A standard like “let’s pick maps that match our other governance boundaries, especially counties” works really well for this, I think.
@Yodelyak:
I was assuming that precinct level vote totals were normally available. Was I mistaken?
I don’t see how. The point of gerrymandering is to give one party more representatives than their share of the vote. Are you misreading my proposal as evaluating the proposed map on the basis of the outcome of the previous election?
@Edward Scizorhands
“I cut you pick”… there are lots of ways to use this. One specifically and readily google-able, and quite specific way: link.
thank you, I’ll need to consider this.
@David Friedman
In six cycles I’ve never encountered a campaign that precinct-by-precinct breakdown of which candidates got how many votes, so I’m pretty sure it isn’t made available.* I have worked in a mid-level or leadership role on party-supported campaigns in four states. What I’ve always seen is data that tell me exactly who voted in each precinct, in every election, along with their party affiliation. E.g., if I had access to either major party’s relevant databases, I expect I could look up and find out exactly which elections you have voted in, and what party if any you were registered to at the time. I can’t, however, find out what the precise precinct-level results were for any candidate you might have supported.
As a side note, I have had to bite my tongue a couple times when a campaign field director explained a strategic decision prioritizing GOTV in one precinct over others because the precinct has lots of regular voters registered to the party of the campaign’s candidate. Who cares about the absolute number of voters registered to your party? In particular, if they’re all the kind of voter who always votes, or who never votes, or who lives at the end of a long driveway behind a locked gate where you can’t get to them to remind them to vote anyway–then there’s no reason to prioritize that precinct, as opposed to prioritizing a precinct with a smaller absolute number of your party’s voters, but a higher likelihood for each of your voters that reminder to remember to vote will make the difference between them voting or not, and where you’ll get a good bang-for-your-buck in terms of how many reminders you can deliver with an hour of trying. Sometimes it’s not worth making waves–whatever the field director thinks makes sense, is better than arguing about it and doing what they wanted anyway.
*This sentence edited for redundancy.
Maybe some combination of “the wrong is political, so the remedy should be political” and “the alternatives have problems of their own”. I don’t think either argument, or both arguments together, has decisive weight, but they do at least have some.
Most of the time it seems to just be ‘the end justifies the means’ plus ‘the other guys do it too!’
That the outgroup is such an existential threat if they get any power, that they must be neutralized. They’re the loud minority to our silent majority, anyways.
It’s effectively impossible to not gerrymander in a territorial voting system. Notably, most anti-gerrymandering proponents suggest something that effectively moves the system towards proportional representation.
A territorial voting system has all kinds of coherent ideological arguments. Communities often have common interests that are not effectively represented in raw election numbers. Territorial systems discourage separatism. The tyranny of the majority. The United States was founded with an explicit agreement to protect smaller communities and we should not renege on that agreement now. Etc.
Note, these are not explicitly conservative arguments or just to the benefit of conservatives. The Democrats often take advantage of territorial systems to ensure minorities, for example, get a representative whose mandated to explicitly represent a minority community’s interests. This does not happen in proportional systems, with a few small exceptions.
@Erusian
You have it exactly backwards. Regional, winner take all systems benefit highly concentrated groups, at the expense of groups that are minorities in most polity-sized regions, like black people.
Gerrymandering to give black people a representative that reflects black interests or black culture is an admission that the relevant interests are in large part not actually local, where people have the same interests as their neighbor, regardless of race or such. It’s really an attempt to make a regional system more like a proportional system.
In a proportional system, groups that are (large enough) minorities in many regions are way better off compared to a non-rigged regional system.
The figures for the US congress bear this out. Blacks are 10.5% of the (rigged) House of Representatives, while only 3% of the (non-rigged) Senate.
Regional, winner take all systems do benefit highly concentrated groups at the expense of populous but dispersed groups. Minorities are often more concentrated than majorities, though. At least for a given meaning of concentrated. One problem the Democrats have is that a number of distant but highly concentrated communities are collectively a dispersed group.
It is no such thing. Black representatives represent specific (often) black communities, not just black people in general. Those communities sometimes have common interests based on their shared race. They sometimes do not. In a proportional system, they would be forced to instead vote for representatives for black people collectively. This would mean they are there not to represent the interests of a minority community but of the minority itself.
Proportional systems benefit people who are more dispersed, yes. A lot of the work in this argument seems to rely on the idea that minorities are more dispersed than majorities. In fact, they tend to concentrate into ethnic neighborhoods.
This only proves that there are no black majority states but that there are black majority communities within those states. Which is true.
The Voting Rights Act resulted a requirement (recently struck down) to make majority-minority districts in order to prevent dilution of minority power. In general it required that minority power be maximized.
I think this was a terrible idea, and the argument that minority power should be maximized equally terrible, but it is an argument.
In practice, the Voting Rights Act worked to ensure that Southern states had about one very solidly Democratic congressional seat, usually held by a person of color, and often held by someone somewhat to the fringe of the party’s national base and national leadership (with predictable results for the relative power of those representatives in Congress).
I used to argue in defense of the act by saying the point was not to maximize minority power but to guard against total minority disenfranchisement via gerrymandering. That is, the idea was to prevent the South from being maximally dickish. I no longer think the odds of states being maximally dickish on purely racial lines are that high–they are much more likely to be maximally dickish on purely partisan lines, with race just being the best avenue they have for achieving that.
I think a much better approach would have been to just require districts to be drawn on the basis of some better principle(s) than “what’s best for my party”.
I’m no longer really sure what I think about the Voting Rights Act. I have some sympathy to the idea that the Roberts court just threw away their umbrella because they weren’t getting wet… hard to say if the rain stopped, or the umbrella was working.
I’m not sure this provides an answer to your question, but you might be interested in the Māori electorates in the New Zealand general election. To compress a large amount of history into a very brief description, as a result of negotiations there were seats created in the New Zealand parliament for which only the native Māori people of New Zealand were eligible to vote. This was at a time when candidates were selected by strict electorate-by-electorate first past the post. This effectively results in a kind of gerrymandering, deliberately selected to ensure Māori representation in parliament. The parliamentary system in New Zealand is now a mixed member proportional one, which muddies the waters somewhat and has led to calls for the seats to be disestablished, but they remain currently.
This is actually very nearly what the voting rights act achieved. The states that were covered by the act (prior to it being gutted by recent Supreme Court holding) were forced to set aside ~one district to be majority-minority. The rest they could mostly jigsaw as they saw fit.
You can bet that representatives of color from VRA-created districts had to work a little harder to be taken seriously, since their colleagues could write them off as affirmative action hires, and since they often had to cater to districts that were somewhat outside the mainstream.
Oddly, IIRC India has similar seats for Anglo-Indians (that is, ethnically English citizens of India). The rationale is that other ethnic groups in India are concentrated in specific geographical areas (which ensures representation, as India’s lower house is elected under a system of first past the post in single-member geographical constituencies), while Anglo-Indians are not.
Currently, the two Anglo-Indian members of Parliament are nominated by the President rather than being elected.
India also reserves seats in its Parliament for members of “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes”, but does this by stating that certain constituencies can only be represented by such people- though everyone in that constituency is allowed to vote.
Two comments boxes?
Hey, it appears I’m unbanned again!
Welcome back!
You might know a Chesterton quote I remember vaguely. I think he said something to the effect that the common people aren’t moved by reasonable considerations– it’s all symbolism and breaking points.
Thank you and yes, I have a vague idea of what you mean but I can’t pin down the exact quote. I’ll have to do some searching and see if I can shake loose the exact memory other than “I have a notion I read something like that somewhere”.
There are always two comment boxes – one above the comments, one below. People always get surprised about this when they’re the first commenter on a thread, because it’s the only time they see both of them at once.
Weirdly, the normal buttons don’t appear when you do this. If I’m the first post, I have to go back and edit in the links.
But yes, the first poster sees two comment boxes.
Two comments boxes are displayed only when the algorithm predicts that you will leave one of them unused.
The answer for that paradox would be to always take the 1 box regardless of the trust you have in the computer.
You might lose $1000, but that’s not much of a price to possibly destroy the trust of an all-mighty predictor.
One box for each “the”.